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UsaffShi'isrn and State Approaches to Islamic Unity: The Ecumenical 
Movement in Post-Safavid Iran 
By Fahaad I M. M. Alenezi 
Since the upheaval of 1979, the Iranian Islamic Revolution has grasped the interest 
of scholars and spurred the writing of numerous academic works which have 
investigated all aspects of this event. However, these previous studies have entirely 
disregarded the relationship between the establishment of the UsOff School of 
Twelver Shi'ism which corresponded to the rise of the Safavids at the beginning of 
the 16th century and the frequent endeavors to revive the principle of the Islamic 
ummcYs unity in modern and contemporary history, involving six calls for Islamic 
unity from Iran in the post-Safavid era, with four of those calls officially initiated by 
the state. The significance of this subject matter is that its investigation would shed 
light on different dark corners not only of modern Iranian history but also the radical 
developments in the political dogma of Twelver Shi'ism which transformed the 
Shi'ites from total political absence of intizirto the revolutionary activism of wiliyat 
al-Faqffi. 
This research, hence, aims at exploring the Iranian calls for Islamic unity within a 
framework of the U50/iSchool of Shi'ism developed as part of the modern Iranian 
history, as the stronghold of Twelver Shi'ism since the rise of Safavids. Accordingly, 
various stages of such theological and political attempts to promote calls for Islamic 
unity, as well as the motivations for such attempts with their historical implications 
and conceptual frameworks are critically discussed and thoroughly analysed. 
In designing the research, the case study method was utilised to individually 
approach the four initiatives officially promoted by the state for Islamic unity 
throughout the modern history of Iran, prior to relying heavily on historical analysis 
to establish the connections between these attempts while extrapolating the 
developments in the political attitudes of u., 50/iShi'ism. 
After conducting a critical analysis, this research argues that the Islamic unity 
movement in post- Safavid Iran passed through two different stages: in the first, it 
was utilised by the Iranian u. ýOff ulami as a policy to absorb the catastrophic 
outcome of the fall of the Safavid state and was activated as a pragmatic policy 
befitting the new regimefs quest for legitimacy. Its ultimate aim was to preserve the 
accomplishments it had achieved during the Safavid era: its influential role in state 
affairs as the single means to secure the tý50fficlentity of Twelver Shi'ism in Iran. 
However,, the movement in the second stage became a natural outcome in addition 
to the sustained political dimensions that had initially aimed to turn away from the 
isolation of intizir by politicizing Twelver Shiism, eventually leading to genuine 
conceptual reforms to the long lasting traditional doctrines, which can also be found 
in the post-revolution policies in Iran. 
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Note on Transliteration 
In this work, I adopt the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studie5trans I iteration 
systems for Arabic and Persian with few alterations. The tj " marbota in Persian words 
is written as "'at" (i. e risilao while in Arabic it is inscribed as "a" (i. e. risila), and the 
Persian Ojfa after the ta-yi marb5ýta will be shown as '%-yirr or ""-i" according to the 
context. Also, the Arabic article 'Nal" is being used for both the qaman and shamsi 
forms in which the tash&d (double) required for "alshamsiyya" is disregarded (i. e. al- 
Shi"a instead of ash-SW'a). Furthermore, all words referring to Islamic or Arabic 
concepts, names and official titles that do not have commonly accepted English forms 
will be translated according to their Arabic forms. 
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The Unity of the Islamic nation is one of the sacred principles that Islam has 
called for since its outset. The belief in this principle does basically comply with 
God's commands in which He has asserted the unity and brotherhood of all 
Muslims and demanded that they preserve this unity in numerous locations in the 
holy Qur"in. For example, verse 92 in chapter 21 of al-Anbiyj (sing. Nabiyy 
means Prophets) places the recognition of unity of the umma as equivalent to 
the recognition of God: ""Verily, this brotherhood of yours [your umma] is a single 
brotherhood, and I am your Lord and Cherisher: therefore serve Me (and no 
other). "' Likewise, verse 52 in chapter 23 of Believers affirmed the significance 
of the unity of the umma to the extent that preserving such a unity is a sign of 
complying with God's command and showing a fear of the Almighty: ""And verily 
this Brotherhood of yours [your umma] is a single Brotherhood [umma], and I 
am your Lord and Cherisher: therefore fear Me (and no other). f12 Furthermore, 
God demands the preservation of the unity of Muslims in chapter 49 of 
Champers: ""The Believers are but a single Brotherhood, so make peace and 
reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye 
may receive Mercy. ,3 
The unity of the Islamic nation appears to be among the major issues to which 
the Qur'jnic discourse gives more attention and in which the Almighty does not 
only guide Muslims towards matters that would strengthen their unity but also 
1 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Qur'jn: translation and commentary (Birmingham: Islamic Propagation Center International, 
1946), 21: 92. 
2 The Qur'jn, 23: 52. 
3 The Qur'jn, 49: 10. 
forbids them other matters that could lead to their division. In other words, God 
clearly set the rules that preserve the unity of Muslims. One of the rules is that 
obedience to the teaching of God and his Prophet and the bearing of hardship 
during its implementation will spare Muslims from the risk of dispersal: "'And 
obey Allah and His Messenger, and fall into no disputes, lest ye lose heart and 
your power depart; and be patient and persevering. For Allah is with those who 
patiently persevere. "4 Also, Muslims' cooperation with each other in good deeds 
would preserve them from God's resentment since it expresses their true fear of 
Him: God states, "'Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye 
not one another in sin and rancor. Fear God, for God is strict in punishment. "5 
Furthermore, favor the Qur"in that represents an escape-line stretched from 
Heaven to Earth as mentioned in ýadith al-Thaqalayn (tradition of the two heavy 
weights) for it gathers the whole teaching of God and His messenger: 
And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for 
you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with 
gratitude Allah's favor on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your 
hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on 
the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah 
make His Signs clear to you: that ye may be guided. 6 
In fact, the Prophet of Islam had touched on this issue in his traditions on 
several occasions. On one such occasion he states: 
Do not you 0 Muslims, be jealous of each other, do not increase the 
price of your goods to cheat other people, do not hate each other, do not 
bear enmity against each other, and do not try to unreasonably excel one 
another. And be the slaves of Allah who are brothers to each other. A 
Muslim is a brother to every Muslim. So do not commit injustice to your 
4 The Qur'jn, 8: 46. 
5 The Qur'jn, 5: 2. 
6 The Qur'jn, 3: 103. 
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brother, and do not deny him any help. Do not belittle him. Taqwj is in 
here (the Prophet pointed to his chest three times). It is sufficient evil 
for a Muslim to harm his own brother in Islam. A Muslim's blood, 
properties, and honor are inviolable to another MUSliM. 7 
In another ýadl-th, the Prophet says 
The Parable of the believers who love each other, are merciful and 
compassionate, they are like a body, if an organ becomes ill, the other 
organs feel the illness too. 
8 
Also, the Prophet had clearly explained the concept of the Islamic Brotherhood 
and illustrated the duties of a Muslim towards his other Muslim brothers: 
A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim - he does not wrong nor does 
he forsake him when he is in need; whosoever fulfills the needs of his 
brother, Allah will fulfill his needs; whosoever spares a believer from a 
distress, Allah will spare him from one of the distresses of the Day of 
Resurrection; and whosoever, conceals a fault of a Muslim, Allah will 
conceal his faults on the Day of Resurrection. 9 
In spite of the sanctity of unity of the umma for all Muslims regardless of their 
sectarian belief, this sanctity failed to protect this unity, which began to 
disintegrate politically following the fall of the Umayyad State in the first third of 
the second century thanks to the actions of most of the Islamic sects. With the 
rising of the Abbasids in the East, for instance, the Sunni Umayyads established 
their second state in Andalusia in the western side of the Islamic world. From 
then onwards the Islamic world experienced a new stage in its history when the 
7,5ahlý Musl1m, pad1th no. 6707. 
8 $3ý/? 7 Muslim, Padl-th no. 6751. 
9 WO al-Bukhjri, Norlth no. 2482. 
Khjrýfis established two secta ria n -oriented states in North Africa: al-Midrariyya 
state was established by Miclrýr ibn al-Yasa' in Sijilmýisa in 140 A. H. and 
followed the $ifCi Khýirijfi doctrine and al-Rustomiyya state founded by Abd al- 
ROm5n ibn Rusturn in Týhart in 156 A. H. which was based on the Ibipl- 
doctrine. Then, it was the turn of the Shi'ites to become involved in the 
sectarian race to fragment the unity of the umma when the ZayydiShi, ites' state 
was first instituted by Idr-is ibn Abdullah in Wal-11i in 789/172 before it was moved 
to the newly-established capital city of Fez; then the Fatimids created their own 
state in North Africa and proclaimed the Ism514 doctrine of Islam as the state 
religion in 910/297; and the other Zayydi state of $al-0yya that was founded in 
the city of Jibla by the $51iýi family in 1047/438. 
Remarkably, two aspects came to the fore in this sectarian chaos that had swept 
through the unity of the umma in the medieval Islamic period. Firstly, Twelver 
Shi'ism had maintained the quietness and passiveness and entirely isolated itself 
from the de facto state during the time of the Imams and lasted until after the 
ghayba (occultation of the twelfth Imam). For that reason, ShV-1 dynasties such 
as the Buwayhids and Oamaclýinis preserved loyalty to the Sunni Abbasid 
caliphate. 10 During that time the Akhbirf School" of jurisprudence dominated 
Twelver Shiism in which the role of the ulamiwas merely to act as narrators to 
the traditions of the Prophets and the Imams with no desire to become involved 
directly or indirectly in politics or state affairs. Secondly, a survey of the same 
10 Hamid Algar, Religion and 5tate in Iran 1785-1906. - the Role of the Ulama in the Qqjar Period (University of California: 
Berkeley, 1969), 4. 
11 The Akht; jriSchool of Jurisprudence was the methodologically orthodox Twelver Shi'ism that relied on the Qur'an, 
the Prophet's ýadl-U7, and the Imams' traditions as the only means for extracting the ^jm of Shari'a (ordinances); the 
AkhWIf School represented the conservative orientation that preserved the inclination towards intizir during the ghayba 
(occultation). After the rise of the Safavids, the akht; jri ulami had entered the bitter jurisprudential debate with the 
newly established Usj//-School (reformist) that had lasted for three centuries before it was resolved in favor of the iatýer; 
see Ahmad al-K6tib, Tarawwur al-Fikr al-Siyisi al-Shii min al-5h0ný Aj Wiliyat al-Faqlh (Dar al-Shbrý val-1'15m: 
London, 1997), 389-96; also, David Morgan, Medleval Persia 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1988), 158-61. 
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period reveals no serious approach had been conducted to alleviate the sectarian 
contentions that were frequently arising between the ordinary Sunni and Sh! (I 
followers. 
It was not until 1500 AD that the founder of the newly established state, Shah 
Ismý'Til I, proclaimed Twelver Shiism as the official state religion. Thus Twelver 
Shi'ism could be said to have taken its share for the first time in destroying the 
unity of the Islamic nation. The Safavid state set up a political alliance with the 
newly established u. 5ý01i school of Twelver Shi'ism in which the ulami, unlike 
their counterpart akhbiris, legalized the reliance on the 'aql (reason) in 
reviewing the traditions of the Imams in order to compose independent legal 
opinion, &Nhict, the u. ýOff ulami, with the claim of being the representatives of 
the Hidden Imam, authorized the temporal rulers of the Safavid dynasty with 
unprecedented political legitimacy, to rule the Sh-i'-i community on their behalf 
during the occultation of the Hidden Imam, while the state in its turn imposed 
the u., r)O/iversion of Shi (ism in Iran and granted the ulami of this school the right 
to religiously lead the community and politically participate in the state's affairs. 12 
Although it appears that the exceptional legitimacy of the alliance between the 
ShV-i ulami and the Safavid state was partially based on their claim of 
clescendency from the 7 th Imam, Musa al-K54im, and the establishment of 
Twelver Shi'ism as the official religion of the state meant that the ulama of the 
u, r, Off Twelver Shi'ism benefitted from unprecedented influence not only in 
religion but also the state's affairs; it does indeed represent a momentous 
shifting paradigm in the traditional attitude of passivity and quietness of Twelver 
12 Rainer Brunner, I51amic Ecumenism in the 20th century. the Azhar and Shiism between Rapprochernent and Restraint, 
trans. Joseph Greenman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 28; also, David Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 
1988), 158-61. 
Shi'ism towards "earthly" government that had characterized the relations of the 
Imams with the existing authorities since the tragic massacre of Karbala in 61 
H. C., when Imam Ousayn along with several members of AN al-Bayt were 
martyred by Yaz-ld's army. This attitude had lasted after al-Ghayba al-Kubra 
(greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam, Mohammad ibn al-ýasan in 326 H. C. ) 
during which the akhbiri teachings prevailed over the followers of Twelver 
Shi'ism. 
1.2. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Iranian history had attracted the interest of scholars since the nationalisation of 
the Iranian oil industry in 1953 by the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Muýadaq, 
and this interest greatly increased after the success of the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. Since then, a great deal of research has been conducted dealing with 
modern Iranian history from various angles; however, none of it does 
comprehensively approach the endeavours of the Iranian state to revive the 
unity of the Islamic umma in the context of the modern and contemporary 
history of Iran. This is a matter that must provide adequate answers for 
unresolved queries regarding the change that has taken place in modern Shi, ism 
and its attitude to the state and Sunni Islam, which will portray a clearer picture 
and better understanding of several historic events as well as contemporary 
incidents. 
Significantly, the official Iranian approaches to the issue of Islamic unity and its 
impact on the political activities and developments of Twelver Shi'ism in the 
post-Safavid period has been totally neglected despite hints of such an issue in 
several studies; for that reason, the absence of a substantive literature review in 
this study for the issue matter might be justified on one hand, and emphasis the 
value of this approach as unprecedented attempt on the other hand. In other 
6 
words, the present study aims be a genuine contribution to the field and could 
divert the attention of scholars to the significance of this issue and stimulate 
them to conduct further research. Indeed, the previous studies could be placed 
in two major categories: the first contains studies that approached modern 
Iranian history in general, while the second includes research dealing with the 
efforts at Islamic unity in particular. Predominantly, the research in the field of 
modern Iranian history falls into the first category and pays no attention to the 
issue concerning the present study - although a few of them do obliquely point 
to the significance of such a subject. For example, Hamid Algar, in his valuable 
work Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: the Role of the Ulama in the Qajar 
Period, noticed the problems that Twelver Shi'ism has been facing since the fall 
of the Safavid state in which Twelver Shi'ism is supposed to retain the quietness 
and passiveness as a minority that was dominant before the rise of the Safavids 
and is continuing to the present time -a matter that was incompatible with the 
emerging desire to maintain the gains obtained by the Shi'ites under the Safavid 
state when Iran became the stronghold and homeland for ust7liTwelver Shi'ism, 
and the ulami acquired a political role and heavy involvement in the state's 
affairs. However, Algar did not make an effort to explore how the Shi'ites could 
get out of this dilemma. And what were the means that they adopted to 
circumvent this problem? Hamid Algar states: 
Yet one essential element of pre-Safavid Shi'ism survived to be passed 
on, after temporary obscurity, to the Q5j5r Period and beyond: the 
necessary and inescapable illegitimacy of the state. One might maintain 
that a Shi'i state itself is a contradiction in terms, since the essence of 
Shi'ism demands a minority status for its adherents, who are in 
opposition, often quiescent, but unyielding, to de facto authority. The 
real triumph of Shi'ism is possible only through the return and 
7 
manifestation of the hidden Imam, when legitimacy will return to the 
world and be fulfilled. 13 
Additionally, David Morgan recognised the significance of the 18 th century as the 
period of potential developments in Iranian Shi'ism although this requires 
additional investigations as he failed to notice the recurrent calls for Islamic unity 
in the middle and at the end of this century as one of the major significant 
changes in attitude of modern Shi'ism. He illustrates this point as follows: 
Thus it was that the eighteenth century, a period whose political history 
was for the most part dismal and anarchic even by the exacting standard 
of the Persian past, was in other respects of great creative significance. 
The permanent importance of the changes within Shi'ism which took 
place hardly needs further emphasis. Knowledge of what happened in 
the eighteenth century, as well as in the earlier centuries of Islamic 
Persia, is an essential prerequisite for anyone who wishes to understand 
the evolution of Persia during our own day. " 
Even the prominent Sh-I'll scholar, Shaykh Mohammad Jawad Mughniyya, who 
dealt with the development of Sh-i (i political thought in his work al-Shl-"a F/ al- 
mizin, believes that Shi'ism has passed through three phases. The first phase 
was propagation Shi(ism (23-132), which started from the death of the Prophet 
and lasted until the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. The second phase was the 
crystallization of Sh-I'll jurisprudence, which lasted throughout the lifetime of 
Imam Ja(far al-$Micl. The third one is the stage of defending Shi (ism, which 
began at the time of Shaykh al-Muf[d and his student al-Shar-if al-MurtaOý and 
13 Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906. - the Role of the Ulama in the QýIar Penbd (University of California: 
Berkeley, 1969), 5. 
14 David Morgan, Medieva/P&sia 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1988), 160. 
S 
15 lasted until the time of Shaykh al-Hill-i. However, Shaykh Mughniyya totally 
disregarded the relationship between repeated calls for Islamic unity and Twelver 
Shi'ism that has become a phenomenon in the post-Safavid period and which 
chronologically and historically corresponds with Mughniyya's categorization and 
could be considered as the fourth stage in the development of Shi'ism, covering 
the era from the fall of the Safavids until the present time. 
The studies in the second category dealt directly with the Iranian involvement in 
Islamic unity. In addition to being very few in number, they are not very 
comprehensive approaches, merely considering one case of those calls and failed 
to highlight the significant motivations that have frequently provoked such 
attempts. For example, Ernest Tucker dedicated his valuable work, NjdirShahýý 
Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safa vid Iran, 16 to Nadir Shah's efforts to incorporate 
Shi'ism into the Islamic umma as the fifth Islamic School of Jurisprudence and 
with which the Shah was attempting to legitimise his newly established 
sovereignty. Wilfried Buchta too has contributed to the category in writing a 
chapter about the Iranian endeavors of Islamic rapprochement in the post- 
Khomeini era. 17 Unlike the preceding studies, Rainer Brunner conducted deep 
investigations into the issue of Islamic rapprochement in the 20th century in his 
historiographical work, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: the Azhar and 
Shiism between Rapprochement and Restraint, 18 however, he focussed on the 
Sunni contributions to the subject matter, mainly the efforts of al-Azhar, as is 
clearly reflected in the title. He highlighted the part taken by some Shi'i 
15 For more information see Mohammad Jaw5d al-Mughniyya, al-5hi'a 17al-Mizin (Beirut: Nr al-Jaw6d li al-Tib5'a via 
al-Nashir wa at-TawzV, 1989), 96-114. 
16 Ernest Tucker, NJ&r 5hahý; Quest for Legitimacy in Pbst-5a/avid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006). 
17 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' A]-Taqni-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., The Twelver 5hia in Modern TImes., Religious Culture and Po/tc, 31 
Histiory(Boston: Brill, 2001). 
18 Rainer Brunner, Islamic ecumenism in the 20th century. - the Azhar and Sh#sm between Rapprochement and RestraInt, 
trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 
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Iranians such as Nadir Shah, but failed to place them in the Iranian historical 
context, though acknowledging that the calls for Islamic unity have always been 
a reflection of the development in the relationship between the ulamiand the 
state: 
The most significant of these was the clear connection between 
theological pronouncements and the specific political scene of the 
moment... Pan-Islamic appeals or the behaviour of Shiite scholars in the 
Iraqi pilgrimage sites can only be understood against the backdrop of the 
prevailing politics, a situation that was to remain unchanged in the taqr6 
debates of the twentieth century. 19 
However, the most significant approach to the issue of Islamic unity is the work 
of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi Shams al-Din,, the former president of 
the Islamic Shi'i Supreme Council in Lebanon,, although he made no reference to 
the Iranians" involvement in the subject. Ayatollah Shams al-D-in designated a 
120 chapter in his work, al-Tajdidfl al-flkr al-lslamial-mu ' ý5ir to representing the 
relationship between the Imamate and the principle of Islamic unity, in which the 
former represents the divine right of the Imams while the latter represents their 
sacred duty. Ayatollah Shams al-D-in claimed that the Imams had always 
sacrificed their right to rule for the sake of preserving the sacred principle of 
Islamic unity, concluding this chapter with an appeal to interested scholars,, in 
which he not only urged them to pay more attention to this subject but also 
evaluate, revise and criticise his approach. 21 
The previous approaches to this subject matter - in which Nadir Shah and Imam 
Khomeini's attempts had particularly seized the attention of scholars in the field 
19 ibid, 44. 
20 Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, al-Tajdl-d ffal-Rk, al-lslamial-Mu. ýsir (Beirut: D5r al-Manhal, 1997). 
21 bid, 155-77. 
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while 'Abb5s M-irz: 5 and Kh5mina'Vs were most likely unobserved - have mainly 
focussed on the political dimension and totally overlooked the radical 
developments in traditional Twelver ideology that were in one way or another 
preceding or corresponding with those attempts. In fact, the repeated Iranian 
calls for Islamic unity have been indisputably a later corollary for the rise of the 
u. ý0/iSchool of Thought in Iran in the 16th century and the link between the two 
should not be disregarded; the rise of the u., 50WSchool essentially aimed to put 
an end to the deadly passiveness of intizir by practically politicizing the 
jurisprudence of the Twelver Shi'ism. Indeed, the u., 50ff ulami as the common 
element in all attempts could have been the key stimulators of all the calls for 
Islamic unity since such calls have been conducted recurrently by the Iranian 
state regardless of the nature of the ruling regime. The ulami, on the one hand, 
might have utilised the need for Islamic unity as a legitimate ploy to justify their 
endeavours to maintain the political achievements and influential role that they 
were granted under the Safavids; hence, the call for Islamic unity carried the 
required legitimate cover for the newly rising regimes -a matter that 
emphasises the need for the ulamjSý active participation to manage such a 
religious issue. On the other hand, the efforts to jurisprudentially legitimize the 
political role of the Twelver ulami during the ghayba inevitably led to sparking 
off the gradual but non-stop process of conceptual reconsiderations of the 
traditional principles of Twelver Shi'ism when a reformist tendency had targeted 
several historical doctrines and several points of disputes that had isolated 
Twelver Shi'ism Islam from their Sunni counterparts were either virtually 
overcome or became somehow diluted. This may have revived the hopes and 
provoked the efforts to restore the lost unity. 
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Consequently, the aim of the present study is to critically analyse the Iranian 
calls for Islamic unity in the post-Safavid era within the simultaneous context of 
the progressive political scheme of u. ýOiTwelver Shi'ism. In addition, this study 
aims to contextualise and analyse the various stages of this movement, including 
the post-revolution version,, in modern Iranian history and to provide biographical 
accounts of the Iranian individuals that were the key-players in the Islamic 
ecumenical efforts, Juh&d al-Taqrib. Although biographies of some of them, 
such as Nadir Shah, and Imam Khomeini, have already been published, they 
have paid no attention to their contributions to the issue of Islamic unity that 
had a noticeable impact in shaping their political careers. Furthermore, there are 
no English biographical accounts of 'Abbýs Milrzý Qýj5r and Ayatollah Khýmina'-i 
dealing with their involvement in Islamic ecumenism. 
In fulfilling these aims, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) to provide conceptual definitions and analyses of the related historical 
events and their theological and political sources; 
(ii) to provide a jurisprudential basis for the Shi'ite involvement in the call for 
Islamic unity according to the Imams' traditions and their attitude 
towards the de facto authority of their time, as the infallible Imams 
gave priority to unity of the Muslim community over their divine right 
for political leadership; 
(iii) to critically discuss and analyse the four attempts to promote Islamic 
unity in modern Iranian history within their historical, theological and 
political contexts; 
(iv) to evaluate the, impact of these attempts in changing some of the 
traditional concepts of Twelver Shi'ism, such as the attitude towards 
earthly authority and direct involvement in political affairs, which 
eventually led to the development and later implementation of waliyat 
al-faqhi 
I? 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As the aims state, this research attempts to answer a number of questions, such 
as what are the authoritative sources in the jurisprudence of the Twelver Shiism 
that correspond to and claim the same position in the unity of the umma 
asserted in the abovementioned Qur"inic verses? Although the Shi'ites 
generally acknowledge the same holy Qur"in, they have their own 
interpretations that differ from the Sunni ones for several Qur "inic verses. Why 
could those authoritative sources have not been activated before the rise of the 
Safavids or under their rule? In other words, had the Shiites violated those 
provisions when they committed themselves to quietness and adopted passive 
behaviour towards the de facto state before the rise of the Safavids? Why have 
the calls for Islamic unity been linked with Iran in the modern history of that 
country? What could have been the permanent cause that provoked the 
reiterated calls for Islamic unity? How could the call for Islamic unity most likely 
become the point of agreement in the state's political agenda in the post- 
Safavid era despite the essential differences and changeable nature in political 
orientation and religious ideology among the ruling regimes in this period? The 
central and significant question of this study is could those calls for unity within 
the Islamic umma methodologically and systematically be placed in the one 
framework to compose a specific pattern that could reveal significant and as yet 
undiscovered characteristics of modern Shi'ism? 
1.5. CONTRIBUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study also intends to achieve important objectives. First of all, it is not only 
the Western scholars who have neglected this topic; a survey of the Islamic and 
Arabic libraries will reveal the lack of interest among Muslim scholars regarding 
the efforts towards Islamic ecumenism in general and Iranian endeavors in 
particular. It is hoped therefore that this research will shed light on this 
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neglected but significant aspect of modern Iranian history in order to stimulate 
other research in the field. 
Abu al-Darclý' narrated that the Prophet said: "Do you want me to tell you what 
has a better rank than prayer, fasting and charity? They [the Prophet's 
companions] said: yes. The Prophet then said: reconciliation among adversaries 
"Islih thit al-Bayn). ir22 Hence, it is hoped that the analysis in this research 
would help to remove the fears and suspicions that have been enveloping the 
reaction of the Sunni world towards the Iranian calls for Islamic unity since the 
fall of the Safavid state in the 18 th century. Generally speaking, the Sunni 
Muslims have received those invitations with a sceptical and distrustful attitude 
since they believe that those calls carry a hidden agenda in which the Iranians' 
primarily aim is to deploy Shi'ism in the Sunni world and thus achieve political 
and economical control within it. Presenting the motivations of these endeavors 
within the context of a challenge within inner-Shi'ism and the political 
relationship of the ulamjwith the state would provide a better understanding to 
the Sunni Muslims and hopefully subdue their doubts and panic. 
1.6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Accordingly, this study aims to individually analyze the four efforts to revive 
Islamic unity that have been officially implemented by the Sh-l'! Iranian state. As 
a result, this will be methodologically based on a descriptive approach and 
historical analysis as the main means for the case study method employed. 
Mitchell has defined case study as follows: 
22 Sunan Abi Djw0d, padlffi no. 4921. 
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In its most basic form a case study may refer to the fundamental 
descriptive material an observer has assembled by whatever means 
available about some particular phenomenon or set of events. 23 
It is true that the period of time that separates these attempts are fairly long 
especially the first three ones: Nadir Shah had ruled almost fifty years before 
'Abbýs M-irza's time, while more than a century separates the latter from Imam 
Khomeini's era. However, it is not the intention of this study to meticulously and 
chronologically cover the events of the century and a half in question but to track 
the progress in Twelver Shi'ism ideology that might have directly impacted the 
scheme of Islamic unity before independently scrutinizing each case in an 
attempt to bridge the gap between all these efforts and in so doing attempt to 
discover the pattern that might possibly accommodate them and which might 
offer scholars a better understanding and highlight the unseen dimensions of the 
situation. Mitchell, who categorized the method of case study into three types - 
an apt illustration case study, social situation case study, and extended case 
study - asserts that such an ongoing approach could be viable when he explains 
the significance of the last type, the extended case study. This 
... deals with a sequence of events; sometimes over quite a 
long 
period ... The extended case study enables the analyst to trace 
how events 
chain on to one another, and therefore how events are necessarily linked 
to one another through time. " 
The descriptive methodology enables us to contextualize the study in the 
wholeness of the mentioned cases, which is concerned with 
23 1 Clyde Mitchell, "Case and Situabon Analysis, " in edits. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley and Peter Foster, Cd5e 
study Metho& (London: Sage Publication, 2000), 168. 
24 ibld, 171. 
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conditions or relationships that exist; practices that prevail, beliefs, points 
of views, or attitudes that are held; processes that are going on; effects 
that are being felt; or trends that are developing. At times, descriptive 
research is concerned with how what is or what exists is related to some 
preceding event that has influenced or affected a present condition or 
event. 25 
Thus, descriptive research fits well into the aims of this study, which is an 
attempt to interpret the historical events and their present consequences. The 
analytical nature of this descriptive study is further substantiated by adopting an 
exposition method, which aims at explaining and analyzing the cause and effect 
or the meaning of an event or an idea. While the historical nature of the study is 
demonstrated through analyzing the events in their own contexts - such as calls 
for Islamic unity being located in their own historical context - exposition 
provides an opportunity to explain and analyze the reasons and consequences of 
such calls for Islamic unity within the wider context of modern Iranian history by 
also looking into the cause and effects of the events mentioned. 
The descriptive and exposition method enables us to interpret the events in their 
natural settings. Thus, textual analysis of the historical events through an 
interpretative method constitutes the main research method of this study. The 
interpretative method is, hence, utilized to give meaning to the historical events 
here by attempting to provide an interpretation of the accounts of other. 26 In 
this, the mode of analysis is the textual material available on the subject matter. 
In other words,, textual material as the interpretations of the others is interpreted 
with the objective of presenting the social (historical) reality within the context of 
their present implications. 
25 Louis Cohen and Lauwrence Manion, Research Methods in Educa&dn (London: Roudedge, 1994), 67. 
26 Alan Bryman, Social Researc Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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It is important to also highlight the axiological consequences as part of the 
research methodology, as it is necessary to point out that the present author is a 
Sunni Muslim and was raised in a community where the Salafi` doctrine 
dominates, with its preoccupied negative image of Shi'ism as the sect of 
infidelity and hypocrisy. This could have an inevitable influence on the author's 
opinion and analysis. However, the effects of the bias in question could be 
controlled to some extent by the present author's strong belief in the significance 
and possibility of the revival of Islamic unity; this belief is excluded by the need 
to activate realistic jurisprudence, fl'qh al-wjqi ". in which Muslims should 
acknowledge that the point of disagreement,, imamate or caliphate and all its 
pretenders, no longer exists while the recognition of the miserable political and 
economical conditions of the Islamic umma, not to mention the sanctity of the 
divine order, all impose the exigency for the revival of such a unity. 
Indeed, an increasing concern has been developing during the conduct of this 
research since the outbreak of the sectarian killings among Sunnis and Shi'ites 
of Iraq in 2006. The sectarian debates and controversy on the internet and 
satellite TV channels have been gripping the attention of the author where each 
fighting group referred to academic studies and articles in its efforts to support 
its cause and justify its wrong doing. This alerted the author to the possibility 
that others may utilize this study to validate sectarian enmity in the future which 
will be a deviation from the original attention of the present researcher that 
mainly aimed to present the significance of the concept of Islamic unity in the 
development of Twelver u..? rOrl Shi'ism. 
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1.7. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This study consists of five chapters that are chronologically organised. The first 
chapter will be dedicated to exploring the jurisprudential basis for the issue of 
Islamic unity in Twelver Shiism and will deal with the attitude of the infallible 
Imams, mainly the first Imam, Ali ibn Ab-I Talib, toward the de facto authorities 
of their time. This will be inevitable to emphasise the significance and exigency 
of Islamic unity to Twelver Shi'ism since the traditions of the Imams have been 
considered authoritative by the consensus Twelver ulami. Also, it will be a 
suitable opportunity to correct some of the misinterpretations of the Imams' 
positive behaviour towards the state that were commonly misconstrued as an 
action of taqiyya (the concealment of the true belief) when the Imams' actions 
and sayings are placed in the context of maintaining the unity of Muslims. 
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 are devoted to the efforts for Islamic unity under the 
monarchical states. In the introduction to chapter 2 an attempt will be made to 
sufficiently survey the provocative cause that paved the road to the surpassing of 
the historical dilemma of the Twelver Shiism, namely the doctrine of intizir and 
motivated the rising of the u. ýOffschool of Shiism under the Safavid dynasty in 
which it played the most significant role in promoting the calls for Islamic unity in 
the post-Safavid era as a response to the challenges which not only threatened 
the ulamjSý political influence in state affairs but also the sectarian identity of 
Iran as well that was promoted by the Safavids. The rest of chapter 2 will focus 
on NMir Shah's attempt to establish the Ja "fari Madhhab as the fifth school of 
Islamic jurisprudence and the key role that the u. ýOff ulami had played in it. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the endeavours of 'Abbas M-irzý Qajar to promote 
rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire. At this stage, the u. ýOli ulami 
encountered a new challenge that was presented by the founding of the Qýjar 
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dynasty, when the ulami employed the issue of Islamic unity as a means of 
maintaining their political influence in state affairs and overcoming the reluctance 
of the new Shah,, Fatý Ali, to recognize their authority. The ulamifound astray 
in 'Abbýs M-irz5 who was facing several challenges to his legitimacy as a crown 
prince. (It should be emphasised that part of this chapter is a modified summary 
for a Masters thesis presented to the University of Texas at Austin, entitled "The 
History of 'Abb5s M-irz5 Q5j5r"' that has been updated and rewritten). 
The following chapters will be dedicated to exploring the efforts to achieve 
Islamic unity and the al-Taqrfb movement under the Islamic Republic, which 
developed throughout two different periods. In the first period, the efforts to 
revolutionarily revive Islamic unity dominated the Iranian political agenda and 
discourse, energized and supported by the founder of the IR, Imam Khomeini 
(1979-89). Therefore due to its significance, a survey of Imam Khomeini's 
political views and striving for Islamic unity will be approached in depth in 
chapter 4. 
The second period started when Kh5mina'i was elected in 1989 as Imam 
Khomeini's successor and the new Rahbar (Supreme- leader) of the IR of Iran. 
From then on, the term al-Taqrib replaced Islamic unity in Iranian political 
discourse, and its endeavours no longer were random initiatives but become 
centralised when the new leader established independent institutions to promote 
and supervise al-Taqrib policies. Therefore, chapter 5 will be devoted to 
exploring these institutions and investigating their aims and objectives. 
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Chapter 2 
BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT AND THE SACRED 
DUTY: RECONSIDERATION OF THE IMAMSf 
PRACTICE OF INTMR IN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC 
UNITY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike their Sunni brothers, the Twelver Shi'ites deem the traditions and 
narratives of their Twelve Imams infallible and absolutely authoritative. This 
holiness and authoritativeness for their Imams which distinguished the Imamate 
Shi'ites from the vast majority of Muslims is based on two sacred principles. 
First, the Shiites believe in the infallibility of ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet, his 
daughter F5tima, his cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Ab-I Týilib, and the sons of Ali 
and F5tima, Oasan and Ousayn), and this infallibility was inherited by the nine 
following Imams after the incident al-Taff (battle of Karbala) in which Imam 
Ousayn and a number of his family members and companions were killed by the 
army of the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid, on the loth of Mulýarrarn 61 H. C/ 
October 10,680 C. E. All the nine infallible Imams were derived from the 
descendents of Imam ousayn. The Twelver Shi'ites demonstrate the infallibility 
of their Imams by invoking the Qur "in and the Prophet's traditions; verse 33 in 
chapter 33 asserts 
And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like 
that of the former Times of Ignorance; and establish regular Prayer, and 
give regular Charity; and obey Allah and His Messenger. And Allah only 
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wishes to remove all abomination from you, ye members of the Family, 
and to Make OU Ure and S bfe,,; Yp po _S , 
27 
The term ahl al-W has been widely controversial not only among the Sunnis 
and Shi'ites but also among the $aýaba (the Prophet's companions), for a group 
of companions such as Abdullah ibn 'Abb5s and Ikrima believed it refers to the 
Prophets wives because it is compatible with the context of the verse that talks 
about the spouses of the Prophet, while other companions such as Umm Salam5 
(the Prophets wife), Umar ibn AN Salam5 (the stepson of the Prophet), Abu 
Sa'Id al-Khuclarf, W5thila ibn al-Asqa'. ýak7im ibn Sa'd and others affirmed that 
the term AN al-Bayt meant Ali, F5tima, ýasan and ýusayn; however, the 
Shi'ites, who deny the former opinion and acknowledge the latter one, find the 
support for this claim in several ýadl-Ms. For example, Abu Sa'Id al-Khudarii 
narrated that the Prophet said: "'This verse is aimed at five: myself,, Ali, ýasan, 
ýusayn, and F5tima. Also, Umar ibn AN Salam5, the Prophet's stepson, 
narrated that 
When the verse (Allah only desires to keep away the uncleanness from 
you, 0 people of the Housel and to give you a (Morough) purifying) was 
revealed to the Prophet in the house of Umm Salam5, the Prophet called 
F5tima,, Oasan and Ousayn and covered them with a cloak along with Ali 
who was behind him; then the Prophet said: 0 God, these are the people 
of my House, so keep away the uncleanness from them and purify them 
with a thorough purifying. Umm Salam5 was witness; she then said: 
Shall I join them? The Prophet said: you are where you stand and you 
will be benefited. 29 
27 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 7he Qur'jfr translation and commentary (Birmingham: Islamic Propagation Center Internationai, 
1946), 33: 33. 
28 Check the interpretation of the verse (33: 33) in Mohammad ibn )arir al-Tabaffs. AJnzi'al-Baygn 'an 7a'; s77 al-Qur'in, 
edits. MaýmFjd and Mohammad Sh. 5kir (Cairo: Ddr al-Ma'W, 1957). 
29 &Awn al- T&7wdV, tkidlffi no. 3129. 
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Second, the holy status of ahlal-Bayt is also confirmed by ýadl-th al-Thaqalayn in 
which the Prophet placed ahl al-Bayt in an equivalent position with the holy 
Qur "in - the unique issue that has received the consensus of all Muslims as the 
speech of God who promises to protect them from being corrupted by satanic 
attractions- and who are tightly connected and equally designated to lead 
Muslims to the path of the truth. The Prophet said in this hadýth: 
I left among you the two heavily weighted pillars; each one is greater 
than the other: Kitib Allah (the holy Qur"in), a stretched robe from 
heaven to earth; and `itraffAhlu Bayti(my descendents) that will never 
be detached until they reach me at the pond (al-hawd [on the Day of 
Judgement]. " 
Accordingly, the traditions of the Infallible Imams that include their sayings and 
attitudes have been unanimously accepted by the Twelver Shi'ites. However, 
the Imams' political attitude towards the de facto authorities of their times has 
been widely accepted, outside the context of Islamic unity, by the Shi'i and 
Western scholars alike as an action of taqiyya which resulted in the 
establishment of inaccurate interpretations to the doctrine of intizirthat failed to 
recognize the developmental stages that this doctrine had passed through before 
it finished with the concepts of quietness and passiveness in which the 
exaggerating in the employment of intizir has exceeded its intended political 
framework to dominate all aspects of life of the Twelver Shi'ites after the 
ghayba (the Occultation). For example, Hamid Algar dropped a hint for the 
practice of such a taqiyya through which Twelver Shiism refused to accept the 
legitimacy of the state but still rejected any move against it since the time of the 
infallible Imams -a matter that continued in Iran during the Safavid regime and 
survived in the post-Safavid era. He maintains: 
30 MusnadAhamad, vol. 3 ýadlffi no. 10779; Imam Khomeini, VJb WaW. - Waslyyat-I Njmly-i 51ýýsi 'Ilihi, edit. Hujlcl' 
al-lslým ThaNh Allah Ali-Z5da (Tehran: Intish5rat Fard0si, 2002), 16. 
Moreover, both activist and quietist attitudes to prevailing authority could 
be deduced from the Imami belief, but it is clear that the latter came 
gradually to dominate the mainstream of Shi'ism, leaving its trace also 
on Safavid and post-Safavid Shiism of Iran. Insofar, as any attitude to 
the state and existing authority can be deduced from the teachings of 
the Imams, its combines a denial of legitimacy with quietist patience and 
abstention from action. 31 
However, Algar's claim appears questionable due to the fact that the political 
attitude of the newly established Usd/iSchool became a shifting paradigm in the 
historical position of Twelver Shi'ism towards the existing state in which the 
Safavid ulami had not only kept close ties with the state but were also actively 
involved in the state"s affairs from the Safavid era onwards. Indeed, the u. ý011- 
ulami had striven to preserve their direct involvement in state polity and their 
representation was frequently recorded in the major political events from the fall 
of the Safavids. This could be deemed as a clear retreat from the principle of 
intizir (the waiting for the return of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, to set up a 
legitimate and lawful government), a principle that had been dominating the 
behavior of traditional Twelver Shi'ism since al-Ghayba al-Kubra (the greater 
occultation of the Mahdi in 326 H. ). For that reason, Turner raises the question: 
How can belief in the article of Twelver Shi'ite faith known as intizir, 
according to which there is no just rule save that of the Hidden Imam, be 
reconciled with the existence of the current Islamic regime in Iran or, for 
that matter, any Islamic government obtaining before the awaited return 
of Muhammad b. Hasan al-'Askari? 32 
31 Hamid Algar, Religlon and stdte in Iran 1785-1906., the role of the ulama in the Qqjar perlod (Berkeley: Univers 
tARfomia Press, 1969), 2. 
32 Colin Turner, "Still Waiting for the Imam? The Unresolved Question of Intizýr in Twelver Shi'ism, ' PeMIc, 3 XV(1993- 
1995), 30. 
Turner continued the questioning of the authenticity of the Safavid Twelver 
Shi'ism inclination to the doctrine of intizir and criticizing the contradiction 
between the traditions of the Imams regarding the attitude toward the usurping 
rulers which were supposedly composed the basis for the faith of the Twelver 
Shi'ism on one hand and the actual behavior of the ulamjin Iran towards the 
de facto authority since the rise of Safavids until the present on the other hand. 
He argues: 
Self-preservation in the face of oppression from an alien majority, the 
practice of taqiyya in all circumstances, patient submission to the will of 
God and hope in the imminent return of the Imam - all of these may 
have been pertinent to the Shi'ite community during the life time of the 
Imams; however, this kind of imtihin is difficult to reconcile with the 
conditions obtaining in Safavid Iran, where the Twelver Shi'ites were no 
longer a minority, where taqiyya had been rendered theoretically 
unnecessary, and where belief in the return of an Imam would obliterate 
injustice and tyranny sat uneasily alongside the notion that the Safavid 
rulers were a reflection of the Divine. The imMin remained, 
nevertheless, a component of intizirand thus an article of the Twelver 
Shi'ite faith, despite the fact that its preconditions had been altered 
drastica lly. 33 
In fact, Turner's inquiry is legitimate for the conspicuous contradictions in the 
attitude of Twelver Shi'ism in Iran in which the traditional jurisprudential base 
warned believers against neither taking part in anti-state activities nor interacting 
with the de facto authority - instead they should always aim for passiveness and 
quietness. Yet the virtual and heavy involvement of the ulaMa of Twelver 
Shi'ism in the state polity under the Safavids and afterwards reflects an opposite 
implementation for such a base - underlining the necessity for reconsideration of 
the Imam's traditions of intizir by placing them in the context of the Imams' 
33 bid, 33. 
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efforts to fulfill their sacred duty of preserving the unity of the Islamic umma; as 
this would not only provide a better interpretation for these traditions that might 
not only remove the confusing clashes between the theory and its 
implementation but also assert the importance given by the Imams to the issue 
of Islamic unity. In addition, it would be an inevitable approach to 
understanding the reformation and development in the political ideology of 
Twelver Shi'ism that was ignited by the rise of the QsJ/7-School of jurisprudence 
under the Safavid rule that activated the #Nhial (independent legal opinion). 
However, it seems necessary to emphasize that the probability of the practice of 
taqiyya (concealing the genuine belief) should be excluded due to its inflated 
consideration that possibly caused the creation of such a current misleading and 
inconsistency in the Imams" traditions in the first place; for that reason, Ayatollah 
Mohammad Mahdi Shams al-D-in urged scholars to re-examine the practice of 
taqiyya excluded from the Imams' political attitude when he opposed the 
hyperbolic employment of taqiyya in interpretation for the attitude of the 
infallible Imams' and their followers towards the existing authority that he placed 
within the framework of preserving the sacred unity of the Islamic umma; he 
merely deemed the Imams' behavior a reflection of their legal duty in which they 
always favored the unity of the Islamic umma over any other consideration. He 
urges: 
... the careful examination 
for the narratives that deals with the 
organization of the political issues for the Islamic society among which 
the narratives of taqiyya, the dealing and working with the usurpers 
certainly lead the faclih to the fact that the Imams had the unity of the 
nation over any other consideration. As well, the supplications of the 
Imams that were well-documented such as al-. Faýifa a1-SJjjdiyya express 
the same position and orientation of the fallible Imams on a theoretical 
and practical level. " 
In view of that and in response to the call of Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi Shams 
al-D-in, this chapter is an attempt to survey the traditions of the infallible Imams 
that might reveal their attitude towards the de facto state and re-read them in 
the context of Islamic unity and outside the scope of the alleged taqiyya in which 
they would not only provide a better interpretation for the change in the political 
behavior of Twelver Shiism but also offer more understanding of the 
jurisprudential basis on which frequent involvement of the u.? rOff ulami in the 
calls for Islamic unity might stand. 
2.2. IMAM ALI AND THE RASHDI CALIPHS 
The significance of the unity of the Muslim umma for Imam Ali could be drawn 
from his relationship with the actual authority of his time which was symbolized 
by the first three caliphs. Such a relationship could be possibly revealed by what 
we have received from his sermons, letters and sayings which were collected by 
35 al-Shat-if al-Rad-i in a work entitled Nahj al-baligha. Fortunately,, while the 
authenticity of this source is unquestionable by the Shi'Ites is also widely 
acceptable to Sunnis. For that reason, this source will be exclusively approached 
to highlight the Imam's attitude towards the state. 
Ali ibn Ab-i T51ib, the first of the twelve Imams according to Twelver Shi'ism, was 
the cousin of the Prophet, and he was raised by the Prophet himself. He was the 
34 Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi Shamsu-Diin, "al-Wahda wa al-Imama, " in al- Tajccld /7 al-flkr al-Islami al-Mu'j5ir (Beirut: 
Nr al-Manhal, 1997), 175. 
35 Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baligha: SermOns, letters and sayings, trans. Syed Ah Raza, vol. 1,2 (Qum: Ansadyan Publications, 
2007). 
second to accept the call of Islam after Khad-ija, the Prophet's wife. Also, he 
jeopardized his life for the Prophet when he replaced the Prophet and stayed in 
his bed to trick the infidels of Quraysh and provide the opportunity for the 
Prophet and his companion, Abu Bakr, to flee from Mecca to Medina. After he 
migrated to Medina, he became the Prophet's son-in-law when he got married to 
F5tima, the Prophet's youngest daughter. The virtues of Imam Ali were 
innumerable and undeniable and that made him an eligible successor to the 
Prophet in leading the Islamic community. Indeed, Imam Ali himself believed 
that he was the one eligible to succeed the Prophet; that was obvious from his 
reaction when he heard the news of what had happened in the meeting of 
SaqifatbaniSjida, held immediately after the death of the prophet in which a 
debate intensified between al-Muhijirin (the immigrants) and al-An.? rjr (the 
supporters) over who had the right to succession which resulted in a pledged 
allegiance for Abu Bakr to be the successor of the Prophet. Imam Ali, in sermon 
67, stated: 
He enquired what the An55r said. People said that they were asking for 
one chief from among them and one from the others . Amir al-m6min-in 
said: Why did you not argue against them (an55r) that the Prophet had 
left his will that whoever is good among [the] aný5r should be treated 
well and whoever is bad should be forgiven . People said: What is there 
against them in it ? Amir al -m6min-in said: If the Government was for 
them, there should have been no will in their favour. Then he said: What 
did the Quraysh plead? People said: They argued that they belong to the 
lineal tree of the Prophet. Then Amir al-m6minin said: They argued with 
the tree but spoiled the fru itS. 36 
On another occasion, Imam Ali clearly declared his god-given right to the 
leadership of the Muslim community when he emphasized in sermon 144: 
36 ibld, 253-54. 
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Where are those who falsely and unjustly claimed that they are deeply 
versed in knowledge, as against us, although Allah raised us in [to a 
high] position and kept them down, bestowed upon us knowledge but 
deprived them [of it], and entered us (in the fortress of knowledge) but 
kept them out. With us guidance is to be sought and blindness (of 
misguidance) is to be changed into brightness. Surely [the] Imams 
(divine leaders) will be from the Quraysh. They have been planted in 
this line through 1-15shim. It would not suit others nor would others be 
suitable as heads of affairs. 37 
Despite the fact that Imam Ali had refrained from swearing allegiance to Abu 
Bakr for six monthS38 although the latter had received the loyalty of the majority 
of the Muslim community, he refused the offer of his uncle al-'Abbýs ibn Abdul 
al-Mu4alib and Abu Sufy5n ibn ýarb to swear allegiance for him and challenge 
the legitimacy of Abu Bakr. Indeed, he considered Abu Sufyýin's 
recommendation as a sort of sedition among Muslims, so he warned his 
adherents from drifting towards such an action and maintained in sermon 5: 
0 People! Steer clear [ofl through the waves of mischief by boat of 
deliverance, turn away from the path of dissention and put off the 
crowns of pride. Prosperous is [the] one who rises with wings (i. e. when 
he has power) or else he remains peaceful and other enjoy ease. It (i. e. 
the aspiration for Caliphate) is like turbid water or like a morsel that 
would suffocate the person who swallows it. One who plucks fruits 
before ripening is like one who [has] cultivated in another's field. " 
37 ibid, 528. 
38 Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, 7he Oiýgins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam (oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 59. 
39 Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baligha: serrwns, letters and sayings, trans, Syed Ali Raza, vol. 1 (Qum: Ansanyan Publications, 
2007), 74. 
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During the time of Abu Bakr's caliphate that lasted for two years, Imam All most 
likely maintained a passive role in the life of the community. Syed Jafri deemed 
such an attitude by Imam Ali was required for the supreme interests of the 
newly-established Islamic state that was facing unprecedented difficulties after 
the death of the Prophet, when the majority of the Arab tribes renounced Islam, 
which meant the new Caliph had to mobilize the Muslim armies and engaged 
with these tribes in several wars before he successfully subdued the rebelling 
tribes to the rule of the Islamic state. 40 
Abu Bakr on his deathbed nominated Umar ibn al-Khaqýb to succeed him. After 
the death of the first caliph, Imam Ali continued to favor the sacred unity of the 
Muslim community over his own right to leadership, so he was among the first 
group of companions to swear allegiance to the new caliph. In fact, Imam Ali 
played an active administrative role during Umar's caliphate in which he likely 
became the de facto wazir (minister) and trusted consultant for the second 
caliph. For instance,, Umar appointed Imam Ali as his vice for ruling Medina, the 
capital city of the new Islamic state, when the former travelled to Jerusalem to 
sign the pact for the city's surrender .41 This turned out to be a suitable 
opportunity for the Imam to seize power and retrieve his usurped right to rule; 
however, he consciously let it pass as usual just to preserve the solidarity of 
Islamic state, passing through a crucial period when the armies of the believers 
were confronting the banners of infidels on both the Eastern and Western fronts. 
On another occasion, Imam Ali had the chance to get rid of Umar when the latter 
consulted him about joining the Muslim army that was conducting a campaign 
against the Byzantine Empire in Syria. Imam Ali protested against the caliph's 
40 Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, The 01ýgins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 59. 
41 bid, 6 5. 
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intention foreseeing dangerous consequences for the future of the Islamic state. 
In sermon 134 he stated: 
Allah has taken upon Himself for the followers of this religion the 
strengthening of boundaries and hiding of the secret places. Allah 
helped them when they were few [in number] and could not protect 
themselves. He is living and will not die. If you will yourself proceed 
towards the enemy and clash with them and fall into some trouble, there 
will be no place of refuge for the Muslims other than their remote cities, 
nor any place they would return to. Therefore, you should send there an 
experienced man and send with him people of good performance who 
are well-intentioned. If Allah grants you victory, then this is what you 
want. If it is otherwise, you would serve as a support for the people and 
a returning place for the MUSliMS. 42 
Imam Ali wasted another opportunity to regain the leadership by supporting the 
Caliph's intention to participate in the war against the enemies of Islam, but he 
held the same position and re-emphasized his objection to such a tendency; the 
second caliph,, Umar ibn al-Khaqab, was concerned about the numbers in the 
army that was preparing to campaign on the Persian front and sought the 
Imam's advice in taking part in this army. Imam Ali's advice revealed great 
talent in military techniques and, more importantly, a keenness in protecting the 
caliph's life. He demonstrated this in sermon 146: 
The position of the head of government is that of the thread for beads, 
as it connects them and keeps them together. If the thread is broken, 
they will disperse and be lost, and will never come together again ... Avoid 
battle, because if you leave this place the Arabs will attack you from all 
sides and directions till the unguarded places left behind by you will 
become more important than those before you. If the Persians see you 
42 Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baligha: 5ennons, letters and sa)4ngs, trans. SYed Ali Raza, vol. 1 (Qum: Ansaryan Publications, 
2007), 504. 
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tomorrow they will say, ""He is the root (chief) of Arabia. If we do away 
with him we will be [live] in peace. " In this way this will [thus] heighten 
their eagerness against you and their keenness to aim at you. You say 
that they have set out to fight against Muslims. Well, Allah detests their 
setting out more than you do, and He is more capable of preventing 
what He detests. " 
Imam Ali's contributions as a loyal advisor and mentor for the leadership of the 
Islamic state were appreciated by the Caliph who publicly admitted his inability 
to solve several issues without the assistance of Imam Ali Umar said: "Had there 
not been Ali, Umar would have perished. "44 
Perhaps the best evidence for the significance of the unity of the Islamic umma 
to Imam Ali was noticed after the election of Uthmýn who was nominated by the 
5hi7ri -a group of six companions were selected by the dying Caliph to choose 
one among them for the position of the caliphate - to succeed Umar and when 
the Muslims were gathering in the mosque to swear loyalty to the new Caliph, 
the Imam publicly declared: 
You have certainly known [been aware] that I am the most rightful of all 
others for the Caliphate. By Allah, so long as the affairs of Muslims 
remain intact and there is no oppression in it, save on myself(, ) I shall 
keep quiet(, ) seeking reward for it (from Al&) and keeping aloof from 
its attractions and allurements for [to] which you aspire. 45 
43 bid, 533-34. 
44 Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, The Ofigins and Early Development of 5hi'a I51am (Oxford: Oxford Universi-, v Press, 
2000), 61. 
45 Sermon 74, Imam Ali, Nahj al-Balighe. sermons, letters and sayings, trans. Syed Ali Raza, vol. I (Qum: Ansarý, in 
Publications, 2007), 272. 
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After the third Caliph, Uthm5n, was killed in provincial rebellions, the Muslims of 
Medina, which included several companions such as a[-Zupayr ibn al-'Awwam, 
Talha ibn Abdullah, 'Amm5r ibn Yýiser and others, went to Imam Ali and begged 
him to accept the position of caliph. However, the Imam was reluctant to accept 
the offer and asked them to find another qualified candidate, although in fact it 
was the very opportunity that he was waiting for to claim his rightful position. 
He advised them: 
Leave me and seek someone else. We are facing a matter which has 
(several) faces and colours, which neither hearts can stand nor 
intelligence can accept. Clouds are hovering over the sky, and faces are 
not discernable. You should know that if I respond to you I would lead 
you as I know [according to my interpretation of Qur "in and knowledge 
in the Prophet's traditions] and would not care about whatever one may 
say or abuse. If you leave me then I am the same as you are [I will be 
like anyone among you]. It is possible I would listen to and obey 
whomever you make in charge of your affairs. I am better for you as a 
counsellor than as a chief. " 
Undoubtedly,, the Imam's reluctance was justifiable and exposed his great insight 
aware of the fact that he might well be associated with the assassination of the 
third Caliph by his political rivals especially the Umayyad., UthmWs clan -a 
matter that could lead to a civil war among the Muslim community. Imam Ali's 
concerns turned out to be a reality, when he accepted, under pressure from the 
Medina community, the post of caliph. Mu'ýiwiya, UthmWs cousin, refused to 
pledge allegiance to Imam Ali, demanding that either the new Caliph retaliate 
46 b1d, Sermon 92,360. 
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from the killers of his predecessor or he would consider him an accomplice with 
them in their crime, on which case Mu5wiya threatened to take revenge. '7 
Imam Ali described the critical conditions the Islamic state was passing through 
at the time of his nomination after the assassination of Uthmýn when he had no 
other choice but to comply with his religious duty and safeguard the sacred unity 
of its people. He said in one of his famous sermons known by al-Shaqshaqiyya: 
At that moment, nothing took me by surprise, but the crowd of 
people rushing to me. It advanced towards me from every side 
like the mane of the hyena (, ) so much so that ýasan and Ousayn 
were getting crushed and both the ends of my shoulder garment 
[cloak] were torn. They collected around me like [a]the herd of 
sheep and goats. When I took up the reins of government one 
party broke away and another turned [became] disobedient while 
the rest began acting wrongfully as if they had not heard the word 
of AMh saying: 
That abode In the hereafter, We assign It for those who intend not to 
exult themselves [on] In the earth, nor (to make) mischief (therein); 
and the end Is (best) for the pious ones. (Qur "Jn, 28: 83) Yes, by 
A115h, they had heard it and understood it, but the world appeared 
glittering in their eyes and its embellishments seduced them. Behold, 
by Him who split the grain (to grow) and created living beings, if 
people had not come to me and supporters had not exhausted the 
argument and if there had been no pledge of All5h with the learned 
to the effect that they should not acquiesce in the gluttony of the 
47 In response to this unjust accusation, Imam Ali said: "Umayyads' knowledge about me did not desist them from 
accusing me, nor did my precedence (in accepting Islam) kept off these ignorant people from blaming me. Allah's 
admonitions are more eloquent than my tongue. I am the contester against those who break away from Fait and the 
opposer of those who entertain doubts. Uncertainties should be palced before Qur'ýn, the Book of A116h (for 
clarification). Certainly, people will recompensed according to what they have in their hearts; check Sermon 75, Imam 
Ali, Nahjal-Baligha, sermons, letters and sayings, trans. Syed Ali Raza, vol. I (Qum: Ansahyan Publicatioris, 2007), 272. 
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oppressor and the hunger of the oppressed [j I would have cast[ed] 
the rope of the Caliphate on its own shoulders [literally means: I had 
neither striven for the nomination to the Caliphate nor would it affect 
my humble and equal treatment of my fellow Muslims if I became the 
caliph], and would have given the last one the same treatment as the 
first one. Then, you would have seen that in my view this world of 
yours is no better than the sneezing of a goat. " 
The aforementioned sermon could be deemed as the most significant piece in 
Nahjal-Baligha, since it shows the eloquent rhetoric of the Imam Ali in which he 
not only demonstrated the basis on which he inevitably had to accept the 
caliphate but also justified the wars that he conducted against his fellow 
Muslims. On the one hand, Imam Ali clearly stated that his acceptance of the 
caliphate was not a restoration of his divine right to leadership (as the Shi, ites 
like to believe), but rather he was complying with his religious duty to uphold the 
existence of binding requirements for assuming this post, namely the recognition 
of the majority of the community (ýuýYt7r the presence of backing 
forces (wuj0d al-Xýsir) and the divine assignment of the ulami to assure the 
achievement of social justice. The nomination for post of Caliphate was then 
obligatory as the Imam's legal duty, so he would have been deemed legally 
guilty if he refused to fulfill his duty. 
Additionally, Imam Ali, in the same sermon, pointed out that he was protecting 
the unity of the Islamic State by engaging in civil wars against other Muslim 
troops. Four months after the Imam's nomination, Tallýa ibn Ubaydallah and al - 
Zubayr ibn al -Aww5m, who were both candidates for the caliphate 
before Uthman's election, defected after they had sworn the oath of allegiance to 
Imam Ali in Median They joinedAisha , the Prophets wife, 
in Mecca and 
48 ibid, Sermon 3,52-54. 
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marched along with other defectors and a great army against Ali's troops in 
Basra under the pretext of bringing the murders of Uthmýn to justice 
Therefore, the Imam had no choice but to swiftly move to defend his subjects 
and enforce the troops in Basra. The engagement of the two armies, said to be 
at Basra in 36/656,, became known as ma "rakat al-Iamal (the Battle of the 
Camel) in which Imam Ali's army was victorious. Also, the Imam was fighting 
Mu'ýwiya, who had resigned as governor of Syria, because Mu C awiya had 
refused to acknowledge the caliphate of Imam Ali so he had executed his 
deposition order. The army of the Caliph met with the Syrian troops in the Battle 
of . 5affl-n on the banks of the River Euphrates in Syria in 37/657. This battle 
ended with a proposal from Mu5wiya's camp to arbitrate God's law, which Ali 
accepted. However, this news of arbitration sowed the seeds of discord in Imam 
Ali's army which resulted in a defection of some of his troops, accusing the Imam 
of betraying the legitimate principle of Islam. These defectors became known as 
the Khawjr# (from the sing. Arabic term Khjrffl-, meaning outside the law); they 
organized themselves and began to launch terrifying campaigns against Ali's 
subjects, so the Imam eventually had no option but to put an end to the danger 
they were causing. Hence, he marched against them and defeated them in the 
Battle of Nahrawin in 38/658. 
In short, it seems noticeable that Imam Ali from the outset realized that among 
the companions for this position his right to the succession of the Prophet was 
the most suitable. Yet he made no moves to actively claim this usurped right, 
and in fact wasted numerous opportunities to regain it, choosing instead to 
preserve the sacred unity of the Muslims' community over his absolute right. 
Indeed, this suggests that the Imam's concerns of jeopardizing the unity Muslim 
community made him hesitate in accepting the offer of taking on the caliphate. 
Nevertheless, he finally agreed and stood up for his religious obligation when he 
realized that his reluctance would be more dangerous for Muslim unity in these 
momentous times. 
2.3. IMAM kiASAN AND MU'AWIYA IBN ABi SUFYAN: THE 
RENOUNCING OF THE CALIPHATE 
While he was preparing to conduct another campaign against Mu (awiya, Imam 
Ali was assassinated in Ufa in 41, and the people swore allegiance to Imam 
ýasan, his elder son and the second Imam according to Twelver Shi, ism. The 
intention of the new Caliph was to pursue his father's efforts to reunite the 
Islamic State; however, he realized that he did not have sufficient power to 
overwhelmingly subdue Mu'ýiwiya - indeed this would merely lead to more 
killings and division among Muslims. Meanwhile, Mu'ýwiya's deputies arrived at 
Imam ýasan's camp carrying an initiative from Mu'6wiya to the Imam to 
relinquish the caliphate and stop the bloodshed of Muslims. When he received 
these deputies, Imam ýasan gathered his followers and delivered a sermon in 
the mosque in which he compared the zeal of his father's forces in : 5affln and 
weakness and unwillingness to fight of his troops; he, then, told them about 
Mu'ýiwiya's offer and asked them to choose between dying for their cause or 
accepting the offer and relinquishing the caliphate. The people started shouting 
at him to accept the offer . 
49 Despite the Shii claim that the reconciliation with 
Mu (ýiwiya was forced on him by the betrayal of key figures among his associates 
and officers who were bribed by Mu (6wiya that was threatening the Imam's 
life, " Imam Hasan, had to opt between his right to rule as the legitimate caliph 
and his duty to protect the sacred principle of Muslim unity that was about to 
be 
sacrificed by a civil war, so he followed in the footsteps of Imam All and 
sacrificed his right for the sake of the supreme interest of the Islamic state. 
Imam Oasan resigned himself from the post of caliphate after he had 
held it for 
49 Ibn al-'Athir, al-Kimil fial-tAnkh, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1385/1965), 406. 
50 imam Husseln and the day of ashura, (Tehran: al-Balagh Foundation, 1990), 18-19. 
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six months. Indeed, the conditions that Imam Hasan's resignation imposed on 
the peace treaty might have revealed his strong position for negotiation and 
perhaps resistance and suggested that his real intention seemed to be to secure 
the unity of the umma; according to the reconciliation document, Mu'awiya had 
been committed of seven conditionS51 as follows: 
1. Imam ýasan relinquishes the caliphate in favour of Mu'5wiya who should 
rule over the Muslims according to the teaching of the Qur'jn and the 
traditions of the Prophet and his Rightly-Guided Caliphs. 
2. Imam Oasan is the elected caliph after Mu ( awiya, but ýusayn would take 
over this position if anything happened to ýasan. 
3. Mu'5wiya should not persecute the people of Medina, ýlij5z and Iraq for 
their role in Imam Ali's caliphate. 
4. Mu'ýwiya and his appointed governors of the provinces promise neither 
to curse Imam Ali from the pulpits of mosques nor to point to him with 
offensive statements. 
5. The security of all people wherever they are should be preserved. 
6. Imam ýasan alone is in charge of administering the Bayt al-mil (public 
treasury) of the city of KCifa. 
7. Mu'ýiwiya should promise not to confiscate the properties of Imam Oasan, 
Ousayn, their followers and their supporters. 
51 ibid, 19-20; For more information also consult M. G. Fadl Allah, Sulh al -1mam al -ýiasan: asbibuhu 
wa natiyuhu 
, ýgsj 
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2.4. IMAM kiUSAYN AND THE KINGSHIP OF YAZiD 
After the resignation of Imam ýasan, the conflict over the caliphate was resolved 
in favour of Mu'5wiya who gave his entire intention to consolidating his rule and 
extending his authority. The new Caliph followed the policy of carrot and stick 
by which he managed to mobilize those who supported his political schemes and 
get rid of opponents, namely the adherents of ahl al-Bayt. It became obvious 
that the ultimate aim of Mu'5wiya's policies was to pave the way to establish an 
monarchical regime for the Umayyad family in which he created a new Islamic 
ruling system that totally changed the political traditions of the Prophet and his 
Rightly-Guided Caliphs -a matter that was earlier predicted by the Prophet when 
he stated "awwal man yughqyy1r Sunnati rayulun min banl UMayya,, 52 (My 
tradition will be first changed by a man from the Umayyad family). Mu ' awiya's 
unjust and aggressive dictatorsh ip53 that was contrary to the conditions of Imam 
ýasan's resignation, with which he had promised to comply, led to unrest and 
contention among Muslims. Yet Imam ýusayn chose to preserve his oath of 
loyalty to Muc5wiya despite several calls upon him from the adherents of Ahlal- 
Baytto rise against the latter's dictatorship and otherwise unjust rule. 54 
After the demise of Mu'ýwiya, Yaz-id ibn Mu'5wiya assumed the caliphate 
according to the meticulous scheme of his father. This resulted in a situation the 
Islamic umma had never experienced before in which the Muslims' dilemma was 
52 Mohammad N5sir al-D-in al-Alb5ni, Silsilat al-Ahjo-lffi al-5; 3ý1ýa, ýadl-ffi no. 1749, vol. 4 (Riyadh: Maktabat al '. Wrif, 
n. a), 329. 
53 The injustice of Mu'ýiwiya and his aggressive behavior was epitomized in the killings of several innocent %luslims who 
merely rejected his financial and political policies and expressed and-regime views among those was the widely 
considered as the pious monk among the Prophet's companions, ýijr ibnAdiyy al -Kindii, who Mu'6wiya ordered to 
beheaded along with some of his followers because he refused to curse Ali ibn Abi-T61ib and his sons. 'ýVawiya, 
himself, 
admitted his wrongdoing and regretted his own conduct when he says "I never 
killed anyone without knowing why I 
killed him except Hijr who I do not know the quilt by which I punished him" refer to 
'Abbýs MahmFid al- Aqq6d, Abdal- 
5huhadj. * al-tluW ibn Ali (Cairo: Dar al-Hilil, 1969), 43; also see Imam Hussein and 
the day of 'AshOra, (Tehran: al- 
Balagh Foundation, 1990), 37-8. 
54 'AbWs MaýmFjd al-'Aqqýicl, Abij al-5huhadj. - al-ýIu5ayn ibn Ali (Cairo: Dar al-Hilzil, 1969), 40. 
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apparent not only in Mu'5wiya's treachery to Imam ýasan's resignation 
agreement when he preceded to create an innovative and anti-Islamic system of 
hereditary monarchy but also in passing the authority on to the religiously and 
administratively unqualified Yaz-id, who was famous for his debauchery and 
addiction to wine while lacking any knowledge of governance and politics. 
Imam ýusayn, however, preferred not to act against Yaz-id at this stage although 
he avoided complying with Yaziid's demand (delivered to the Imam by the 
governor of Medina, Wal-id ibn Utba) to perform the bayy "a (the oath of 
allegiance) and attempted to buy time by convincing the governor to postpone 
the oath until the next day under the pretext that the legitimacy of allegiance 
requires the oath to be publicly sworn. 55 Apparently, Imam ýusayn was aware 
that if he pledged allegiance to Yaz-id he would virtually grant him the needed 
legitimacy. Such an action could be used in Umayyad propaganda to subdue all 
the more qualified claimants and convince ordinary Muslims to follow the Imam's 
step. For that reason, Imam ýusayn along his household immediately managed 
to flee from Medina on the same night and sought a save haven in the 
neighborhood of the Ka "ba (the most respected and holy shrine of Islam to 
which all Muslims face in their daily prayers) in Mecca. 
While in Mecca, Imam ýusayn politically committed himself to quietness and 
spent most of his time in religious duties. Indeed, a survey of the sources of this 
period shows no single evidence for any anti-Yaz-id activity or propaganda on the 
part of the Imam or his adherents during his stay in Mecca, which lasted for 
four months, notwithstanding the suitability of this period to recruit and mobilize 
insurgency against the unjust Umayyads' authority. This is all the more 
surprising as it corresponded with the season of hay, the greatest Islamic annual 




ritual that consists of a large number of Muslims gathering from all over the 
Islamic provinces. 56 Perhaps there were two reasons that might have precluded 
the Imam from rising up at this stage: He might have acknowledged the sanctity 
and prohibition of location and date in of his staying in Mecca, 57 where al-Ka'ba 
or BaytAllah al-t1arim (the prohibited house of Allah) is located, together with 
the forbidden monthS58 both of which were totally unbefitting to any hostility, 
which would be deemed a great and merciless sin. On the other hand, the 
Imam perhaps was following in the footsteps of his father, Imam Ali and his 
elder brother, Imam ýasan in practicing what could possibly be called the 
'positive' inti, -7jr(waiting) in which Imam Ousayn, although he disapproved of 
Yaz-id's authority, preferred not to become the motivator to spark off any 
disorder that would jeopardize not only the Umayyad's regime but also the 
established unity of the Islamic umma as a whole. In other words, rather than 
leading the insurgency himself against Yaz-id's nomination, for which he would be 
held responsible for all the blood shed of Muslims who might die for his cause, 
he might have chosen to merely observe the situation and leave the initiative for 
opposition to other claimants - especially as his right to the caliphate was 
guaranteed and unchallengeable according to the conditions of the reconciliation 
agreement between Imam ýasan and Mu'ýwiya and had received the consensus 
of Muslims who praised it. Indeed, his residing in Mecca at this time supports 
such a probability since Mecca was the gathering point of the Muslims' caravans 
from all Islamic provinces that were heading towards Mecca for the , umra 
(worshiping visit) and hajj (annual pilgrimage), thus as far as the Imam's 
56 ibid, 178, 
57 Imam Husayn left Madina to Mecca on the 28th of Rajab where he spent the months of Sh6b5n , Ramaoýn, 
Shawwal, 
and dul-Qi'da, and he left Mecca toward al-KOfa on the 8th of dhul-oijja. 
58 The forbidden months are four according to the Islamic Calendar, namely Muharram 
(1), Rajab (7), dul-Qi'da (11), 
and dhul-oija (12). The holiness of these months could be traced back to the religion of 
Prophet Ibrahim which became 
part of the Arabs' culture prior to Islam. After Islam, the sanctity of these months is emphasized even 
more in several 
Qur'5nic verses such as 2: 194,217,5: 2,97, and 9: 5. 
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situation was concerned it served as the major centre for information as those 
caravans could bring the reactions of their people to Yazid's nomination. 
Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr had preceded the Imam to Mecca and prepared his own 
base to denounce Yazids authority and establish his own caliphate. Amazingly, 
the sources of this era indicate that during his stay in Mecca Imam Ousayn did 
not criticize or underestimate ibn al-Zubayr's ambition, nor did ibn al-Zubayr 
challenge the Imam's right to the leadership of the Islamic community. 
However, one might inquire what had happened to make the Imam consider an 
uprising against Yaz-id's authority at this time and four months after his 
nomination. Jafri claimed that Imam Ousayn's kinship to the Prophet and Yaz-1d's 
pressure on him to pledge allegiance had stimulated the Imam"s movemen t; 59 
still, Jafri's claim might be refuted by the fact that such a kinship could not 
provoke the Imam to revolt against Mu'ýwiya's rule after the death of Imam 
ýasan, when he formulated the plan to have his son Yaz-id inherit the throne, in 
spite of the numerous calls that were expressed in the letters of Ku-fan and 
Basran adherents urging him to rise at the time. Neither did the Imam use such 
a relationship to gather supporters and stimulate insurgency against Umayyad 
kingship while he was staying in Mecca -a matter that Jafri himself honestly 
acknowledged, as stated above. On the other hand, there is no single evidence 
of Yaz-id's pressing demand for homage to Imam ousayn during the Imam's 
residency in Mecca. Significantly, Imam ousayn's intention to challenge Yaz-1ds 
authority seems to be inspired by two variables. Firstly, Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr's 
unconcealed and serious ambition to rise up against Yaz-id's regime in Mecca if 
Imam ousayn chose not to act and left the city. Secondly, he had received 
thousands of letters from his adherents in Ku-fa and Basra from Mu, ýwiya's time, 
urging the Imam to denounce Mu'ýiwiya's authority, but all these calls had 
fallen 




on deaf ears as far as the Imam was concerned as he had committed himself to 
the pledge of allegiance that he gave to Mu'ýiwiya. However, the contents of 
the letters sent to the Imam this time expressed a serious and resolute intention 
to overthrow the political status quo, with the authors denouncing Yaz-1d's 
authority by isolating and boycotting and even offering their willingness to oust 
his appointed governor of Ufa; they also urged the Imam to join them since 
they no longer had a leader and to establish the caliphate based on his 
grandfather's genuine shari"a in the capital city of his father, Imam Ali. For 
example, one of the letters signed by several of the Imam's adherents, among 
which was the Prophet's companion, Sulaym5n ibn $urd al-Khuza-il reads: 
We thank God for casting down the tyrannical rule of your enemy, who 
had usurped the power to rule this community without any right, allowed 
the possession of God to pass into the hands of the powerful and rich, 
and killed the best men [an allusion to ýijr b. Ad-i and his supporters] 
while allowing the worst of the people to remain alive. We invite you to 
come to KOfa, as we have no Imam to guide us; and we hope through 
you God will unite us on the path of truth. We do not go to Friday 
congregational prayers to pray with Nu'm5n b. Bashir, the governor of 
Ufa, nor do we assemble with him on the occasion of the Eid(Feast). If 
we hear that you are coming to us, we will oust the governor from our 
city. Peace and mercy of God be upon you. 'O 
The significance of this letter lies in two potential and critical points. First, it 
emphasizes that in reality the city of Ku-fa was suffering from a vacuum of 
leadership beside the uncompromising determination of the Imam's adherents to 
challenge the regime which could lead to bloody chaos. Second, such a vacuum 
in leadership consequently disrupted the implementation of the pillars of shan 
"a 
thus representing a serious threat to Muslim unity. In such conditions, Imam 
60 Quoted in bid, 178. 
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ýusayn became legally obliged to intervene to restore unity, guide the people 
and secure the right implementation of shari"a. Still, Imam Husayn was not 
rushing to accept the Ku-fans' offer due to the bitter preceding experience with 
his father and brother, Imam Ali and Imam ýasan respectively. Hence, he sent 
his cousin Muslim ibn 'Aqil to KOfa to investigate the situation there and report 
to him on the credibility of their commitment to his cause and the adequacy of 
such support in achieving the ultimate goal. Imam ýusayn responded to the 
Kofa-n calls in a significant letter that reads: 
From Ousayn ibn Ali to the public of the believers and Muslims. 1-15ni and 
Sa'Id conveyed to me your letters, and they were the last among your 
messengers to come to me. As I have understood all that you narrated 
and stated and the opinions of the majority among you: that you have 
invited me to come to you because you have no Imam to guide you, and 
that you hope my arrival there will unite you along the right path and in 
the truth. I am sending my brother , cousin and the trusted member of 
my household, Muslim ibnAq-il, to report to me about your affairs. If he 
confirms what you have already mentioned in your letters, has received 
the consensus of your nobles and the majority among you, I will come 
soon since the Imam is merely the one who strictly follows the Book of 
God, rules virtually with justice, rightly secures the implementation of 
shari"a, and honestly devotes himself to the service of God. " 
Significantly,, Imam ýusayn's action indicated that any future movement on his 
part against the de facto authority was conditionally connected to the existence 
of genuine and sufficient support; otherwise he might have acted differently if 
his cousin and deputy to Ufa, Muslim ibn 'Aq-N, reported negatively. Indeed, 
Imam 1jusayn's decision to retreat to Medina when he discovered that the Ku-fans 
had betrayed him and failed to support him might emphasis such a claim. The 
Imam evidently expressed such a decision in his speech addressed to the KOfan 
61 Ahmad al-Kýtib, Tatawur al-fikr al-siy5si al-Shi c i: min al-shUr5 i15 wil5yat al-faqih 
(London: Wr ash-ShOra, 1997), 19. 
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soldiers in the Umayyad army just one day before the outrageous massacre of 
KarbaI6 on the 1 Oth of Mulýarram, stating: 
0 people of Ufa! You sent to me your delegations and wrote to me 
letters saying that you had no Imam and that I should come to unite you 
and lead you in the way of God ... You wrote that we, the AN al-BaA are 
more qualified to govern your affairs than those who claim things to 
which they have no right and who act unjustly and wrongfully ... But if you 
have changed your minds, have become ignorant of our rights, and have 
forgotten your delegations and repeated appeals to me to come for the 
sake of your religion ... I shall turn back. 
" 
2.5. THE IMAMS DURING THE KINGDHIP 
2.5.1. IMAM ALI ON AL-kiUSAYN (AL-SýJJAD) 
Imam ýlusayn's ambition was demolished, and he was killed along with all his 
companions in the reprehensible massacre of Karbala. This tragic end that had 
so shaken the feeling of Muslims had an even greater impact on the remnants of 
a171 al-Bayt, mainly Imam Ali ibn al-ýusayn, also known by Zayn al-, Abid-in and 
al-Sajj5d (d. 93/712), the Fourth Imam according to the doctrine of Twelver 
Shi'ism. Imam Ali ibn al-Ousayn was an eye -wetness at the battle of KarbaI6 , 
and the only male left alive from ýusayn's descendants, as a serious illness had 
spared his life from the swords of Yaz-id's soldiers. After the battle of Karbala, he 
had been taken captive along with the women of A171 al-Bayt to Yaz-id's court in 
Damascus before being released and returned to Medina, the city of his 
grandfather. 
62 Quoted in Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, The Origins and Early DeveloPment of Shi'a Islam (Oxford: 
(,,, 'Drd 
University Press, 2000), 186. 
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Apparently, Imam Ali ibn al-ýusayn's bitter experience of Karbala which had 
exposed the Umayyad regime"s brutal and ruthless tendency against the 
Prophet"s grandson despite the sanctity he enjoyed among Muslims, led to his 
total reluctance to get involved in politics; instead he committed himself to 
worship and religious education. In fact Imam Sajjýicl expressed such a desire 
when the KOfans and Shi'ites of Basra offered him their allegiance and urged 
him to take revenge on his father in one of very rare traditions that might reveal 
his political orientation: he showed himself to be firmly standing against any sort 
of anti-authority activities when he stated: 
By Allah, no one among us [is] to rise up before the [coming] of the 
Mahdi [al-QW im], lest he be like the fledgling that flew from the nest 
before its wings were straightened out and was picked up by children 
who began toying with it. 63 
Indeed, three significant points could be extracted from this tradition. First of 
all, the tradition carries the tone of a petition but not a demand. Secondly, it is 
clearly exclusively addressed to the ahl al-Bayt Finally and most importantly, 
the tradition implicitly warns against false calls urging the ahl al-Bayt to rise up 
against the usurping authorities and gives promises to provide the required 
support and when the confrontation happened in the battlefield these promises 
would turn to no more than lies; then ýusayn's scenario would be repeated. For 
that reason, The Imam was firm in his resolution not to heed several calls to 
claim the caliphate -a matter that eventually led to the election of Sulaymýn ibn 
Sard al-KhuzW-1, one of the grand companions of the Prophet, to be the Amir of 
63 Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending discourses in shici law on the tradidon of wiiayat al-faciih, " iranlan Rudles 29: 3, ()une 
1996), 256. 
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the Shi'i communitY of Basra and entrusted to conduct campaigns against the 
Umayyad troops. 64 
Noticeably, the ultimate gist of the aforementioned tradition divulges in the 
Imam's efforts to protect the unity of the Islamic state regardless of the 
legitimacy of the actual ruler, and there is clear evidence that Imam Sajjýd was 
only too aware of the safety and integrity of the Umayyad state when he 
dedicated a great du "i -' (supplication) in which he pleaded with God to protect 
this state and its army and defeat its enemy. The du CaP reads: 
0 Lord, bless Mohammad and his descendants, fortify the Muslim 
frontiers with Thy Majesty. Support their defender with Thy strength. 
Lavish gifts on them --------------- out of Thy Bounty. 
0 Lord, bless Mohammad and his descendants. Increase their number, 
sharpen their weapons. Guard their surroundings. Protect their 
environs. Keep their company united. Regulate their business. Let their 
(supply of) provisions be uninterrupted and Thyself alone look after their 
affairs. Strengthen them with victory. Help them with fortitude. Be kind 
in devising a stratagem for them. 
0 God, bless Mohammad and his descendants. Make them know what 
they do not know. Show them what they do not see... " 
In other words, the Imam's total refusal to get involved in the challenge over the 
political leadership and his attitude towards the Umayyad regime seems to be 
odd, not only because it was the regime that killed his father along with seventy 
members of ahl al-Bayt and their adherents, but also because it could be 
64 Ahmad aI -K5tib, Tatawwural-Fikral-Siygsial-Shi'i min a1-Shj7rgj1j W11jyata1-FJq1h (London: Dýr al-ShOr5 ri al-Dirasat 
wa al-il5m, 1997), 20. 
65 Imam Z-in al-'Abidin Ali ibn al-Husayn, 5aýifiyy-i sVjdiyya, Supplication 27, trans. Sayyid Ahmad '-1uhani (Tehran: 
Islamic Propagation Organisation, 1984), 243-245: also, for the Arabic and Persian collection and translation check Imam 
Zin al-'Abidin Ali ibn al-ýlusaiyn, . 5Jýfflyy-isqff9diyW, trans., Mohammad Mahdi RiO5i 
(Qum: Nashr Jamal, 1382), 144-47. 
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deemed to be a deviation from the political line of the first three Imams in 
dealing with the de facto authority. However, the Imam's attitude might have 
been greatly affected by the radical alteration in the political system when the 
question of the political leadership of the Muslim community was settled in 
favour of Yaziid,, and the concept of dynastical 'caliphate' became a reality after 
the battles of Karbala and al-Harra, in which Yazid's army cruelly subdued the 
revolt of the people of Medina in 63 H. Indeed,, Imam Sajjýd realized that any 
sort of opposition would merely provoke the brutality of the regime, shed the 
blood of Muslims,, threaten the unity of the Islamic state, and most importantly 
jeopardize the lives of ahl al-Bayt, the second pillar of Islam according to ýadith 
al-Thaqalayn stated above, not to mention that it would also have no promising 
outcome as far as changing the political status quo was concerned. Hence, 
Imam al-Sajjýd might have wisely deemed that the supreme interest of Islam 
and Muslims in such circumstances required waiving the right to claim the 
caliphate and instead implement a period of political quietness in which the early 
'positive" state of inti, 7-jr, that implied the hope to peacefully hold the position of 
caliphate through the shOri (consultation) turned out to be far away; hence it 
had to be substituted with a new form of what could be called a 'politically 
rational' intizir that was definitely compatible with former state of intizir in the 
ultimate goal in preserving the unity of Muslim community but different in its 
complete withdrawal from the active involvement in political affairs. 
2.5.2. IMAM MOHAMMAD IBN ALI (AL-BAQIR) 
The conceptual and practical modification in the doctrine of intizir - unlike the 
case of the fourth Imam whose excessive worshipping consumed most of his 
time, so he left very few traditions - could be easily traceable in several traditions 
attributed to the fifth and sixth Imams, Mohammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-5ýdiq 
respectively. The new state of the "rational' intizirseems to be crystallised into a 
legal basis that precluded any involvement in anti-state activities and reflected 
47 
the Imams' tendency to voluntarily give up their right in the political leadership 
and their absolute unwillingness to forcibly restore such a right. Howeverf it is 
necessary to emphasise that the methodology applied by early scholars of 
Twelver Shi'ism in collecting the traditions of the Imams is lacking in good 
documentation that gave great attention to the time and the occasion of each 
tradition as it the case in the well-documentation of the Qur an and the 
prophet's ýadiths (especially those collected by the Sunni scholars); hence, the 
political significance and the conceptual modification of the traditions of intizir 
would be hard to apprehended if they were interpreted out of the context of 
their time and occasion. 
In the concept of 'rational' inti, 7-jr, the responsibility for the restoration of the ahl 
al-Bqytýý political leadership seemed to be adjourned and given over to the 
Mahdi. Significantly, the two Imams, who in their time witnessed the challenge 
among the different branches of ahlal-Bayt over the issue of the imamate - such 
as the case of Ali ibn al-ýusayn (al-Sajjýid) and his father's half brother 
Mohammad ibn al-oanafiyya - Mohammad al-Baqir and his brother Zayd ibn Ali, 
and Ja'far al-$5diq and bani al-'Abbýis, may have attempted to hit two targets. 
On the one hand, they aimed to put an end to the calls and pressure coming 
from their followers to rise against the de facto authority. On the other hand, 
making the armed claim for the caliphate an exclusive right for the Mahdi would 
be enough to topple the legitimacy of other claimants who were using ahlal-Bayt 
as a slogan to attract their adherents and exploit their sentiment for ahl al-Bayt 
to achieve the pretenders own political objectives. 
According to Twelve Shi'ism, the fifth Imam Mohammad ibn Ali ibn al-ýusayn 
(d. 114/733), also known by al-B5qir, inherited the position of imamate after the 
demise of his father in 93/712. His Imamate had lasted for nineteen years 
during which he was contemporary with five Umayyad caliphs, al-Wal-id ibn Abd 
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al-Malik (705-715), Sulayym5n ibn Abd al-Malik (715-717), Umar ibn Abd al-'Az-iz 
(717-720), Yaz-ld ibn Abd al-Malik (720-724), and Hish5m ibn Abd al-Malik (724- 
743). During al-B5qir-s time, relations between the ahl al-Bayt and the Umayyad 
dynasty could be described as cold and cautious, for while the ahl al-Bayt were 
committed to political calm, the Umayyads nevertheless kept a vigilant eye on 
them. However, that relationship dramatically changed in the last decade of al- 
B5qir"s imamate when Hishým ibn Abd al-Malik assumed the post of caliph for 
oppression against the ahl al-Bayt and their followers had been resumed 
following uncertain allegations of preparing to revolt against the Umayyad 
authority. 
This new stage of oppression revived the calls for the restoration of the usurped 
right among the ahl al-Bayt Imam Zayd, the younger brother of Imam al-Baqir, 
led those calls and began preparations for an uprising. However, Imam al-Baqi'r 
in his turn not only adhered to his father's line and firmly stood against his 
brother's intention but also made every effort to persuade Zayd to change his 
mind. Nevertheless, a dispute over the legitimacy of the revolution at this critical 
time had developed and turned into a challenge over the requisite qualifications 
for the post of Imamate. Ahmad al-Utib has conveyed the dialogue over this 
critical issue between Imam al-Bagir and Imam Zayd when the latter presented 
to his brother the Ku-f5ns' letters in which they were telling him about their 
gathering to support his cause and insisting on him making a stand against the 
Umayyad kingship. It reads: 
Imam al-Mclir asked: were those letters initially sent from the Ku-fans or 
merely responses to your letters? 
Zayd replied: they initiated the correspondence as they recognise our 
right as the relatives of the Messenger of God for which God declares the 
compulsory of our love and obedience in His Book, and because of the 
stress and scourge we are experiencing. 
41) 
Then Imam Baqir begged him: ... not to be hastened by those who have 
no certainty ... for they will be helpless against God's Will. Do not rush, for 
God will not accelerate His Will, and do not try to precede the Will of God 
for if you did this, you would be killed by the scourge. 
Imam Zayd in an angry tone said: The Imam among us is not the one 
who stayed in his home, arkhj sitrih (dropped down his curtain), and 
failed to conduct the fihid, the Imam, but the one who secured his 
ýawwzatih (his property), put every single effort into fighting for the sake 
of God, defended ralyy, 3tih (his subjects), and protected his ý, 3ram#7 (his 
sanctuary). 
Imam al-B5qir: Do you know my brother of any evidence that supports 
your argument in the Book of God [Qur"in] or the Prophet's traditions? 
If so, give an example ... If you have evidence from God, and you were 
certain of your issue and knew what you are taking on, suit yourself; 
otherwise, do not conduct something you have doubt about, but do not 
challenge a kingship that has not yet reached its point of demise... 
Brother, I beg you in the name of God: do not be the one who will be 
crucified in al-Kan5sa. 66 
Although, al-Katib probably believed that this dialogue was made up by the 
Imam-i Shi'ites of the 4th century to protest against the followers of Imam Zayd, 
al-Mgir's stand thoroughly corresponded with the political line of Imam al- 
Sajj5d, and the message extracted from the dialogue delivered exactly the same 
content in the tradition attributed to Imam al-Sajj5d 67 stated above, reflecting 
clear suspicion about the credibility of the alleged followers and foreseeing the 
total failure of a revolt and the horrific fate that would await the rebels. 
66 Ahmad al-K5tib, Tarawwural-Flkral-5i), g. 5ial-5hii min al-5h0fiý4 Wiliyatal-Faq177 (London: D5r al-Shar5 rl aI -Diraýt 
wa al-il5m, 1997), 28-9. 
67 Indeed, al-Majlisi in Biý5r al-Anw5r attributed the same tradition to Mohammad al-B5qir; see %lohammad Baqir al- 
Majlis-i, býhjral-Anwk, vol. 52 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 139. 
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Even though the traditions, which assert the virtue of intizir and are attributed 
to Imam al-Baqir, reveal nothing about the occasion and the date of each one, 
they are most likely to have come from this period when Imam al-Baqir's 
essential concern could have been attempting to prevent his followers joining 
Imam Zayd in his intended uprising and thus sparing the lives of his adherents 
from what would undoubtedly be a severe retaliation on the part of the 
Umayyads. In one of his famous traditions, Imam al-Baqir provided one of the 
motivations in which he frequently invited his adherents to maintain political calm 
when he stressed the strength and coherence of the Umayyad regime and 
prophetically predicted its longevity: 
I advise you to maintain the fear of God, stay in your home, be with the 
ordinary people, and be careful not to join those rebels among us [ahl al- 
Bayt but here he points to Imam Zayd] for their rebellion lacks a legal 
basis and will gain nothing. Be aware that the kingship of the Umayyads 
will be a long one, and no one will be able to deprive them of it. 68 
In Biýjr al-Anwar, al-Majlis-I states another tradition in which Imam al-Baqir 
explicitly illustrated that ahl al-Bayt might be held accountable for their followers' 
political activities, and he urged his followers not to give any legal excuses to the 
authority to persecute and kill ahlal-Bayt. The tradition reads 
35bir said: We went to AN Ja'far [Imam al-Býiqir] in a group of people 
to bid him farewell after we had already finished the ritual of ýajj. We 
asked him to advise us. He said: The stronger ones among you should 
help the weak; the wealthy should assist the poor; a man should give 
sincere advice to his brother as he would advise himself; keep our 
secrets; and do not give an excuse to the people [the regime] to behead 
68 ibid, 136. 
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us [i. e. by 
authority]. 
69 
your involvement in rebellions against the de facto 
2.5.3. IMAM WFAR IBN MOHAMMAD (AL-5ADIQ) 
Imam la'far al-Wiq (83/702-148/765) had assumed the imamate and became 
the sixth Imam according to Twelver Shi'ism after the death of his father in 
115/733. Imam Ja'far has been recognised by the Twelver Shi'ites as the 
founding father for the school of jurisprudence of ahl al-Bayt. The Imam was a 
contemporary of the last five caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty, Hishým ibn Abd 
al-Malik, al-Walid ibn Yaz-id ibn Abd al-Malik, Yaz-id ibn al-Wal-id ibn Abd al-Maliki 
Ibrah-im ibn al-Wal-id ibn Abd al-Malik, and Marwýn ibn Mohammad. He also 
witnessed the rise of the Abbasid dynasty and the rule of the first two Abbasid 
caliphs, Abu al-'Abbýs al-Saffýý and Abu la'far al-ManýOr. 
Imam Ja'far lived in one of the most critical times of Islamic history 
characterised by a revolutionary trend when a number of revolts against the 
Umayyad dynasty and later the Abbasids broke out in different provinces of the 
Islamic state. In fact, revolution against the de facto authority seems to have 
70 been the favourite alternative for all the opposition groups during this period, 
and the members of the ahlal-Baytof this period proved to be no exception. 
For example, Imam Zayd ibn Ali ibn al-ýusayn started preparing a revolt against 
the Umayyads during the imamate of his brother al-Býiqir, but it was not until the 
early years of al-$Miqs imamate when he actually led the insurgency in Ku-fa in 
122/739. Y^a ibn Zayd conducted a failed uprising in 125/742. Additionally, 
there was Abdullah ibn Mu'5wiya ibn Abdullah ibn Ja'far (al-Tayy5r), who had 
chosen Isfahan as headquarters for his opposition to the Umayyads before he 
69 ibld, 122-23. 
70 Hasan 'Abbas Hasan, a1-Fkra1-Siyjsia1-Shii. - al-Usol wa a1-MJtxjd1'(n. a: al-Dcir al-'Alamiyya li-Tibýa wa al-Nashr,. -. a 
al-Tawwzli', 1988), 277-79. 
declared his revolution in 128/745; that spread widely in the eastern provinces 
and in fact formed a serious threat to the Umayyad regime. Also, Mohammad 
ibn Abdullah (al-Malýo) ibn al-Oasan ibn al-Oasan ibn Ali ibn AN Týilib (also 
known as dhl-al-nafs al-zakiyya literally meaning "the man of the great soul" who 
had revolted against the Abbasids in Medina and succeeded in controlling several 
provinces of the Islamic state before he was killed and his uprising was harshly 
suppressed in 145/762. Finally, we have Ibrahim ibn Abdullah ibn al-ýasan (al- 
MalýO)'s unsuccessful rebellion against the Abbasids that took place in Basra after 
the killing of his brother Mohammad in the same year. 
The revolts led by ahl- al-Bayt posed a serious challenge to the imamate of 
la'far al-S5diq and the tendency of 'rational' intizir that he was adopting. This 
was because the rising of any of the members of the ahl al-Bayt created a great 
confusion among the Shi'ites at the time and it was difficult for ordinary Shi'ites 
to recognise the bona fide Imam among several rebelling seniors of their tribe - 
a matter that claimed the lives of a large number of Shi'ites. This was the case 
with Salim ibn Ab-i ýafý and a number of his companions such as Kath-ir al-Naw5 
Ism5`11 ibn N5fi, al-ýakam ibn Uyayyna, Salama ibn Suhayl, and Ab-1 al-Miqd5d 
Thabit al-Oaddad who were among the first to call for Ja'far's imamate after al- 
B5qir's demise; however, they soon joined Imam Zayd's uprising. " 
During such gloomy circumstances, Imam Ja'far strived to pursue the same 
orientation of the 'politically rational" intizir and showed his inclination to the 
trend adopted by his father and grandfather when he expressed no interest in 
getting involved in the challenge over the political leadership on several 
occasions. For example, Abu-Muslim al-Khurýsýinli, the leader of the Abbasid 
troops that defeated the Umayyad army and abolished their dynasty, sent to 
71 Ahmad al-KRib, Tatawwural-Fikral-5iyjsi, 31-5hi'i min a1-5hOf; Eji1j Wlljyatal-Faqlh (London: Wral-Sh&5 R al-Dir5sM 
wa al-il5m, 1997), 35. 
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Imam la'far offering allegiance to him and urging him to stand for the political 
leadership of his movement; however, the latter turned down this offer and 
refused to directly or indirectly attach himself to this movement. 72 In fact,, Imam 
al-5ýicliq's major concern at this point might have been how to spare the lives of 
the Shi'ites of ahlal-Baytby identifying the true path and getting them all safely 
out of this revolutionary chaos. For that reason, a good number of the traditions 
of inti, 7-jr in the encyclopedic work of the traditions of the Twelver Shi'ism 
Imams, Bihiral-anwir, unsurprisingly are attributed to Imam Ja'far. In one of 
these traditions that was repeated by different narrators and in slightly different 
forms, the Imam demanded that his Shi'ites maintain complete calm and 
imprison themselves in their homes when any uprising breaks out; the tradition 
reads: 
Ab! al-Murhaf narrated that Abi Abdullah said: al-maýjýclr had perished, 
halak; I [Abi al-Murhaf] said: what is al-maýjýflr? He replied: those 
who are hastening (i. e. the establishment of the government of 
truth) ... the citadel is steadily fixed on its base; commit yourselves to your 
home; for the turmoil, fitna, will merely hurt those who provoke it in the 
first place, and God will protect you from their malice. 73 
According to al-Majlisi, the interpretation of thabata al-hisn (the citadel is steadily 
fixed) is an indication from the Imam of the stability and longevity of the 
Umayyad regime, which carries with it a number of significant indications. First 
of all, the tradition is pointing to the Umayyad reign and the Imam perhaps was 
pointing to his uncle Zayd with the word maýaVfr, those who had revolted 
against the Umayyads a few years after Imam la'far had assumed the Imamate, 
and using the word halak in its past tense form indicates that the tradition seems 
to date from the time after this revolt had been suppressed. Apparently, Imam 
72 Ramoin 1-6wind, al-Imam al -5idig. - ilm wa jqida (Beirut: D5r Maktabat al-ýayýt, 1991), 88; also; AN al-Bayt. - 
Maqjmuhum, Manhajuhum wa Masýruhum (Tehran: al-Balagh Foundation, 1986), 14 1. 
73 Mohammad B5qir al-Majlisi, Bihir al-Anwir, vol. 52 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa, 1983), 138. 
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la'far was warning his followers of the terrifying end awaiting Zayd and his 
adherents for hastening the establishment of the rule of rightness before its 
divinely scheduled time, despite the fact that Imam Ja'far had recognised Imam 
Zayd's knowledge and piety. Akhavi affirms "the Sixth Imam, warns the Shi'ah 
against resuming Zayd's rebellion, even though he acknowledged that Zayd was 
74 "learned and honest. In fact history itself held witness to the Imam's incorrect 
prophecy of the Umayyads' stable and long lasting reign when it fell in less than 
a decade later at the hands of the Abbasids. However, perhaps the Imam by 
declaring such a prophecy hoped that his adherents would give up the idea of 
armed revolution if they knew that the Umayyad demise not to be in the near 
future, thereby emphasising the practical meaning of the 'rational' intizir 
Significantly, Imam Ja'far called the rebellion of the "learned and honest"' Zayd a 
ftna that is deemed one of the greatest sins according to the divine definition, in 
which it is "worse than slaughter, r, 
75 " perversity, 106 "hypocrisy, 
07 vk unbeliever. 108 
Still, the tradition attributed to Imam Ja'far that is held to be "'the most 
pertinent, the political aspect of inti, 7jr, "79 and is predominantly recognised as 
the legal basis on which the absolute prohibition of political involvement during 
the occultation of the Mahdi stands is the one that reads: 
74 Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shici Law on the Tradition of Wilayat al-Faqih, " Iranian Studles 29: 3, 
(3une 1996), 256. 
75 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur , in: translation and commentary (Birmingham: Islamic Propagation Center 
International, 1946), 2: 191,217. 
76 The Qur'jn, 3: 7. 
77 777e Qur'jn, 4: 91. 
78 7he Qur'jn, 9: 49. 
79 Colin Turner, "Still Waiting for the Imam? The Unresolved Question of Inbz5r in Twelver Shi'ism, " P&slea XV (1993- 
1995), 36. 
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Each flag that is raised (i. e. by a rebel) before the rise of the Mahdi will 
have been raised by an idol (right7o who wants to be worshipped 
instead of God. 80 
Again, this tradition has been extensively misleading due to the lack of 
comprehensive interpretation that places it in its historical context and 
simultaneously gives great consideration to the link between it and other relative 
ones attributed to the sixth Imam. The significant key that would resolve the 
political puzzle posed by this tradition lies in the connection between the two 
Arabic words "Mahdl' and "riya, " which literally means a flag that is technically 
raised to declare war or insurrection. Initially, the word"raya'was stated but in 
it plural form "rjyjf' in the Prophet's several apocalyptic ýadl-ths, unlike what 
Turner believed when he doubted the authenticity of the traditions of foretelling 
the nature of Mahdi in Biýjr al-anwar, 81 those ýadiths most likely received the 
consensus of the Sunnis and Shi'ites alike, when the Prophet was telling about 
the black flags that would be raised in the East in Sunan ibn MjjJ, or in 
Khur5s5n in Musnad Ahmad ibn t1anbal to establish a preliminary state of the 
Mahdi; ibn Mýija mentions the ýadith in several forms and from different 
narrators among which are the following: 
Abdullah ibn al-05rith ibn luý al -Zubayd-i said that the Prophet said: 
'"people rise from the East, pave the way, (yuwarrl) to al-Mahdi. " This 
means his authority. 82 
Also, 
Abdullah said: As we in the presence of the Prophet, the kids of Bani 
H5shim came. When the Prophet saw them, his eyes overflowed with 
tears and his colour changed. I said: We still see in your face something 
80 Mohammad Mqir al-Majlis-i, Biýjral-Anwjr, vol. 52 (Beirut: Muassasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 143. 
81 Colin Turner, "Still Waiting for the Imam? The Unresolved Question of Intiz6r in Twelver Shi'ism, " Persica XV (1993- 
1995), 45. 
82 Sunan ibn Maia, ýad-lffi no. 4226. 
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we dislike. We, ahl al-Bayt, God wanted the joy of the hereafter life 
[paradise] for us rather than the present life, and my household (ahlu 
Baytl) after me will suffer from scourge, expulsion, and displacement till 
people will come from the East along with black flags (rjyjt st7d); they 
will ask for prosperity (khayt) but their request will be denied; then they 
will fight for their cause; afterwards they will be granted what they had 
asked but they will never accept to retreat until they pass it [the flag of 
leadership] to a man from my household who will rule the world with 
justice and remove all signs of grievance; whoever would be present 
among you at that moment, he should come to them even if you march 
over snow. 83 
While the ýadith in Musnad Ahmad reads 
Thawbýn said: the Prophet said: if you see the black flags are coming 
from Khurýisýn join them for God's caliph, al-Mahdi, will be within. 8' 
Additionally, there is one tradition attributed to the fifth Imam, al-Býqir, 
regarding the people who rise from the East in which he delivers a slightly similar 
content of the With documented by Ibn Mýija stated above. The tradition 
reads: 
Ab-i Kh5lid al-K5bili said: Ab-i Ja'far said: I see people in the East, rising 
up to claim their rights but failing to do so. They rise up again but fail a 
second time. Once more they brandish their swords; this time they are 
given that which they have sought, but they do not accept it until they 
are well established and hand it [the flag as a symbol of leadership] to 
no one but merely to your man [the Mahdi]. Their slaughtered ones will 
83 5unan bn Maja, ýadllh no. 4220. 
84 Musnad Ahmad, had-Ith no. 21353. 
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be martyrs if I realize that I will put myself at the service of that man 
[the Mahdi]. 85 
The prophecy of the black flags or the people who will start the revolution from 
the East or Khur5san, located east of Medina, the hometown of the Prophet and 
Imam Ja'far as well, was widely recognised among ordinary Muslims at that 
time. For that reason, the Abbasid movement, that was led by Abu Muslim al- 
Khur5sýinl and succeeded in putting an end to the rule of the Umayyad dynasty 
in 132/749, had successfully utilised this prophecy. It was significant that they 
selected Khur5s5n to be the starting point and the black flags as a symbol of 
their movement, with which they effectively recruited a large number of 
adherents among those who had some sympathy for the cause of ahl al-Bayt as 
well as others aggrieved by the injustice and tyranny of the Umayyad regime. 
Indeed, the influential Abbasid propaganda might have found some echo among 
Imam Ja'far and his close Shi'ites. Al-Majlisi narrates: 
Abb5n and I went to AN Abdullah when the black flags rose in Khur5s5n; 
we said: what do you see? (i. e. advise us what to do? ); then he said: 
stay home, and when you see us gathered around a man, then rise with 
us with weapons. " 
Significantly, Imam 3a'far from the above cited tradition appears to believe in 
the prophecy of the black flag, and perhaps he experienced the same feeling of 
excitement as his Shi'ites; however, the excessive exploitation of this prophecy 
which most likely became a phenomenon during his time, composed a serious 
threat for the stability and unity of the Islamic state and the lives of its people. 
Indeed, Imam 3a'far witnessed several attempts, as stated earlier, where the 
coming of the Mahdi and the raising of black flags had been employed in one 
85 Mohammad B5qir al-Majlisi, Biýjral-Anwjr, vol. 52 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 243. 
86 ibid, 138-39. 
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way or another to serve the political ambition of a number of claimants to the 
caliphate among the ahlal-Bayt For example, Abdullah ibn Mu'5wiya ibn Ja'far 
wished to cast his movement with the legacy of this prophecy when he started 
his rebellion against the Umayyads in Isfahan. Also, Mohammad ibn Abdullah al- 
Malýd outspokenly claimed Mahdism when he relied on his kinship to the Prophet 
and the similarity between his names, Mohammad ibn Abdullah with the Mahdi's 
name. Apparently the theory that deems the twelfth Imam, Mohammad ibn al- 
Hasan al-'AsskaCi as the Mahdi, had not developed yet. Furthermore, the 
Abbasids in their turn utilised all the significant aspects of this prophecy onto 
their movement. And one could not anticipate how many pretenders would rise 
before the appearance of the actual Mahdi. Hence, Imam Ja'far realized the 
significance of this prophecy for ordinary Muslims in strengthening their capacity 
to patiently endure tyranny and oppression by the usurping regimes in the hope 
of a better future - and this is what the concept of the saviour Mahdi who will 
bring justice and put an end to oppression is all about. In the earlier cited 
tradition attributed to him, in which he considered any flag raised before the rise 
of the Mahdi would be a flag raised by righ0t, he may have principally aimed at 
prohibiting and delegitimizing any armed rebellion that attempted to politicise 
the prophecy of Mahdism, which would not only be dangerous for unity and 
peace within the Islamic state but also deprive devoted ordinary Muslims of their 
dreams and hopes and exploit innocent lives -a matter that the Imam could 
have considered an abuse of the Prophets ýadith and violation of the sanctity of 
one of the principles of Islam. For that reason, Imam la'far was not 
exaggerating when he drew a similarity between the individual who committed 
this sin and the righOt 
Indeed, the military option to resolve conflict over the political leadership, i. e. the 
caliphate, had been firmly ruled out since the martyrdom of ýusayn, and the 
Imams not only decisively denied any compliance with the frequent calls to rise 
against the usurping authority but also remarkably stood against the idea of 
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rebellions and clearly warned their devoted Shi'ites from taking part in these 
revolts. Hence, it might be consistent to believe that the tradition of the flag of 
Pghikdid totally concur with the policy of "rational"" intizirapplied by the Imams 
in the post-Karbala period in which the prohibition and illegalization did not 
target the political ambition itself but rather the violent means that would be 
necessary to achieve such an ambition , and perhaps the conduct of the eighth 
Imam, Ali ibn Musa al -Ridý, who had voluntarily accepted al -M6mGn's offer of 
the post of wiliyat al-, Md (the heir to the caliphate), provides clear evidence of 
the validity of this belief. For that reason, Norman Calder perhaps got closer 
than any other scholars to this conclusion when he notices: 
the denial of any immediate threat to de facto powers (the rightful ruler 
being absent) rendered possible a variety of approaches to the 
government of the day. 
87 
Still, in this stage of "'rational" inti, 7-jr, though they promoted the state of political 
acquiescence among their followers towards the ale facto, the Imams 
encouraged their Shi'ite followers to be a part of the larger Muslim community 
and enthusiastically participate in its activities, namely those gatherings that 
characterize the conceptual and physical meaning of the unity of the Islamic 
umma such as prayers, fastening during the holy month of Ramaolan, and 
celebrating the Eds. For instance, Abd al-Kar-im bi Az5r Sh-ir5z-i delivered a 
tradition attributed to Imam al-B5qir in which he called on his Shi'ites to join the 
rest of the Muslim community in the of Ramadan fasting and celebration of the 
Feast. The tradition reads: 
Ziy5d ibn Mundhir narrated that Imam al-B5qir once was asked when the 
Shi'ites should fast (i. e. do the Shi'ites need to disagree with ama 
[Sunnis] on the beginning of the month of Ramadan); the Imam firmly 
87 Norman Calder, "Accommodation and revolution of the imami Shi'i jurisprudence: Khumayni and the classical 
tradition, " Middle Eastem Rudie5 18, (1982), 4. 
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responded: the fasting begins on the day when the people [Sunnis] fast, 
and the celebration of the Ed (Feast) on the day when the people 
[Sunnis] celebrate. 88 
Imam Ja'far al-$ýicliq as well in one of his traditions attempted to persuade the 
Shi'ites to maintain their attendance at the salit al-Jami"a (congregational 
prayers) of the Sunnis when he made them aware of the rewards of these 
prayers, describing them as almost equivalent to the prayers of the Prophet. 
The tradition reads: 
Whosoever among you prayed in the first column among them, it is as if 
he attended a prayer led by the Prophet in the first column. 89 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The positive and rational connotations of intizir had been totally lost in the 
legislative chaos that had shaken the foundation of Imam! belief after the demise 
of the Hasan al-'Asskar-i, the eleventh Imam, in 260/873, without having an heir 
to inherit the Imamate. This placed his adherents in confrontation with the 
concept of the divinity of the imamate, which was supposedly to last until the 
Day of Resurrection. Though it was said that the dispute over the figure of the 
new Imam had fragmentized the Imami Shiite community into fourteen 
factions, 90 the bulk of the Shiites, who from now on would be known as the 
Twelver Shi'ites, managed to extract themselves from this chaotic situation by 
the invention of the questionable theory of the Hidden Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam, 
whose life passed through two different stages of disappearance: ghaybj. ýughra 
88 Abd al-Kar-im b-i Az5rShir5z-i, R15il-yl Navin: ! badjtvakhJdskiýjv(/affwj-yi Imam K170melbl, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Daftar 
Nashr Farhang Isl5rni, 1376), 268. 
89 ibid, 268. 
90 Ahmad al-K5tib, Tarawwural-Fikral-5iy2ýsial-5hi'I min al-5hanýilj Wiliyatal-Faq177 (London: D5r al-ShGr5 rl al-Dir5s, ýt 
wa al-ilým, 1997), 113. 
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(the lesser occultation, lasting from 260/873 to 329/94 during which his guiding 
instructions were delivered to the faithful via four consecutive deputies), and 
ghaybi kubri (the greater occultation that will last until such a time when the 
earth is so overcome by oppression and tyranny that the Hidden Imam will 
return to restore justice and fairness). During the ghaybi kubri, the Hidden 
Imam will have recognized the ulami of Twelver Shiism, who are the narrators 
of the Imams" traditions, as guidance for the community of the faithful: 
For the incidents that happen, refer to those among you who narrate our 
traditions as they are my proof against you, and I will be the proof of 
God against them. 91 
The radical change in political circumstances during the second age of the 
Abbasid caliphate in which the political unity of the Islamic state was virtually no 
longer existent -a matter that encouraged other Muslims sects , such as the 
Sunnis, Zaydis, Ism6ilis, and Khýrijis to develop their own political theory and 
establish accordingly their independent regimes in different parts of the Islamic 
world. However, the ulamjof Twelver Shi'ism excessively enforced the practice 
of a new negative mode of intizir along with its necessary taqiyya (the 
concealment of the genuine belief), and deemed not only the establishment of 
an earthy government but also other Islamic rituals (such as Friday prayers, the 
collection of Zakjo as an exclusive right for the Mahdi that must be suspended 
until his return -a matter that placed the Shi'ites in a quarantine. Nevertheless, 
the ulamjýý prohibition of the establishment of the state during ghayba has led 
to a new deadly quandary in which the creation of the Islamic state seems to be 
a prelude to pave the way for the rise of the Mahdi according to the Imams' 
traditions of "J1-rjyjta1-sz7d`that have been discussed above. 
91 bid, 155. 
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Chapter 3 
THE ROLE OF THE USfJLi ULAMA IN NADIR SHAH'S a 
ECUMENICAL INITIATIVE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Nadir Shah's attempt to unify the Muslim community by uniting the four Sunni 
schools of jurisprudence with the Shi'ite Ja'farý-i rite, which led to the convening 
of the controversial Najaf conference, was the first such attempt in Muslim 
history. As a result, it rightly occupies the attention of scholars of Muslim and 
Iranian history alike. However, the genuine motives of Nadir Shah puzzled 
scholars then and continue to do so today. Most considered Nadir Shah's attempt 
to have been aimed at two targets: firstly, he wished to block any attempt at 
either the restoration of Safavid authority or the revival of the Safavid state using 
any of their claimants; secondly, he wished to guarantee a peaceful coexistence 
and political stability not only among his subjects but also his troops in such a bi- 
doctrinal state . 
92 Sti II, other scholars, although uncertain about Nadir's sectarian 
orientation, believed that his approach amounted to no more than conversion of 
his Shii subjects to Sunnism. 93 
Despite the validity of some of these interpretations as to Nadir's political 
motives, the quasi-unanimity among the previous studies in which the emphasis 
92 David Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1988), 155; Hamid Algar, "ShVism and Iran in the 
eighteenth century". in T. Naff and R. Owen (edits), studies in Elghteenth Century I51amic HIstory (London, 1977), 288, 
292,299; Hamid Enayat, Modem Islamic political thou_qht: the Response of the Shtl and Sun ni AL) <'-7 < to the Twentieth 
Century (London: Macmilan Press ltd., 1982), 40; and Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. ' the Azhar 
and ShIlsm Between Rapprochement and Restralrit, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 28. 
93 L. Lockhart, NaoXr Shah: critical study based mainly upon contemporafy sourres (London: Luzac & Co., 1938) 101, 
278-79; John R. Perry, Katim Khjn Zand., a h1story of Iran, 1747-1779 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1Q /79), 1-2; 
and, James Fraster, The History of Nader Shah (Dehli: Mohan Publication, 1973), 140. 
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was placed on the disagreement of the u. ýJrl ulami with Nadir's initiative and 
which deemed their participation in the process as merely a practice of taqiyya 
(dissimulation), appear to be inaccurate and need to be reconsidered due to the 
fact that the u.? rOffulamjý; role and their motivated aims and attained objectives 
have not as yet been approached comprehensively. Accordingly, the previous 
studies remain deficient and inadequate in portraying a three-dimensional picture 
because of the unjustifiable neglect of the three critical and correlated factors. 
First of all, it is the political motive behind the initiative that mainly seems to 
attract the attention of scholars to the extent that they have failed to pay proper 
attention to the significance of the principle of the unity of the Islamic umma in 
the shari"a which could provide by default the justification for any efforts in this 
regard. For that reason, it has been remarkable that the significance of such 
Islamic principles, according to the Holy Qur"in, the Prophet's hadiths, and the 
Imams' traditions had been entirely overlooked -a matter that was thoroughly 
illustrated in the introduction and chapter 1. 
Furthermore, the previous studies of the subject have failed to evaluate the geo- 
political significance of Persia and the Persians in apocalyptic Islamic events, 
according to the promise in the Qur'jn, the prophecy of the Prophet's ýadiths, 
and the epic traditions of the infallible Imams that pointed to Khurýs5n as the 
starting point and to the Persians as the prospective people for the required 
precursor state that would be responsible for preparing the drama of the Mahdi's 
return. This might have initially provoked the establishment of the u., 507school of 
Twelver Shi'ism under the Safavid's ruling and eventually motivated the 
involvement of the u.? r&ff ulami in Nadir"s ecumenical policy, as an attempt to 
survive the tragic consequences of the Afghani invasion following which they lost 
their Safavid sponsor-state, and involved the newly established regime in order 
to preserve their influential role in the Iran polity. This chapter will be dedicated 
to investigating the under-emphasised role and probable impact of the u., 501i 
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ulama on Nadir Shah's initiative for Islamic reconciliation. For that reason, it 
seems to be necessary to note that Nadir's life and career will be outside the 
scope of the article, as only the relevant events and information will be 
highlighted. In addition, a brief survey of the rise of the u.? r0school of Twelver 
Shi'ism under the Safavid rule will be set out. 
3.2. THE RISE OF THE U50U SCHOOL OF SHVISM 
Although several studies have examined the founding of the Safavid regime in 
Iran together with its twin, namely the u, 50ff school of thought of Twelver 
Shi'ism, these previous studies seem to have considered the relationship 
between the two phenomena to be based exclusively on the mutual interest: the 
Safavid dynasty adopted Twelver Shi'ism as the official state religion and 
allowed the u, 5, iXu1amjto promote their teachings, while the latter assisted in 
providing the unprecedented but necessary legitimacy for the newly established 
regime. However, a fundamental question that has been left unanswered 
regarding the legitimate basis on which the ulami., known today as the u. ýOlis, 
had built their argument, is why it not only cooperated with an earthly state but 
also officially became a part of the system - that same system that had been 
historically considered a usurping authority for the right of the Hidden Imam by 
the consensus of the Twelver ulama. In other words, the doctrine of intizir 
(waiting for the return of the Mahdi to establish the divinely just state, 
meanwhile repudiating the legitimacy of the de facto authority) had dominated 
the thought and attitudes of the ulama of Twelver Shiism since the ghayba 
(occultation) of the 12th Imam, Mohammad ibn al-ýasan al-'Asskar-i, in 329/940, 
and forced the Shiites to commit themselves to a political tranquillity that lasted 
for centuries. The legitimacy of such an attitude relied on a single tradition, 
attributed to Imam al-55diq, according to which the Imam prohibited any 
rebellion and called any rebel a righ0t. Nevertheless, no attempt has been 
made to investigate the legal or jurisprudential reasons for the radical change 
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which took place in the ulamjýý attitude towards the earthly state of the Safavids 
-a change that eventually divided Twelver Shi'ism into two disputing schools, 
the traditionalist akhbiriand the reformist usijll-. 
There could have been two reasons that motivated such a radical change. On 
one hand, it is possible that the u. 501fulamihad re-interpreted the Traditions and 
favoured those which saw the Safavid regime as precursor to the rise of the 
Hidden Imam over the Tradition which prohibited all political activism prior to his 
return. Indeed, the "traditions of the black flags' are famous and acknowledged 
by most of the Islamic sects and significantly they correspond with several of the 
Prophet's ýaalfths. Meanwhile, the "taghOt Tradition' has a weak chain of 
transmission and is open to numerous interpretations. It may be that the 
Safavid ulami might have found that the teachings of the latter tradition, Le 
righ0t, referred to the period in which it was transmitted, namely the era of 
la'far al-Sýcliq himself, and was therefore no longer relevant, despite the fact 
that generations of ulama had used this Tradition to promote political quietism 
amongst the believers. Quietism had been promoted since the occultation of the 
Twelfth Imam in which the ultimate goal of ulami at that crucial moment might 
have been to secure the theory of imama and surpass the environment of 
distraction which followed the occultation of the Imam and seriously threatened 
the existence of the madhab (sect) as well as the solidarity of its believers. 
The second motive may be related to the geographical and racial importance of 
the Safavid movement. Geographically, the Safavids although they had originally 
instigated their movement from North-western Persia in the province of 
Azerbaijan, they soon directed their expanding campaigns to East Persia, 
towards the province of Khurýs5n. The Safavid intention was widely accepted as 
an attempt to avoid direct conflict with the Ottoman Empire, especially after the 
sound defeat of their troops at the hands of the Ottoman army at the battle of 
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Childirin in 1514. However, Shah Ismý'Il had succeeded in bringing the entire 
province of Khur5s5n under Safavid rule in 1510, and the city of Herat became 
the seat of the crown-prince. 94 Hence, there was likely to have been an attempt 
by Shah IsmWill, after he had declared Twelver Shi'ism as the official state 
religion, to take advantage of the prophecy of al-rjyjt al-sObl so as to win the 
support of the ulamj of Twelver Shi'ism and attract the sympathy and loyalty of 
ordinary Shi'ites. 
Moreover, Persians enjoy a prestigious position in Islam as the true believers, 
and the holy Qur"jn on a number of occasions carries the divine promise that 
they would replace Arabs in the defence of Islam if the latter failed to handle 
their mission. For example, Verse 38 of Chapter 47, the Al-Mighty states "'if ye 
turn back (from the Path), He will substitute In your stead another people; then 
they would not be like yoU.,, 95 In the interpretation of this verse, al-Tabar-i (d. 
310/922) conveys a ýadilh narrated by abG Hurayyra who said: when this verse 
was revealed to the Prophet, Salmýn al-Fýirisl was sitting beside him, and the 
companions inquired who those people were. The Prophet tapped his hand on 
Salm5n's shoulder and said: From this man and his folks, 0 who hold my life in 
his hand, if belief was hanging on the highest star (thurayyaý, it would be 
reached by Persian men. 96 The same ýa&h was stated in the interpretation of 
this verse in the work of the Shi'i scholar al-Tabars-i (d. 548/); al-Tabars-I in his 
work Majma " al-bayin fi tafsir al-Qur "in copied the same ýadith except that he 
replaced the term d[n (religion) with the term imin (belief) . 
97 Also, this ýadl'-th 
94 Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 35-36. 
95 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, T77e Qur'jn: translation and commentaty (Birmingham: Islamic Propagation Center International, 
1946), 47: 38. 
96 Check the interpretation of the 47: 38 in al-Tabaffs work -7jml' al-bayin 
fi tafsir al-qur'an which is available online, 
thanks to the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought that provides all the books of tafsir for the major Islamic 
sects; 
http: //altafseer. com[Tafasir. asp? tMadhNo=O&tTafsirNo= 1&tSoraNo=47&tAyahNo=38&tDisplay=yes&Page=2&Size= i. 
97 http: //altafseer. com[Tafasir. asp? tMadhNO=O&tTafsirNo=3&tSoraNo=47&tAyahNo=38&tDisplay=yes&Page=2&&ze= 1. 
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was re-emphasized in the explanation of the Verses 3 and 4 of Chapter 62, in 
which God says: 
3. As well as (to confer A# these bene&s upon) Others of them who 
Have not alreadyjoined them: In Might Wise. 
4. Such is the Bounty of God, Which He bestows on Whom He will: And 
God is the Lord of the highest bounty 98 
Perhaps, the rise to power of Shah Ismý'Tll at a critical moment in Islamic history 
when any significant Arab political influence was absent - the two heavyweight 
powers in the Islamic world at the time were the Ottoman state in Anatolia and 
the MamlGk state in Egypt - together with the fragmentation of the Islamic 
umma was cognizant of the divine promise to the people of Persia. Although 
there was no concrete evidence to confirm such a theory, some of the Shah's 
early actions may suggest such an intuition. For instance, the Shah included the 
province of Fars in his newly established state when he conquered the Southwest 
of Iran in 1508 and was keen to adopt Persian culture and promote the Persian 
langua ge, as well as Twelver Shiism, despite his Azar-i origin. Rula Abisaab, even 
if she paid no attention to the dogmatic dimension of Shah Ism5'11's attitude, 
notices: 
Although the Arabic language was still the medium for religious scholastic 
expression, it was precisely under the Safavids that hadith compilations 
and doctrinal works of all sorts were being translated to Persian. The 
'Amilis (Lebanese scholars of Shi'i faith) operating through the Court- 
based religious posts, were forced to master the Persian language; their 
students translated their instructions into Persian. Persianization went 
hand in hand with the popularization of 'mainstream' Shi'i belief. 99 
98 The Qur'jn, 62: 3 and 4. 
99 Rula Jundi Abisaab, "Iran and Pre- independence Lebanon" in Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, DIstant Relations. - Iran and 
Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 76. 
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Shah Ismý'Til virtually managed to break open the cage and escape the critical 
impasse of the legitimacy of rule when he established the state in Iran, based on 
his claim of authorization from Imam Mahdi together with a dream vision of 
Imam Alif in which the Imam ordered Ismý'il to rise and declare Twelver 
Shi'ism as the official religion of his new state. 100 Meanwhile, the utilization of 
the apocalyptic ýadiths and epic traditions such as that of the Eastern black flags 
(al-Riyital-50d) and the highlighting of the Persian aspects of the regime might 
have portrayed his state as one that would indeed prepare for the Mahdi's 
return. This might have become the legal basis for the ulami, to refrain from 
the traditional doctrine of intizir. Accordingly, Shah IsmaTil eventually secured 
the unprecedented recognition of some of the Shi'i ulama who could well have 
found in IsmWTI's movement the long-awaited relief from the dilemma caused by 
the conflict between the traditional doctrine of inti, 7jrancl the state required for 
the Mahc1i's reappearance. As a result, a number of the ulami of Twelver 
Shi'ism, mainly from Jabal 'Amil, in modern Lebanon, joined his court to assist 
in promoting the new sect, to the Sunni dominated populace of Iran, among 
which was al-Muýaqqiq Ali ibnAbd al-'Al-i al-Karak-i, who reached Iran in 1510. 
Noticeably,, al-Karak-i legitimized "aql (reasoning) as an indispensable tool to 
extract the legal opinions from the traditions in which the role of the faqih had 
been changed from merely being a narrator of the traditions and the ordinances 
of the infallible Imams into a figure who is eligible to review, edit, reform, re- 
interpret and establish new ordinances. For that reason, al-Karak-i was granted 
the title of al-Muýaqiq (this Arabic term literally means "the editor; " however, the 
technical application in al-Karak7i"s case seems to be more comprehensive and 
include several tasks such as reviser, re-interpreter, analyst, and reformist). 
a ; 3ql77 (D5r al-ShOr5 wa al-l't5m: 100 Ahmad al-K5tib, Tatawwur al-Fikr al-Slyi5i al-56 i m#7 al-5hjf; Eý i1i W11jYat I-F 
London, 1997), 376. 
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Accordingly, several jurisprudential ordinances that had firmly been established 
previously were revised and re-interpreted: for instance, al-Karak-i revived the 
ritual of Friday Prayer that had been banned since the ghayba although he 
required the attendance of the Imam or his ng"ib (the eligible faqfh) as a 
prerequisite to consider the holding of such prayers compulsory; 'O' also, he 
legitimized the state's right to collect the char (land tax) and allowed the fuqahj 
to accept financial aid and allowances from the temporal ruler. 102 Since then 
Twelver Shiism was divided into two conflicting schools of thought when the 
traditionalists who stick with traditional naql (narrating) became known as the 
akhbiris, while the newly established school that activated the role of "aql in 
addition to the naqlwas called the u.? r0i 
The Safavid era left two extraordinary trends that would be a shifting paradigm 
in the relations not only between Sunni and Shi'i Islam but also between the 
ulami of Twelver Shi'ism and the state in Iran and coincidently became 
attached to the same key figure of modern Twelver Shi'ism who has been 
widely considered the founder of the UsiNSchool, al-Muhaqqiq al-Karak-i. It is 
said that al-Karak7i instituted a political alliance with Shah Isma, fil and 
participated greatly in the brutal conversion of Iranian Sunnis to the official sect 
of the new sate; also, he adopted one of the ghulit (extremists) conducts, 
mainly the 5abb (curse) of the first three al-Oulafa- al-Rishidl-n (rightly-guided 
Caliphs) and explicitly introduced it to the public in his continuous sermons, 
which fanned the flame of sectarian strife among Muslims and negatively 
reflected on the Shi'ites abroad. Turner states: 
The ritual vilification of the first three 'rightly guided' Caliphs (al-khulara 
al-rashidt7n), Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, was rigidly enforced ... in each 
town to ensure that people adhered to the new anti-Sunni instruction. 
10 1 bid, 362. 
102 Colin Turner, Islam wlthoutAllah? (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 83-84. 
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Karaki is reported to have taken part personally in the antics of these 
vigilant squads... Karaki attacked Sunnism blatantly from the pulpit of 
every mosque in which he preached. It is reported that his open attacks 
on the first three caliphs had repercussions in Mecca and Medina, where 
punitive measures were taken in revenge against the Twelver scholars 
resident there, a group of whom promptly wrote a letter of protest to 
Karaki. 'O' 
Al-Karak-i's conduct not only created an immovable stigma on Islamic unity which 
marks the Safavid era as symbolic of the sectarian hatred in Muslims' memories, 
but also provoked an immediate reaction by the counterparts within the Sunni 
ulami, such as Shaykh al-Islim Kemýl Pashzada (d. 940/1533), who was the 
highest ranking of the Sunni clergy at the time. Shaykh al-Islim might have 
been stimulated by the anti-Sunnism practices in Iran when he issued a fatwa 
against Shah Ism5'-il and his troops known as qizilbish. In this fatwa, Shaykh 
al-Islim deemed the Shah and his q&1bish troops as murtaddin (apostates from 
Islam), so he considered their lands o1jr ýarb (a place permissible for war). Thus, 
it is fully legitimate according to shari'a law that those people who curse the 
Prophet's caliphs, spouses or companions, should be killed and confiscated and 
their women enslaved; accordingly, he considered the fil7jd (holy war) against 
them in this case as farpl- 'ayn (compulsory), so he urged the sultan to conduct a 
war against the Safavids. 104 Eventually, this fatwa provided the needed 
legitimacy for the Ottoman Sultan, Sil-im (918-926/1512-1520), to conduct a 
campaign against the Safavid state in (920/1514) when his army defeated the 
Safavid troops in the Battle of Chaldiran and conquered their capital city of 
Tabriz. 
103 ibid, 84. 
104 According to Allouche, the fatwa was issued twice, in Turkish and Arabic, but he claimed that the Turkish copy is 
missing; for the Arabic copy of the fatwa check Adel Allouche, The ofigin and development of the Ottoman -Sý343wd 
conflict (906-96211500-1555) (Berfin: Maus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 170-73. 
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Theoretically, the fatwa was of limited significance as it merely addressed the 
Shah and his fighting forces and it was geographically restricted to the lands 
under the Shah's control. Significantly, although there is no single reference to 
the Shi'ites or Shi'ism throughout the fatwa, its impact affected not only the 
Safavid Shi'ites but also extended to the Shi'ites abroad, and the letter of 
protest sent to al-Karak-i from several Shi'i scholars was clear evidence of such 
an orientation. So this fatwa represented a radical shift in attitude between 
Sunnism and Shi'ism in modern history, and would have paved the way later for 
several fatwas that openly accused Twelver Shi'ism of heresy and set the stage 
for mutual enmity and hatred between the Sunni and Shi'i sects of Islam. 
Though Turner's assertion of al-Karak-i's role in the coercive conversion of the 
Iranian Sunnis and the antagonistic attack against Sunni ideals and principles, 
other scholars denied such an allegation and instead blamed Shah Ismý'Til and 
his qazilbish followers for the enforcement of the Shiitization policy of the 
Iranian Sunnis. For example, Rula Abisaab not only declares al-Karak-i"s acquittal 
from this claim but also asserts his disagreement with such a policy when she 
states: 
Al-Karaki preferred to refute Sunnite theological beliefs publicly among 
Sunnites and Shi'ites so as to bring converts to Twelver Shi'ism based 
on their freely chosen, unequivocal adherence to the rightful cause of the 
Imams. Al-Karaki believed this would initiate a wave of conversions to 
Shi'ism in Herat and achieved several subtle goals: the more peaceful 
spread of Shiism; the decrease in military use; and an increased respect 
for the mujtahidt role on both popular and court levels. "' 
105 Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Convertng Perslj: religion andpower in the Safavid empire (London: I. B. Tauns, 2004), 16-17. 
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Ahmad al-K5tib, furthermore, partly supported Abisaab's opinion when he 
pointed to a clerical opposition against Shah Ismý'Tils sectarian policies and a 
dictatorship led by al-Karak-i and deemed the latter's departure for al-Najaf 
during Shah Ism5'111 time (where he had settled for years before being 
summoned by IsmVfl's successor Tahmasb I), as a clear evidence for such 
opposition. Moreover., al-Kýitib pointed out that al-Karak7is bitter experience with 
the religiously uncommitted Shah Ism5`il and his claim of being deputy of the 
Hidden Imam could have motivated the former to develop the theory of al- 
Wiljya al- 'Amaof the fugahj (the general custodianship of the ulamaý during the 
gh, 3yb, 3 (the occultation of the 12th Imam). 106 By creating such a theory, al- 
KarakT might have indeed aimed to withdraw the religious legitimacy from Shah 
Ism5'-11 and put an end to his extremism., which ended with the Shah's claim of 
Mahdism, according to Savory. 107 
The genuineness of al-Wiliya al-'Amaas a radical development in the political 
thought of Twelver Shi'ism became a point of disagreement among the scholars 
when Turner named al-Karak-i as the founding father of the theory, while 
Sachedina claimed that al-Wiliya al- "Amawas historically practiced by the jurists, 
mainly the four deputies of the Hidden Imam, in the lesser occultation "assumed 
"108 the functional role of the Imams. 
Yet, in addition to firmly establishing the ulami as the legitimate representative 
of the Hidden Imam, the indisputable contribution of al-Karaki is that he not only 
initiated and normalized a new pattern of relationships between the u., 5011-ulamj 
of Twelver Shi'ism and the de facto state, traditionally seen as an illegitimate 
106 Ahmad al-K5tib, Tatawwur al-Fikr al-Siyisf al-5hii m1n al-ShOri Aj Wiljyat al-Faqlh (D5r al-ShUr5 v., a al-1, lam: 
London, 1997), 377-80. 
107 Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 23-24. 
108 Abdul Aziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler in 5hiite Islam: The Comprehensim Author#y of ffie Junst in 
Imamate jutisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 48-49,119-20. 
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and usurping one, but also expanded the ulamit wiljya to include political 
affairs. Hence, al-Karak-i advocated a new type of wiliya that this author refers 
to as al-wiliya al-taAlvýdiyya (delegated authority). According to al-Karakii, the 
wiliya (authority) of the ulami, as the legitimate representatives of the Hidden 
Imam, have the right to conduct all the executive functions of the Imam during 
his occultation; their authority includes the rights to delegate the political 
executive functions to a temporal ruler, and to allow this ruler to operate the 
political machinery of the state on their behalf. Consequently, the significant 
statement that emphasizes the supremacy of the ulamjal- "ulami ýukjm "ali 
al-mulOk'(the ulami rule over the kings) could have been a reflection of al- 
Karak7i's theory of al-Wiliya al- "Ama, which sees the supremacy of the ulama as 
the legitimate representative of the Hidden Imam, and the authority of the 
political rulers as stemming from the legitimacy of the ulami Hence, this 
statement had been widely circulated and commonly known in Iran in the 19ti" 
and 20th centuries, whenever the interests of the state clashed with those of the 
ulami. In other words, the ulami, according to al-Karak-i's claims, are eligible to 
politically rule the community by means of a proxy, by granting permission to the 
temporary rulers to practice their political authority on their behalf. Seeing as 
the ulami had been nominated for this wiliya by the divine authority of the 
Hidden Imam, none would be religiously eligible to dismiss them from this 
position, except the Imam himself. For that reason, Shaykh Ahmad Ardab-il-i, as 
Algar asserted, had openly brought this fact to Shah 'Abbýs's attention when he 
emphasized that "'he [Shah 'Abb5s] was ruling over a "borrowed kingdom" 
(mulk-i "iriya). if 109 
Al-Karak-i's vision of the ulamjýý leading role as the legitimate representative of 
the Hidden Imam, al-Mahdi, moved from theory into practice when Tahmasp 1, 
109 Hamid Algar, Reli ra 906. ' the Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Pendd (Berke! e,: University of qion and 5&3te in I, n 1785-1 
California Press, 1969), 22. 
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Shah Ism5'11's son and successor, issued a farmAn (royal decree) in which he 
acknowledged al-Karak7i's supremacy as the nj-'ib (deputy) of the Hidden Imam, 
ordered the Safavid officials to comply with al-Karaki's instructions, 110 and 
bestowed on him the title of Mitam al-mujtahidin (the Seal of Jurisconsults). "' 
The farman reads: 
In complying with the tradition of Imam Ja'far in which he said "search 
[among you] for he who narrates our traditions, scrutinIzes our ýaljl 
(permitted issues) and ýarjm (prohibited matter5), and knows our 
judgments and accept him to be yourjudge as I made hlm the governor 
over you. " Whosoever refused to obey his rule, would be considered to 
have disregarded the rule of God and to have denounced our authority 
and he would be in a position on the threshold of shirk (polytheism). 
Accordingly, disobedience of the rules of the ulami, the keepers of the 
Prophet's shari"a, has the same status as shirlc, therefore, disobeying the 
seal of the Jurisconsults, the heir of the Prophet's sciences, and the 
deputy of the infallible Imams [al-Karakfl, and whoever failed to follow 
his teachings would certainly be deemed accursed, held accountable, 
punished and expelled from the state. "' 
Obviously, following this procedure Shah Tahmasb I, who inherited the throne 
from his father at age nine,, could have intended to subdue the unleashed 
qizilbis17 leaders, who in fact had enjoyed wielding authority in state affairs 
during the early years of Tahmasb's reign. 113 The Shah's farman might have 
reflected an earlier arrangement with al-Karak-i, based on mutual interests 
according to which Tahmasb I acknowledged al-Karak7i's religious supremacy as 
the njib of the Hidden Imam while the latter enforced the Shah's political 
110 Andrew I Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 37. 
111 Ru Ia Jurdi Abisaab, Con verting Persia: religion and power in the Safavidempire (London: 1. B. Tau ris, 2004), 18-19. 
112 Ahmad al-Kýtib, Tapwwur al-Rkr al-Siyjsi al-Shii min al-Shijrj Ajý Wiljyat al-faq177 (D5r al-Sh&5 wa al-1, lam: 
London, 1997), 381. 
113 ibid, 380-81. 
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authority by authorizing him to rule the state on his behalf. Whatever the 
arrangement, al-Karak-i held the post of 5haykh al-151jm with unlimited authority, 
using this position to achieve two goals. Firstly, he used his new authority to 
propagate his innovative u. ýJff theology across the country and entrench it by 
nominating the prayer leaders of towns and villages to educate the people in the 
doctrine of týs0ff Shi'ism. 114 Secondly, meanwhile he took advantage of his 
influence within the court to remove his theological opponents'15 as was the case 
with Amir Ni'matulla al-ýilri, an Iraqi noble and scholar, who had been entrusted 
with the post of r, >adr by the Shah; al-ýilli's support of legal traditional views of 
the akhbiri Shaykh Ibrahim al-Qatiff on several matters such as the Friday 
prayer, land tax and the legalization of accepting financial aid from the rulers 
clashed with al-Karak7i's teachings and thus cost him his post, eventually leading 
to his exile to Baghdad. 116 On another occasion, al-Karaki managed to persuade 
Shah Tahmasb to oust the Persian noble Mir Ghayath al-Din Manýu-r al-Dashtak-i 
from the post of ? radr as he had objected to al-KarakT's involvement in 
determining the direction of the qibla. 117 
Al-Karak-i's vision of the ulamjýý leading role as the legitimate representative of 
the Hidden Imam, al-Mahdi, moved from theory into practice when Tahmasp 1, 
Shah Ismý'-il`s son and successor, issued a farmin (royal decree) in which he 
acknowledged al-Karak-is supremacy as the njib (deputy) of the Hidden Imam, 
ordered the Safavid's officials to comply with al-Karak-i's instructions, 118 and 
bestowed on him the title of khjtam al-mujtahidin (the Seal of 3urisconsults); 119 
the farman reads 
114 Colin Turner, Islam without Allah? (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 82. 
115 bid, 87. 
116 Rula I urdi Abisaab, Convertng Persia: religion and power in the 5afavid empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 17. 
117 Colin Turner, Islam withoutAllah? (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 92. 
118 Andrew 3. Newman, Salavid Iran: Reblrth of a Perslan Empire (London: 1. B. Tauris, 2006), 37. 
119 Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting Persia: religion andpower in ffie Safat4d empire (London: 1. B. Tauris, 2004), 18-19. 
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In complying with the tradition of Imam Ja'far in which he said "search 
[among you] for who he narrates our traditions, scrutinizes our ýaljl 
(permitted issues) and ýarjm (prohibited matters), and knew our 
judgments and accept him to be yourjudge as I made him the governor 
upon you. " Whosoever denied to obey his rule, he would consider to be 
disregarded to the rule of God and denounced to our [infallible Imams] 
authority in which he would be in a position at the verge of the shirk 
(polytheism). Accordingly, the disobedience for the rule of the ulami, 
the keepers of the Prophet's shari"a in the same status of sh0r, 
therefore, the disobedience of the seal of Jurisconsults, the heir of the 
Prophet's sciences, and the deputy of the infallible Imams [al-Karakfl, 
and whoever failed to following his teachings would be certainly deemed 
accursed, held accountable, punished and expelled from the state. 120 
Obviously, Shah Tahmasb I, who inherited the throne from his father at age 
nine, could have intended from this procedure to subdue the unleashed q&1bish 
leaders, who had enjoyed the actual authority in state affairs during the early 
years of Tahmasb's reign. 12 1 The Shah's farman might have reflected an earlier 
arrangement with al-Karak7i, based on the mutual interests according to which 
Tahmasb I acknowledged al-Karak7i's religious supremacy as the njib of the 
Hidden Imam while the latter enforced the Shah's political authority by 
authorizing him to rule the state on his behalf. Whatever the arrangement, al- 
Karak7i held the post of . 5hqyk17 al-Islim with unlimited authority, using which he 
managed to achieve two goals. On one hand, al-Karak-i utilized his new authority 
to propagate his innovative u. 50/itheology across the country and entrench it by 
nominating the prayer leaders of towns and villages to educate the people in the 
doctrine of u., r>0ffShi'ism. 122 Meanwhile al-Karak-i took advantage of his influence 
120 Ahmad al-Utib, Tarawwur al-flkr al-SiyJsT al-Shii min al-Shaný i1i Wilikat al-Faql77 (Mr ash -ShOra wa al -Mm: 
London, 1997), 381. 
121 bid, 380-81. 
122 Colin Turner, Islam wlthoutAllah? (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 82. 
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within the court to remove his theological opponents 123 as was the case with 
Amir Nimatulla al-Hill-i, an Iraq! noble and scholar,, who was entrusted the post of 
. ýadr by the Shah; al-oillis support to legal traditional views of the akhbiri 
Shaykh Ibrýihim al-Qarifi- on several matters such as the Friday prayer, land tax, 
and the legalization of accepting financial aids from the rulers clashed with al- 
Karak-i's teachings and thus cost al-oilli his post and eventually led to his exile to 
Baghdad . 
124 On another occasion, al-Karak-i managed to persuade Shah 
Tahmasb to oust the Persian noble Mir GhayRh al-D-in ManýOr al-Dashtak-i from 
the post of ? radr in response to his objection to al-Karak-i's involvement in the 
determination of the qibla direction. 125 
3.3. THE DILEMMA OF THE U5ULi ULAMA 
As has been emphasized above, the establishment of the UstXSchool of Twelver 
Shi'ism was motivated by the rise of the Safavid state in Iran, in which the 
ulamjýý association with the state and the legitimacy granted to its rulers was 
based on the hope of this state for being the prelude state that would pave the 
way for the Mahdi's return, according to the traditions of the Imams. It seems 
significant that this view survived and found adherents among the u. ý0fffuqahj in 
the second half of the 17 th century, just a few years before the fall of the Safavid 
state. For example, Mohammad 13ýiqir al-Majlis-1 (1037-111/1627-1699), the 
author of the encyclopedic work of the Imams' traditions, Biýjr al-anwir, clearly 
states: 
It was while I was engaged in my work [&ýjr al-anwid that I came 
across two traditions in which (the Imams) foretold the appearance of 
this exalted dynasty (dawla) and gave to the Shi'ites the glad tidings 
that this glorious dynasty [the Safavids] would be connected (iffisA in 
123 ibid, 87. 
124 Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Convertng P&sia: religion andpower in the Salavid empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 17. 
125 Colin Turner, Islam wiffioutklah? (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 92. 
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time to the government of the Hidden Imam of the House of 
126 Mohammad. 
Al-Majlis-1 cited those traditions that may have predicted the establishment of the 
Safavid state as the prelude to the rise of the Mahdi in his work Biýjr al-anwar. 
The first tradition, attributed to Imam al-B5qir, was one in which the Imam was 
predicting to his Shi'ite followers that people who will rise from the East and 
engage in several wars to defend their right to justice and prosperity will 
eventually hand the flag to the Mahdi. 127 Al-Majlis-i believed that the Imam in 
this tradition was pointing towards the Safavid state and this good omen for the 
state would last until the return of the Mahdi. 
In another part of his work, al-Majlis-i documented a tradition attributed to Imam 
Ali, in which he revealed a long story about the events that will happen on the 
eve of the Mahdi's return. The Imam said: 
When someone rises in Khur5s5n and brings under his domination the 
lands of the KOfans (arp(Kt7fan) 128 and the two doctrines (millatin) and 
goes beyond the island of BanO K5w5n, someone from our line rises in 
G115n and the Abur and Daylam join him. The flags of the Turks will 
flutter for the cause of my son in different countries ... If Basra is 
destroyed, and the prince of princes rises ... if thousands are mobilized 
in 
organized rows, and the ram kills the lamb 121 ... then the qj 
"im wil I rise. 130 
126 Quoted in Colin Turner, "Still Waiting for the Imam ? The Unresolved Question of Intiz5r in Twelver Shiism " Pers1ca 
XV (1993-1995), 43-4. 
127 Mohammad Mqir al-Majlisi, Blýjral-Anwjr, v. 2 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 243. 
128 KOfa but perhaps it was changed to this form due to the necessity of what is called in Arabic saj' to match the 
rhythm of Khur5sýin and Millat5n. 
129 The Ram is used by Arabs to signify a great and brave leader while on the contrary the lamb symbolized a weak and 
insecure man. 
130 Mohammad B5qir, al-Majlisi, Blhjr al-Anwir, v. 52 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 236. 
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Al-Majlis-I, in his explanation of this tradition, attempted to politically exploit it to 
legitimize Safavid rule. He reckoned that the one who would rise in Khurýisýn is 
either HulRu or Changiz Khýin, and Kýiww5n is an island in the Gulf of Basra. He 
also believed the one who rises in GT15n is Shah IsmWil and claimed that Abur is 
a village near Astr5b5d while the ram is Shah 'Abbýs I, who killed his son 5afi 
Mirza, symbolized by the lamb. 131 
Al-Majlisi's conviction seems to have had major significance because he held the 
office of Shaykh al-Islam during the reign of Shah Sulayman and Sultan Ousayn, 
which was considered the highest rank of official clergy in the Safavid state. 
Hence, his convictions might be interpreted as a reflection of the dominant view 
among the u. ýOff ulami at the time. In contrast, the picture seems to be entirely 
different during al-Majlis-i's period, in which the political weakness of the Safavid 
state with its irreligious and feeble rulers in the second half of the 17 th century 
coincided with the growing influence of the u., rull- ulami in the state polity, 
encouraging the latter to argue that the ruler must not only be a sayyid (the 
Safavid rulers claimed to be sayyids as the descendants of the 7 th Imam) but 
also a faqih. 132 Indeed, the situation suggests that the body of the u., r, 1W ulami 
might have been politically divided at the time into two conflicting currents over 
the future of usOiShi'ism in Iran. The first current, what this author could term 
as that of the "conservatives, " was represented by the state's official ulami, led 
by al-Majlis-1. who were striving to promote loyalty to the Safavid dynasty and 
preserve the status quo of the political system. Thus, there is little doubt that al- 
Majlis-i in his commentary, advocating the need to legitimize Safavid rule, was not 
only refuting the fuqahjýý criticism of the immorality of the Safavid rulers, as 
131 ibid, 236-37. 
132 For more information refer to Said Arjornand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden 
Imam: rellglon, politIcal Order, 
and socetal Change In Shilte Iran from the beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 105-108. 
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Turner believes, 133 but also defending and justifying his supportive and loyal 
position in relation to the Safavid state. 
The other current,, which could be described as 'pragmatist, was led by anti- 
Safavids among the USIN ulami who aimed to deprive the Safavids of any 
religious legitimacy in the hope of establishing the legal basis that might bring 
about the intended political change. The pragmatists could have perceived the 
political status quo as a sign of the inevitable fall of the Safavid state, the 
protectorate of u. ýOiShi'ism, which would amount to a serious threat for the 
existence of u. 50ffTwelver Shiism in Iran. In addition, the pragmatists might 
have been provoked by the al(birirevival, which became dominant in the sacred 
shrines of Iraq and reached several Iranian towns and villages. It is possible 
that they construed the association of urtWShi'ism with the uncharismatic and 
sinful Safavid Shahs as undermining their credibility and weakening their 
authoritative role. This might have caused a decrease in the popularity of the 
u.? rOffShi'ism among the believers. 
As a result, al-Majlis-i's interpretations of the Imam's traditions, through which he 
had attempted to legitimize the Safavid state as a prelude for the Mahdi's return, 
became the target of unreserved criticism. For instance, Mir Lawh-I in his polemic 
work, Kifiyatal -muhtadl-fimirifatal -Mahdl, accused al-Majlis-i of seeking 
personal fame and rebutted al-MajlisY s false interpretations of the Imam 
traditions when he said that Shah Ism5'il neither rose from G-ilan nor the East 
but from Azerbaijan in the West; also, Changiz Khan never conquered Multan 
and so on. 134 Indeed, this work, as the title suggests, implicitly disputes the 
legitimacy of Safavid rule by attacking al-Majlis-i's innovative fantasy that aimed 
133 Colin Turner, "Still Waiting for the Imam? The Unresolved Question of lnbz5r in Twelver Shi'ism, " P&slca XV (1993- 
1995), 45. 
134 ibid, 45-46. 
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to legally establish the link between the founding of the Safavid state and the 
Mahdi's return, by means of which al-Majlis-I attempted to reinforce the 
decreasing popularity of the Safavids. 
Accordingly, one could imagine the extent of disappointment and bitterness that 
the usOff ulami experienced when the Safavid state was demolished the invading 
Afghans in 1722, only a few years after the demise of al-Majlis-i himself, which 
could have increased the differences between the two ur>O/igroups. What made 
it even worse was that the invader Afghans were extremist Sunnis whose 
opposition to Safavid domination was initially ignited by an anti -Shiites fatwa in 
which Twelver Shi'ism were accused of heresy and disbelief 135 -a matter that 
would open the possibility sectarian revenge and jeopardize the future of u., 50/1 
Twelver Shi'ism in Iran to such an extent that it could potentially uproot its 
presence. In addition, the Iraqi hosts succeeded in spreading akbiriteachings 
among the Iranian arrivals fleeing the Afghani invasion to the Iraqi shrines in al- 
Najaf and Karbala, in their search for a safe haven, 136 thus increasing the burden 
of the usOlfulama. 
3.4. NADIR SHAH AND THE ECUMENICAL APPROACH 
Nadir's early life is obscure, which creates a major controversy amongst Western 
scholars but he was from the Afshars, a Shiii Turkish tribe inhabiting the province 
135 Peter Avery, "N5dir Sh5h and the Afsharid Legacy, " in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and C. P. MeMlle, 7he Cambndge 
History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to Me Islamic Republic, vol. 7 (Cambridge: University Press, 1991), 12; L. Lockhart, 
7he-Fall of the Savavi Dynasty and the Afghan Ocrupation of Persia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 86; 
Also, Ernest S. Tucker, Nadir Shah ý; Quest for Legibmacy /n Po5t-Salavid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
23. 
136 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " Iranon Studles 
18: 1 (1985), 13-16. 
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of Khur5san in the North East of Persia 137 and was born in the village of Dastgird 
in 1100/1688 138 to a poor peasant called Imam Qul-i Beg. Nadir"s fortune 
dramatically changed when he joined the Safavid army and entered the service 
of Mb5 Ali Beg I<Cisý Aýmacllu-j a strong Afsh5rýfi chief and the Safavid governor of 
the town of Abivard, during the regime of Sultan Husayn. 139 Nadir was a "fairly 
close kin 1440 to B5b5 Ali Beg I<Cisý, so he served him with zeal and courage for 
which he was promoted in B5b5 Ali Beg's entourage where he then served until 
the Afghani invasion. 
After the Afghani invasion, Nadir QuF settled in the Kalat (castle) near Mashhad, 
which became the headquarters for his intended movement to liberate his 
country. Nadir attempted to recruit the Afsh5rs, Kurds and other tribesmen in 
his preparation to achieve his goal. However, he also relied on hundreds of 
families of the Jal5yir tribe to make up a group to raid Khurýs5n, but lost his new 
recruits after they left him and joined the troops of Malik Mahmud, the Afghani 
governor of Mashhad. 141 
Nadir QuIT became a military activist against the Afghan invaders mainly in the 
province of Khur5s5n and conducted unsuccessful attempts to recapture 
137 Peter Avery, "Nadir Shah and the Afsharid Legacy". in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (eds. ), the 
Cambridge history of Iran, vol. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 4. 
138 L. Lockhart, Nadlr 5hah: Critical 5tudy Based Mainly Upon Contemporary 56urce5 (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 
18,20; also, Mul)ammad K5? im, 'Alam Afg-, ýi Naoirý Muhammad A. Riyýihi (ed. ), (I(iUib-far-Oshi Zuww5r, 1364), 7; Peter 
Avery, "N6dir Sh5h and the Afsharid Legacy". in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (eds. ), the G3mbnbge 
HIstory of Iran, vol. 7, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3; al-Suwaydi the Judge of Baghdad who 
moderated the al-Najaf Conference, asserted that Nadir Shah was in his eighties, and he had lost some of his teeth when 
he met him in 1156/1743, thus implying that Nadir Shah could have been born in the 1660s refer to Mohammad Bahjat 
al-Azarii, DhrjW al- 'Aýabiyjt fi Ithirat al-HurOb wa yamlit Nadir 5hah 'alj al-Iriq fl'Rlwjyat 5hihid 'Ayin (Baghdad: 
Matba'at al-Majama' al-'Ilmi al-Ir5qi, 1981), 38. 
139 L. Lockhart, Naoiý 5hah: Critical Rudy Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 20. 
140 Peter Avery, "Nadir Shah and the Afsharid Legacy". in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles '. I, Iville (eds. ), t'ie 
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83 
Mashhad. He then supported the $afavid Shah Tahmasp II in his efforts to 
restore the throne of his ancestors. The Safavid army was under the leadership 
of Ali Khan, who failed to repel the invaders, but the situation was dramatically 
changed when Nadir QuIll replaced him as chief of the army. Nadir then carried 
out the arduous task of restoring independence to the country: after great 
efforts, he successfully expelled the Afghans from Isfahan when he defeated 
Shah Ashraf in the course of three battles and retook the capital city of the 
Safavids. 142 In 1729, Nadir QuIT revived the Safavid dynasty and installed 
Tahmýisp II on the throne. 
After several campaigns and a long struggle with the Ottomans and Russia, Nadir 
managed to restore most of the territories of the Safavid state. However, his 
endeavors were wasted as the irresponsible and immature Shah Tahmasp 
conducted a campaign in 1731 against the Ottomans, without agreement from 
Nadir, who was attacking Herat. Tahmasp's troops were soundly defeated, and 
he was forced to sign an inequitable peace agreement with the Ottomans in 
1732, according to which he lost most the lands that Nadir had recently 
recovered from the Ottomans. 143 The treaty provoked the wrath of Nadir, who 
announced his repudiation of the deal and threatened the Ottomans with a 
resumption of hostilities if they did not return the captured territories. Nadir 
then retreated to Isfahan and used the treaty of 1732 as a pretext to replace 
Tahmýisp II with his infant son; he had him crowned as 'Abbýs III while he 
appointed himself as the regent of the de facto ruler of Persia. 144 
142 Roger Savory, Iran Under The -5afavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), 253. 
143 A Chronicle of the Cannelites In Persia and the Papal MIsslon of the XVIIth and AWIlth Centunes, vol. 1 (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1939), 596. 
144 'Abb5s Ism5'fl $, abbigh, Tankh al- 'Iljqjt al- 'Uthmjn1yya al-inýniyya: al-, Yarb wa al-Salim bayn al- 'UthmJn1yyin wa 
al-Safawiyyin (Beirut: D5r al-Nafiaýis, 1999), 216. 
84 
Further actions were expected from Nadir for he was merely waiting for a 
suitable opportunity to remove the feeble Tahm5sp. numerous occasions he 
sought to underestimate Tahmasp and provoked the inexperienced and helpless 
Shah into irresponsible actions, merely to satisfy his self-esteem. For instance, 
Nadir married Tahmasp's sister, Ra(liyya Begum, in May 1730 without securing 
the Shah's permission. 145 On another occasion, Nadir sent the Shah along with 
his family to Qazvin and denied the Shah's claim to have his share of the money 
that Nadir had obtained from the inhabitants; despite the Shah's clear 
discontent. 146 Subsequently. Tahmasp became convinced by his advisors to 
conduct a campaign against the Ottomans, in which he would claim all the credit 
for the success. 147 
As the regent of Shah 'AbMs's III reign, in fact Nadir had been the de facto 
ruler of Persia since 1732. During this period he secured the title of wakil 
Although Nadir's political ambitions for the throne were obvious, he was likely 
anticipating some opposition to his intended move, especially from army officers 
still loyal to the Safavid dynasty. 148 For that reason, Nadir waited to set the 
stage for a smooth and successful transition by replacing the pro-Safavid 
provincial governors with his own adherents and increasing the non-Persian 
constituents of the army. 149 In 1733, Nadir had instigated a discussion of the 
peace agreement with the Ottomans after his aggressive campaign against Iraq, 
when he realized that then was the time to reap the rewards of his extensive 
career. In 1736, he summoned all the state officials and nobles, army 
commanders, qjVis and ulami and the governors of the provinces and towns for 
145 L. Lockhart, NadXrShah: Critical Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary SburceS(Lond on: Luzac &Co., 1938), 42. 
146 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal MIssion of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centunes, vol. 1 (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1939), 595. 
147 L. Lockhart, NJd1r Shah: CrItIcal Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 55. 
148 A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Misslon of the XVIYth and XVIIIth Centunes, vol. i (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1939), 595. 
149 L. Lockhart, Naoir Shah: Cj7t? tal Study Based MaInly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 63. 
a meeting on the Plain of Meghan in Azerbaijan, where a qikilffy (national 
150 council) was to be assembled. 
3.4.1. THE ASSEMBLY OF MUGHAN AND NADIR'S INITIATIVE OF 
THE WFARi MADHAB 
The assembly was held in the Plain of Meghan in March 1736. During the event, 
Nadir expressed his desire to retire after he had defeated the enemy and 
restored all the erstwhile territories to the Safavid state. He then ordered the 
attendees to crown whoever deserved the honor. The crown was offered to 
Nadir himself. Nadir initially showed hesitation but accepted the offer to ascend 
the throne, with two ultimatums. First, the throne must be hereditary and pass 
to his descendants. Second, he would adopt the -7a 
'fan- madhab according to 
which the Shi'ites should abandon all practices that are intimidating to Sunni 
Muslims, mainly the sabb (vilification) of al-Khulafa- al-Rishidin (namely the first 
three rightly-guided Caliphs), raýd (the denial of their legitimacy), and the third 
testimony recited in the call for prayers Ali waffAllah (Ali is the friend of God). 
The attendees agreed, and the assembly issued wathiqat Me_qhan (the document 
of Meghan) in May 1736. Nadir was crowned and took the title of Nadir Shah. 
Upon his return to Mashhad, Nadir issued a farman to the people of Iran that 
relayed the contents of the aforementioned wathiqa. 151 
While he was in Meghan and immediately following his coronation, Nadir sent 
delegations to the Ottomans to inform them of this fact and to carry his proposal 
for a peace agreement, which consisted of five demands: 152 
1. The ja "fan-madhab should be recognized as the fifth madhab of Islam. 
150 Emest S. Tucker, Nadir 5hahST Quest for Legit7macy in Post-Safavid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
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2. A corner should be designated in Ka'ba for the followers of the -7a 
"fan- 
madhab like for the other four Madhift. 
3. A Persian amir al-tiajj (the leader of the pilgrimage caravans) should be 
appointed and treated equally with his Syrian and Egyptian equivalents. 
4. An exchange of prisoners from both sides and a prohibition on them being 
bought or sold. 
5. An exchange of permanent embassies. 
Nadir Shah's embassy to the Ottoman Empire, under the leadership of Nadir's 
prospective Ambassador, 'Abd al-Býiq! Khan, reached Istanbul on March 9,1736. 
From the beginning,, the negotiations between the Iranians' embassy and the 
Ottoman officials were heading for a dead-end due to the fact that each side had 
a different perspective on the intended peace agreement. While the Ottomans 
were focusing on the political dimension that would lead to the establishment of 
permanent peace on their Eastern frontiers, 153 the Iranians were more interested 
in discussing Nadir Shah's religious proposal by means of which they wanted to 
get the Ottomans' recognition of the -Wfari madhhab as the fifth school of 
Islamic law. The Iranian negotiators did achieve a partial success when they had 
won the freedom of Iranian prisoners after prolonged indecision by the Turkish 
side. However, the Iranian embassy's effort turned out to be fruitless as it failed 
to persuade the Ottomans to acknowledge Nadir's innovative madhhab. 
Meanwhile, Nadir Shah invested his time in expanding the borders of his newly 
established state beyond the historical frontiers of the Safavids. In 1738, he 
attacked the traditional enemies of Persia, the Afghans, and placed their major 
cities of Ghazna, Kabul and Peshawar under his control. 
154 He also led a 
153 Emest S. Tucker, Nadir Shah ý; Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
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campaign to the Indian Subcontinent and captured Delhi after defeating the 
Indian army at the battle of Karnal in 1739; he sacked the Mogul's treasure and 
returned with a huge booty. 155 Nadir Shah secured his authority and entrusted 
the Mogul Muhammad Shah to rule on his beha lf. 156 The same policy was 
followed when Nadir Shah conducted a campaign against the Uzbeks of 
Transoxania and occupied the cities of Bukhara and Kh-1Va in 1740, after which 
he assigned the Khan of Bukhara as a subject governor. 157 
3.4.2. AL-NAJAF CONFERENCE 
As was mentioned above, Nadir Shah's embassy to the Ottoman Empire had 
failed to persuade the Ottoman officials to adopt his ecumenical policy, which 
enforced the Ja "fari madhab as the official religion of his newly established 
regime. However, Nadir's delegation did achieve a minor success when the 
Ottomans officially recognized Nadir as the Shah of Persia in the preamble to the 
draft of the proposed peace treaty and agreed to exchange permanent 
ambassadors with the Persians. 158 The Ottomans then sent an embassy to Nadir 
to discuss the terms of this treaty. The Ottoman delegation's departure from 
Constantinople was simultaneous with the departure of the Iranian embassy and 
reached Isfahan when Nadir Shah had already instigated his long campaign 
against the Afghans 159 that led him to eventually conquer India and subdue the 
Uzbeks. 160 Nadir summoned the Turkish ambassador, Mu5tafa- Pasha, to meet 
him in Nadirabad in 1737 where he was camping after having occupied 
Qandahar; Muýtafa- Pasha handed Nadir the letter from the Ottoman Sultan, in 
155 For a comprehensive account of Nadir Shah's campaign to India consult L. Lo&harý Nadir 5hah: CrItical Rudy 
Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 129-62. 
156 Sir Jaclunath Sarkar, Nidir 5hjh In Indla (Calcutta: Naya Prokash, 1973), 77. 
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which the latter expressed his apology for his inability to accept some points in 
Nadir"s proposal, namely the issue of _7arfarfmadhab and the erection of the fifth 
pillar in Ka'ba for the followers of the new madhab. 161 Although Nadir Shah 
confirmed that the two points the Sultan had discarded were the most significant 
points of his proposed peace treaty, he nonetheless assigned Ali Mard6n Khan 
Sh5mlu- to be his Ambassador to the Ottoman court. 162 This might point to the 
possibility that Nadir Shah wished to temporarily alleviate any contention on the 
Iranian-Turkish frontiers while involved in his central Asian campaign. 
After he had settled the situation in the East during his campaign in central Asia 
and added three sultanates to his realm, Nadir Shah turned in 1743 to the West 
so as to militarily settle the suspended issues of his ecumenical initiative, 
conducting his third and last campaign against Irjq al- "Arab (Mesopotamia). 
Scholars have differed over the motivation for this campaign - Tucker believes 
that Nadir aimed to bring the Ottomans to the negotiating table and enhance his 
position in such negotiations,, 163 while Lockhart implicitly blamed the letter of the 
Ottoman Sultan for increasing Nadir's determination to invade Iraq, as the letter 
clearly quoted the fatwa of the Ottoman Shaykh al-Islim that legally allowed the 
killing of Persians for their innovative religion, which contradicted Islam. 164 Nadir 
Shah nevertheless seems to have been forced to take such a step for three 
critical reasons. First of all, his failure to subdue the people of Darband and 
ShIrawan during his Caucasus campaign of 1741, in which he was almost killed 
after becoming the target of an assassination attempt, 165 could have pushed 
161 L. Lockhart, Nadir 5hah: Critical Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 120- 
21. 
162 bid, 121. 
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Nadir to reinforce his self-perception as an unbreakable figure to his army and 
enemies alike. Also, he had repeated to the Ottomans his religious demands in 
letters sent to them during the embassy of HajjTi Khan Chamishgazak in 1741; 
however, the Ottomans' decisive and uncompromising response delivered by the 
embassy of Munif Afand-1 and Na? if Muýtafý Afand-i in 1742 166 left Nadir with no 
alternative but to fiercely impose such demands. In addition, Nadir's old age 
may have been the critical element in his decision to seek the ultimate resolution 
to this significant dispute, before he would be unable to act; for instance, 
Abdullah Afand! al-Suwaydi, who met Nadir Shah during the conference of al- 
Najaf, noticed that "age has left its trace on his [Nadir] face, his front teeth have 
fallen, so he was approximately in his 80's so his beard was dyed black but 
,, 167 looked nice. 
The upshot of all this was that Nadir Shah resumed the war with the Ottomans, 
conducting his last campaign in 1743, during which his troops conquered Kirkuk 
and placed two of the three major cities of Iraq under siege - namely Mosul and 
Basra. 168 However, Nadir Shah was forced to seek a compromise with the 
Ottoman Empire due to the appearance of the Safavids imposters in the political 
arena. Sam Mirza, the first imposter, was backed by the Lazgis forces, and killed 
the governor of Shirawýn while the other impostor, 5afi Mirza, who enjoyed the 
Ottomans' support, was reported to be heading for the Persian borders. 169 The 
Ottomans, therefore, demanded the retreat of Nadir's army as a pre-condition of 
166 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: Critical Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporafy 5ources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 223- 
24. 
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Nadir's proposal of peace with Ahmad Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, who was 
the Ottomans' representative in the negotiations -a matter that Nadir Shah 
immediately complied with. 
3.4.2.1. The Kurd5n Treaty of 1746 
On his way to meet Ahmad Pasha in Baghdad,, Nadir Shah visited the shrine of 
Imam Musa al-U? im,, the seventh Imam according to Twelver Shi, ismf and the 
tomb of AbG Hanifa, the founder of the Sunni Hanafi School of law. In Baghdad, 
Nadir Shah and Ahmad Pasha drafted a peace treaty after brief discussions; it 
was no more than a confirmation of the Zahýb peace treaty of 1639.170 
The treaty, called the Kurdýn peace agreement, included an introduction of three 
articles and an appendix. 171 The introduction highlighted that this treaty was 
merely the ratification of the unsigned agreements of 1733 and 1736. Article I 
shows the Ottomans' commitment to put in place all measures to assure the 
protection of Iranian pilgrims. Article 2 asserts the significance of the 
establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries for the assurance of 
peace and co-operation; within the framework, the ambassadors should be 
exchanged every three years and the host country would be responsible for the 
accommodation and living expenses of guest ambassadors. Article 3 confirms 
the commitment of both countries to free all prisoners of war and allow them to 
return home. The appendix emphases three points: the recognition of the limits 
and frontiers established under Sultan Mur5d IV, the fact that the Persians 
should relinquish the innovations of the Safavids and show respect to the rightly- 
guided Caliphs and lastly, that the two parties were committed not to provide 
political asylum for the opponents of the other party. However, this treaty was 
170 For ZaMb Treaty of 1639 check I C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the near and mIddle east. - a documentafy record. - 1535- 
1914, vol. 1 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956), 21-3. 
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contingent on the Sultan's approval. The Kurdýn treaty was officially accepted 
by the Ottoman authority on September 4tý', 1476 - only nine months before the 
assassination of Nadir Shah on June 19th 1 1747.172 
3.4.2.2. The Conference of al-Najaf 
Surprisingly, the Kurdýn treaty ignored the question of the Ja "fari Madhab and 
the related issues, such as the place in the Ka'ba and the Iranian leader for ýajj 
caravans that had dictated Nadir"s relations with the Ottomans since his 
coronation in 1736 and which raised the question of Nadir relinquishing his 
religious demands. Lockhart considered these to be merely temporary 
measurements put in place before subduing the uprisings against the authorities 
in Persia: 
It seems most probable that his main object was merely to "amuse" the 
Porte and so gain time until the rising in north-west Persia had been 
suppressed, when he would fling his full weight against the Turks on the 
borders of Anatolia. 173 
However, Lockhart's view lacks consistency as it clashes with the sequence of 
later events that concluded with holding a conference of the Iranian Sunni and 
Shi'i ulami at al-Najaf, not to mention failing to consider Nadir's age, that forced 
him to avoid long-term plans. For that reason, the only probable explanation for 
the exclusion of Nadir's religious demands from the Kurd5n treaty is that he 
might have reached a marginal compromise with Ahmad Pasha off the record 
and the official agreement was to satisfy Nadir's ego, presenting him as the 
victor, able to fulfill the promises he had made before the people, meanwhile 
avoiding the repeated denial of the Ottoman Sultan and his officials, that could 
172 ibld, 51. 
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preclude or postpone the signature on the peace treaty. Perhaps conclusions 
can be drawn from Ahmad Pasha's concession to hold the conference of the 
Iranian ulama in al-Najaf which is located in his domain and his emblematic 
participation in the conference by sending Abdullah Afand! al-Suwayd! to 
represent him. In relation to this,, Brunner comments that "'no delegation from 
the Ottoman side was present. iA74 
After signing the draft of the peace agreement with Ahmad Pasha, the governor 
of Baghdad and the official representative of the Ottoman Empire in the 
negotiations,, Nadir Shah left for al-Najaf, where he paid ziyjra (a religious visit 
to be paid by a believer to the Imams' shrines according Twelver Shiite doctrine) 
to Imam Ali's shrine in al-Najaf. After he performed the rituals of the ziyjra, he 
demanded the dome of the shrine be gilded. 175 Nadir Shah then ordered the 
conference to be held and requested that Ahmad Pasha send a Sunni faqih to 
represent him at the conference and to play the role of the judge in the debate 
between the Sunni and Shi'i ulamjof Nadir's realm. Al-Suwayd-i was nominated 
176 by Ahmad Pasha personally and received the approval of Nadir Shah. The 
scholars of the era most likely believed that al-Suwayd-l's scholastic reputation as 
one of the prominent fuqahj of Iraq at the time was the rationale for his 
nomination. For instance, Hala Fattah asserts: ""Because Abdullah al-Suwaidi's 
reputation had already garnered him much fame outside of his native Baghdad, 
"177 the Iraqi "glim was hand-picked by the wali of Baghdad... However, if that 
was the basis on which al-Suwaydi was selected, Ahmad Pasha should have 
named the Hanafi Muftior ShWi Muftiof Baghdad who were more suitable for 
174 Rainer Brunner, 151amic Ecumenism in the 20th century., the Azhar and 5hlism Between Rapprochement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 31. 
175 Ernest S. Tucker, Nadir ShaM; Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
81. 
176 Hala Fattah, 'Representations of Self and the Other in Two Iraqi Travelogues of the Ottoman Period, 
' Inte-, 31, --al 
Joumal of MIddle East 5tudies, 30: 1 (Feb., 1998), 56. 
177 Ibld, 56. 
such a mission -a question which was raised by al-Suwaydi himself to the 
Pasha's messenger. 178 Indeed, al-Suwayd-i seems to have been carefully selected 
for this mission due to two considerations. He had previously engaged in a 
debate over the same issues with one of the Shi'ite ulama in Baghdad in 1718, 
which had ended in al-Suwaydi's triumph, according to his adherents. 179 
Furthermore, al-Suwayd-i. unlike the two muftis who had occupied their posts by 
farmans issued by the Sultan, was merely a lecturer in astinat qLýtb al- "irifi-n wa 
sultin al-muwahhiblin (the school of pole of knowledge and the Sultan of 
monotheists) AbT $alilý M^! al-D-In Abd Alqýdir al-11-i as he asserted in his 
work 180 and had not yet held any official post in the administrative system of the 
Ottoman Empire. His presence at the conference would not be deemed as the 
official representation of the Ottoman Empire. Apparently, Ahmad Pasha 
through this act aimed to satisfy Nadir Shah while avoiding the provocation of 
resentment on the part of the Ottoman Sultan. 
Al-Suwayd-I recorded the details of his observations and documented his 
participation at this conference in the preamble to his travelogue, al-Nafýa al- 
miskiyya fl- al-riýla al-makkiyya- 18 1 His account undoubtedly become a significant 
first hand source, not only shedding light on the events of the conference but 
178 Abdullah ibn ýusayn ibn Mar'i al-Suwayd-i (1174/1761), al-Nafha al-Mlsklyya fi al-Rihla al-Makkiyya, Unpublished 
Manuscript, The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, King Saud University, Collections of Hajj 'Arif Hikmat al- 
ýusayni of Medina, Classification No. 900/261,13. 
179 Ali al-Ward-i, Lamaýjt1j6mkyya min Tjrlkh a1-'1rjqa1-, Yad'11h, vol. 1 (Qum: Inbshýr5t al-Sharif al-Radýi, 1413), 137. 
180 Abdullah ibn Ousayn ibn Mar'i al-Suwaydi (1174/1761), al-Natýa al-Mlýrkiyya fi al-RINa al-Makklyya, unpublished 
manuscript, The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, King Saud University, Collections of ýajj 'Arif ýikmat al- 
ýusayni of Medina, Classification No. 900/261,29. 
181 There are two copies which exist of al-Suwayd-is manuscript travelogue; one is among the collections of al-"jj 'Anf 
ýikmat al-Husayni of Medina that is available among the collections of King Saud University; also, there is another copy of 
this manuscript in the British Museum in London under the classification number 23385. The information of the event in 
al-Najaf attributed to al-Suwaydi is excluded from the copy of the document in Medina on which the present author relied 
and cited as Abdullah ibn ýusayn ibn Mar'i al-Suwayd-i (1174/1761), al-Nalýa fi al-Rlýla al-M, 3t"OýIa, 
Unpublished Manuscript, King Saud University, Collections of ft 'Arif Hkmat al-ýusayni of ', ledina, Classification 
900/261. 
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also on the more mundane details of this period, including a thorough description 
of his journey for the annual ritual of ýajj. 
The details of the conference are beyond the scope of this research since they 
have been widely covered; however, the importance of al-Suwayd-i's account, in 
spite of his typical anti-Shi'ism tone, is due to the fact that it sheds light on the 
positive and active participation of the u.? rdli ulami of Twelver Shi'ism in the 
debate over the disputes; it evidently denies the claim that any settlement over 
these issues was reached according to 'the will of the tyrant, Nadir Shah. 1182 
According to al-Suwayd-1, the debate with the Shiite ulama took place 
immediately upon his arrival and he was received respectfully by the Mullj bishi, 
Ali Akbar, in the latter's tent. The Mullj bishl- himself instigated the discussion 
as he openly criticized the Multi of Bukhara for adopting the title of baýr al- "ilm 
(the sea of science) and dared him to refute three pieces of evidence 183 with 
regard to Imam Ali's right to the caliphate; he claimed that no one, not even 
among the virile Sunni ulami, would be able to deny this evidence. Apparently, 
the Mullj bishi attempted to indirectly urge al-Suwayd-i to become involved in 
the debate; therefore, al-Suwayd-1 had no choice but to respond to the Mullj 
bishi'ls challenge that aimed to test his scholarship, querying the evidence cited 
and successfully managing to refute it, piece by piece. This forced the Mullj 
182 Ali al-Wardi, Lamahit ljtimj'iyya min Tjrlkh al- 'Iriq al-Hadllh, vol. 1 (Qum: Intish5r5t al-Sharif al-Radii. 1413), 137- 
38. 
183 The MU15 P5shi referred to two Qurlnic verses and one ýadl&, 3: 61 "And whoso disputeth w1th thee concernIng 
h1m, alter the knowledge which hath come unto theeý say (unto h1m): Come! We will summon our sons and your sons, 
and our women and your women, and ourselves and yourselvesý then we will pray humbly 
(to our Lord) and (solemnly) 
Invoke the cur5e of Allah upon those who be, " 5: 55 " Your (real) Nends are (no less than) 
Allah, His Messenger, and the 
(fellowship of) believers- those who establish regular prayers and regular chalit)ý and they 
bow down humbly (in 
worshiqý, " also, the Prophet's ýad-tffi in which he addressed Imam Ali saying: 
"your status, for me, is as H5r-On's for 
Muses except there will be no prophet after me. " 
9: 
bishito eventually acknowledge al-Suwayd-i's scholarship and to blame his own 
insufficiency of Arabic for his misunderstanding of the evidence. 184 
Additionally, it seems notable that the Sunni ulami expressed themselves freely 
during the conference and the behavior of the bahr al- "ilm Had-i Khaw5'a, the 3 
Mufti of Bukhara, towards the Shi'ites during the conference as documented by 
al-Suwayd-i emphasized such a view -a matter that was entirely ignored by 
adherents of the theory of the despotic will. According to Abdullah al-Suwayd-i, 
the Mulli bishi introduced him to the baýr al- "ilm in the general meeting that 
took place at the tomb of Imam Ali, explaining to the baýral-llm al-Suwayd-l's 
mission, with which the latter had been entrusted by the Shah, namely to serve 
as an arbitrator between the Sunni and Shi'i ulami over the disputes and 
remove all the Shi'i practices contradicting 5hari"a and bringing about the 
accusation against Twelver Shi'ites of being kuffa-r (disbelievers). The Mulla- 
bishithen asked the baýr al- "ilm to enumerate these issues. The latter set out 
four issues: sabb al-Shaykhin (the curse of the first two caliphs), tadll-l al-saNba 
(accusing the Prophet's companions of being apostates), the mut "a (temporary 
marriage) as permissible, and favoring Imam Ali over the first three caliphs. The 
Mulli bishi answered that they would remove the sabb, recognize that all the 
companions are "W01 Oust), that mut'a is ýarjm (prohibited), and acknowledge 
that the most important figures after the Prophet were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, 
and Ali respectively. Still, the baýr al-'ilm refused to acknowledge Twelver 
Shi'Ism as one of the Islamic sects under the pretext that whoever committed 
the sin of sabb al-Shaykhin is kjfl'r even if he repents, as his repentance would 
never ever be accepted according to the ýanafl madhab. This was the case until 
the mediation of the Afghan Mufti, who explained to the baýr al-'ilm that 
he 
184 Abdullah ibn Ousayn ibn Mar'i al-Suwayd-i (1174/1761), al-Nafýa al-MiskiyYa ri al-Ripla al-Makkiyya, 
Unpublished 
Manuscript, The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, 1(ing Saud University, Collections of 
Hab 'Arif Hikma, al- 
Ousayni of Medina, Classification No. 900/261,16-19. 
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should accept these Shi'i ulami as fellow Muslims, because he had no evidence 
for their involvement in sabb previously and they did commit themselves from 
then on to ceasing the sabb. 185 
Significantly, al-Suwaydi's account reveals another factor encouraging the 
present author to believe that the u. ýjff ulami were probably the most zealous 
among the other attendants regarding the reason for calling the conference, the 
recognition of the Ja "fari madhab, which was reflected in the large number of 
high ranking u., r, 0ffu1Jmjwho participated at it. There were no traces of any 
involvement from the ak-hbiriulamiof the two shrines, al-Najaf and Karbala, 
contrary to Cole's undocumented assertion of their association. 186 In fact, the 
representations of the Iranian Sunni ulami could be considered humble and 
restrained in comparison to their fellow patriot Shi'i counterparts. Al-Suwayd-i 
was diligent enough to document the names and numbers of most of the 
attending ulamifrom Nadir's realm. He states: 
The Iranian ulami gathered at the tomb of Imam Ali; they were 
approximately seventeen of the ulami, no Sunni among them but the 
Mufti of Ardal5n. I asked for a pen and paper and I wrote the names of 
the famous among them. They were: Mull5 b5sh-1 Ali al-Akbar; Agh5 
Ousayn Multi al-R&5b; Mull5 Mohammad, the Imam of L. ýihij5n; Agh5 
Shar-if, Multiof Mashhad; Mirza Burh5n, the Judge of Shlir5w5n; Shaykh 
Ousayn, the Muttiof ArOmiyya; Mirza AbO al-Fadl, the Muttfof Qum; 05jj 
$5diq, the Multiof 35m; Sayyid Mohammad Mahdi, the Imam of Isfahan; 
al-Mull5 T51ib, the Mufti of M5zindar5n; Sayyid Mohammad Taqi, the 
Multiof Qazvin; Hajj Mohammad Zak7i , the Multiof Kermanshah; Mull5 
Mohammad Mahdi Ni"ib al-4Wjra of Mashhad; Mull5 Mohammad 
Ousayn, the Multiof S-izw5r; Shaykh Mohammad al-Tam5mi, the Multiof 
185 bid, 20-21. 
186 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " lranldn Studles 
18: 1 (1985), 17-8. 
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Shiraz; Mull5 Mohammad $5diql the Multi of Khalkh5l; Mirza Asd Allah, 
the Multi of Tabriz; Sayyid BaW al-D-In, the Multi of Kerman; 
Mohammad Mumin, the Multi& Astrabad, Sayyid Ahmad, the 517ifl"'1- 
Muftiof ArclaI5 (may God be merciful with his soul) and other ulami. 
Then, the Afghan ulami came and I wrote their names: the respectful 
Shaykh MuM ýamz5 al-Qalj5'-i, the ýianafl- Multi of the Afghans; Mulla 
Am-in al-Qalj5'-i ibn Mull5 Sulaym5n, the ýanafi Judge of the Afghans; 
Mull5 AdTin5 al-Kh5ffal-ýanaff; Mal5ta al-Afghani al-ýanaffi, the teacher in 
Nadirab5d; Mulla NOr Mohammad al-Afghani al-Qalj5'i al-ýanafi; MuI15 
Abd al-Raz5q al-Afghani al-oanafi, and Mulla Idr-is al-Afghani al-Abdal-I al 
-ýanafi. 
After a while the ulami of Transoxiana arrived, and they were seven .... I 
wrote their names: al-'All5ma H5d! Khaw5ja, known by baýr al- "Ilm ibn 
'AW al-Din al-Bukhari, the ýianafi- Judge of Bukhara; Mirza Abdullah 
$adOr al-Bukhari al-oanafl; Qalandar Khaw5ja al-Bukhari al-oanafi; Mu115 
Am-id $adOr al-Bukhari al-oanafi; Y5dshah M-ir Khaw5ja al-Bukhari al- 
Oanaff; Mirza Khaw5ja al-Bukhari al-oanafi, and Mu115 Ibrahim al-Bukhari 
al-Hanafi. "' 
According to Nadir's will, the ulami present at the conference issued the 
resolutions of their gathering in a wathiqa (document) which has been known as 
wathl-qat al-Najaf. This wathiqa documented the concessions by the Shi'i ulami 
committing themselves to stop using the sabb for the first two caliphs, 
acknowledging that all the Prophet's companions were just, and the giving 
preference to the rightly-guided caliphs in order of their succession while the 
Sunni ulami recognized Twelver Shi'ism as one of the Islamic sects as long as 
they remained committed to the stipulations agreed upon in this document. The 
187 Abdullah ibn Ousayn ibn Mar'i al-Sueayd-i (1174/1761), al-Nafýa al-Miskiyya fl al-Rlýla al-Makkyya, unpublished 
manuscript, The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, King Saud University, Collections of Oaý 'Anf Oikmat al- 
Ousayni of Medina, Classification No. 900/261,19-20. 
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wathiqa carries severe penalties for whosoever violates the decisions, including 
through God's curse and the Shah's revenge, although there was no mechanism 
for monitoring any violation of the regulations of the document of al-Najaf and 
holding accountable those who committed the irregularities. At the end of the 
document, all the attending ulami including al-Suwayd-i signed their names and 
printed their seals. 188 
3.5. THE IMPACT OF THE U5OLi ULAMA ON NADIR'S ECUMENICAL 
INITIATIVE 
Nadir Shah's political agenda, on which his ecumenical initiative was based, had 
become a point of contention among the scholars in the field. For example, 
Lockhart believed that Nadir Shah ""may have conceived the project of making 
himself a head of the united Moslem world . "189 Enayat, however, believed that it 
was the bloody sectarian hostility in the earlier decade that had forced Nadir 
Shah to adopt this policy. 190 Algar suggested that Nadir's aim was to satisfy the 
Sunni majority in his army and thus guarantee their loyalty. 191 On the other 
hand, Brunner was of the opinion that "'Nýidir Shýh... tried to break the influential 
position of the Shiite clergy in their own country and obviate any potential 
Safavid renaissance. 1/192 However, Morgan asserted that Nadir"s ultimate goal 
was to abandon the policy of the state-sponsored Shi'ism which characterized 
the Safavid era. 193 Nevertheless, Tucker argued: 
188 For a full description of wathiqat ak Najaf refer to al-Suwaydrs work ibid, 22-24. 
189 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: Cr6cal Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 279. 
190 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Pblitýýal 777ought., the Resoonse of tl7e Shii and Sunni MuslIms to the Twentteth 
Centufy (London: Macmilan Press ltd., 1982), 40. 
191 Hamid Algar, 'Shi'ism and Iran in the Eighteenth Century', in T. Naff and R. Owen (edits), Studies /n Elghteenth 
Century Islamic Hi5tory (London, 1977), 288. 
192 Rainer Brunner, I51amic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. - the Azhar and 5hiism Between Rapprodýemert and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 20G4), 29-30. 
193 David Morgan, MedlevalPersia 1040-1797 (London, Longman, 1988), 154-55. 
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Nadir's principal agenda (as had been Ashraf's) was to establish a "new 
order" of legitimacy that transcended the Safavids: a new system in 
which it would be possible and desirable to refine Iran's status with 
respect to other Muslim powers. "' 
In contrast, scholars unreservedly emphasized the u. ýOrl ulamjsý disagreement 
with Nadir Shah's ecumenical initiative and perceived their participation in this 
initiative merely as a practice of taqiyya,, to avoid the ruthless Shah's 
punishment. For instance, Lockhart affirmed that the ulamaSý acceptance was 
driven by the fear of sharing the fate of Mulla-Bishf, who was strangled because 
of his pro-Safavid comments. 195 Furthermore, Brunner pointed out the 
grammatical mistake that a Persian mulli made in pronouncing the name of the 
second caliph, while he was delivering the Jum'a sermon in the KOfa Mosque, as 
clear evidence of a "tried-and tested taqiyya1' thus revealing the disagreement of 
the ulamjwith Nadir's poliCy. 196 Also, Litvak observes: 
A conference of Sunni and Shi'i 'ulama' which he [Nadir Shah] 
convened in Najaf in 1743 produced an imposed agreement to that effect 
[recognizing the Ja "fari madhab], but its impact was short-lived as 
neither the Shi'i 'ulama' nor the Ottomans could reconcile themselves 
to it. Nadir Shah's policies collapsed with his assassination in 1747.197 
Indeed, the claim that the effective participation of the u. ýJff ulami in Nader 
Shah's initiative was motivated by the fear of the Shah's oppression and was 
merely a practice of taqiyya lacks accuracy and requires reconsideration. In the 
194 Ernest S. Tucker, Nadir Shahýi Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
58. 
195 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: Critical Study Based MaInly Upon contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 99. 
196 Rainer Brunner, I51amic Ecumenism in the 20th Century., the Azhar and Shii5m Between Rapprochement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 31. 
197 Meir Litvak, Shii Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq- the Varna' of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 13. 
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light of the historic epoch through which týsOll- Shi'ism was passing, the 
extensive involvement of the U5011- ulami in the process of Nadir Shah's 
reconciliation initiative was no less significant than the association of the 
founding fathers of ust7l[Shi`is, namely al-Karak-i and other 'Aml-i ulami, with / Mf af 
Shah Ism5'-Il at the beginning of the establishment of the Safavid state in the 
early 16th century. This involvement not only preserved the influence of the u., 5011- 
ulami in the Iranian polity but also strengthened the u. 501is, allowing them to 
oppose and eventually demolish the overwhelming domination of their historical 
rivals,, the akhbiris, who had been in control of the holy shrines in Iraq and 
attempted to penetrate into the Iranian provinces. In other words, if the usOrls 
association with Nadir Shah could be measured in terms of profit and loss, it 
could be suggested that the u., 501is` contribution might have gone beyond mere 
participation in the event, but rather being instrumental in its orchestration. 
As stated above, the critical environment at that time with regard to u. ý0ff 
Shi'ism may have left the `pragmatistý current of the u.: 5011- ulami with no choice 
but to join Nadir's movement, because of coinciding interests. On the one hand, 
Nadir's military victories compelled him to pursue political ambitions. On the 
other, the u.? rOff ulamjSý awareness of their inability to stand alone against the 
overwhelming domination of the akhbjri5 might have led them to search for a 
sponsor-state to replace the Safavid one, which was in its death throes. Hence, 
the number of u. 501i ulami who held official positions within Nadir's state and 
advocated his policies may provide ample evidence of the co-operation that 
existed between the two sides. For example, Mirza Ibrah-im was entrusted with 
the position of Qjýff - "Al5kar (military judge), while Shaykh abO al-Qýsim Kashani 
-198 occupied the post of Shaykh al-151im, and mulli Ali Akbar was the Mullj- - J. 
These three clerics were part of the embassy Nadir Shah had sent immediately 
198 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " Iranlin 5tudles 
18: 1 (1985), 17. 
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after the Assembly of Meghan Plain to discuss his proposals with the Ottoman 
ulami. 
The historical conflict between the akhbiriand u5i7ffschools of Twelver Shi, ism 
flared up once more in the second half of the 17th century thanks to the 
weakness of the Safavid state, where the former had the upper-hand and 
succeeded not only in dominating the "Atabit, the shrine cities of Iraq, but also 
in expanding their influence to Iranian territories. Indeed, the conflict reached 
its peak in the 1730s, when the presence of u., 50/iShi'isrn in the two holy shrines 
of Iraq was hardly noticed. 199 During that time,, enmity to u., r, 01i5m in Karbala and 
al-Najaf became unprecedented, as individuals would come to physical harm if 
discovered to have u. 5iWaffiliation ; 200 Cole reports 
Al-Bahrani's neo-Akhbarrý considered Usul,, ý to be ritually impure, 
touching Usuliworks with handkerchiefs to shield their fingers from any 
polluting effects. More serious, anyone walking in the street with Usu# 
literature beneath his arm risked violent assault ... At this point, the 
Akhbart had the important gangster or luti contacts, and could employ 
these to intimidate usulirivals. "' 
Consequently, the conference of al-Najaf had granted u., r>Off Shi, ism the best 
opportunity for a secure presence in the sacred shrines of Iraq, under the 
protection of Nadir's army in which the u., rOff ulami had invested to reinforce 
their influence -a theory significantly corroborated by the selection of al-Najaf to 
hold such a meeting, despite the fact that it was organized by the Iranian 
199 Meir Litvak, ShO Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: the 'ulama' of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 14. 
200 Hamed Algar, "Religious Forces in Eighteenth - And Nineteenth - Century Iran, " in Peter Avery(edit. 
), The Cambndge 
Hi5tory of Iran, vol. 7 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 712. 
201 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, 
' 1ranlin Studles 
18: 1 (1985), 19. 
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government, attended by Iranian ulami, and ultimately targeted reconciliation 
among Iranian subjects. Remarkably, this could explain the fact that about 
seventy of the u-501i ulami from all over the Iranian provinces arrived, in 
comparison with a mere fourteen Sunni clerics, equally divided between the 
202 
r Afghans and Bukharis. In fact, the attendance of the u,, Olis exceeded the 
number needed to perform the dialogue with Sunni clerics. Accordingly, it would 
not be an exaggeration to state that the later triumph of u. 50#sm over its 
historical rival, akhbirism that began to be crystallized in the 1760s and 1770S203 
could be credited, in part, to the al-Najaf conference,, as it led to the restoration 
of the presence of the u., sydIf ulami in al-Najaf and Karbala, that eventually 
promoted the domination of the u., r, 01i school of reasoning over the historical 
reliance on the akhbirs (Imams' traditions). 204 The case of Aghj Mohammad 
B5qir Isfahani Bahbahýni might provide concrete evidence for such a claim. 
Aghj Bahbahýni, born in Isfahan, had moved to al-Najaf after the Afghani 
invasion. In al-Najaf, Aghj Bahbah5n-i initially adopted akhbiri5m. He moved 
again to Bahbahan in Iran after Nadir Shah's last campaign against the south of 
Iraq, which was ended with the al-Najaf conference. Bahbahýin-l reverted to 
u. ýOlism while in Bahbahýin. Less than two decades after the al-Najaf conference, 
Bahbahan-i moved to Karbala and facilitated the teaching of usOlism. 205 Also 
known as al-waýid (the unique), al-Bahbah5n-i has been widely admired for his 
debating talent and for refuting the dogma of akhbirism during the second half 
202 Abd al-Ralýman ibn Abdullah al-Suwidi, tla&7at al-Zawri fl 51-rat al-Wuzarj', edit. Im5d Abdul-Salým Ra'Gf 
(Baghdad: al-Majma' al-'Ilmi, 2003), 536-38. 
203 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " Iranian Studles 
18: 1 (1985), 27. 
204 Ali Ousayn al-35biri, al-Fikr al-Salaff 'ind al-Shia al-Ithni 'Ashfiyya: Dirjýsa Taý nllyya Amawqlf al-Fikr al-Salafi fi al- 
Islim 'umOman wa 'ind al-Ithni 'Ashfiyya 'ali wajh al-Khu. 5js min Manriq wa Falsalat al-YUnin (Qum: D5r ýaya al- 
Ihy5,1409), 393-94. 
205 For a brief biography of al-wah-id al-Bahbah5ni refer to Meir Litvak, 5hi'i 5cholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: the 
Varna' of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14-5; also, Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in 
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of the 18 th century leading to its demise in the holy shrines of Iraq, and the fact 
that u. 5ýijlism has since dominated until recent years. 
The involvement of the urOff ulama in Nadir's initiative cannot be considered a 
practice of taqiyya, as some scholars argue, 206 due to the fact that Nadir's five 
points proposal would ultimately benefit Twelver Shi'ism more than their Sunni 
counterparts. For example, the alteration in the sect name from Twelver Shi'ism 
to Ja "fari would not change the fact that it would secure not only the 
acknowledgement of the Sunni majority as the fifth school of thought but also 
allow it to establish Shi'ism as the largest school of thought, in terms of the 
number of followers, if Sunnism was fragmented into its four schools. 
Furthermore, Nadir's proposal would ensure that Shi'ites received equal 
treatment, such as having their own corner in the Ka'ba and an Arn-Ir to lead 
their pilgrimage caravan. Indeed, the Shi'ites would yield much less than they 
would gain, as their compromises would not contradict their fundamental 
principles. According to Nadir's Ja "fari maalhhab, the Shi'ites had to recognize 
the caliphate of the first three rightly guided caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and 
Uthom5n) and to relinquish the practice of cursing them. In relation to the first 
point, the Shi'ites accepted that they would merely follow and imitate Imam Ali, 
who had voluntarily pledged his own allegiance to them. According to Nahj al- 
baligha, Imam Ali acknowledged Umar as a just Caliph when he mourned him in 
great sorrow, stating: "He [Umar] left this life with purity and little defect, and he 
performed the obedient duty of Allah and feared Allah as He deserves. r1207 For 
the issue of sabb (cursing the first three caliphs), it has been said that the sabb 
was renounced years earlier than Nadir's initiative by the Safavids, who signed 
two peace agreements with the Ottomans in 1590 and 1639. In these treaties, 
206 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. - the Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 31. 
2o- Imam Ali, Nahj al-Baligha: sermons, letters and sayings, trans. Syed Ali Raza, vol. 2 (Qum: Ansanyan Publicaions, 
2007), 222. 
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, 208 they promised to abandon the sabb, however, the previous treaties - as well 
as Nadir's initiative - lacked an effective mechanism to enforce the Shiites' 
commitment to stop the practice of sabb, as stated earlier. Furthermore, the 
sabb is prohibited in the doctrine of Twelver Shiism according to Shaykh Yusuf 
al-Balýrýni, the well-known akl7biritheologian who was living in Shiraz in the 
209 1730s. 
Interestingly, Lockhart proclaims "if he [Nadir] ever had any religious beliefs at 
all, they were neither deep-seated nor sincere". 210 not to mention Nadir's 
inadequate religious background. However, it appears remarkable that no one 
among the historians of the era has raised the significant question of the source 
of inspiration for his ecumenical initiative, and no scrutiny was seriously given to 
the source of Nadir's concept of Ja "fari madhab and its technical details. 
Indeed, Nadir,, as a layman in the field of 3urisprudence had no capacity to 
articulate such an initiative, and thus the credit for such an approach could be 
attributed to the other key players. A few sources have indirectly suggested that 
Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador sent to Nadir to negotiate the peace treaty, 
was the instigator of Nadir"s later Move; according to Jarýd, the conversation 
between Ali Pasha and Nadir took place in the latter"s camp on the Plain of 
j 211 Meghan while he was waiting for guests to assemble for the qOrilt, Y. 
Nevertheless, the claim implicitly pointed to Ali Pasha as the initiator of Nadir's 
initiative yet it lacks coherence, since the meeting of Nadir and Ali Pasha 
occurred only a few days before the qi7rAjy- when Nadir was determined to 
208 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran :a developIng nation in world aftairs, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1966), 18-19. 
209 Emest S. Tucker, Nadir 5hahýý Quest for Legitimacy in Post-SalaýV Iran (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
40. 
210 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: CriticalStudy Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), 100. 
211 Jarcid reported a long conversation regarding this issue, between Nadir and Ali Pasha, by which Nadir summoned 
the 
ulami and asked them to find a resolution for this issue; for more information see Mohammad 
Husayn '. I -andi Jarcid, 
Zandagi Parr Ma Jarg Nadir Shah Afshir (Tehran: Intish5r5t Badaqa Jawid5n, 1382 SH. ), 511-2 1. 
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secure the wished for outcome when he introduced his initiative as a condition 
for taking the crown. This explanation appears to be invalid for two reasons. 
First, the alleged attitude of the Turkish Ambassador obviously contradicted the 
Ottomans' historical tendency toward Shi'ism that eventually resulted in the 
rejection of Nadir's ecumenical proposal. Second, it seems to conflict with the 
most likely consensus among the sources, including those supporting this view, 
which affirms Nadir's meticulous planning for the Meghan Assembly. For that 
reason Nadir's dialogue with Ali Pasha seems to be merely an attempt on his part 
to discern the Ottoman reaction to his intended initiative. 
Indeed, vigilant tracking of the sequence of events in Nadir's political scheme 
may show a significant resemblance with the events of the tradition attributed to 
Imam Ali, in which the Imam emphasized the revolutionary movement that 
would rise in Khurýisýn, as a sign of the Mahdi's return: 
When someone rises in Khur5s5n and brings under his domination the 
lands of the KOfans (arpf KiMan)"' and the two doctrines (millatin) 
and goes beyond the island of BanO 1<5wýn. Someone from our 
line rises in Glan and the Abur and Daylam join him. The flags of 
the Turks will flutter for the cause of my son in different 
countries... If Basra is destroyed, and amir al-umari (the prince of 
the princes) rises ... 
If thousands were mobilized in organized rows, 
213 214 and the ram killed the lamb ... 
Then the qj'im will rise. 
212 Kofa but perhaps it was changed to this form due to the necessity of what is called 
in Arabic saj' to match the 
rhythm of Khur5sýin and Millat5n. 
213 The Ram is technically used by Arabs to point to the great and brave leader while the lamb, on , 
he other hand, 
symbolised the weak and insecure. 
214 Mohammad B5qir al-Majlis-i, Biýjral-anwjr, v. 52 (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Wafa-, 1983), 236. 
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This tradition had been utilized by al-Majlisi to legitimize Safavid rule, for he 
strived to connect key individuals of the Safavid Dynasty, such as Shah Ism6'il 
and Shah 'Abb6s, to the apocalyptic figures of this tradition. Hence, this 
tradition may have been utilized by the u. 50ffulamito subdue Nadir, for their 
spiritual influence as the representatives of the Hidden Imam with the sole rights 
to interpret the religious texts and employ him to undermine their traditional 
rivals,, the akhbiris. Accordingly, Nadir seems to be convinced that he was no 
more than the revolutionary of Khurasýn, who would prepare the scene for the 
Mahdi's return, therefore he had to conquer Ku-fa, the stronghold of the akhbiri 
authority at the time, not to mention make frequent attempts to invade the city 
of al-Basra via the Gulf of Basra, in which his army in both the 1735 and 1743 
campaigns utilized vessels built in ýuwayza to move the troops to the other 
shore and to lay siege on the City. 215 Also, he had to control the millatin (sing. 
milla) which surely referred to Shi(ism and Sunnism, since the term milla is 
mostly used to point to the people of Islam (ahl al-milla), as opposed to the term 
afhimma, a reference to Christians and Jews (ahl al-dhimma). This was exactly 
what Nadir was aiming for in his ecumenical initiative. Furthermore, according to 
the same tradition, Nadir had to subdue the Turkish rulers (rjyjt al-Turk) in the 
region -a need that could explain his expansionist campaigns beyond the 
historical borders of the Safavid state, such as when he annexed the Mongol 
state of India and Turkistan to his state. Indeed, Nadir clearly stated to Abdullah 
Afand! al-Suwaydi, the judge of Baghdad, during the al-Najaf conference that he 
was the Sultan of the Turks [amir al-umaral when he said: "'I am proud that 
while I am sitting on my throne I am representing four Sultanates; I am the 
Sultan of Iran, the Sultan of Turkistan, the Sultan of India, and the Sultan of 
Afghanistan. if216 
215 L. Lockhart, Nadir 5hah: Cri6cal5tudv Based Mainly Upon Contemporary 5ources(Lond on: Luzac &Co., 1938), 234- 
36. 
216 Abd al-Rabman ibn Abdullah al-Suwidi, Yadl-qat al-Zawri fi 51-rat al-Wuzarg', edit. 
'Imýd Abdul-Salým Ra',. * 
(Baghdad: al-Majrna' al-'Ilrrii, 2003), 545. 
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Nadir's obsession and strong belief in visions and omens may support the view 
that he himself became a subject of the ulamils influence, which may have 
inspired him to use the prophecy and depict himself as the Khurasýnli 
revolutionary. For example, as early as during his campaigns against the 
Afghans in the province of Khur5s5n he had a vision in which he saw a water- 
fowl and a white fish with four horns. In this dream, he managed to shoot the 
bird and after his companions failed to capture the fish, Nadir caught it with no 
effort. The dream was interpreted to Nadir as a sign of attaining Imperial power 
in the future. 217 Although Sir John Malcolm argued that the interpreters of 
Nadir's dream were simply ""flattering astrologers", this reflects Sir John's limited 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and culture. Indeed, the interpretation of 
dreams and visions is one of the fundamental tasks of the mullas and learned 
men, since dreams and visions are supposed to be analyzed according to the 
Qur "in and the Prophet's ýaafiths. The vision purportedly seen by Nadir's father 
could serve as another example of the attempts to subject Nadir to the ulamjýý 
political and religious agendas. Apparently, this story could have been made up 
after Nadir had established himself as a key military leader in the Safavid state. 
Avery narrated that Imam Qul-1, Nadir's father, saw in his sleep a vision in which 
there appeared 
... a sun whose radiance covers 
the whole earth and which rises from his 
collar. It sets in the district of KhabOsh5n ... when 
he [Imam Qul]i found 
that his brother had had the same dream about him, the two men were 
emboldened to seek an interpretation from a 11 poor village Mulla". The 
Mull5 gave them the obvious interpretation, even to the world- 
conqueror's death near KhabOsh5n. 218 
217 Sir John MaI colm, 7he History of Persia from the Most Early period to Me Present Tme, vO I. II 
(London: John '. l, -rray, 
na. ), 5-6. 
218 Peter Avery, "N5dir Sh5h and the Afsharid Legacy", in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charies Metville (elds. ), to'c 
Cambnd qe History of Iran, vol. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 6 
108 
Nadir's policy of confiscating some of the Shi'ite endowments has been widely 
received as concrete evidence of his oppression and aggressive attitude towards 
the Shi'i ulami and that perhaps he utilized force to comply with his religious 
agenda, leaving the ulami no alternative but to perform the taqiyya and avoid 
his anger. However, having in mind that the awq, 5f (religious endowments) at 
the time of Nadir Shah belonged to or were administered by different theologian 
currents and their political alliances, no single study has thoroughly investigated 
Nadir's policy in this respect and surveyed the confiscated awqjf to determine 
which was the group targeted by this procedure. Hence, the confiscating policy 
could be placed in the context of Nadir's efforts to strengthen the position of his 
allies' pragmatic party amongst the u. ýOff ulami in the Shi'i community, by 
weakening the mutual opponents of the conservative party of u.? r&lism that 
maintained pro-Safavid sentiments and the historical theological rival of the 
u. 501is, namely the akhbaris. In other words, it is likely that the confiscated 
awqjf could have belonged to either the conservative party of urdlism or the 
biziris (traditional merchants) attached to the akhbiri ulami, which represented 
the financial source for the ulamjof akhbiriShi'ism. Perhaps this view serves 
as elucidation of Brunner's confusing statement in which he attempted to 
implicitly point to corresponding interests between Nadir's confiscating policy and 
his allies within urL71f Shi'ism. He states: 
N5dir Sh5h's intention was twofold: on one hand, he tried to break the 
influential position of the Shiite clergy in their own country and obviate 
any potential $afavid renaissance. The confiscation of Shiite waqf 
lands, 
which were theoretically inalienable, aimed at helping to achieve this. 
In 
the entire process, however, he took great care not to appear anti-Shii'te 
but'only anti-$afavid. 2'9 
219 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Centur) .- the 
Azhar and Sh11SM Bet)"een RaPPrOchement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 29-30- 
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Additionally, the supportive stance of the U.? rOf ulami in relation to Nadir Shah"s 
ecumenical policy,, which continued in the post-Nadir era, may reflect their 
complete satisfaction with and commitment to it. For instance, Shaykh Zayn al- 
Din Ali, the Imam Jum "a of Isfahan from 1746 to 1787, expressed his objection 
to mulli Haydr Ali"s treatise of 1751, that not only opposed Nadir"s policy but 
also declared all Muslim groups other than Imamf (Twelver Shi, ism) ritually 
najas (impure) and as being outside the Islamic circle. Shaykh Zayn al-D-in wrote 




In summary, Nadir Shah's ecumenical initiative, by means of which he strived to 
impose the recognition of the Ja "fari madhab as the fifth Islamic sect, was 
nothing more than a pragmatic policy that seemed to be meticulously crafted by 
the Iranian u. ýOrl ulami in their efforts to contain the devastating consequences 
of the Afghani invasion. However, previous studies have widely undervalued the 
role of the u., r0i ulami in Nadir's religious policy by ignoring two key issues: the 
importance of the unity of the umma in Islamic sharl-'a that has been 
emphasized repeatedly in the Qur"in, the Prophet's ýadiths and Imams' 
traditions, and the promised role of Khurýsýn province and the Persians in the 
establishment of the Islamic state, that will pave the way for the Mahdi's return, 
as has been believed by Sunnis and Shiites alike. This could have motivated 
the rise of u.? ruffShi'ism in the first place, immediately after the establishment of 
the Safavid state by Ism5'il Shah, who legitimized his movement based on the 
220 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " Irank? n S, '-ý, es 
18: 1 (1985), 18. 
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claim of being a descendent of Musa al-Ký? im, the seventh Imam of Twelver 
Shi'ism,, and the consent granted to him by the Mahdi. 
For that reason, the fall of the sponsor-state of the Safavids was a critical 
moment for u.? rOff Shi'ism, as it also faced several threats that could have 
seriously jeopardized its existence in Iran: the invasion of extremist Sunni 
Afghans, who were motivated by anti-Shi'ism fatwa, bringing about this collapse 
and the overwhelming domination of their traditional rival of akhbiri Shi, ism in 
two sacred shrines of Iraq and parts of the Iranian provinces. 
Apparently,, the challenges that the u., sOrl Shi'ism had encountered led to a 
division within its ulamjinto two groups, conservatives and pragmatists. On the 
one hand, the conservatives maintained a strong sentiment towards the Safavid 
dynasty and strived to preserve the political alliance with them, in the hope that 
this dynasty would be revived and restored to power. On the other hand, the 
pragmatists have been conscious of the corruption and decay that was 
dominating the Safavid state; for this reason, the fall of the state had not 
surprised them. Hence, the pragmatists, for whom the major concern was the 
protection of u.? r&lf existence in Iran and the preservation of its accomplishments, 
appeared to be skeptical regarding the revival of a powerful Safavid state. Thus, 
they either had to stand for the executive authority as the Mahdi's representative 
or to seek a stronger alliance instead. The last choice seems to have prevailed. 
The pragmatic u. ý011-s found their target in Nadir, who held a key position at the 
head of the army and exhibited both courage and ambition. Nadir, who was a 
Shi'ite and came from a humble background, was at the time the Cle facto ruler 
of Persia. Due to the lack of legitimate cover, Nadir was unable to accomplish 
his ultimate political goal of ascending to the throne. Hence, the religious 
legality of the Ja "farimaohab and the noble cause of Islamic ecumenism became 
the Trojan horse, by means of which the u. 50ff ulami struck two birds with one 
stone: the pragmatist u. ýOff would get rid of the negative aspects of the 
association with the Safavids that would jeopardize their future existence, at the 
lowest cost; the usi7lis would not have to resort to painful sacrifices that could 
affect the basic principles of Twelver Shi'ism. This policy would be suitable for 
containing Nadir and gradually bring him under the influence of the u. ý011- ulami 
as the representative of the Hidden Imam and the exclusive interpreter of the 
faith. Therefore, they had to convince him that the declaration of innocence 
from Shah Ismý'Til's apostate innovations that isolated the Shi, ites from their 
fellow Muslims and expressions of desire to re-incorporate them in the Islamic 
body would provide the legitimate pretext that Nadir needed to overthrow the 
Safavid regime and ascend the throne of Iran. It seems that the u, 5011- ulami 
took advantage of Nadir's background, such as his Khurýsanfi origins, strong 
beliefs in prophecies, and his unlimited political ambition, to subtly inspire him 
with the scenario of the Khurýisýini revolutionist who would form a vast Islamic 
realm and enjoy the honor of preparing the scene for the return of the Hidden 
Imam, the Mahdi. This scenario had been efficiently exploited by the u, 5, Offulama 
to resolve their dilemmas after the collapse of the Safavid state, without 
sacrificing the deep-rooted principles of Twelver Shi'ism. 
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Chapter 4 
ABBAS MIRZA AND THE QAjAR-OTTOMAN 
RAPPROCHMENT 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the 19th century, Iran came under the rule of the Qýj5r dynasty 
which succeeded in controlling most of the territories which were once under the 
Safavids. However, the newly established empire encountered numerous critical 
situations which would threaten its sovereignty and unity. Firstly, the Russian 
invasion of the Northern provinces of the Qýj5r Empire was the most serious 
hazard that had ever faced Iran's sovereignty, when the Russian Czar adopted 
an expansionary policy to achieve Peter the Great's dream of gaining access to a 
warm water outlet: the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea in southern Iran. 
Furthermore, such aggressive action later on served to stimulate the interest of 
other imperial powers in the Q5jýr Empire such as Napoleonic France and Great 
Britain. For instance,, Napoleon became more interested in Persia as offering the 
most accessible route to strike Britain's most valuable colony in India - the so- 
called Pearl in the British Crown - in his efforts to take revenge for his humiliating 
defeat in Egypt. In the same context, Great Britain had no alternative but to 
defend its interests in India, so the Qýj5r Empire increasingly became a 
significant player in the British imperial agenda. In addition the traditional 
sectarian rivalry between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shi'ite Iranians was 
another intimidation to the dominion of the Q5jar Empire. 
With the death of AghcJ Mohammad Shah, the founder of the Q6j5r dynasty, in 
1796, he was succeeded by Fatlý Ali Khan who since that time became known as 
Fath Ali Shah. Fath Ali Shah nominated his fourth son 'Abbýs M-irz5, who was 
I Ill 
also the governor of Azerbaijan, to the position of the Crown Prince of the 
empire in 1798 according to the wishes of Aghj Mohammad Shah's last will. 
'Abb5s MTrz5 (1789-1833) soon became the cle-facto ruler of the empire when 
he was charged by the Shah to deal with the Russian invasion. 
In his attempts to halt the continuous defeats and retrieve the lost territories 
from the hands of the invading Russian forces, 'Abbýs M-Irzý had to adopt and 
activate all the necessary policies and reforms on both domestic and foreign 
levels to protect the unity and the sovereignty of the Qýj6r Empire. Acting 
immediately, he conducted several campaigns against the raiding Russians. He 
also benefitted from the dispute between France and England and managed to 
involve them in his wars with Russia, not only obtaining French and British 
assistance but managing to accomplish several reforms to modernize Persia. 
Additionally, 'Abbas M-irz5 launched numerous correspondences with the 
Ottoman Empire to unify their efforts and engage them in what he called fihid, 
the Holy War, against the infidel Russians. At this crucial point, the u, 50ff ulami 
seized the opportunity to penetrate and re-enforce their political influence on the 
court of the new dynasty through the crown prince, the de facto ruler, and 
surpass the skeptical Shah who was favorable to the shaykhiyya teachings. This 
chapter is dedicated to a survey of why 'Abb5s M-irza began his efforts at Q5j6r- 
Ottoman rapprochement. How did he handle such an enterprise? What was the 
outcome of his efforts at al-Taqrfb and what was the role of the u. ýJll- ulama-? 
Therefore, it is necessary to shed light on the political conditions within the 
Iranian arena at the time to demonstrate 'Abbýs Mlirzý's efforts at al-Taqrib and 
the role the u., r, 01i ulami might have played in these efforts. 
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4.2. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CROWN PRINCE 
Each one of Fath Ali Shah's elder sons had been entrusted with a governorship of 
one of the empire's provinces . 
221 For example, Mohammad Ali M-irzý was named 
as the governor of Kerman Shah. ýusayn Ali MTrz5 was entrusted with the 
province of Pars. Mohammad Vali M-irz5 became the governor of Khur5sýin. 
'Abb5s M-Irz5 was given the governorship of the most important and the richest 
province, that of Azerbaijan. 222 Strangely enough, Persian sources state nothing 
about Mohammad QuIT M! rz5, and why he was deprived of a governorship in 
favor of his younger brother. 
In addition to being the governor of Azerbaijan, 'Abbýs M-irz5 was nominated as 
223 
crown prince of the throne (Nj "ib al-Saýtana) in 1798. Although Ann Lambton 
claims that this nomination was in 1818,224 it seems that she was confused 
between the designation of 'Abbýs Mirz5 for the post of the crown prince in 
1798 and his nomination to manage foreign affairs which would indeed occur in 
1818. Also, Fatlý Ali Shah made public the selection of the crown prince in 1818 
as a supportive policy to backup crown prince in his preparation for the second 
war against Russia. This selection raises two substantial questions: why would 
Fatl) Ali Shah have preferred 'Abb5s Mlirzý above his other sons, especially the 
elder ones? And what was the impact of this nomination on the other sons? 
Most sources suggest that Fatý Ali Shah was following the last will of Aghj 
Mohammad Shah: that no one but Abb5s M-irz5 should be the crown prince. 225 
As mentioned previously, Aghj Mohammad Shah aimed in his will to create a 
221 Ann K. Lambton, Qjjjr Persla (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 13. 
222 Robert G. Watson, A History of P&sia (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 65, Cornhill, 1866), 170-3. 
223 Mostafa M. Tabari, 'Abbis Afirzi Wjjr Sharh Haal wa Syaa5at wa Khadamaat-e Ou (Tehran: Intishaaraat Ibn Sinaa, 
1353), 21. 
224 Ann K. Lambton, Q, ýjjr FL-rsla (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 13. 
22 5 Mustafa M. Tabari, 'Abb, ý5 Mifza Qýýjr (Tehran: Intesharat Ibn Siin5,1353), 20- 1. 
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legislative precedent for the lineage to the throne in the Qýjýr dynasty which 
emphasized that the mother of the candidate prince should be a Qýjari princess. 
However, Mohammad Qul-I Miirzý whose mother was a Q5jýri princess too, should 
have been in a superior position for crown prince because he was older than 
'Abb5s M-Irzý. 
This suggests another reason for the selection of 'Abb5s M-irzý as crown prince. 
In other words, Aghj Mohammad's last will might have laid out more particulars 
than the condition regarding the heir's mother. According to reliable Persian 
sources, Aghj Mohammad Shah made two connected orders in his last will: the 
first being that 'Abb5s MTrz5 must be the crown prince, and the second that 
'Abbýs M-irzý must marry Dhul-Qi'ada the daughter of Amir Mlirzý Mohammad 
Khan-i Q5j6rs DevehlCi. By focusing on the connection between them,, it 
becomes obvious that Aghj Mohammad's wish was that the mother and the wife 
of the crown prince must be from the DevehlO clan of the Q5j5rs. With this 
stipulation, Aghj Mohammad might have intended to strengthen his old coalition 
with the Q5j6r DevehlO, the same coalition that had played a major role in the 
defeat of Aghj Mohammad Shah's strongest opponents and in the establishment 
of his own rule over all of Persia. In fact, Agha Mohammad might have intended 
to reward the Q5j5r DevehlO with this final request. 
Additionally, Aghj Mohammad Shah might have aimed to guarantee a broad 
base of support for his selected crown prince, so that no one would be able to 
challenge him over the throne after the death of the next Shah. In short, Agha 
Mohammad sought a peaceful and smooth transition of power and wished to 
prevent any kind of hostility over the Qýjýr's succession, so he could be assured 
that his dynasty would last longer. 
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The nomination of 'Abb5s Krz6 for the position of the crown prince, however, 
caused severe animosity between him and those elder brothers who considered 
themselves more deserving of this position. The brothers expressed their 
dissatisfaction on many occasions. For instance, Watson notes 
One occasion the Shah ordered that at the public reception which he was 
to hold on the following day no one of the princes excepting Abbass 
Meerza was to appear before him wearing a sward. The morrow came, 
and with it came the princes to attend upon their sovereign. All, save 
Mahomed Ali Meerza [the Shah's elder son], appeared unarmed, but the 
Shahzadeh wore his sward as usual, and when he was asked by the Shah 
why he had not obeyed his command he replied that there was only one 
way of making him obey it, and that way was to take his sward by force. 
He further announced his readiness to fight with his brother Abbass then 
and there, and to abide by the event of the duel. 226 
4.3. RUSSO-IRANIAN WARS 
The Russo-Iranian wars in fact opened the path to foreign interference in Iranian 
local affairs. Since the Qajar territories were the arena of these wars, and the 
Russian invasion sparked off the conflict among the imperial powers, it will be 
very significant to review the political, economical, and military conditions of the 
Qajar empire as well as that of the Russian empire at the beginning of the 19th 
century in order to recognize the causes of these wars and comprehend their 
outcome. 
Persia was passing into an epoque of great chaos at the end of 18 th century. 
The Qýijýr Empire had just been established in 1779 by Aghj Mohammad Shah 
who had restored stability and imposed his authority over the whole country; 
226 Robert G. Watson, A History of PL-rsla (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 65, Cornhill, 1866), 171. 
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however, such stability could not last longer when the Shah was assassinated in 
1797, and the empire entered into greater chaos. Fatlý Ali Shah inherited the 
throne of his uncle although he had experienced initial opposition from some 
pretenders, such as $ýdiq Khan the Turkish tribal leader who was in fact accused 
of being responsible for Aghý Mohammad's assassination. 227 Lacking the 
experience and charisma of Agha Mohammad Shah, Fatlý Ali was unable to 
impress his authority over the whole empire, so several revolts took place around 
the country. For instance, Hercules II, the governor of Georgia, had announced 
his subservience to the Russian emperor since 1795.228 
Hardly surprisingly, this political mess had a strong impact upon the Iranian 
economy. Commerce was depressed because of the lack of security on the 
trading routes which consequently caused the stoppage of exchange trade 
among the main commercial centers in Iran. Lambton emphasizes that 
"commerce which had been developed under the Safavids had been severely 
damaged by the disorders which had followed the fall of that dynasty. 11229 
Agriculture, also, was overwhelmed by the political turmoil during the 18 th 
century. The rivalries among local rulers destroyed many fertile lands. These 
rulers, furthermore, excessively increased taxes on the agricultural crops in order 
to fulfill their military adventures. As a result, peasants, who were unable to pay 
such high taxes, quitted their fields and looked for other kinds of living instead. 
On the military level, the Qýijýr Empire had no army in the modern sense of the 
word. Its army was composed of a small medieval squadron which served 
basically as imperial guards. In the case of a war or conducting a campaign, the 
Qýj5r army mainly depended in its recruitment on what the provinces 
227 Hasan-e Fasaa'j, Farasnaama-ye Naasen, trans. Heriber Busse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 78. 
228 Kam5l M. Ahmad, Dirjýsjt 17 Tirikh Iran al-tiadl-M (Baghdad: Arkaan Publisher, 1985), 25. 
229 Ann K. Lambton, Qjjjr PL-rsia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 33. 
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provided. 230 Such a system was useless for several reasons. First of all, this 
army would be deficient as regards discipline to the general leadership since the 
loyalty of its soldiers would be to their local commanders. Obviously, such an 
army would lack appropriate military training since it only assembled 
occasionally. Finally, the governors of provinces would keep the professional 
fighters for their own interests and send inexperienced ones instead, which 
might include barbers, bakers, and fruit sellers. 231 In addition the Q5j5r army 
lacked any modern weaponry system: it depended instead on the traditional 
medieval weapons such as swords, horses and camels to supplement the few old 
fashioned artilleries. 
On the other hand, Russia was entirely different. Politically, it experienced real 
stability when the Romanov family seized power in Russia in the beginning of the 
18 th century, and it succeeded, through its emperors, in unifying and expanding 
its territories. At the same time, Russia had a strong industrial economy which 
was at its peak when Russia invaded the Qýj5r's territories in 1804. According to 
Kamal, Ahmad, Russia had a thousand considerably large industrial companies at 
the end of the century. 232 This flourishing economy, therefore, supported the 
creation of a modern army following the European system which was provided 
with the most recent military supplies. 
Its blooming economy and huge army prompted Russia to adopt an expansionist 
policy. This policy was stimulated by the need for primary sources for its 
developing industry, and new markets to sell the Russian goods, and this 
included the warm water ports from which to distribute these goods around the 
world. Therefore, Russia directed its imperial policy towards Iran because it was 
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a shortcut to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, its vast surface would provide 
Russia with the necessary primary sources for its industry, and its commercial 
location would be suitable markets for Russian goods. Russia, as well, wished to 
control the Iranian silk trade and change its route to pass through Russian 
territories rather than Ottoman lands, so Russia would be able to deprive its 
southern enemy of a significant financial source. 
Russian interest in Iran was shaped during the time of Peter the Great (1682- 
1725), in the early 18 th century. Peter the Great conducted a campaign against 
Iran in the summer of 1722 which was concluded in signing a treaty with the 
Safavid Shah Tahmasp in Petersburg in 1723. According to the Petersburg 
treaty, Iran ceded Baku and Darband to Russia and promised that it would not 
allow the Ottoman Empire to intervene in Iranian affairs. At the same time, 
Russia would be committed to protect Iran from any Afghani aggression; 
however, Iran must provide the Russian army with supplies and camels. 233 
Yet the Petersburg treaty was unable to stand for long because Nadir Shah 
cancelled it in 1732. Nadir Shah took advantage of the Russian-Ottoman war at 
that time, and signed two new treaties with Russia, one in Rasht in 1732 and the 
other in Ginga in 1735. Consequently, Nadir Shah restored all Iranian land that 
was granted to Russia by the Petersburg treaty of 1723; however, Russia was 
granted some special economic considerations as a substitute, such as customs 
exemptions for its goods. 234 At that time the Russian empire became engaged in 
war with the Ottoman Empire, so its interest in Iran was temporarily suspended. 
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With the establishment of the Qýijýr Empire, the relationship between Iran and 
Russia went off on a different tangent. Aghj Mohammad Shah's desire to 
control all the territories of the Safavid Empire crossed swords with the Russian 
imperial policy; therefore, Georgia became the conflict zone between those two 
empires. However, the death of Catherine II in 1796 and Agha Mohammad Shah 
in 1797 interrupted any hostilities between the two nations for a while. 
The tension revived when the Czar George XIII of Georgia voluntarily ceded his 
235 
crown in the favor of the Russian emperor on September 28,1800. This 
impolitic action drove George's younger brother, Alexander, to oppose him. But 
Alexander, who was vehemently against his father's crown being given to 
someone out of the family, was not in a sufficiently strong position to stand 
against the Russian forces alone. Therefore, he sought military aid from the 
Ottomans who were unwilling to create a new dispute with their powerful 
northern neighbor. 
Eventually, Alexander composed a coalition with the tribal chief of the Avars and 
the Khan of Karabýigh who both welcomed him and expressed their desire to join 
his efforts to expel the Russian troops from Georgia. 236 Although the sources do 
not mention it, why did those two leaders participate in such a coalition? It 
seems that they considered the Russian presence in the region a direct threat to 
their authority, so they wanted to expel the Russian troops from the area as a 
protective procedure. When the coalition forces encountered the Russian army 
at Ganja in 1804, they were defeated and left the battlefield to the Russians, and 
Seeseanov, the Russian commander, entered Ganja by force and killed Jawýd 
Khan-i Q5j5r Ziy5dlO, the governor of Ganja. 237 Seeseanoov, acting on the 
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assurance from Mohammad Khan-i Q5j5r QuyU-nlG of Erevan that he would 
surrender the town without a fight, made his way to Erevan. 238 When the news 
was received in Tehran, Fatlý Ali Shah appointed 'Abb5s M-irz5 as commander-in- 
chief of the Qýj5r army and dispatched him to rescue Erevan. In 1804, the 
Qýj5r army encountered the Russian troops at Etchamiazdeen, the residence of 
the Patriarch of the Armenian Church. Although the fight lasted for three days 
no one side gained a crucial victory. When General Seeseanoov and his troops 
reached Erevan, Mohammad Khan, the governor of the town, changed his mind 
and refused to surrender the fortress. When the Qýj5r army faced Russian 
troops again at Erevan, it experienced a humiliating defeat, and the Qaj'ar 
soldiers were forced to flee the battlefield. 
'Abbas Mfirzý collected together the remains of his troops and realized that with 
his ill - equipped army he would not be able to engage with the disciplined and 
well-trained Russian troops armed in addition with what seemed in contrast to be 
horrendous cannons, so he espoused a new approach in order to halt the 
Russians: he opted for guerilla tactics. Watson elucidates: "'The crown prince 
became convinced that his irregular troops could not successfully encounter 
disciplined infantry in the open field: he, therefore, gave orders for night attacks 
upon the Russians in their entrenched position. "239 Although this tactic did not 
restore the occupied lands to the Q5jýirs, it seems that it was the only possible 
means whereby 'Abb5s MT1rz5 could compensate for his lack of a modern army. 
It was also 'Abb5s KrzYs aim to invest the superiority of his army in such a 
tactic since it traditionally depends on the chivalry. 
The first Russo-Iranian war ground on for nine years (1804-1813) due to several 
reasons. First of all, the challenge among imperial powers played a significant 
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role in failing to come up with any effort to stop the war. For example, when 
Napoleonic France having achieved crucial victories in Eastern Europe advanced 
towards Russia's western frontiers in 1807, the outcome was victory for the 
Russians; on the strength of this they then proposed a treaty with the defeated 
Qýjýr Empire which could have concluded the war between the two countries. 
Nevertheless, the French convinced Fatlý Ali Shah to reject the Russian proposal 
unless Russia returned all Iranian lands that had been occupied by Russia, and 
this of course was unacceptable to Russia . 
240 The British, in their turn, brought 
about the failure of the Russo-Iranian negotiations for a peace treaty in 1810 
and 1812 in spite of the great and sincere efforts of 'Abbas M-irz5 to put an end 
to the war. 241 Yet eventually Russia, which was preparing for a combined 
Franco-Ottoman attack, found itself unable to concentrate on the Iranian front as 
well and halted the war. With British mediation, Russia and the Q5j5r Empire 
signed the Treaty of Gulistan 242 on October 12,1813. Accordingly, the Q5j5r 
Empire submitted to Russia all their territories north of the River Arras. 243 
I Abbýs M-irza, who had meanwhile trained and equipped his army with British aid 
since 1813, intended to restore the Iranian lands and avenge Iranian dignity,, 
although the Russians were determined to prevent further hostilities from 
breaking out. Meanwhile, he sought the support of the ulami, the religious 
leaders, to grant him a fatwa, (religious permission) for a -7ihad against Russia 
which he could have used to stimulate Iranians to participate in a war. 'Abbas 
MTrz5 eventually obtained such a fatwa from A_qhj Sayyid Mohammad, who 
himself became a consultant to the crown prince along with other mujtahids and 
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joined the Q5j5r army in this war. 244 Thus again 'Abbas M-irz5 proclaimed war 
against Russia in 1826. Taking advantage of the sudden attack, the Q5jar army 
achieved some victories in the beginning of the war and restored Shu-sh5 and 
Ganja to Iran. 
However, when Russian troops were reorganized and received new aid, the 
Iranian army was obliged to retreat before Russian counter attacks. Ultimately, 
Russian forces invaded the northern province of Azerbaijan and with the fall of 
Tabriz in 1828, the path was open to continue to Tehran. Yet, the British who 
would not allow Russia to occupy Iran and thus threaten their interests in India, 
intervened and exerted strong pressure upon Russia to end the war. As a result, 
'Abbýs M-irza and General Paskevich, the Russian commander, signed the peace 
treaty of Turl(minchi/45 in 1828. Accordingly, the Qýj5r Empire agreed to pay 
five million Robles in gold as reimbursement for breaking the treaty of 
Gulist5n. 246 
This humiliating defeat for Iran was due to numerous causes. First of all, it had 
happened because of the niggardliness of Fatlý Ali Shah who repeatedly refused 
to spend an adequate amount of money on his army. Also, as we have seen 
above, the Qýjýr army because of its miserable conditions was no match for the 
modern Russian troops. Umpton states: "The Persians were badly defeated for a 
number of reasons, among which were the Shah's refusal to provide enough 
money for the army; the erratic leadership of the princes in command; and the 
lack of discipline of the troops, who tended to be distracted from their main 
purpose by the lure of booty. 11247 It is also worth noting that unrest in domestic 
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affairs could have prevented 'Abbýs M-irz5 from giving full concentration to the 
war. Additionally, the interest of the imperial powers at that time played a major 
role in such an outcome. For example, the Qaj5rs would not have been faced 
with such a disgraceful defeat in the first war if the British had provided them 
with some military support, or at least political back-up. Umpton points out that 
"Great Britain, in alliances with Russia, was also engaged in the Greek war of 
independence and for this and other reasons took no steps to aid Persia. 11248 
`Abbýs Mfirzý himself might have been partly responsible for the outcome of the 
second Russo-Iranian war in spite of any positive effort he had made for he 
engaged his country in another hopeless war against Russia despite the fact that 
the Qýijýr army was far from being able to stand up to the Russians. One may 
inquire why 'AbMs Mirza took such an unwise decision for war at this particular 
time. Although there is no certain answer to this question, it seems that there 
are many probabilities that could have motivated him. First of all, 'Abbas Krza 
could have believed that his efforts in modernizing his army over the previous 
thirteen years were enough to gain them victory. Besides, the friendship treaty 
of Erzurum, which he himself had concluded with the Ottoman Empire in 1823, 
might have made him to believe that the Ottomans might conceivably join him in 
such a war especially if he pushed the religious angle. He might also have 
embarked on this war following accusations of being responsible for the first 
defeat, so he attempted to prove to his opponents that he was capable of 
obtaining victory. Furthermore, 'AbMs MTrza perhaps might have suffered from 
an undisclosed illness, which Watson implied when he mentions "... the 
misfortune to hear the death of his English physician, Dr. Cormick, who had 
attended him during twenty-three years, and who, by his professional skill and 
his intimate acquaintance with the prince's constitution, might perhaps have 
248 bid, 5. 
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been the means of saving his life . "249 This could justify why Fatlý Ali Shah had 
two crown princes in the same time along the Q5jýr history: 'Abbýs M-Irzý the 
first crown prince, and Mohammad Miirzý, 'Abb5s M-irz5's elder son, the second 
crown prince. 250 
4.4. ABBAS MiRZA AND THE BRITISH-FRENCH ENMITY 
Due to the frequent defeats in the war with Russia, 'Abb5s M-1rz5 searched for 
military aid from the other super powers. Therefore, he attempted to activate an 
Anglo-Iranian political treaty which was signed between Fatlý Ali Shah and the 
envoy of the British government of India, Captain John Malcolm in 1800. 
However, the British refused to provide the Q5j5r Empire with such help since 
the political treaty restricted British aid to the Q5jar rulers except in the case of a 
French or Afghan attack. 251 
'Abbas Mirzý attempted to use imperial rivalry between Great Britain and 
Napoleonic France, so he turned to France for aid. Although there is no clear 
evidence in the sources to suggest that he initiated a direct contact with the 
French, his long letter to Napoleon revealed his enthusiasm for the French 
proposal. 252 For example, he mediated to free the French envoy that was 
carrying letter from Napoleon when he was caught and was imprisoned by the 
Turkish governor of the Erzurum in 1805.253 Moreover, 'Abb5s M-irz5 honorably 
received the mission of Mohammad Rafi' Afandii, the Turkish envoy, who was 
carrying a Turkish proposal for an alliance among Iran, France, and the 
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Ottomans, in 1807; 'Abbýs mlirzý sent a letter to the Ottoman deputy, Qj "Im 
Maqjm Ottomaniand welcomed such an alliance. 
254 
According to Fasaa'-i, the negotiations between France and the Qýjars began 
when Napoleon sent a letter to Fatlý Ali Shah offering a treaty of friendship in 
255 1806. In this letter, Napoleon stated that the enmity with Russia would be a 
solid base for French-Iranian cooperation. A treaty with France was concluded 
when "the French Ambassador, Brig ad ier-Genera I Gardane, arrived in Tehran 
with 70 artisans, master artisans, army instructors and engineers 1256 in 1807. 
According to this treaty, Napoleon promised to return Tiflis, the province of 
Georgia, and the district of Azerbaijan to the Qýjýrs by means of war or peace 
and he would yearly provide the Qýjars with military aid which was to include 
instructors, engineers and supplies. In their turn, the Q5jýr rulers should grant 
permission to the French army to march through Iranian lands in case of a 
French invasion of India. 
Apparently, the French used this treaty professionally to achieve their goals 
regardless of Iranian interest. First of all, they aborted any Russian attempts to 
put an end to the war with the Qýijýr Empire, by promising the Iranians to free 
all their occupied territories. Since invading India was the main French object at 
that time, it appears that France was looking for Russian support to accomplish 
its eastern ambition,, so the French might have employed their treaty with Iran to 
apply strong pressure upon Russia to be more cooperative with them. This 
purpose was achieved when the two imperial powers, France and Russia signed 
a friendship treaty of Tilsit in 1807 that also overlooked any benefits to Iran. 
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Since the French-Iranian treaty became worthless, 'Abbýs M-irz5 turned to the 
British who were also affected by this treaty. Indeed, the treaty of Tilsit caused 
great chaos among the British who saw it as a direct threat to their interests in 
India, so both London and India dedicated their efforts to prevent such a threat. 
As a result, the significance of Iran was restored to an important position in 
British foreign policy as the first defensive line to protect India from any French 
advance. However, this attempt to protect the British interest in India via the 
Iranian gate produced a great rivalry between London and India to dominate 
British influence over the Q5jýr Empire, so two British envoys, Malcolm and 
Jones, were sent to Iran in order to bring about a friendship and alliance treaty 
with the Qýijýr rulers. Wright affirms "'rivalry between London and India for 
control over policy towards Persia -a rivalry that was to persist for many years - 
contributed to the appointment of both men [John Malcolm and Harford 
Jones]". 257 
Brigadier-General John Malcolm, who had concluded a political treaty with the 
Qajars during his visit to the country in 1800, was sent from the British 
government of India in 1808. When he arrived in Bushier, Malcolm demanded 
that General Gardane and all French officers should depart from the country 
before he would advance to the Q5j5r capital to discuss a new treaty. But the 
Q5j5r rulers considered his demand as an attack on their sovereignty, so they 
refused Malcolm's order. Hence, John Malcolm left for India with no 
achievement. 
The second British envoy was Sir Harford Jones who was sent from England. Sir 
Harford had been the representative of the East India Company in Baghdad for 
two years, and he had visited Iran twice when he gained knowledge of 
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Iranians. 258 Upon his arrival in Tehran in 1809, Sir Harford Jones successfully 
drafted a preface to a friendship and alliance treaty with the Qýjars which was 
sent to London to be scrutinized. 259 In 1812, Gore Ouseley, a British 
Ambassador to the Q5jýr court, arrived in Tehran and signed a defensive treaty 
with the Q5jýrs which was based on Harford's preliminary treaty of 1809. 
According to this, Great Britain had undertaken to support the Q5j5r Empire 
against any European attack and to pay it a subsidy of 200.000 Tumin annually 
from the treasury of the government of India as long as Iran was engaged in 
war with Russia - which would have implied a British desire to use Iran as a 
cat"s-paw against Russia. The British had agreed to provide Iran with military 
ammunition such as artillery and muskets and British officers to reorganize and 
train the Q5jýr army. In return,, the Qýjýr rulers denounced the treaty with 
France and expelled all the French representatives from Iran. They also 
promised to prevent any European power from using Iranian soil to launch any 
attack against India. Furthermore, the Q5j5r rulers would be committed to 
provide military support if the Afghans or any European power attacked India. 260 
Abbýs Mfirzý who officially became in charge of Iranian foreign policy in 1810 
might have played a major role in clenching the rivalry between John Malcolm 
and Sir Harford Jones in favor of the latter, although Watson urged that Harford 
Jones should also demand that the Qýj5rs must expel the French mission from 
Iran as a prior condition of any discussion on the British proposal of a friendship 
treaty . 
261 The Q5j5r records showed that 'Abbýs Mirz5 had sent a letter to Sir 
Harford Jones in which he discussed the conditions of the Russo-Iranian war. 262 
However, there is no mention of any sort of contact between 'Abbýs M-irz5 and 
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John Malcolm. Therefore, it seems that 'Abb5s M-irz5 had preferred to conduct 
the negotiations with Sir Harford Jones rather than John Malcolm who might 
have been considered far too wily by the Q5j5r rulers from their previous 
experience with him when he concluded what turned out to be the worthless 
political treaty with Iran in 1800. 
In 1814, the British-Russian rapprochement at that time obliged the British to 
revise their defensive treaty of 1812 with the Qýjar Empire. Mainly, the British 
aimed to rid themselves of their obligation to train the Iranian army. Therefore, 
they concluded a new treaty with Iran in 1814 which was known as the Tehran 
treaty. 263 
The British put a great deal of effort into bringing an end to both Russo-Iranian 
wars in 1813 and 1828; however, they lingered to aid the Iranians when the 
latter had claimed the British support in 1826 according to the Tehran treaty. 
Although the British officers had participated in putting together the plan for the 
Iranian counter attack against Russia in 1826,264 they refused to get involved in 
any further military operations. They reiterated the somewhat ambiguous terms 
of the Tehran treaty to wriggle out of their duties towards Iran, emphasizing that 
the Qýijýr Empire was ineligible to obtain such military aid because it was 
responsible for initiating the hostility against Russia while the Tehran treaty 
dictated that British military aid would only be provided in the case of Iran 
coming under attack. 
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4.5. IMPLEMENTING THE NI? -AM-I JADiD 
The Russian invasions of the northern provinces of the Q5jýr Empire and the 
humiliating loss that the Q5jýr army had experienced at Russian hands opened 
'Abb5s M-irz5's eyes to the backward state of the Q5j5r Empire and motivated 
him to adopt a series of reforms to modernize his empire. Additionally, it was his 
hope that such reforms would help to enforce the authority of the central 
government against the increasing power of the provincial governments. These 
reforms initially began with the development of the Qýjýr army; however, 
'Abb5s M! rz5 promptly recognized that sufficient modernization of an army 
requires several noncombatant related changes. As a result, he expanded the 
reforms into a program entitled the Niý--jm-i Jaoliol which included dispatching 
students abroad, Introducing printing, and regulating the taxation system. 
However, for the time being only the military reforms was to be attempted while 
the rest of the program seemed to be relegated to the back burner. 
4.5.1. THE MILITARY REFORMS 
As we have seen, the Qajýr army was following a very backward system in the 
early 19th century. The traditional chivalric method was dominant throughout 
the military, not to mention the archaic use of sword and lance. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that such an army would not be able to stand against such 
comparatively well-developed troops as the Russians. For that reason, the 
Nizim-i Jadl-d was tentatively applied by 'Abb5s Krza to help bring the Qýj5r 
army up to European military standards in a desperate effort to avoid the 
frequent humiliating defeats that his army had suffered at the hands of the 
Russian army. However, it is controversial when the first attempt to modernize 
the Q5jar military system took place. On the one hand, Lambton believed that 
the military reforms were launched for the first time in the Q5j5r Empire with 
French assistance, when General Gardane arrived in Tehran in 1807, although 
she admitted that some of the European approaches were learned from Russian 
1, I)i 
internees. For example, she stresses, "Some knowledge of European tactics was 
brought by Russian deserters and renegades, but the first serious attempt at 
military reform was made under the guidance of French officers who 
accompanied General Gardane's mission. if265 On the other hand, the QaJar 
sources revealed that the Qýj5r army had been armed with modern weapons 
since 1804, when FW Ali Shah ordered two armories to be built in Azerbaijan 
and Fars. Fasaa'-I states 
In that year [1804] royal decrees were issued [by 175tý Ali Shah] to the 
effect that hundreds pieces of artillery should be cast of copper and 
brass, with all accessories in the province of Azerbaijan and Fars, and to 
be delivered after completion. In accordance with this order, the crown 
prince 'Abb5s M-irz5 had the gun assigned to fabricate under the 
provision of Mirz5 'IS5, known as M-1rz5 bozorg vizier at Tabr-iz. Hosin All 
M-irzý, governor of Fars, had the guns assigned to his province with all 
the accessories, manufactured under the supervision of Char5gh Ali 
Khan-e Navaý'-i, vizier of Fars. 266 
Nonetheless, Fasaa'i gave no explanation for the way that the Qýjars had 
obtained knowledge of how to manufacture artillery. Apparently, the 
modernization of the Q5jýr troops took place prior to the arrival of the French 
mission, but it was a modest attempt and that was the reason for 'Abb5s M-Irza 
seeking further help from the French. 
'Abbýs M-irza succeeded in concluding a treaty with the French in 1807, and with 
the arrival of the French mission, the military reforms began. According to the 
Franco-Qýijar treaty of Finkenstien of 1807, Napoleon agreed to help the Qajar 
Empire with all necessary means to modernize its troops following European 
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guidelines,, so he composed his mission to reflect such a commitment. The 
French General Gardane was appointed to lead this mission, and it consisted of 
fourteen experts in all military fields such as engineering, mapping, artillery, 
cavalry and infantry. 267 The French mission assisted with organizing and training 
the Q5jýr troops. According to Vanessa Martin, the French suggested that half 
of the Qýjýr troops follow the French military model of infantry and artillery. 268 
Additionally, the French translated references in military approaches and theories 
of defense, sketched a geographical map of Azerbaijan, and established a mortar 
269 
smelter. Indeed, it had a significant impact upon 'Abbas M-1rzas program of 
modernization. First of all, a French officer tutored him himself. 270 Also, he 
became acquainted with all military matters,, since the French mission included 
officers from all military fields. It is possible that 'Abb5s Krza had outlined his 
Nizim-i Jadid according to this experience. However, French-Q5j5r relations 
came to an abrupt end with the Franco-Russian peace treaty of Tilsit (1 July 
1807) which led to an annulment of the treaty of Finkenstien (4 May 1807) and 
the expulsion of the French mission. 
'Abbýs Mlrzý then looked for British assistance with the departure of the French 
and worked towards for the Anglo-Qýjýr treaty of 1810. By this the British 
undertook to provide the Qýj5r Empire with training for officers, and in weapons 
and munitions . 
271 But the British, unlike the French, also sought a political role in 
the Q5j5r Empire and avoided engaging heavily in the military reforms, although 
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some British officers did guide the Qýijýr troops. According to Ringer, a British 
envoy was amazed by the progress that the Qýijýr army had made, observing 
that English officers led the uniformed army with shaven chins. 272 However, 
from 1815 their role had been mostly to provide weapons and funds, for they 
had removed nearly all their officers from Iran because of the dispute with the 
Qýijýirs over the subsidy that the British had provided to the Qýjýirs according to 
the 1814 treaty. Perhaps the British might have been anxious about provoking 
Russia, which would foil them from playing the role of peacemaker in the war 
between Russia and Persia when needed. Also, the British might well have 
feared that enforcing the Qýijýr army would threaten their interests in India if the 
Q5jýr Empire reached an agreeable peace treaty with Russia and claimed their 
historical rights in Afghanistan and some Indian territories. 
In order to continue military reforms after the withdrawal of the British officers, 
'Abbýs Mirzý took advantage of Napoleon's deterioration in 1814 and employed 
some of his French officers who had fled to the east. 273 According to Ringer, 
'Abbýs Mirzý ordered a number of elite youth to study military subjects with a 
French officer in the crown prince"s court. 274 This might have reflected 'Abbýs 
Mirza's desire to popularize his program among the Qýijýr elites, especially tribal 
chiefs who were historically the military leaders of the army, by involving their 
youth in the military reforms which could bolster up their traditional authority. 
Additionally, 'Abbýs Mlirzý dispatched five students to be educated in England in 
1815; among them three were assigned to study in military majors such 
11 engineering and fortification, the duties of an artillery and cavalry officer, [and 
272 Monica Ringer, Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform In Qcýjjr Iran (Costa Mesa: Mazda 
Publishers, Inc., 2001), 23. 
273 Ann K. Larnbton, Qjjjr Persia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 23. 
274 Monica Ringer, Education, Rellglon, and the DIscourse of Cultural Reform In Qjjjr Ifan (Costa 'ýI- sa: '. 1-. zda 
Publishers, Inc., 2001), 23. 
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11 275 the] art of [a]gunsmith. The variety of subjects that these students were 
commanded to study reveals that this could be considered an early sign of 
'Abbýs M-IrzYs wish to introduce the MzAm-i Jadid, which embraced unarmed 
reforms. 
4.5.2. OBSTACLES 
As was to be expected, 'Abbýs M-IrzYs attempt to introduce the Nizim-i Iadl-d 
encountered robust resistance from Fatlý Ali Shah's court and the Qýj5r elites for 
one reason or another. The tightfisted Shah showed no enthusiasm for these 
reforms because of its high costs that that forced 'Abbýs M-irza to request Sir 
Harford Jones to mediate with the Shah and enlighten him to the necessity of 
developing the Azerbaijani forces . 
276 'Abbas M-Irz5 then had to fund his Nizim-i 
Jadidaccording to his own financial means; however, they were limited and were 
almost consumed by the Q5jar-Russian wars which had a negative impact on the 
Nizim-i Jadid Martin notes, "The main problem behind the relative failure to 
reform and modernize government was of course financial. 11277 
The Qýijýr princes contested the Nizim-i Jadid because they believed that these 
reforms would strengthen 'Abbýs MTrz5s authority and increase his chances for 
accession. Mohammad Ali M-irz5, 'Abb5s M-Irz5's brother and the governor of 
Fars who challenged 'Abb5s M-irz5's claim to the throne of the Q5j5r, was also 
opposed to the Nizim-i Jadl-af since he assumed that the newly trained army 
would pave the road for 'Abb5s M-irza to seize the throne. He criticized 'Abb5s 
M! rz5's military reforms on several occasions and accused him of following the 
275 Ann K. Lambton, Qjjjr Persia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 202. 
276 Monica Ringer, Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform In Qjjjr Iran (Costa '. Iesa: Mazda 
Publishers, 2001), 20-21. 
277 Vanessa Martin, An Evaluation of Reform and Development of the State in the Eariv Qýjar Period, Die 11, 'elt 
Des 
Islams, vol. 36, no. 1 (Leiden: E. 3. Brill, 1996), 10. 
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innovations of disbelievers, forcing 'Abbýs Krzý to refer to the Qur"a-n to 
justify his actions. Lambton confirms: 
Muhammad Ali Mirz5, 'Abb5s MTrz5s brother and rival, attempted to cast 
odium on the latter and his efforts to form a modern army by seeking to 
show that in adopting the customs of infidels 'Abb5s M-Irz5 was 
subverting the religion of Islam. In order to counteract this, 'Abbýs 
Mirz5 caused a passage of the Qur'ýn [prepare whatever you could of 
strength, and of horses to overawe A115h's foe and yours] 278 favorable to 
the improvement of the means of the defense in the cause of religion to 
be copied and disseminated through the country. 279 
Military leaders, especially tribal chiefs and governors, also stood against the new 
order because they believed it was directed at eliminating their own authority. 
According to the new military reforms, these leaders would lose their previously 
held positions as the only source of providing the Qýj5r army with its soldiers. 
Also, European officers in the desired army would replace them. Financially, the 
central government would be directly responsible for collecting the taxes 
according to the new taxation system which would prevent these leaders from 
gaining their usual profits, not to mention the additional burden that they would 
pay in the form of new taxes to cover the cost of these reforms. 
Additionally, the ulamjwere resistant to the Nizim-i-Aadid. First of all, they had 
countered the military reform, stating it conflicted with Islamic traditions. In 
other words, they might have viewed the military reforms as a path to smuggle 
secular beliefs into the Islamic territories. Also, perhaps the ulami opposed 
some military customs which seemed to them humiliating to Islamic sensibility or 
tradition, such as shaving beards and being under a Christian officer's leadership. 
278 The Qur'jn, 8: 60. 
279 Ann K. Lambton, Qiýjjr Persia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 104-5. 
136 
The ulami too could have seen the military reforms as an enforcement of the 
role of the central government, which could reduce their power or perhaps be 
used against them, and that would explain the uprising against 'Abbas Wrzý in 
Tabr-iz in 1828 which was led by a Shii mujtahid Although Ringer suggested 
that the policy of dispatching students abroad had faced no opposition due to the 
small number engaged, 280 the ulami might have opposed this policy as well for 
two reasons. First, it would diminish their unchallengeable monopoly over higher 
education in the Shi'i seminaries. Second, it would put the student in direct 
contact with secular ideas, so they might have looked at it as another tool to 
spread secularism among Muslims. 
4.6. 'ABBAS MiIZZA AND THE QAJAR-OTTOMAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
Hostility had been initiated between the Ottoman Empire and Iranians since 1501 
when Shah Ismý'Tl had officially announced the Shi'i "Ithni 'Ashri madhhab 
(Twelver Shiism) as the religious sect of the newly established Safavid Empire, 
which later led to the battle of Ch5lclTrýn between the two Muslim empires in 
1514. Since then, sectarian enmity and mistrust has engulfed relations between 
the Ottoman Empire and whoever ruled the Iranian Plateau. 
Iran's repetitive defeats at the hands of Russians, however, had left , Abb5s 
M-irz5 with no choice but to seek help from the Ottoman Empire and he did 
manage to establish a friendly and co-operative relationship with the Ottomans. 
Such a relationship would be extremely supportive to 'Abbas Wrzý in his 
delirious struggle against Russia and allow him to achieve two targets, tactical 
and strategic ones. Tactically, the adopted policy would allow him to alleviate 
and secure Iran's frontiers with the Ottoman Empire, so he could direct all his 
280 Monica Ringer, Educa&on, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qjjjr Iran (Costa Mesa: Mazda 
Publishers, 2001), 41. 
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resources towards the Russian front rather than having to cover two fronts. 
Strategically,, 'Abbýs M-1rz5 was depending on the historical hostility of Russia 
and the Ottomans as the two empires had previously engaged in a number of 
wars against each other . 
281 Therefore, 'Abbas M-irz5 hoped to reach a mutual 
defensive agreement with the Ottomans by which he could involve them directly 
in what he called Jihid, the Islamic holy war, against the infidel Russian Empire. 
The Qýj5r's Asnid, the state official registry, reveals that 'Abb5s Mllrzý had sent 
numerous letters to several Ottoman officials of different ranks in the period 
from 1799 to 1831. The authenticity of these letters is unquestionable since they 
are well-documented by Dr. Mohammad Na$Tirii in his great work, Asnid wa 
(Qj j_ . 
282 mukitabit-i tirikh-i Iran jr /) Dr. Na5in presents these letters along with 
the Q5jar and Ottoman registration numbers as well as the original manuscripts. 
Additionally, all the information, which was extracted from these letters, coincide 
with what can be found in other historical accounts of this era, and that would 
avoid any suspicion of forgery. 
Although these letters are widely accessible for historians, no single study has 
utilized them to shed light on 'Abbýs M-irza's use of religion in the service of his 
political rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire. Even Algar in his work, in 
which he dedicates a whole chapter to 'Abbýs Mfirzý's relationships with the 
ulami, failed to present such an aspect and paid no attention to the significance 
that religion played in 'Abbas M-irz5's political rapprochement. Consequently, 
such a tendency to utilize religion in the political process when dealing with the 
Ottoman Empire as suggested by those letters will be the focus of the next 
pages. To achieve such a goal, these letters will be thoroughly examined for 
their explicit and implicit religious indications and analyzed according to their 
281 Since 1676, the Russian and Ottoman empires had engaged in ten wars. 
282 Mohammad Naýiri, Asnid wa Mukitabit-i Tinkh-i Iran (Qjjjr-i), Vol. 1,2 (Tehran: Entisharýtj Kih5n, 1338). 
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historical significance. Therefore, the letters covered will be chronologically 
divided into two parts according to the major events of the time. Although 
'Abbýs Mlrzý had sent more than sixty letters to the Ottoman officials, a few 
letters will be under the scope of this study since they serve our purpose, while 
the rest deal with administrative issues and do not have any significance here. 283 
4.6.1 THE FIRST RUSSO-IRANIAN WAR (1219/1804-1229/1813) 
The Qýijýr's Asnid (official registry) showed that the first contact between 
'Abb5s MTrz5 with the Ottomans could be traced back to 1214/1799. In a letter 
addressed to Sayyid Khal-il Pasha, Qj`im-Maqjm, and entitled "The war of Iran 
and Russia, f1284 'Abb5s MTrz5 updates the Ottoman official with the latest news 
about the Q5j5r-Russian conflict, and the victories that the Qýj5r's army gained 
against the Russian forces and captured the city of Nlakhjawýin. He also 
expresses his happiness at the arrival of the ships that Great Britain had provided 
to the Ottoman Empire. In his letter, 'Abbýs M-irz5 describes the conflict as a 
war between'asikiral-Islim (the soldiers of Islam), who were supported by God, 
and the infidels. Additionally, he asserts that he is waiting for the happy news of 
the unification the two Muslim states and promises that he will defend the 
borders of the two states, the Qýj5r and Ottoman, and he will push away and 
subdue the infidels who have strayed, meaning Russia. 
This letter is exceptionally significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it reveals 
that this war in fact had historical roots although the Russo-Iranian war actually 
started officially in 1804/1219. The Russo-Iranian dispute initiated with the 
establishment of the Q5j5r state in 1796 and Agh5 Mohammad Shah, the 
283 Dr. Naýiri includes sixty seven letters from 'Abbas Mirz6 to the Ottoman officials in his two volumes work, a few 
letters will be investigated due to their significant relevance to the subject matter. 
284 Mohammad Naýiri, Asnid wa Mukitabk-i Tinkh-i Iran (Qjpr-i), Vol. 1 (Tehran: Entishar5ti Kihýn, 1338), 26-27. 
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founder of the Q5jar dynasty, had launched two campaigns to retrieve Georgia 
from the hands of the Russians before he was assassinated in his second 
campaign in 1797, and the scrimmage that was mentioned in the letter was an 
example of a series of similar incidents that could have paved the road to war. 
Secondly,, the letter proves an early inclination to utilize religion to gain the 
Ottomans' sympathy and involve them in the war against Russia which he could 
foresee. Therefore, 'Abbas Mirzý applies effective terms such as "soldiers of 
Islam". "strayed", "'infidels". "'God's support"', "'unifying the two Muslim states", 
and his promise to protect the borders of the two empires to invoke an Islamic 
feeling among the Muslim Ottomans so that they would seek to ally themselves 
with their fellow Muslim Qýijýirs against Russia, seeing it as a compelling religious 
duty. 
Thirdly, it implicitly indicates the mistrustful nature of the relationship between 
the Qýijýirs and the Ottomans during the early stages of the Q5j5r dynasty rule. 
'Abb5s Mirza conveys his pleasure at the news that the Ottomans had received 
ships which 'Abbas Wrz5 thought, or might have been convinced by the 
Ottomans, that were sent as British military aid as part of the British-Ottoman 
defensive alliance which was reached on 5th January, 1799. In fact the warships 
were a Russian subsidy in compliance with the Russo-Ottoman defensive alliance 
which was signed in Istanbul on 23rd December, 1798. According to a secret 
article of this agreement, Russia had to "'provide the Ottoman government with a 
fleet of twelve ships of line and, if required, an army of 75,000 to 80,000 
men. ri285 
285 3. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in Me Near and MIddle East; A Documentary Record. - 1535-1914 (New Jersey: Princeton, 
1956), 65. 
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Finally, the letter is very important since it solves the controversy among 
scholars of Q5jýr history over the issue of 'Abbýs KrzYs nomination for the 
position of the Crown Prince. For instance, Lambton claims that this nomination 
was in 1818 1286 while Naýiri insists that 'Abbas Mirz5 was nominated in 1223 ; 287 
however, Tabar-I suggests the nomination took place in 1798.288 This letter, on 
the other hand, sustains TabaCi's argument since 'Abb5s M-Irzý without the 
position of the Crown Prince could have lacked legitimacy to issue such a letter. 
Furthermore, it would have been an unwise decision to postpone the nomination 
of the Crown Prince for a long period since it could have inflamed the conflict 
over that position among the sons of Fatý Ali Shah. 
When the war started in 1219/1804 'Abbýs M-irza sent another letter to Mahmud 
Tayyar Pasha, Wall Erzurum . 
289 In this letter, 'Abbýs Mirza informs the governor 
of Erzurum that he led the army of the conqueror, the Shadow of God Fatý Ali 
Shah, in a campaign and first entered "Shuru-r-lrawýin" (meaning Sh-irw6n or 
Irav6n), to organize and set straight the city affairs, and then blockaded the 
infidel Russian forces and their allies (the Georgians) on the 28 th $afar 1219/ 
Friday 8 th June, 1804. His intention was to go on to destroy the surrounding 
forces and head towards Tiflis "'to annihilate the souls of the strayed followers of 
Satan from our borders"' (Satan being the Russians and the followers being the 
Georgians). 'Abb5s M-irza informs Mahmud Tayy6r Pasha that he has dispatched 
Sayyid Naqd Ali Khan Ghul5m to secure peace at the Iranian-Ottoman borders. 
Finally, he emphasizes that the harmony and rapprochement between the Qajars 
and Ottoman was fulfilled and denies any sort of tension. 
286Ann K. Lambton, Qjjjr Persia (Austin: University of Texas PIress, 1987), 13. 
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The letter reveals several key issues in the Russo-Iranian war as well as in the 
Q5j5r-Ottoman relations. First of all, 'Abb5s M-irza attempted to emphasize the 
sacred Islamic dimension of the war against Russia. For example, he depicted 
his father, Fatlý Ali Shah, as Islam Panjh (the protector of Islam), and 
7 remarkably used a term that was historically known among Sunni caliphs _fflu 
Allah (the Shadow of God), when he referred to his father, Fatlý Ali Shah. 
Although this title literally means the Shadow of God, it technically suggests that 
the caliph is the representative of God on Earth, unlike the traditional view of the 
caliph as being a successor of the Prophet (Khalifat Rast7l Allah). This theory, 
which called the divine right of ruling, had a Sunn-1 origin and was first introduced 
to Islamic political literature by the Abbasids during their time of weakness to 
strengthen their authority by claiming infallibility. 'Abb5s M-irz5 also employed 
terms that carried religious indications such as kuffir (infidels), and taba 'at iblis 
(the followers of Satan). His aim might well have been to provoke Islamic 
fanaticism in the Ottomans as being brothers in religion. 
The letter is very significant too as a reflection on 'Abbýs M-irza's early desire to 
engage the Ottoman Empire in his war against Russia. As a result, he initially 
wanted to guarantee tranquility at the Qýjýir-Ottoman frontiers; therefore, he 
nominated Naqd Ali Khan as a peace maker to alleviate any problem arising that 
could threaten the promising amicable relations with the Ottoman Empire. Thus, 
'Abbýs M-Irzý would have proceeded further in his developing rapprochement 
policy. 
Another key issue could be excluded from this letter. It establishes a connection 
between 'Abbýs M-irza and Nadir Shah's policies towards the Ottoman Empire 
when 'Abb5s Mirz5 surprisingly affirms that the harmony and rapprochement 
had already happened, and there was nothing that could agitate any quarrel and 
hostility between the two Islamic states. In fact no agreement had been signed 
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between the Q5j5rs and the Ottomans at that time. This suggests that 'Abb5s 
M-irz5 was aware of Nadir Shah's attempt at Islamic ecumenism when he held the 
al-Najaf assembly that led to the Kurclan peace treaty of 1746, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, this letter could have been a 
circuitous acknowledgement to that treaty by 'Abb5s M-Irz5. 
As shown by the Qýj5r Asnid, 'AbMs Mirz5 carried on no further no 
correspondence with the Ottoman Empire since the previous letter in 1804. 
There were two possible reasons for such a cessation. First of all, the Russian 
campaigns against Iran resulted in failure in the first year of the war, 290 whereas 
the Q5jar army gained several victories which 'Abbas MT1rz5 might not have 
mentioned in his contacts. Alternatively he could have suspended the 
correspondence as he had been disappointed about the Ottoman-Russo 
291 defensive alliance treaty of 1805 which was terminated in 1806. 
Yet the contacts between 'Abbýs Miirzý and the Ottomans were resumed in 1807 
when Mohammad Shad Afandl, an Ottoman clerk, arrived at 'Abb5s M-irza's court 
in Tabriz carrying an Ottoman proposal to form a tripartite military alliance: the 
Ottomans, Qýijýirs and France against their common enemy, Russia. The political 
circumstances of the time in the region were emboldening for such a military 
coalition: Iran had been in a defensive war against Russia to restore its occupied 
territories since 1804, the Franco-Russian war in Eastern Europe had not yet 
come to an end, and the Ottomans had been engaged in a war against Russia 
since 1806 which lasted till 1812. 
290 Murriel Attkin, Russia andIran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 101. 
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For his part, 'Abbýs Mfirzý had been striving for such a move since his first 
contact with the Ottomans in 1799; hence, he zealously activated several steps 
to meet the terms of that proposal. First of all, he accepted the Ottoman offer 
with a swift response to the Qj'im Maqjm Ottomani292 In his letter, 'Abbýs 
Mirz5 stresses the necessity of such a coalition between the two Islamic states in 
the interests of Islam and expresses his willingness to attend the planned 
conference. Moreover., he signed the treaty of alliance (Finkenstein) with the 
French in 1807 . 
293 'Abbýs Mirza also took advantage of this proposed coalition 
with the Ottomans to agitate the ulamjof "atabitin Iraq and Isfahan to issue a 
fatwa for fihid, the proclamation of holy war, and he collected all these fatwas in 
a volume called risila-yi-Ahidiya. 294 Those fatwa5 were extremely significant for 
'Abbýs M-irz5s cause. First of all, his elder brothers, governors of the other 
QaJar provinces, were reluctant to supply him with his needs of men and 
ammunitions due to jealousy; however, he employed these fatwas to put 
pressure on them since according to the previous fatwas it became a religious 
duty to support him. 'Abb5s MTrza gained wider support too when he mobilized 
the public with the fatwas. It could also be said that he legitimized his 
rapprochement with the Ottomans from a religious point of view. 
Although this plan of the tri-coalition was quickly aborted by the previously 
mentioned Tilsit treaty between the French and Russians late in 1807,295 'Abbas 
Mfirzý conveniently neglected the French withdrawal and made every effort to 
continue in his cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, dispatching a letter to 
292 Mohammad Nasirii, Asnid wa MikitaAki Tirikh-ilrian (Qjjjr-i), Vol. 1 (Tehran: Entisharki Kjh5n, 1338), 78-9. 
293 Finkenstein treaty was previously mentioned in more details in this chapter, for more information see I. C. Hurewitz, 
Diplomacy In the Near and Middle Ea5t; A Documentary Record. 1535-1914, Vol. 1 (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 
1956), 77-81, 
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Ibrýhlim Pasha, 296 the Governor of Erzurum, in 1810 in which he drew Ibrýihim 
Pasha's attention to the security disturbance in the areas of Akhesqa, Bayaz-1d 
and Q5riý. 'Abbýs M-Irz5 warned Ibrýihlim Pasha that the infidel Russians could 
take advantage of that disturbance to launch an unexpected attack which would 
make the situation even more complicated. He thus urged him to send one of 
his army leaders to restore order on the Eastern frontiers informing Ibrýihllm 
Pasha that he from his side had already dispatched the army of Islam under the 
leadership of Ali Khan with artillery towards Q5riý to be at the service of the 
Ottomans. 'AbMs M-irzý mailed another letter with the same content to Khal-il 
Pasha, 297 Qj "im Maqjm Ottoman in 1810. 
In July 1810 (Jumadi al-Akhir 1225), 'Abb5s M-irz5 contacted Sayyid Mohammad 
Pasha, the Head of Ottoman Clerks . regarding the mission of Zayn al -'Abid-in 
Khan who had been dispatched to Istanbul by 'AbMs Mllrzý in that year to settle 
a quarrel arising among the Iranian merchants in Istanbul. 298 Despite the fact 
that the apparent purpose of 'Abb5s M-irzý's letter was urging Mohammad Pasha 
to ease Zayn al-'Abid-in's mission, he seized the opportunity to highlight the 
Qýjýir-Ottoman rapprochement emphasizing that the unity between the two 
Islamic states was crucial for the sake of Islam and Muslims. There were two 
significant points in this letter. First, 'Abbýs M-irza again mentions that the 
efforts of rapprochement move along according to Sharjyýt-i Ahnamly-l' 
Mubiraka (the conditions of auspicious convention) by which he might have 
been referring to the al-Najaf Covenant that had been reached by Nadir Shah 
and discussed in the previous chapter. Second, 'Abbýs M-irza appears to the first 
to use the phrase Jamiiy4lslamiya (the Islamic confederation) in modern history. 
It seems noteworthy since 'Abbýs Mfirzý used the term -7amla in its Arabic 
296 Mohammad Nasirii, Asnid w. 3 Mukitabit-i Tirlkh-ikan (Qjjjr-i), Vol. 1, (Tehran: Endshar6d Kihin, 1338), 103-4 
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298 bid, 111. 
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meaning by which he could have represented its political and religious 
characteristics rather than the Persian meaning of the word that limits it in social 
meaning. 'Abb6s Mlrz6s phrase, Jami'iy4 Islamiya, became increasingly 
important when Jam5l al-Din al-Afghani raised it as a slogan for his taqrib 
(ecumenist) encleavours in the third quarter of the 19tý' century. 
A new letter was sent to Khal-il Pasha f 
299 Qj`im-maqjm, in 1810 by 'Abbas Krza 
in which he begged him to put an end to the obstacles that impeded the military 
supplies due to the lack of coordination. He was anxious too to keep the 
Ottomans informed when he enlightens the Qj`im-maqjm with the Russian 
300 offers for peace. General Trumosov had proposed a peace treaty to be 
concluded between the Q5j5r state and Russian empire in a long letter to 'Abbýs 
Mlirzý in 1809,301 urging 'Abb5s M-irz5 to accept his offer and not to count on the 
Ottomans and British for support and help; however, the offer was turned down 
as was mentioned previously. 
'Abb5s M_Irz5 intensified his correspondences with the Ottoman Empire in 1813 
when he made six contacts with different Ottoman officials: 5haykh al-Islim 
Sayyid ýusayn Mandl, Qj*'im Maqjm ýJdjrat Ottoman, Khursh-id Pasha , 5adr 
A 'r, 7am Ottoman, and 16a(-1(udjic1aw1Jt Ottoman. One could inquire what might 
have been the cause that had driven 'Abbýs Krza to such conduct. Obviously, 
'Abbas M-irza might have become very persistent due to the political change in 
the Russo-British relations when the Russian entered into a war with France, the 
long-standing enemy of Britain. As a result, the British played a mediating role 
and exerted huge pressure on 'Abbýs MTIrz5 to put an end to the war with 
Russia. British pressure very much displeased him so he consequently turned to 
299 lbid, 128-30. 
300 bid, 82-9. 
301 bid, 82-9. 
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the Ottomans because they were the only available source from which he could 
gain both political and military support. It has also to be borne in mind that he 
might have aimed to update the Ottomans with the latest political and military 
developments in the Iranian arena and assure them to his commitment for the 
mutual co-operation. 
Among all previous mentioned letters, the one addressed to Shaykh al-Islam 
could be considered the most significant. 'Abb5s Mlrzý wrote to the Shaykh al- 
Islam of the Ottoman Empire,, Sayyid ýusayn Afand-1, who was the highest 
302 ranking religious leader in the Sunni Islamic world at that time. Abb5s Mirza 
congratulated him on retaking Medina, the second sacred shrine of Islam and the 
capital city of the Prophet of Islam where his grave is located, from the 
Wahh5b-is, and hoped that would have opened the path to rescue the holiest city 
of Mecca as well. 
Wahh5bism, a fundamentalist Sunni movement, had been established in 1745 in 
Najd in the centre of the Arabian peninsula; although the opponents of that 
movement bestowed the term Wahhýbism upon it after its founder Shaykh 
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahh5b, the movement, which follows the ýanbaff 
madhab, was directed to fight against the increasing performance of polytheism 
and heterodoxies among Muslims and return to the pure Islam as practiced by 
303 the Prophet and his companions. WahMbism became widely known after it 
was adopted by the al-Sa'Od family of al-Dir'iyya, and it eventually controlled 
most of the Arabian Peninsula and ýij5z where the two holiest Islamic shrines, 
302 ibid, 149-50. 
303 ]an 3. Burby, The Arabian PL-ninsula, trans. Najdat H5jar (Cairo: D5r al-Afa-q al-Arabiya, 2001), 48. 
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Mecca and Medina, are located and from which it was spread throughout the 
Islamic world. 304 
At the command of the Ottomans, the Egyptians launched two campaigns 
against the Wahh5bis. The first campaign was led by Tusu-n Pasha, the younger 
son of the Egyptian Sultan Mohammad Ali Pasha, who effectively conquered 
Medina in 1811 and the rest of Hij5z by 1813, though TusGn Pasha was satisfied 
with his achievements and could not proceed further due to strong Wahh5b-i 
resistance. However, the Wahhýib-is were finally defeated by Ibrah-im Pasha, who 
led the second Egyptian campaign, and succeeded in putting an end to the 
Wahhab-i state in 1818 when he destroyed al-Dir'iya, the Wahhabis' capital 
city. 305 
This letter is very significant for two reasons. First, it might have been the first 
time that a Shi'i prince addressed the Sunni's highest cleric (Multl), so it could 
be considered a historical initiative and a shifting paradigm in the relationships 
between the two biggest sects of Islam, Sunnis and Shiites - although Nadir 
Shah had predated 'Abbýs Mlrzý in making contact with the Sunni ulami, he 
never had direct contact with such a higher clerical rank. Second, it reveals the 
hostility between the Q5j5r Empire and this fundamentalist Sunni group which 
'Abbas M-irza called kuffir (infidels), mushrikin (polytheists), ending his letter by 
calling the Wahhýibis Bedouins (A'rab, singular A'rýibfi) to emphasize their 
hypocrisy according to the Quranicverse that criticizes the Bedouins for being 
306 the most extreme infidels and most hypocritical. This was an extreme view 
because 'Abb5s Mirza might have considered these fundamentalists a real threat 
304 al-Jamli al-Oaj, al-Mawsula al-Muyassara ff al-Rkr al-Falfalsafi wa al-lj&mkl (Beirut: Maktabat Libnan, 2000), 675. 
305 For more details refer to Mohamad M. Abdullah, Imifit al-S; jýd wa tlmjn wa al-Dawla al-560dlya al-01j., 1793-1818, 
Vol. 1 (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Mao al-ýiadiith, 1978), 247-253. 
306 The Qur'jn, 9: 97. 
148 
to his efforts to unify the Muslims' endeavors against the enemies of Islam. In 
other words, 'Abbýs Mirzý's aim, from his efforts of rapprochement with the 
Ottomans, was to achieve the unity of all Muslims regardless of their sectarian 
differences, which he believed to be the only method to stop the new Russian 
crusade against Islamic territories. However, the fundamentalists awakened a 
sectarian enmity when they disbelieved other Islamic sects, and their harsh 
expiatory policy led them to conduct a massacre against the Shi'ite holy shrine 
of Karbala on April 21,1802.307 The expansion of this extreme movement began 
to threaten Oman, so the Sultan Sayyid Sa'-id, the Imam of Oman and Masclat, 
who had come under the Q5jýr protection by paying annual tribute to the 
governor of Fars for several years, asked for Q5j5r military assistance against the 
Wahhýib-IS from Ousayn Ali Mfirzý Farmin Firmi (governor) of Fars . Ousayn Ali 
Mlrzý accordingly dispatched some of the Qýj5r troops to Oman, and S5cliq 
Khan-i Q5j5r DevehlU- was entrusted with their leadership. The Q5j5rs, along 
with the Oman Imarn's force, encountered the Wahh5bTs in 1810. Despite the 
fact that the Wahhabis had the upper hand at the beginning of the battle, the 
Q5jar troops and the imam's forces successfully defeated the Wahh5b-i army and 
pushed them back to Najd. 308 
4.6.2. THE TREATY OF ERZURUM I OF 1823 
Finally, 'Abb5s Krzý's endeavors yielded few tangible results when the treaty of 
Erzurum I concluded the negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Qýj5r Empire in 1823, and was signed by 'Abb5s Krza and Ra'U-f Pasha, the 
commander of the Eastern Ottoman troops in the Turkish city of Erzuru M. 309 
Indeed, the treaty was no more than a re-ratification of the Zahjb peace 
307 For more details see Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Oftal Essay (New York: Oneonta, 2002), 24-5; also, Hasan-e 
Fasaa'i, Fraasnaama-ya Naaseli, trans. Heriber Busse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 103. 
308 Hasan-e Fasaa'i, Fraasnaama-ya Naasen, trans. Heriber Busse, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 134-5. 
309 For more information refer to Mohammad al-'Aydarus, al-Aljqjt Al- 'Arabiyya Al-lranlyya 1021-171 (Kuwait] Dh5t 
al-salcisel, 1985), 110-12. 
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agreement between the Ottomans and the Safavids of 1369 that had also been 
re-confirmed by Ahmad Pasha and Nadir Shah in 1746 under the title of 
Kurd5n, 310 as was discussed in chapter 2. Although this treaty temporarily put a 
halt to the clashes on the borders between the two empires, it fell short of 
'Abb5s Mirz5s ambitions as he was looking for a political and militarily strategic 
coalition with the Ottomans against their common enemy, Russia. However, this 
treaty was very significant for two reasons. First, it calmed the tension on the 
Q5j5r-Ottoman borders, so 'Abbýs M-irz5 was able to give his full attention to the 
war with Russia. Second, it canonized the treaty of K5ru-n that had been signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and Nadir Shah in 1746, which had established the 
mutual frontiers between the Ottomans and the Afsh5rs who ruled the Iranian 
plateau at that time. 311 
4.7. 'ABBAS MiRZA AND THE Uýfti ULAMA 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the most significant outcome of the al- 
Najaf conference was the re-emergence of u., r>Orl Shi'ism in the two sacred 
shrines of Iraq, al-Najaf and Karbala that had been under a strong akhbiri 
influence. It was during the 1760s and 70s that u. ýFtWShi'ism had succeeded in 
asserting itself in those cities over the akhbiris mainly thanks to the efforts of al- 
Walýlcl al-Bahbahýini who managed to impose the logical tendency (Jqý of the 
u, r, Off school upon the traditional akhb5ri doctrine of naql (transmission) after a 
series of long debates with the akhbiri ulami, mainly Shaykh Yusuf al- 
Balýr5nT. 312 Perhaps the death of the latter as the senior akhbiri in 1772 may 
have hastened the decline of akhbiri influence in Iraqi shrines. Also, the u. -? rOff 
310 1 C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the near and Middle East. - a documentary record. * 1535-1914, vol. 1 (Princeton: D. Van 
Nostrand Co., 1956), 21 and 51. 
311 Mohammad 0. al-Aydarus, al-AljqjtAl-ArabiyyaAl-Iriniyya 1921-171 (Kuwait: Dh5t al-sal6sel, 1985), 110. 
312 Ali Ousayn al-JZibiri, al-Fikr al-Salaff 'ind al-5hi'a al-Ithnj 'Ashriyya: DirA5a Taý Rlyya 11mawqlf al-Flkr al-5alafifi al- 
Islim 'UmOman wa 'ind al -Ithnj 'Ashnyya. Wj wajh al -Khu. 50. ý min Manpq wa falsafat al-Ydnin 
(Qum: Nr Oay5 al- 
Iýy5,1409), 393-94. 
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were sustained by Kar-im Khan Zand's occupation of al-Basra that lasted for three 
years (1776-79) when he imposed the Shii traditions of prayers and Friday 
sermon. 313 However, the akhbiri preserved to some extent an influential 
existence in Bahrain, Qatif and Ahsý. 314 
At the start of the 19th century, the u.? rOff ulami of Twelver Shi'ism had to deal 
with two major challenges. One was the rise of the Wahlý5b-i movement founded 
by Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Najd in the Arabian Peninsula during the 
second half of the 18 th century. He had condemned the popular practices of 
glorifying and visiting the tombs and shrines of the Prophet's family members 
315 and companions. As a result, Twelver Shi'ism became one of the prime 
targets for this movement. Indeed, the Wahhýb-[ campaign led by Sa'Gd ibn Abd 
al-'Azfiz sacked the holy city of Karbala on 22 
nd April, 1802, that corresponded to 
th Ir, 316 the 18 of dhi al-tl#ja 1216, the day of the Shi'i celebration of Ed al-Ghadl-), 
on which the Shi'ites believed Imam Ali was publicly entrusted by the Prophet 
Mohammad to be his successor. The invading troops plundered the treasures of 
the shrines of Imam ýusayn and his brother 'Abb5s, demolished the tombs and 
conducted a massacre against the people of Karbala that took the lives of 5,000 
ViCtiMS. 317 The booty from Karbala might have attracted the Wahh5bis for more 
treasures when they attacked al-Najaf; however, the people of the city who had 
been put on high alert by the news of the massacre of Karbala, valiantly 
defended their city after heavy fighting with the Ahab . 
318 Four years later, the 
Wahhab-is launched a second attack against al-Najaf, but the city was saved by 
313 Yitzhak Nakash, 777e Shi'lý- of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 15. 
3 14 Ali ýusayn al -Jýbin, al-Rkr al-Salaff 
'ind al-Shi'a al-Ithnj 'Ashfiyya: Dinýo Taý n1wa limawqlf al-Flkr al-Salafi 
fi al- 
1slAm 'Umaman wa 'ind al-Ithni 'Ashriyya 'al, ý wajh al-Khu5Os min Manoq wa Falsafat al- 
YOnin (Qum: Dýr Hay5 al- 
Iýy5,1409), 394. 
315 John L. Esposito, The Oxford Dict7onary of Islam (New York: Oxford University press, 2003), 
333. 
316 Ali al-Wardii, LamaýjtIjtiwj'iyya min Tankh al-'Iriýq al-tiadlth, vol. 1 
(Qum: Intish5r5t al-Sharif al-RadTi, 1413), 190. 
317 John Barrett Kelly, Sntain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 
100. 
318 Ali al-Wardii, Lamaýjt Ijtimj'iyya min Tjnkh al-'Iriq al-tiad-11h, vol. 1 
(Qum: Intish5rýt al-Sharif al-Radi, 1413), 19 1. 
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the firm resolution of its people and the courageous and wise leadership of 
Shaykh la'far al-Janýý-I, who succeeded in mobilizing both the students of the 
seminaries and ordinary people to drive back the attacking Wahhýibis. 3 19 The 
Qýjýr state took a firm stand against the massacre of Karbala that was set out in 
the harsh letter sent by Fatý Ali Shah to the Wiff(governor) of Baghdad. In it 
he threatened Sulaymýn Pasha that the Iranian troops would march against him 
and attack Baghdad if he failed to make a commitment to punish the Wahhýibfls, 
restore the stolen treasures, free the prisoners and compensate the families of 
the victims. Sulaymýn Pasha, aiming to satisfy the Shah and avoid any clash 
with the Qýijýri army, promised to compensate lives and properties lost and put 
to death the local commander of the Turkish garrison of Karbala. 320 
However, Fatl) Ali Shah (1795-1833) despite his supportive stand with the 
Shi'ites of the Iraqi shrines against Wahhýibfi aggression,, himself became second 
challenge for u. ýOff Shi'ism since his succession to the Qýijýr throne he had 
shown a noticeable tendency towards akhbirism, 321 so he welcomed the visit of 
Mlirzý Mohammad al-Akhbar-i to Iran and granted him a prestigious status at his 
court. This alarmed the u., r>Offulami, namely Shaykh Jafar al-Janalý-i, who in his 
response to the developing relationship between Mlirzý Mohammad al-Akhbar-i 
and Fatl) Ali Shah composed a treatise entitled Kishif al-gharj "an ma'Jýyib 
Mirzj Mohammad "adL7 al- "ulamj'? 22 and sent it as a gift along with an 
authorization to Fatlý Ali Shah to rule Iran on his behalf as a representative of the 
319 Ali ýusayn aI -35biri, al-Rkral-Salafl 'ind al-Shl 'a al-Ithni 
'A517riyya: D1r 5a Tahll-llyya 11mawqif al-Flkral-salafirl al- j 
ý7 jh al -Khus05 mln Mantýq wa Fal.; af I51im 'UmOman wa 'ind al -Ithni 
'Ashrlyya / Wai at al-yanin (Qum: D5r Hay3 al- 
llýy5,1409), 397. 
320 Meir UNA, Shii Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: the Vama ' of Najaf and Karbali (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 121-22. 
3 21 Al iý usayn aI -J5 biri, al-Rkr al-Salafi 
'ind al-Shi'a al-Ithni 'A5hnyya: DkA5a Taý nliyya Nnawqlf al -Flkr al-Salafi fi al - 
Islim 'UmOman wa 'ind al -Ithni 'Ashfiyya ý? /j wajh al -Ouslis min Manpq wa 
Falsafat al-YOnin (Qum: Dýr ýaya al- 
Iýy5,1409), 398. 
322 Since then Shaykh Ja'far became known as K5shif al-Ghat5. 
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Hidden Imam. 323 Under pressure from the u., 51711-5, Mirzý Mohammad had to leave 
Iran and settled in Ký? imayya in Iraq where he was killed along with his elder 
324 son in 1816. The expulsion of the Akhbari did not end the tense relationship 
between the u5ijff ulami and the Shah, who in his efforts to weaken the 
influence of u5i7li5m in his state summoned Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsý'P 25 to Tehran 
and gave the order that all the demands of Shaykh al-Aýsa'i must be executed; 
as a result, Shaykh Ja'far Kýishif al-GhaO had to travel to Iran in an attempt to 
restrain al-Aýsý'i's influence on the Shah, who refused to receive him. 326 
Under these circumstances, the u.? r&ff ulami had no choice but to approach 
crown-prince 'Abbýs Wrzý who enjoyed vast authority to the extent that he was 
deemed the ofe facto ruler of the Qýjar realm at the time. 'Abbýs M-irza, in spite 
of the tentative allegation of being a devotee of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahs5 ) If 327 
seemed to be interested in securing the ulami's support for his ongoing struggle 
with his elder brothers who were striving to destabilize his authority and 
questioning his policies; he may have aimed also to take advantage of the 
influential role of the u. ýOff ulami on the community to mobilize the Iranian 
populace for the war against the Russian invaders - the war in which he alone 
was in charge - and support his efforts, namely the implementation of the 
323 Ahmad al-Kýitib, Tapwwur al-Fikr al-Siyisi al-5hii min al-5h&2ý Aj Wiliyat al-Faqlh (D5r ash -ShOr5 wa al -ilým: 
London, 1997), 394. 
324 Ali ýusayn al-35biCi, al-Rkr al-5alafi 'ind al-5hi'a al-Ithni 'AshfiyW: Dirjýsa Taý Myya Amawqlf al-fikr al-Salalff al- 
Islim 'UmOman wa 'ind al -Rhnj 'AshfiyyaWj wajh al -Khuýýs min Mantiq wa Falsafat al-Kinin (Qum: D5r ýay5 al- 
Ihy5,1409), footnote no. 1,398. 
325 Al-AW'i claimed to have direct connection with the infallible Imams through visions, and later he introduced his 
theory of al-Rukn al-Ribi(the fourth corner) in which he claimed that there should be one perfect Shi'a at any time who 
must be imitated as he represents the fourth pillar of Irnýn after God, Prophet, and the Imam. Al-AOsVi's followers are 
known as Talifat al -Shaykhiyya; for more information about the Shaykhiyya doctrine refer to Ahmad al-Utib, Tarawwur 
al-Fikr al-5iyisial-Shl 'j min al-5hOrj & Wiliyat al-Faq#7 (D5r ash-ShOr5 wa al-Mm: London, 1997), 396-97. 
326 Ibld, 396. 
327 327 Hamid Algar, Rellgion andthe 5tate in Iran, 1785-1906, the Role of the Ulama in the Wjjrpenod(Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1969), 74, note no. 2. 
15 
Nizim-i Jadl-of which according to Algar faced no resistance or critique from any 
of the UlaMj 328 Cole notes that 
Usulism, with its doctrine that the ulama can legitimate Friday prayers 
(said, in fact, in the name of the secular ruler) and its position on state- 
related functions such as defensive holy war, proved more amenable to 
329 the need of the rising rulers in Iran... 
'Abbas M-irz5 was keen to appear as a just ruler who was religiously devoted, 
paying serious intention to the matters of shari"a and the affairs of his subjects 
in order to assure the support of the ulamj, ' Algar states 
He attended Friday prayer in the congregational mosque of Tabriz; and 
every Thursday evening the ulama would meet at his invitation in one of 
the mosques of Tabriz to discuss the implementation of the shar-i'at. 
Any case that had not reached settlement elsewhere was referred to 
these meetings for an authoritative judgement. 330 
In view of that, it might appear that the usiN ulami not only supported 'Abbýs 
Mfirza's rapprochement with the Ottomans but also played an effective role in its 
process, and there were a number of indications supporting such a belief. 
Initially, enhanced relations between the Qýjýirs and Ottmans corresponded with 
the interests of the Iraqi Shi'ites whose major concern was the increasing threat 
of the Wahhabis, themselves taking advantage of the growing weakness of the 
MamlCiks' authority in Baghdad. Accordingly, the Qýijýir-Ottoman rapprochement 
would positively reflect on the security of the shrines in Iraq, for co-operation 
between the two states could commit the Sunni Ottomans to provide the 
328 ibid, 76. 
329 Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, " 1ranlin Rudles 
18: 1 (1985), 27. 
330 Hamid Algar, Relloion and the State in Iran, 1785-1906, the Role of the Ulama in the Q. Vjr period (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1969), 74. 
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necessary shelter for the Shi'ites of Iraq from the attacks of the Sunni Wahhabi, 
especially as the Shi'i protectorate state of the Qýj5rs was passing through a 
crucial stage in its war with the Russians. This view was confirmed in the letter 
of 'Abb5s M! rz5 to the Ottomans regarding the Wahhabi danger discussed 
above. Also, the strong link between 'Abb5s Milrzý and the u., 5jrl ulami that 
lasted until the humiliating defeat of 1828 during which time 'Abb5s Mirz5 
committed himself to discuss with the ulamiall the related issues of the 5han-a, 
and the principle of Muslim unity is one of the most important purposes of 
5hari"a; hence, the ulami could well have taken part in composing 'Abbas 
M-irza's letters to the Ottomans. For instance, the role of the ulami could be 
suggested by the noticeable religious contents of the letters of the layman young 
crown prince where several religious terms were employed - such as fihicl, 
jami "iyy-i 151imiyya, kuffa-r (Russians), taba "at ib& al-Vilin, thughik (frontiers), 
#Nhid, waff al- "Amr and dawlat al-151im. Moreover, there is the fatwa that 
Shaykh la'far Ushif al-Ghatý issued during the war against Russia in which he, 
as the representative of the Imam, authorized Fatý Ali Shah to conduct _70id 
(holy war) against the infidel invaders . 
33 1 Having in mind the consideration that 
iihiblis absolutely prohibited during the occultation of the Imam according to the 
doctrine of Twelver Shi'ism, the only exception to this rule is the state of 
defense when an enemy is critically threatening the bayVatal-151im (the heart of 
the Islamic stronghold)/ so Shaykh Jafar perhaps wanted in this fatwa to 
embarrass the ottoman Sultan, who as the caliph of the Muslims was legally 
responsible to defend the (1jr al-151im (Islamic dominion). Thus, the Shaykh 
ultimately aimed to enforce 'Abbýs M-irza's endeavors striving for military 
coalition with the Ottomans against the mutual infidel enemy. Another 
significance of this fatwa lies in the fact that it revealed the Shaykh's total 
satisfaction and full support for the crown-prince's policies since he was single- 
331 Abdul Aziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler in 5hi'ite Islam: The ComprehensIve Authonty of the Junst in 
Imamite Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 21-2; see also Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending 
discourse in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of the Wilayat Al-faqih", Iranian 5tudies 29: 3, (1996), 234. 
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handedly administering the war. Indeed, 'Abbýs Mlirzý utilized this fatwa as a 
pressurizing means against his brothers who maintained their religious suspicions 
against his military reforms and always delayed their response to his frequent 
pleas for aid. 332 
Yet, the appreciation and respect that 'AbMs Wrzý had expressed to the ulami 
was turned upside-down after the humiliating defeat which his troops suffered at 
the hands of the Russian army in the war of 1826, after which he fled the battle 
field leaving the capital of his governing province, Tabriz, to fall without 
noticeable resistance into Russian hands. 'Abbýs M-irza placed the disappointing 
outcome of this war on the shoulders of the ulami for failing to do their assigned 
duty, which was to use their influence to mobilize the people, and surrendering 
the city of Tabriz after such a short Russian siege. As a result, he sent a letter to 
his Qj-'im-maqj (prime minister) stating his exceedingly low opinion of the 
ulami and demanded that he should immediately disassociate himself from 
them. Algar affirmed that 
Ultimately, Abb5s Mirz5 came to regret bitterly his policy of close 
association with the ulami. Writing to M-irz5 Abu-I-Q5sim, the qj`im 
maqjm, after the surrender of Tabriz to the Russians by M-irz5 Fatt5h, he 
ordered him to cease all associations with the ulami to "shake himself 
free of their dust, " and instead to cultivate the company of capable men 
of affairs. The ulami were no more useful "than overfed horses who 
have forgotten their function of running. 333 
Since the founding of u,, r>JffShi'ism in the early 16 th century, al-Karak-I's theory of 
wiliya aýma of the fuqahj had dominated u., r, 011- political thought in which the 
332 Hamid Algar, Religion and the State in Iran, 1785-1906, the Role of the Ulama in the Q. ýjk penod (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1969), 80. 
333 ibid, 80. 
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political authority of the ulami, as the representatives of the Mahdi, was 
accredited by the Wamithemselves to the temporal rulers. However, the ulami 
felt aggrieved by their bitter experience with Fatlý Ali Shah and his son and 
crown-prince 'Abbýs Mlirzý, when the former had tried to undermine the 
influence of u.? r0i ulami in Iran by corresponding with their historical enemy, the 
akhbiris, while the latter utilised their influential status to serve his own cause 
before he dumped them in a disgraceful way. Such an experience may have 
motivated mulliAhmad al-Narýqi (d. 1828) to develop his own political theory of 
wiliyat al-faqih (the Guardianship of the jurists) that he introduced in his work 
'Awi "id al-ayjm fl- bayin qawi "id al-^jm (literally, the Revenues of Days in 
Declaration of the Rules of Provisions). Unlike al-Karak-i"s, al-Narýqfl argued that 
"only the qualified jurist [mujtahial could be the legitimate ruler in the absence 
of the Imam [ghayybal, and that government led by the jurist would be the only 
legitimate kind. if334 He also granted the qualified mujtahid with the same 
authority as the Prophet and the Imam unless otherwise excluded by clear 
evidence or the census of the ulamj. 335 To authenticate his argument, Shaykh 
al-Narýiqi provided nineteen different valid evidence from the Prophet and the 
336 Tths Imams' hadiths and narratives. For example, he cited two prophetic ýad 
as transmitting proofs that formed the legal basis for fuqahi ruling. In one of 
the hadiths, the Prophet said: "0 God, be merciful to my caliphs... who will come 
after me and narrate my ýadl-ths and traditions"; while the Prophet asserted in 
337 
the other hadith that "'the ulami are the inheritors of the Prophets". 
Nevertheless, al-Nar5qVs theory was said to be ignored due to the political 
334 Vanessa Martin, Crea&ng an Islamic State. - 107omeini and Me Making of the New Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 
117; see also, Ahmad al-Kýtib, Tarawwur al-F& al-Siyisial-Shii min al-ShJnjý Aj Wiliyat al-FaqJ77h (D5r al-ShGr5 wa al- 
il5m: London, 1997), 400-3. 
335 $adr al-D-in al-Qab5nchi, al-Madhab al-Slyisifi al-Islim (Beirut: D5r al-Aow5,1985), 202. 
336 Shahrough Akhavi, "contending discourses in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat AJ-faqih, " Iranian Sheles 29: 3-4, 
(1996), 234. 
337 Ahmad al-Utib, Tarawwur al-Flkr al-Siyjsi al-ShO min al-ShOri i1i Wiliyat al-FaqJ77h (Nr al-ShGr5 wa al-11,5m: 
London, 1997), 401. 
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circumstances at the time - when the ulamj were in a weak position. 338 Indeed, 
al-Naraq-i"s theory did not even receive sufficient acceptance from the ulama of 
his time; on the contrary, it raised controversy among the u. ýJrl ulami over his 
logical evidences that have lasted till recent days. Imam Khomeini, who had 
adopted and developed this theory since the late 1960s, was reluctant to accept 
al-Naraq-ifs argument without further research, as will be illustrated in the next 
chapter. 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
In short, the political motives of both 'Abbýs Mlrzý and the usi7li ulama had 
dominated any ecumenical efforts with the Ottomans and totally overshadowed 
the religious dimensions of the issue at this stage. The rapprochement with the 
Ottoman Empire was merely a policy among other measures that the young 
Qýijarfi Crown-prince conducted to legitimize his nomination for the post in the 
light of the robust challenge that this nomination received from his elder half- 
brothers. He also wished to accomplish his mission to protect his country by 
such measures. On the other hand, the involvement of the u. ýOff ulami in this 
process was a result of their quest to strengthen their influence in the Qýjýr 
court and thus halt Fatlý Ali Shah's frequent attempts to replace the u. ýjli 
orientation of Persia with akhbirism, not to mention that any Qajýir-Ottornan 
rapprochement would commit the Ottomans to provide Twelver Shi'ism with the 
needed protection for the shrines of Iraq and their Shi'ites against the growing 
threat from the WahhýbTs. 
338 Hamid Enayat, "Iran Khumayni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of Judsconsult, " in James P. Piscatori (ed. ), Islam in 
the Political Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 162-3. 
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Chapter 5 
IMAM KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC UNITY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters explored the attempts at Islamic unity and al-Taqrfb that 
had been officially conducted by the temporal monarchical regimes. This phase 
of Islamic unity and al-Taqrib, however, has been activated since the success of 
the Islamic revolution in 1979, (almost a century since the previous attempt by 
'Abbýs Mlrzý), by the theocratic state. In unprecedented status since the time 
of Imam Ali, the first Imam of the "Ithna "Ashrimadhhab (Twelver Shiite sect), 
Imam Khomeini, the founding father of the Islamic Republic, enjoyed both the 
highest political and religious authority as he occupied the position of rahbariyya 
(political leadership) and was al-mayi` al-A "ali #-attaqlid of the Shi'ite (the 
highest source of imitation) at the same time so both authorities were combined 
in Khomeini's invented position of waff al-faq#7; this compound Arabic term has 
been converted to English in several forms such as "supreme-leadership, " "the 
rule of jurisconsult, " "guardianship of the jurist, " "'mandate of the jurist, " 
"trusteeship of the jurist, " "'the discretionary authority of the jurist, "' "and the 
governance of the jurist. "339The office of the warl faqih still holds a position at 
the peak of the state's authorities in Iran and is now occupied by the Imam is 
successor, Sayyid Ali 05mina'li. However, the new supreme-leader no longer 
enjoys the same religious legitimacy as the Imam, due to the alteration of the 
constitution in 1989 in which the condition of religious MJ)jiVYYa was dropped 
from the qualifications of this position, even with the absolute authority that he 
has obtained by the thereto amendments. 
339 Shahrough Akhavi, "contending discourses in Shici Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat Al-faqih, " Iranian Studles 29, no. 
3-4, (Summer/Fall 1996), 231. 
159 
In this theoretically based and revolutionary-oriented phase, the endeavours of 
Islamic unity and al-Taqrib have been stimulated by the use of classical rellg'Ous 
motivations and slogans that were evident in previous attempts such as: 
1. All Muslims practice the five pillars of Islam: (1) al-Tawýid, the belief in one 
God; (2) Nubuwa, the belief in the prophecy of Mohammad; (3) lqjmat al-. ýJlah, 
the practice of the five daily prayers; (4) Iff" al-Zakit, alms giving; and (5) ýýj 
al-Bayt, the pilgrimage to the holy sites of ýij5z, Mecca and Medina. 
2. All Muslims fundamentally share and profoundly sanctify the same Book, the 
Holy Qur"an, as the main source of legislation, and pray in the same direction to 
the qibla. 
Additionally, there are new challenges that are facing the Islamic nation in the 
contemporary time: 
1. The Palestine Question 
The occupation of Palestine in 1948 has become the major challenge that faces 
the Islamic nation in modern history and which motivates its calls for Islamic 
unity to liberate what Palestinians regard as their capital, Jerusalem, a city 
shrouded in holiness for all Muslims regardless of their sectarian differences since 
it was the place from which the Prophet Mohammad ascended to the seven 
heavens, and the first qibla for Muslims. In addition it is where the third Islamic 
týaram (inviolable precinct), al-Aq. ýj mosque is located . 
340 Hence, the sanctity of 
Jerusalem is reflected in its Arabic name al-Quds, which means Holiness, derived 
from the Arabic infinitive qaddisa (sanctify or being sacred). Unlike the previous 
attempts, the Palestinian question has significantly become a new issue of unity 
340 The first Oaram of Mecca where the Ka'ba (bayt Allah al-Har5m) allocated, and the second Haram is the Nabawi 
mosque where the Prophet Muhammad is buried, located in Medina. 
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for all Muslims since the second half of the 20tt' century. The Iranian scholar, 
Zýimil Said-1 states: 
The Palestine question is an Islamic as well as Arab issue, and it 
concerns all Muslims who would never relinquish it .... 
The Palestinian case 
could become a point of unity among Arabs on the one hand and Arabs 
and other Muslims on the other ... 
The unifying dangers that were the 
outcome of occupying Palestine, that threaten the Arab countries and the 
Iranian Islamic Republic as well as other Islamic countries, could unify 
these countries in their efforts to protect their national and regional 
security and defend their sacred principles and values for which Palestine 
341 and noble Quds are the vanguards. 
2. The Propagation for the Restoration of Political Unity of the Islamic Umma 
under the Rule of the Fuqahj 
The call for Islamic unity at this stage has been motivated by the Western hold 
on the Islamic World that divided the Islamic nation into several weak countries 
in order to exploit its wealth and ease its control. In his effort to find a 
resolution to such a miserable situation, Imam Khomeini reconsidered the early 
years of Islam, during the time of the Prophet and his Rightly-Guided Caliphs, as 
the Golden Age and the ideal to which Muslims referred to devise the provisions 
of Islam. Imam Khomeini reached the conclusion that Islam with all its aspects 
represents a combination between religion and politics, as indeed it was during 
the idealistic era when the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs assumed the 
religious authority as well as the political leadership. He also identified that the 
power and dignity of Islam are based on a triangle of three correlative props: the 
united state that would enforce the Islamic provisions and protect the unity of 
the Islamic nation; the qualified faq#J whose presence is necessary to interpret 
341 ZAmil SMI, al-Aljqjtal- , ArabOaal-Iraniyya: a1-itjjhjtar-ijhina wa jfaqa1-Mustaqba1 
(Beirut: Nlarkaz Dir5sýt al- 
Wa"da al-'Arabiyya, 1996), 642. 
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the Islamic provisions; and a united nation which is able to defend itself. 
Accordingly, Imam Khomeini developed what later turned out to be a somewhat 
unclear political scheme, which he first introduced in his work al-HukOma al- 
Islimiyya, to revive those qualities, but he put it into practice soon after the 
success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The Imam's political scheme is 
basically an attempt to revive the concept of the leadership as it was practiced 
during the time of the prophecy and the rightly-guided caliphs, but in a modern 
modified form in which the Imam acknowledged the political status quo of the 
Islamic nation and because it was divided into several nationa I -states, he called 
for the establishment of an Islamic federal state to include all the present Islamic 
countries. He also recognised the sensitivity that the concept of the caliphate 
might cause for the Shi'i Muslims; hence, in order to attract the attention of his 
Shi'i followers and gain their support, he borrowed the term of wiliyat-i faql-h 
from the heritage of Shi (ism to avoid any direct mention of the caliphate. 
Remarkably, the IR totally disregarded the previous efforts made under the 
temporal state while it had an odd attitude towards the individual attempts that 
were initiated by Iranian Shi'ite clerics in the twentieth century, such as al- 
Afghani and al-QumT. Al-Afghani was widely respected and highly admired 
among the governing cleric elite in revolutionary Iran. 342 However, the IR dealt 
differently with al-Qum-i who lived in Tehran after the revolution. Al-Qum-1, the 
founder of Dir al-Taqrib in Cairo, not only was neglected but also aggravated till 
he left the country for France, where he died in a mysterious car accident in 
1991.343 Such an attitude raises a question about the motivations that stood 
behind this neglect of al-Qum-i by the IR. Shaykh al-Qum-is strong ties with the 
Pahlavi's regime could have been the reason for the ambivalence of the 
342 The Islamic Republic honoured al-Afghani in the 100th anniversary of his death in 1996 for which ', Iajma' al-Taqnb 
held a conference and published a biography of his life and achievements. 
343 For more information refer to Ayatollah Muntaziri's memoir at <http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziri03. 
htm> 
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revolutionary clerics towards h iM. 344 However, Brunner defended al-Qumi and 
stated that he was despatched to Cairo by the Grand Ayatollah Ousayn Borujerd-i 
according to Ayatollah Monta? irii, who identified al-QumT as Ayatollah Borujerd-i's 
deputy-at-large in the Islamic World. 345 Munta? ir-i personally attended a meeting 
between Ayatollah Borujerdi and al-Qum! in which the latter was demonstrating 
the achievements of Dir al-Taqrib. 346 Al-Qum-i's close relations with Ayatollah 
Borujerd-1 provided a solid ground for the IR's misbehaviour since he was one of 
the fuqahj"who strongly disagreed and resisted the direct involvement of clerics 
in politics and the state. 347 Such a position was not only heavily criticized by 
Imam Khomeini but he also encouraged the Iranian youths to attack "the fuqahj 
of the court" who preached for this submissive view. 348 As a matter of fact, 
Imam Khomeini stressed on a number of occasions that he condemned such a 
view, and approached Ayatollah Borujerdi along with Ayatollah al-oijja, Ayatollah 
al-Sadir and Ayatollah Khunsýiri, inviting them to stand against it. 349 In addition, 
another reasonable interpretation for the IR's behaviour towards al-Qum-i is that 
the IR's leadership could have been attempting to deny any connection with Dir 
al-Taqrib especially at the outset when it was accused by some Sunni 
hardliners350 of preaching for Shi'ism among a Sunni dominant population, 
344 Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in COntemPOr3fY Iran: ClergY-5tatie Relations in the Pahlavi Perlod (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1980), 99 and 103. 
345 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Centiffy: the Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 141 note (86); an Arabic version of al-Monta4iri's memoirs was 
published in five series in the Middle East Newspaper, check <http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziriOl. htm> 
346 <http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziri03. htm> 
347 According to Ayatollah MuntaýiCi, Imam Khomeini's support and protection of Nawýb $afawi and his organization 
Fid5'iy-in Islam was a point of dispute between Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Borujerd-i, See 
<http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziri03. htm> 
348 Imam Khomeini, al-ýYAOmaI7 al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kit5b Kh5nah Buzurq, 1981), 132-145. 
349 ibid, 139-40. 
350 Muhib al- Din Al-Khatib, al-Khtltzk al- 'Alida # al-Us&l allati qjm 'Aalayhj Din al-5hi'a al-lmamlYYa al-Ithni 4, a, 
edit. Mohammad Na$-if (Publisher and place (NA), 1380/1960); also, N4ir bin Abdullah al-Ghafari, MJýalat al- 
7-aqnb Sayn 
ahl-Assuna wa al-Shia, vol. 1,2 (Riyadh: D5r Tfba li al-Nashir wa al-Tawzi', 1413/1992). 
163 
although the IR honoured Shaykh Mahmud Sha Itot/35 1 al-Qum-i's Sunni 
counterpart in Dir al-Taqrib, for his genuine efforts to support Islamic unity 
when he issued the unprecedented fatwa in 1959 proclaiming the Twelver 
Shi'ite as the fifth considerable school of Islamic jurisprudence that a Muslim 
might follow in worship. However, the attitude towards Dir al-Taqrlb has been 
dramatically changed under the leadership of Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamina'i when he expressed ""the sincere wish to found Dir a1-taqr[b bayn al- 
madhihib a1-. 1s1jmiyya (House of Reconciliation between the Islamic Sects) and 
[I] want to realize this wish, n'352 and the journal of the newly established 
institution was named Risilat al-Taqrfb after al-Qum-I's journal; yet the name of 
Shaykh Mohammad Taqi al-Qum-1 has been avoided unless it is inevitable. 353 
5.2. IMAM KHOMEINI'S POLITICAL SCHEME: A STRIVE FOR A THIRD 
WAY 
At this great pilgrimage gathering, an occasion that should serve to 
benefilt Islam and the Muslims, we see that certain polson pens In the 
servIce of Imperialism have for several years been seeking to sow 
dis5ention In the ranks of the Muslims , here in the very land that 
wItnessed the revelation, and in a manner entirely contrary to the alms of 
the Prophet (upon him be peace Pamphlets like al -Khutut al --brida'5' 
351 The IR honoured Shaykh ShaltOt by calling a major street in Tehran and Sunni ýIawzah (school of theology) in 
Kurdistan after him; Fahmi Huwicli, Iran min al-Djkhil (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrým lit-Tarjamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 355. 
352 Quoted in Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqn-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a 
Trojan Horse of Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem Times: Religious Culture 
and Political History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
353 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: the Azhar and Shiism between Rapprochement and 
Restraint, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 382-3. 
354 Al-OutOt al- , Aridd # al-US&I allaU qjm ý71ayhj Din al-Shia al-imamlyya al-Ithni Ashnyya, (the lines on which the 
basis of the Religion of the Twelver Shi'ism were established), is an anti-Shi'ism pamphlet first published in Jeddah 
(Saudi Arabia) in 1961/1380 by the well-known Sunni Shaykh Mulýib al-Din al-Khao-b in response to the calls for Islamic 
rapprochement by D5r al-Taqr-ib in Cairo, and it has been republished and distributed several times in the Hajj session in 
Saudi Arabia. In addition it was republished twice in Damascus while the fifth edition was republished in Cairo. In this 
-h Sunni Islam, and he work, Shaykh Mubib al-Din considers ShPism a different religion that cannot be reconciled wit 
numerated the rituals and practices that he thought dashed with the pure Islamic dogma such as the revision of the 
Qur'jn, the concept of rija, the sabb and other differences. 
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are being published and distributed here In order to serve the 
lmperlalistsý who hope to use lies and slander to separate a group of 170 
million people from the ranks of the Muslims, It Is suronsing that the 
authorities In H#az would permit such misleading material to be distributed In the land of revelation. The Muslim peoples must shun such divIsIve and imperialist-inspired books and publications, and reject those 
opponents of Islamic unit), ý355 
The above quotation is a part of Imam Khomeini's first message on February 6 th 1 
1971 to the Muslims of the world who were performing the annual Islamic ritual 
of pilgrimage (ýajj) in Mecca. Remarkably, the concept of Islamic unity, which 
Imam Khomeini calls for in the above message, is believed to be an innovation in 
Imam Khomeini's political discourse and dogma. The Imam had been involved in 
the Iranian political arena since 1943 when he published his work Kashf al-astar, 
(the Revealing of Secrets) in which he expressed his aspiration for the future role 
of Islam in Iran. In this work, while he denies the accusation of the ulamaýg 
ambition for political authority, he praises the 'ma5hrtýtiyycY (the constitutional 
government) for being a better means to achieve justice; Imam Khomeini's work, 
on the other hand, implies an anti-Sunnism sentiment when he unconventionally 
criticises the Sunni "falsifled" foundation, 356 which will be thoroughly discussed 
below along with his revised tolerant views that corresponded with his new 
compelling views on Islamic unity. 
Although Imam Khomeini had became a prominent figure in the Iranian political 
arena since 1963 when he led mass opposition against Shah Mohammad Reza's 
"'White Revolution, " there was no clear indication which suggested a genuine 
diversion from his previous stand on the Pahlaw-l-s regime as well as on Sunnism. 
It appears noticeable, however, that his revolutionary work ýIuk-dmat-1.151jml-(al- 
ýiukOma al-151imiyya in Arabic) bears a shifting paradigm not only in the Imam 
355 Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: WriNng and declarations of Imam lftmeinl', trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 1981), 196. 
356 Imam Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrjr, trans. Mohammad al-Bind5ri (Amm5n: D5r Ammýir, 1988), 193. 
165 
Khomeini"s previous political visions against the regime in Iran but also in his 
attitude towards Sunnism in general. 
Yet one might inquire: had his new moderate tendency towards Sunnism been 
genuine or a modification to serve his political agenda? Could that reflect the 
impact of Sunni political thoughts on the Imam's political views? What caused 
this shift in the Imam's views against Sunnism? Or had his call for Islamic unity 
been influenced by/or correlated with the radical change in his political views and 
deeds, towards the Pahlavii's regime in particular and the other royal and 
principality systems in the Islamic World in general, mainly the polemical theory 
of wilayat al-faqih and the revolutionary Islamic state? 
On one occasion, tlujjat al-Islim Mohammad Khatami claimed the genuineness 
of the Imam's attitude towards Sunni Islam when he asserted in an interview 
with Wilfried Butcha in 1993 that "after the revolution, in a small circle of his 
closest pupils, Khomeini did utter repeatedly his extreme dislike for any offences 
against the Sunnis. , 357 Khýtaml's statement though not inconsiderable, might be 
an underestimate for three possible reasons: first, Khýtamfi was one of 
Khomeini's close and enthusiastic adherents, which could affect his objectivity. 
Second, he offered no rational justification for the Imam"s harsh attack on the 
great Sunni figures in 1, (ashf al-asrjr. Khatam-i, after all, represents the reformist 
and moderate current in the Iranian polity and his statement could have been 
employed to serve his political agenda. 
357 Wilfried Butcha, "Tehran's Ecumenical Society (MAJMA' AL-TAQRIB): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan 
Horse of Iran?, " in The Twelver Shia in Modem Tlmesý Rellglous Cultilre & Polltical H&ory, edit. R. Brunner and 
W. Ende 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 333, note (3). 
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Additionally, it has been suggested that Imam Khomeini could have become 
politically 'Sunnatised' when he called for an Islamic state and wilayat al-faqfh. 
For instance, Hamid Enayat considered Imam Khomeini's views of the Islamic 
state brought him closer to Sunnism than Shi'ism when he argues "Khumayni's 
thesis stands opposed to popular Shi'ism and comes close to Sunnism. r1358 
Enayat believes that Imam Khomeini was influenced by the views of some of the 
Sunni intellectuals and clerics such as Mohammad Rash-id Reza and Abu al- , A'lý 
al-Mawd0di, 359 but he never provided further demonstrations for such a claim. 
Colin Turner agrees with Enayat's view; however, he is meticulous in his use of 
words which implicitly point to the jurisprudential rule in which al-dar0rit tub[h 
al-mahdOrit (in the case of necessity the prohibited is to be allowed) when he 
differentiates between theory and practice: 
The occultation of the Imam was in fact a veritable millstone around the 
necks of the Twelver fuqah5, the dilemma it posed them being that 
although society must be governed in some way, until the arrival of the 
Mahdi all governments are illegal. This led naturally to a compromise, 
and to a stance which is in practice much nearer to the Sunnite attitude 
to authority and government than perhaps most Twelver Shi'ite would 
have cared to ad Mit. 360 
Apart from the two studies of Wilfried Butc ha 
36 1 
and Rainer Brunner 
362 that 
briefly shed light on the IR's policies towards Islamic unity (although they place 
358 Hamid Enayat, "Iran Khumayni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of 3uHsconsult", in James P. Piscatori 
(ed. ), Islam in 
the Political Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 163. 
359 For more information see Hamid Enayat, "Iran Khumayni's Concept of the 
'Guardianship of Jurisconsult, " in James P. 
Piscatori (ed. ), Islam in the Political Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
360 Colin Turner, "Still waiting for the Imam? The Unresolved Question of Intiz5r in Twelver 
Shiism, " Pelvca XV, 1993- 
1995,41-2. 
361 Wilfried Butcha, "Tehran's Ecumenical Society (MAJMA' AL-TAQRIB): a Veritable Ecumenical 
Revival or a Trojan 
Horse of Iran? " in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times, Religious Culture 
& Political History, edit. R. Brunner and ý%. Encle 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
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them in the context of the Iranian national interest), no attempt has been made 
to examine the genuineness of Imam Khomeini's call for Islamic unity with a 
careful reference to its political and jurisprudential shift in the Imam's visions 
correlated to the unobserved dimension of Imam Khomeini's Islamic federal 
scheme to resist Western hegemony in which the single Islamic state, a sole 
leadership and a united nation are the three corners of this tripartite scheme. 
Politically this makes Imam Khomeini not only a revisionist for Shiism but also 
an orthodox revivalist for Sunnism as well. However, Islamic unity had a wider 
comprehensive meaning in Imam Khomeini"s scheme than being confined to the 
Iranian national interest, as it called for the establishment of one Islamic 
federation state, under one leader and was to include undivided Islamic nations. 
In other words, the political restoration of Islamic unity had been the 
cornerstone of the Imam's revolutionary scheme while the Imam's other two 
concepts, namely the Islamic state and wiliyat al-faql-h, not only reflects such a 
unifying desire but also represents the only possible means to achieve it. 
As a result, two key issues should be considered in order to reveal such a 
dimension and proffer adequate answers for the aforementioned questions. 
First, Imam Khomeini's had been heavily and directly involved in politics since 
1963 when he led the opposition to resist the Shah's Westernised policies of the 
"'White Revolution" which followed the Western line and emphasised imperial 
hegemony not only in Iran but also the Islamic world; therefore, it seems 
significant to trace the development and/or the change in Imam Khomeini's 
political thought and the impact of that on his attitude towards Sunni Islam and 
his call for Islamic unity in which a survey of the Imam's earliest and latest 
works, KJ517f al-a5rjr and al-ýIukOma al-151imiyya, will be inevitable. Second, 
the efforts of Islamic unity that had been conducted during the Imam's 
362 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century., the Azhar and Shilsm between Rapprocheme7t and 
Re5tralnt, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 
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leadership should be examined and thoroughly evaluated to elucidate how 
genuine his attempt was. 
5.3. IMAM KHOMEINE: FROM REACTIONARY TO REVOLUTIONARY 
Evidently, Imam Khomeini's wiliyat-i faqih in its sketchy theoretical framework 
never departed from modern political Shi'ism, and its roots could be traced back 
to the Safavids' era and the rise of the Shi'i u., rj/fschool of thought when the 
idea that required the ruler should be both a sayyid and mujtahid was on the 
363 table of discussion. Since the conversion of Persia to Twelver Shi'ism at the 
start of the sixteenth century by Shah IsmW-il I, the founder of the Safavid 
dynasty, the US01? 64 Shi'i fuqahj had developed several political theories 
amongst which three are noteworthy of a brief discussion due to their influential 
role in the development of Imam Khomeini's questioned theory of wiliyat-i faqih: 
the wiliya Ama (the general custodianship of the ulamaý of al-Muýaqiq al-Karak-i, 
the wiljyat al-faqih (the Guardianship of the ulamaý of mulli Ahmad an-Naraq-i 
1 363 Meir Litvak, Shi'i scholars of nineteenth -century Iraq: The ulam5 of Najaf and Karbala (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1998), 13; Juan R. Cole, "Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict 
Reconsidered, " Islamic Studies 18: 1 (Winter 1985), 5; Said Arjornand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: 
religion, political Order, and societal Change in shiite Iran from the beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), 105-108. 
364 The &szWschool, that was established in the early 16th century during the reign of Shah Ism5li by the' alimah al- 
Karaki, legitimised the fuqahi to exercise the'&6hid (independent religious judgement) on which theusUffs depended to 
emphasise the political right of the qualified faq#7 to rule during the ghayyba of the hidden Imam; while the traditional 
Twelver Shi'ism, or the akhbirz school, restricted the role of the fuqahj in narrating the Prophet and the Imams' 
tradition and prohibited any involvement in politics for they believed it is a usurpation of the right of the hidden Imam, 
but they referred instead to the theory of lnbýzjr (the waiting for the Mahdi's return) and the practice of taq1yya (the 
concealment of the true belief). For more information consult Juan Cole, "Shi'i clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: the 
Akhbari-Usuli conflict reconsidered, " Iranian Rudies 18, no. I (December 1985), 3-34; Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting 
Persia: Rellgion and Power In Me 5a/avýd Empire (I. B. Tauris, 2004); also C. P. Turner, "Still Waiting for the Hidden 
Imam? The Unresolved Question of Intizýr in Twelver Shi'ism, " Persica XV, 1993-1995, and David Morgan, Medleval 
Persia 1040-1797 (London: Longman, 1988). 
169 
(that have already been discussed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively) and the 
ma. 5&5ýtiyya (the constitutional government) of Mlrzý Wlin-i. 
The despotism was the major concern of Mirzi Mohammad Ousayn Ný ) in-i 
(1860-1936); alternatively, he proposed a constitutional government in his work 
Tanbih al-umma wa tanzih al-milla (literally, Alerting of the Nation and Purifying 
the Religion )365 that was first published in 1909 in Baghdad then in Tehran in 
1910; he also blamed despotism for the backwardness of the Islamic nations. 366 
This book was republished in 1955 by Mahmud TaliqýnT, one of Khomeini's 
revolutionary assistants who was assassinated soon after the success of the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, after ""W-in-i himself took the unusual step of 
collecting and destroying the remaining copies of his book not long after its 
"367 publication. 
N5'ini utilised the Shii usiN jurisprudential methodology that was based on 
Qur^'jn, ýIadith, and "aql (reason )368 to compose his argument in which he 
legitimised the replacement of despotism with a constitutional government, for 
... there remains no room to doubt the necessity of changing a despotic 
regime into a constitutional one. This is true, because the former 
consists of three sets of usurpations and oppressions: 1) it is usurpation 
of the authority of God and injustice to Him; 2) it is usurpation of the 
lmamSý authority and oppression of the Imanr, 3) it also involves 
oppression of the people. By contrast, a constitutional system is only 
oppression of the Imam, because his authority is usurped. Thus, a 
365 Akhavi translated this title as " the Admonition to the Islamic community and rectification of the nation"; see 
Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending discourses in Shici Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat Al-faqih, " Iranian 5tudies 29, no. 3-4, 
(Summer/Fall 1996), 234. 
366 Waj-ih Kawthar5ni, al-Faqlb wa as-5u)ffn (Beirut: D5r ar-Rashid, 1989), 186-93. 
367 Said Amir Adomand, "The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order, " Iranian Rudies 13, no. 1 (1980), 152. 
368 bid, 150. 
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constitutional regime limits three sets of oppressions to one; 
consequently it is necessary to adopt it... In order to remove the 
oppression done to the Imam,, there is but one solution. As we said 
before, the function of the ruler in the new regime is like that of the 
function of the supervisor of the awqaf The person in charge of the 
awqaf, even though he may have illegally occupied the office, can seek 
the sanction of the lawful authority, i. e., the "ulama, to make his own 
function lawful. If he gains the "ulamaýý approval, then there will remain 
no usurpation of the jMaM. 369 
Even though he had carefully reviewed Ný ) in-i's work, Said Amir Adomand 
frankly admitted that he is still uncertain about the author's real purpose in 
publishing it. Adomand clearly states 
It is true that the Tanbih al-Umma was revived 45 years later by a 
staunch opponent of the present regime, Mahmud Taliqani. But the 
book's revival was entirely due to its vehement attack on tyranny - 
indirectly identified with the shah's regime. What were totally obscured 
were the chief intentions of its author: the propagation of 
constitutionalism, and the legitimization of parliamentary democracy as 
the mean for bringing modern government under the normative 
governance of the Shi'ite political ethic. Since its revival, the book has 
remained the object of the keen attention of the religious opposition 
while the chief concerns of its author have receded even further into 
obscurity. "' 
Yet Wajih Kawtharýinl had a second look at Shaykh Na-in-i's work in the hope 
that it might divulge Shaykh Ný'Tin-i's intention that had seemed so 
incomprehensible to Adomand; thus Kawthar5n-I could justify Shaykh Ný ) ini's 
369 Quoted in Said Adomand, ibid, 151-52. 
370 ibid, 162-3 note: 12. 
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destruction of the first edition of this work. According to Kawthar6ni, Shaykh 
N5 in-i classified despotism into two types, temporal and religious, in which the 
former claims legitimacy from power and coercion while the latter, depends on 
371 deception and trickery. Hence, he called for mas&5ýtiyya (constitutional 
government) in which the function of the parliament is compatible with Islamic 
shOri (consultation) in order to put an end to despotism when it might be 
possible to ""limit the ruler's arbitrary power and grant people limited 
sovereignty. if372 Defending his proposal, Shaykh Wfini deemed the ma5hrOriyya 
as a replacement for the prerequisites of "isma (infallibility) of the Twelver 
Shi'ite Imams and "adila (equity) of the Sunni Caliphs to make justice 
achievable. 373 However, he attacked the "mu"ammamilf (literally "'the people 
with turbans" referring to the ulami, in which he meant the clergy) who had 
been resisting the constitutional movement, for deceiving the umma and 
described them as ulami al-SO " (evil clerics), lu., 50, r, al-dl-n (thieves of religion), 
and mupfilipfu "afj al-Muslimin (misleaders of ordinary MUSliMS). 374 
Although Vanessa Martin mistakenly asserted that Shaykh Ný ) in-i's political views 
"emerged largely from the Iranian political context rather than the Islamic 
theoretical background, "375 Ný'inl's views undoubtedly influenced by the Syrian 
political activist Abd al-Raýmýn al-KawRibT's work, Tabj"i" a1-'i5tibdjd (the 
Nature of Despotism) which was translated from Arabic to Persian during the 
constitution movement of 1905 and become widely circulated. Therefore, 
Shaykh Wfini's theory significantly showed a high awareness of the Muslims' 
miserable reality in a wider scope and reflected the Muslims' general suffering, 
371 Waj-ih Kawthar5ni, al-Faqlh wa as-Sulffn (Beirut: Dýr ar-Rashid, 1989), 188. 
372 Quoted in Neil Sheviin, Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitubon of Iran: the Implementation of Theocracy, (Journal of 
Constih1bon Law, Fall 1998, Vol. 1: 2), 361. 
373 Waj-ih Kawthar-5ni, al-Faqlh wa as-Suon (Beirut: D5r ar-Rashid, 1989), 192. 
374 bid, 189. 
375 Vanessa Martin, Cfeating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the lVaking of New Iran (London: 1. B. Tauns, 2003), 104. 
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both Shi'i and Sunni, at the hands of temporal and religious despotism, against 
which they strived for justice when the simultaneous constitutional movements 
broke up in the Shi'i Q5j5r Persia (1905) and Sunni Ottoman Turkey (1908); 
thus Shaykh Wflnli believed that his mashruriyya might provide a unique 
resolution of the problems confronting the Islamic nation as a whole, and he 
implicitly pointed out that the ma. 5hruriyya could serve as a basis for achieving 
Islamic unity since the actual source of disunity, namely the Imamate and 
Caliphate, no longer existed. 376 
Remarkably, the political thought of Imam Khomeini had passed through two 
politically active stages separated by a gap of tranquillity. In the first stage, 
Imam Khomeini's political views might have appeared to be merely vague, 
perhaps because he was emotionally impacted by refuting reaction when he 
published his work., Kashf al-asrjr 
Although Moin believed that Imam Khomeini had distanced himself from politics 
since then and focussed on his theological studies, he pointed to Khomeini's 
friendships with active Islamist figures such as Ayatollah Kash5n-1. the political 
activist cleric who had supported Muýaclaqs coup against the Shah, and Nawwýb 
I 
$afaw-1. the leader of the organisation of fl'oljiyjn Islim (men ready to sacrifice 
themselves for the cause of Islam). 377 Ayatollah Munta4ir-i, the former 
designated successor of Imam Khomeini and one of his closest friends, not only 
asserted this in his memoirs but also added that Imam Khomeini was influenced 
by Nawwýb $afaw-i's political views and had a strong sympathy for his cause in 
which the Imam's relationship with the late Buruierdi became strained when 
Imam Khomeini once offered a safe haven to some members of I'ldi"iyin Islam 
376 Waj-ih Kawthar5ni, al-Faqlhh wa al-5ultgn (Beirut: Dýr ar-Rashid, 1989), 191-2. 
377 See Baqer Moin, Khomeini, Life of the Ayatollah (New York: St. Martn's Press, 2000), 67-69. 
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in the ýawza (Islamic seminary). 378 Significantly, Nawýb $afawi introduced 
Imam Khomeini to al-lkhwk al-Musliml-n (the Brotherhood of Islam) and their 
political dogma; Amir Taheri affirms 
The man who introduced Khomeini to the Ikhwan and their ideas was a 
young mullah by the name of Mohammad Nawab-Safavi who was both 
admired by his extreme good looks and feared for his power to 
mesmerize a crowd. The two men spent long hours together. Nawab- 
Safavi believed that the philosophy of the Ikhwan - based on the 
purification of Islamic society by ridding it of "corrupting individuals" by 
carefully planned assassinations - had to be modified to take into 
account the specific features of Shi'ites society in Iran. 379 
It was not until 1963 when Mohammad Reza Shah introduced his "White 
Revolution" a set of political reforms aimed at modernising Iranian society that 
Imam Khomeini profoundly involved himself in the political arena and stoutly 
opposed the Shah's proposed policies. As a result, Imam Khomeini was exiled to 
Turkey in 1964 before he finally settled down in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq. 
From then onwards, Imam Khomeini concerned himself with developing 
comprehensive Islamic political views among which he introduced the theory of 
wiliyat-i faq#7 and revived the Qur"inic concept of Islamic unity that he 
delivered to his students in a series at Najaf seminary, and which was later 
collected and published in the early seventies in the seminal work tiukOmat-j 
Islimi- wiliyat-i faqih (Islamic Government: the Guardianship of the Jurist). 
378 MuntaziWs memoirs at <http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziri02/htm> 
379 Amir T aheri, 7he 5pifit ofAllah (Bethesda: Adler & Adler, 1986), 98. 
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5.3.1. THE REACTIONARY WORK OF KASHF AL-ASRAR (THE 
REVEALING OF SECRETS) 
Imam Khomeini published his early work,, Xashf al-a5rjr in 1941. This was a 
refuting response to Ali Akbar Hakami-Zýcla's published article, Asar-1- Hizir 5ila, 
during Reza Shah's regime in which he "accused the ulam5 of encouraging 
superstitious practices among the Iranian people to perpetuate their own 
powers, and for being the main cause of the country's backwardness. t380 Imam 
Khomeini implicitly pointed to Ali Akbar Oakam! -Z5da and his article when he 
stated 
... some of our writers make it their mission in life to attack religion, 
religiosity, and the men of religion [clergy] with no intention but to bring 
about quarrels. They use their hired pens to write papers [against 
religion] and spread them ... 
forgetting that weakening relationships 
between those people with religion, religiosity, and men of religion is a 
terrible criminal act that will achieve nothing but destroy Islamic 
countries. 381 
Furthermore, Imam Khomeini revealed the reasons behind the composition of 
this work in which he aimed to refute each one of the allegations of the anti- 
clerical writers, namely Ali Akbar. 
Thus, let us get to the gist of the matter, and provide an answer to each 
one of the sayings of those who resembled the Wahhabis and their 
examples to expose their lies and reveal their betrayal. 382 
Apparently, Imam Khomeini was most likely defending the clerical views that 
were had been attacked by Ali Akbar rather than propounding his own political 
views. For example, he aimed to falsify Ali Akbar's claim that "the fagifts right to 
380 Vanessa Martin, Creatng An 151amic State: Khomelni and the MakIng of New Iran 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 103-4 
381 Imam Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrjr, trans. M. al-Bandýri (Amman: DcirAm5r, 1988), 15-16. 
382 ibid, 26. 
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hold authority has no jurisprudential basis 11383 and to expose Ali Akbar's 
ignorance in jurisprudential matters when he cited several considerable Shi'i 
sources where the evidence for the wiljyjt-i faqfh could be found, such as 
Shaykh al-$ad0q's Ikmil al-dfn (Completing the Religion), Shaykh al-Tus-i's al- 
Ghayba (the Occultation), and Tabars-i's al-lýt6fjj (the Objection); nevertheless, 
Imam Khomeini showed objectivity when he acknowledged elsewhere that the 
theory of wiliyat-i faqfh is a controversial issue among Shi'ite scholars. He 
stated that 
... wiliya of the mujtahid.. has been the subject of discussion among 
mujtahids since the first day in regard to it is a foundational issue or not 
and to the limits of the wiliya and its sphere. This [issue] is one of the 
branches of jurisprudence for which the various disputing groups bring 
forward evidence based on Withs attributed to the Prophet and the 
Imams. 384 
Additionally, Imam Khomeini reminded his audience that the constitutional 
government (mashrOra) had already approved the implementation of Islamic 
laws which it had never opposed or precluded its development385 even though 
Imam Khomeini seemed to be conservative in dealing with the masfttýta to 
which he never showed his full admission; rather he selectively demanded to 
apply only one article from the 1905 constitution 386 since it had clearly 
emphasized Islamic law as the source of legislation, and "Every legislation 
opposed to the shari Ca (Islamic law) is not considered a legitimate law. /687 On 
the other hand, Imam Khomeini emphasized that the ulamý merely hoped for 
the implementation of Islamic rules. 
383 bid, 206. 
384 lbid, 204. 
385 ibid, 236. 
386 David Menashri, Iran: Decade of War and Revolu&on (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), 5 1, note (6). 
387 Imam Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrjr, trans. M. al-Band5ri, (Amman: DZirAm5r, 1988), 237. 
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We [Khomeini himself and clerics in general] are, as we pointed out 
earlier,, not saying that authority must be handed to the faqih; however, 
authority should be administered according to divine Laws which will not 
be achievable without being overseen by the faqJ77.388 
In this work the traditional sectarian antagonism towards Sunni ideals was 
noticeable. For example,, Imam Khomeini initially accused the meeting of Saqifa 
of being the source of all the differences and disputes among Muslims in which 
the Prophet's companions gathered immediately after his death and elected Abu 
Bakr al-$idiq to succeed the Prophet in the leadership of the Muslim 
commun ity. 389 Then, he enumerated the violations to the instructions of the holy 
Qur"jn that had been committed by the 5haykhin". the first two Caliphs Abu 
Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khaqýb such as preventing the Prophet's daughter Fatima 
benefiting from her father's inheritance, the denial of Ali's right in succeeding to 
the position of his cousin and father-in-law, the prohibiting of mub (temporary 
marriage) ... etc. It seems obvious 
from the outset that Imam Khomeini was 
strongly provoked by Ali Akbar ýakam`[-Zacla's article which, according to 
Vanessa Martin, indirectly falsified Shi'ism and declared his admiration for Sunni 
Islam for practicing a belief based on accurate traditions . 
390 Although we have 
no access to Ali Akbar's article, it could be understood from Ka5hf al-a5rjr that 
he had conducted a comparison between the Iranian version of Islam and the 
Wahh5b-i version that has been practiced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, going 
on to praise the latter for applying true Islam. Imam Khomeini's attack, 
therefore,, was aimed at revealing what he thought to be anti-Islamic innovations 
of Wahh5bism to refute Ali's claim rather than attempting to revive the historical 
sectarian disputes among Muslims; hence, he bluntly accused Ali Akbar of being 
388 bid, 236. 
389 ibid, 130. 
390 bid, 143. 
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a mouthpiece for Wahh5bism. 391 Imam Khomeini, however, was defending the 
legitimacy of the Shi'ism entity more than disdaining the first two caliphs or 
Sunnism when he criticized some of the Shaykhilýs misinterpretations of the 
Qur "in that the Shi'ite had historically denied. Indeed, Imam Khomeini showed 
respect to the first two caliphs when he used the favorable title, Shaykhin 
(singular Shaykh), that Sunnis like to address them by, unlike the conventional 
Shi'i authors who widely called the first two caliphs by abusive titles such as 
ýC, anamqyy Quray. 5h (the two idols of the tribe of Quraysh) and al--7abt wa al- 
Tighit (which means Satan and despotic respectively) and in their polemic 
writings. 
Yet Imam Khomeini seemed in this work to be reluctant to voice his support for 
any one of the recognized opinions of that time due to the needs for further 
research. 392 Significantly, this is clear evidence that the political dogma of the 
Imam, mainly the theory of wiljyat al-faqýh, had not yet developed at the time. 
5.3.2. THE REVOLUTIONARY ORIENTATION OF AL-HUK0MA AL- 
ISLAMIYYA (THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT) 
Thirty years later,, Imam Khomeini published his seminal and revolutionary work 
of tiuk&mat-i Islimi. - viliyat-i faqih (Arabic al-ýYukt7ma al-151imiyya: wiliyat al- 
faq#7, Islamic government: the governance of the jurist). 393 Originally, this work 
was a collection of seventeen lectures in Persian that he gave between 21 
January and 8 February, 1970 that corresponded with the period between 13 th of 
Dhj1-qi`da to the 1st of Dhil-hýja to his students of the religious sciences at 
391 ibid, 19-20. 
392 bid, 2G4. 
393 Imam Khomeini, al-ýYuktlma al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kitib Kh5nah Buzurq, 1981). 
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Shaykh al-Ans5ri mosque 394 in Najaf (where he had been exiled since his uprising 
against Mohammad Reza Shah's Westernizing policies in 1964); later on this 
work was transcripted and published in different languages such as Arabic, 
French, Turkish and Urdu in 1978. 
In this work, Imam Khomeini introduced his widely controversial concepts of the 
Islamic state and the wiliyat al-faqýh in which he called for the establishment of 
an Islamic state under the leadership of the fuqahj, He began with a vehement 
attack against the West for the fragmentising of the Muslim umma: "'the Western 
powers divided the Islamic nation into several states and appointed to each one 
of these states one of their agents, 11395 and he explicitly criticised the secular 
aspects of the governments in the Islamic world that had been introduced by the 
Western imperial powers and adopted by their lackeys. He then blamed Western 
Imperialism for the misery of the Islamic nation having exploited Muslims' 
wealth. Additionally, he claimed that the imperial powers had launched a 
campaign against Islam,, accusing Islamic laws of being cruel and inapplicable, 
and propagating secularism to marginalise Islam and subdue its resistance. 396 
Hence, he referred to the golden age of Islam during the time of the Prophet and 
his Rightly-Guided Caliphs as providing evidence that there is no separation 
between religion and politics in Islam: 
Had religion been isolated from politics during the Prophet's age? Were 
there at that time specialists in religion and other specialists in politics? 
And at the time of the Caliphs, and of Imam Ali were politics separated 
394 This mosque is called after Shaykh MurtaO5 al-Anori (d. 1864), Shaykh al-Narjq-i's student who enjoyed the title of 
al-ma)ji' al-mutlaq #-attaqrld (the absolute source of imitation ). al-'Ansýirý disagreed with his teacher and restncted 
w4yat al-Faq#7 in supervision over the financial affairs and the administration of the Islamic endowments; for more 
details refer to Shahrough Akhavi, "contending discourses in Shici Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat Al-faclih, " Iranlan 
Rudies 29, no. 3-4, (Summer/Fall 1996), 237; also; Hamid Enayat, 'Iran Khumayni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of 
Jurisconsult', ' in James P. Piscatori (ed. ), Islam in the Political Process (London: Cambridge University PIress, 1983), 16 1. 
395 Imam Khomeini, al-ýIuktjma al-lsljmlyya (Tehran: Kit5b Khýnah Buzurq, 1981), 35. 
396 ibid, 7-16. 
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from religion? Were there a designated institution for religion and 
another institution for politiCS? 397 
Additionally, he revealed that the monarchical system is an innovation and 
contrary to Islamic provisions and recalled the event at Karbala when Imam 
ýusayn revolted against Yafid's succession and lost his life in an unequal battle 
just to oppose the newly introduced and innovative monarchisms. 
Imam Khomeini also maintained, making reference to the golden age of Islam 
that the presence of Islamic government had been unanimously agreed upon 
even at the peak of their differences after the Prophet's death. 
There was no single Muslim who had doubted the necessity of the 
continuation of an Islamic government after the Prophet's death. All 
were in accord on this point, but the difference was on who would rule 
this government; hence, the government existed after the death of the 
Prophet and during the time of Imam Ali with all its executive and 
administrative institutions. 398 
Consequently, he called for the establishment of an Islamic state and claimed the 
right of the ulami to rule this state according to wiliyat-i faqih. To support this 
claim, he made several references to the Prophet and the Imams' hadiths and 
narratives among which is a narrative known as maqbt7lat (accepted) Omar ibn 
ýan? ala, attributed to the sixth Imam la'far al-$5diq, when he asked Imam 
Ja'far al-$5diq to whom should the Shi'i followers refer to solve their disputes? 
Imam Ja'far ordered him to refer to a person who recites our traditions, 
learned in our permitted (ýaljluna) and prohibited (ýarjmunaý issues, 
397 Old, 20-21. 
398 ibid, 2 7. 
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and acquainted with our judgments ... they should accept his ruling as I 
appointed him a ruler over you [the Shiite community]. 399 
Remarkably, Imam Khomeini reasserted his claim of wiliyat al-faqfh by 
recognising a controversial ýadith. This ýadl-th had received the #mj" (the 
consensus) of the Sunni Wami. Also, Abu Bakr al-$id-iq (the first Caliph) had 
referred to this Nalith when he made the decision to prevent the Prophet's 
daughter (Fatim5) from inheriting her father's properties; however, the Shi'ite 
historically opposed the first caliph's unjust decision and refused to accept this 
hadith due to the weakness of the narrator. Imam Khomeini, however, deemed 
the strength of this ýadith lies in the unquestionable text since it was reiterated 
by another high credential source, Abi Ali ibn IbrWim ibn Hýishim. 400 
Furthermore, Imam Khomeini emphasised that Shaykh an-Nar5q-1 had adhered to 
this ýadith . 
40 1 According to Abi al-Bukhtari, that Abi Abdillah (Imam Ja'far) 
reported the Prophet had said the ulamiare the heirs of the prophets since 
A02 the prophets do not leave diniror dirhan7, but they left knowledge... 
Imam Khomeini's al-tiukOma al-Islimiyya undoubtedly reveals clear shifting 
paradigm in his political views and attitude towards the Pahlavi regime and 
Sunnism as well. Despite the fact that Imam Khomeini had been a key opponent 
to the Pahlavi regime since 1963, Shahrough Akhavi notices: 
In fall1962/ spring 1963, Khomeini abandoned his quietism of the last 
two decades by denouncing the proposed changes in the provincial 
election law ... Nonetheless, he still seemed to be holding out the 
possibility of cooperation, if the Shah would "come to his senses" and 
orient public policies in favour of the national independence and respect 
399 bid, 86-7. 
400 bid, 9 3. 
401 b1d, 94. 
402 lbid, 93-4. 
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for the religious traditions. In other words, he was not yet willing to burn 
all his bridges with the secular authorities, and he did not yet advocate 
executive rule by the clergy-40' 
Thus, the Imam explicitly instigated Iranian youths to overthrow the dictator and 
urged them to disgrace the regime"s clerics. 404 He, also, attacked the traditional 
religious institutions associated with the regime for preventing Iranians from 
rising up against tyranny405 for which a number of Western scholars, such as 
Hamid Algar, believed that this work was mainly addressed to Iranian 
audienceS406 It is evident, however,, that Imam Khomeini throughout this work 
was discussing the wretched situation of the Islamic nation as a whole and the 
use of the Shi'i emblems was merely due to the fact that his audience were 
Shi'i ýawza students among which were hundreds of Iranians, together with the 
political conditions of the time when he was under close observation by the 
secret police of the Iraqi Ba'this. 
Instead, he proposed a gradual programme to establish an Islamic government 
which would be the only possible means, from his point of view, to revive true 
Islam and resist Western hegemony that was exploiting the resources of the 
Islamic world, and eventually would lead to a restoration of Islamic unity. 
Indeed, Imam Khomeini designated his proposed scheme in a way that could be 
implemented in any Islamic country and explained his political ideas in this work 
in a moderate tone in which his sectarian orientation become hardly identified. 407 
He neither claimed nor anticipated the establishment of an Islamic state himself 
403 Shahrough Akhavi, "contending discourses in Shici Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat Al-faqih, " Iranian Studies 29, no. 
3-4, (1996), 235. 
404 Imam Khomeini, al-tiukdma al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kit5b Kh5nah Buzurq, 1981), 143-5. 
405 Ervand Abrahamian, Khoeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 11. 
406 Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolutlon: Writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941-1980), tran. and ann. 
Hamid Algar ( Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 25. 
407 David Menashri, Iran a Decade of War and Revolution (Holmes & Meier: New York, 1990), 16 note (11). 
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and that would need time before it could stand in reality; however, his attempt 
was merely a step on the thousand mile journey. 
We did not expect that our instructions and endeavours would be fruitful 
within a short time, since the establishment of the Islamic state requires 
sparing no effort over a long period. We saw a number of wise people 
who placed a foundation stone on which others will build a building, 
albeit after two hundred years. "' 
For that reason, Imam Khomeini attempted to discard his early attacks on 
Sunnism when he emphasised the necessity of Islamic unity in order to establish 
an Islamic government and confront the imperial attacks of the West on the 
Islamic territories. For example, the Imam urged Muslims of the world to be 
vigilant about the conspiring role of the imperial powers against Islamic unity 
reminding them 
... colonialism 
divided our Muslim homelands and allotted the Muslims 
different identities. At the rise of the Ottomans [Sunnis] as a united 
state, the colonialists strived to fragmentise it. The Russians and English 
with their other alliances set up a coalition and fought the Ottomans, and 
then shared the booty as you know. " 
As a result, the imam offered a salvation to exit this miserable situation that the 
Islamic nation is experiencing when he appealed for the restoration of Islamic 
un ity: 
... the only means to unify 
the Islamic nation, liberate our lands, and 
overthrow the traitorous governments is to establish our Islamic 
408 Imam Khomeini, al-Hukdma a1-I51jmiyya (Tehran: Kit5b Kh5nah Buzurq, 1981), 128. 
409 bid, 34-35. 
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government. The establishment of an Islamic government, then, aims to 
achieve and preserve Islamic un ity. 410 
Furthermore, the Imam called for the protection of the miserable victims of 
injustice of the Western powers and their domestic lackeys: 
We are instructed to rescue the deprived and aggrieved people, we are 
ordered to help them and antagonise their oppressors as it was stated by 
the commander of the faithful [Imam Ali] to his sons: be opponents of 
the unjust (pfilim) and supporters of the wronged (Maoýdlj7M). 411 
This work raises the exigency of the establishment of the Islamic state according 
to the theory of wiliyat-i faqih in which Imam Khomeini was strongly influenced 
by the political views of Shaykh s Narýq! and Ný'! n-i, explicitly accrediting them 
as the major sources for his theory when he asserts: 
As I mentioned to you that the late (marýJm) Nar5q-i believes that [the 
practice of] all the affairs that the Prophet had dealt with are handed 
over to the fuqahj,, except for the issues relating to his prophecy that 
were restrictedly confined to him. The late Shaykh N5'in-i used to say: 
this whole issue [ wiliyat-i faqih] could be excluded from maqbi7lat Umar 
ibn Oan? alah. 412 
Significantly, Imam Khomeini neglected pointing to Shaykh Karaki- who was 
widely accepted among the Shi'i clerics as the founder of the theory of 
wiljya ama while he paid tribute to Shaykh 1\15inli, who was an adherent of the 
mashrtýtiyya. This suggests that the Imam could have intentionally attempted to 
4 10 bid, 3 5. 
411 bid, 36. 
412 bid, 116. 
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distance himself from the Safavid heritage with all of its antagonism and hatred 
against Sunni Islam in which Shaykh Karak-i played the major provocative role. 413 
In summary, Imam Khomeini's work, tiuk0mat-i1sliml-, represents the gist of the 
Imam"s accumulated political experiences; they are framed in a political Islamic 
scheme to revive Islamic unity in order to get rid of the miserable situation of 
subordination to the Western superpowers that divide the Muslim people and 
exploit their wealth. Accordingly, Islamic unity symbolises the cornerstone of 
this scheme in which an independent Islamic state under the leadership of the 
Muslim ulami, as the inheritors of the Prophet and the guardians of the religion, 
should be established to repulse Imperial Western values, Vanessa Martin 
discerns 
Khomeini was otherwise much concerned about foreign influence in Iran, 
and in the Muslim world as a whole, with which he became more 
preoccupied from the time of his residence in Najaf ... the economy was 
subordinated to the interest of the West, rather than those of Iran... He 
attacked the Western dominance through compliant regimes, and saw 
the answer as Muslim unity ... In particular Sunnis and Shi'a should unite 
and forget their differences. "' 
Yet Vanessa Martin, likewise other scholars who discussed this subject such as 
Norman Calder, 415 did not fully investigate the impact of the Imam's call for 
Islamic unity that caused the shifting paradigm in his new political dogma of al- 
413 For Shaykh Karak-rs role in inciting antagonism and hatred against Sunnism see Colin Turner, Islam without Allah? 
(Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 84. 
414 Vanessa Martin, CreaUng an Islamic 5tate: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London: 1. B. Tauris, 2003), 114- 
15 
415 Norman Calder missed the associated connection between Imam Khomeini's calls for Islamic unity on the one hand 
and the new political dogma of his thorough approach to the ýYukumat-iisljmý, see Norman Calder, "Accommodation and 
Revolution of the Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical Tradition, " MIddle Eastern Studies 18, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1982). 
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Hukl7ma al-Islimiyya; indeed, there is a significant correlating relationship 
between the call for Islamic unity as the ultimate aim and the newly-proposed 
concepts of the Islamic state and the wiliyat-i faqih as the only possible means 
to guarantee this political unity. Approaching such a relationship would clearly 
illustrate the potential alteration in Imam Khomeini's political thought from his 
previous stand in Kashf al-asrjr which should be recognised as his genuine 
contribution that made him not only a revisionist of modern political Shi, ism but 
also orthodox according to the criteria of traditional Sunnism. 
Remarkably, Imam Khomeini seemed to be theoretically successful in 
accommodating the political dilemma of the legitimate government that had 
isolated the Shiites from playing an active role in the ummaýý political affairs 
since the death of the Prophet when Twelver Shi'ism recognised no legitimate 
government but Imam Ali's short-lived and unstable regime; accordingly, the 
Twelver Shi'ites most likely placed all Islamic history outside the realms of 
legitimacy- a matter that reflected the political thought of Twelver Shl'ism and 
led to the historic lack of an idealistic form in Islamic government. Therefore, 
Imam Khomeini,, throughout his work, subtly designated a gradual methodology 
that cohesively emphasised Islamic unity while discussing his political views. 
First of all, he referred to the age of the Prophecy and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs 
as 'the golden age of Islam' and the authoritative era from which all Muslims 
extract Islamic precepts; the government in such an age, commencing with the 
infallible Prophet and concluded by the infallible Imam, was to form the idealistic 
model that would appeal to both the Sunni and Shi'i Muslims. In other words, 
he employed the fact that the legitimacy of the era of rightly-guided Caliphs is 
unquestionable for Sunni Islam while the active participation of Imam Ali in 
government affairs during the time of the Caliphs, that ended with the rule of 
Imam Ali himself, would legitimise this era in the eyes of the Shi, ites to create 
an authoritative example for all Muslims to strengthen Khomeinifs appeal. 
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Then, Imam Khomeini, as mentioned above, asserted the concurrence among 
Muslims over the necessity of an Islamic government, but he admitted that 
disagreement came about among Muslims after the Prophet-s death over who 
should be the successor. As a resultf the exigency of an Islamic government at 
all times has received the census of all Muslims regardless of their political and 
sectarian orientation, in order to assure the activation and implementation of 
shari ca. 
Thus, Imam Khomeini managed to introduce a new interpretation to the 
concepts of Imama (imamate) and khAifa (caliphate) in order to bypass the 
historical question of the leadership without intimidating the essential principles 
of each sect. In affirming the just faqihýý right to rule the Islamic state and 
practice the political and executive authority of the Prophet, he divided the 
wiliya (authority) into two different notions: wilayat-i i "tibiri (authority based on 
practical function) and wiliyat-i takwfni (genetic authority). The former is a 
functional authority by which the faqih will be practically able to administer the 
political and executive affairs of the Islamic state, but he has to fulfil two 
conditions of al- "adila (justice) and al- "Am bi al-Qjndn al-. 1sliml- (being 
knowledgeable in Islamic law), while the latter is a divinely prestigious status 
that is merely designated for the infallible Imams and that has no contradiction 
-i i "tibiri 416 with the Imams' ability to assume the wiliyat Significantly, Imam 
Khomeini's new interpretation seems to find a compromise to implicitly legitimise 
the rule of the first three caliphs so this work clearly provides further evidence 
for his reunifying tendency. Sayyid Ayy5d Jam5l a[-Din, the Iraqi cleric and MP, 
who opposed Khomeini's wiliyatal-faq177, unintentionally pointed to this tendency 
in Imam Khomeini's political dogma while he was attempting to denounce it; he 
argued that fallible Imam Khomeini claimed the authority of the infallible Prophet 
416 Imam Khomeini, al-ýYuk&ma al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kjt5b Kh6nah Buzurq, 1981), 45-53. 
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and Imams, so we should first acknowledge the caliphate of the fallible Abu Bakr 
Wila at al_fa ih. 
417 in order to accept Khomeini's innovative yq 
Coincidently,, the ýadiths to which Imam Khomeini referred in his work to support 
his argument are most likely recognised by both Sunnite and Shi, ite - something 
that has attracted none of the scholars which might significantly highlight the 
Imam's call for Islamic unity. For example, the hadfth of sahihat Qadd5h 418 in 
which the illamiare considered the heirs of the Prophets is cited in the Sunan 
al-Tarmadhi (2606), Sunan AN Daw0d (3257). and Sunan al-D5rm! (360). Also, 
another hadith in which the death of a Muslim faqýh Islam would be like opening 
a chink in the Islamic fortreSS419 is cited in Sunan al-Nrm-i (326). 
5.4. ISLAMIC UNITY FROM THE THEORY TO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
It has been said that Imam Khomeini's tlukOmat-i 151imi became the manifesto 
for the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 420 and the success of this revolution had 
become the touchstone for the Imam's political scheme in which the call for 
Islamic unity became the cornerstone. Since then, the issue of Islamic unity has 
become the main theme of the Imam's frequent speeches that were publicly 
delivered. For example, he admitted that both Shi'ites and Sunnis had been 
involved in preventing the unity of the Islamic umma in a speech addressed to 
the Muslims of the world on July 11,1979 in which he declared 
417 Sayyid Ayy5d Jam5l al-Din declared this in a recorded interview with A]-Arabiya Satellite Channel; the interview was 
broadcast on Friday 14.12.2007 and published on its website at the URL 
<http: //www. alarabiya. net/programs/2007/12/16/43008. html> 
418 Imam Khomeini, al-tiuk6ma al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kit5b Kh5nah Buzurq, 1981), 93. 
419 bid, 62. 
420 Hamid Enayat, 'Iran Khumayni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of Jurisconsult', ' in James P. Piscatori (ed. ), 151am in 
the Political Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 164. 
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We confess that Shi'ite and Sunni brothers, because of the evil hands 
involved, whether intentionally or unintentionally, were unable to 
establish the unity which Muslims must have when confronting atheists 
and polytheists. 421 
In another speech delivered on July 19, Imam Khomeini deemed the troubles 
that the Islamic countries have been experiencing have resulted in the disunity of 
the Islamic nation; he affirms 
If Muslims would act in accordance with the Command of God Almighty, 
""Hold fast to the covenant of God and do not be divided" (3: 103), all 
their difficulties, their political, social and economic difficulties would 
have been resolved and no power would be able to counter them. But 
unfortunately, due to negligence of some, the inattention of others, and 
the ignorance of still others, they have remained deprived of this facL As 
long as this Divine Command is not realized, Muslims must expect (to be 
faced by) further difficulties. 422 
Also, the Imam warned on December 27,1980 of the conspiracy of the 
superpowers and their domestic lackeys to preserve the racial break up of the 
unity of the Islamic nation which they had brought about against Allah's will. He 
illustrates it thus: 
The plan of the great powers and their affiliates in Islamic countries is to 
divide up the various Muslim groups that God the Almighty has joined in 
brotherhood and has called the believers to brotherhood. (The plan) is 
to divide one from the other, to create hostility among them in the name 
of the Turkish, Kurdish, Arab or Persian nation. This is in direct 
contravention with the course of Islam and the course of the Holy Quran. 
421 Imam Khomeini, Excerpts of Imam Khomeini's Speeches on the Unity of Muslims, (London: Embassy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, n. a), 7. 
422 ibid, 7. 
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All Muslims are brothers and equal with each other. None of them 
should be divided from the other. They should all fall under the banner 
of Islam, under the banner of monotheism. Those who sow discord 
among Muslims in the name of ethnic groups and nationalism are the 
host of Satan, the supporters of the great powers and the opponents of 
the Holy Quran. 423 
However, the Imam's serious inclination was ultimately accomplished when he 
clearly articulated and firmly established the aims and means of his political 
scheme in the newly composed constitution of the IR in 1979. 
5.4.1. THE WILAYAT AL-FAQiH (THE JURIST GUARDIANSHIP) 
It has been declared in the Iranian Constitution that the founding of the Islamic 
state under the leadership of the Wiljyt al-Faqýh has been designated to be 
implemented not only in the Iranian Republic but also beyond its borders. In its 
preamble, the constitution stresses 
When the tyrant was at the peak of his tyranny and control over the 
people, Imam Khomeini introduced the concept of Islamic government 
based on the notion of the Mandate of the Clergy, which gave a new, 
distinguished and harmonic motivation to Muslims and paved the way for 
a genuine ideological Islamic struggle. This idea [the Islamic 
government under the Mandate of the Clergy] consolidated the 
revolutionary efforts of those devoted Muslims who were fighting both at 
home and abroad. 424 
423 bid, 10-11. 
424 Nifin A. Mus'ad, 5un ' al-Qarik 5 Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya-a1-kaniyya (Beir-ut: Markaz Dirýsýt al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 274. 
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The concept of wiliyat al-faqih had been the hallmark of Imam Khomeini, s 
political dogma that he called for from his exile in Najaf in 1970 and which is 
inculcated and firmly established in the newly composed constitution of the IR of 
425 1979. Article (5) asserts the significant mission of the waff al-faqih in 
leadership of the umma during the occultation of the Imam. 
During the occultation of the Waff al- `A. ýr (may God hasten his 
reappearance) [the hidden Mahdi], the leadership of the umma is to 
devolve upon the just and pious person who is fully aware of the 
circumstances of his age, courageous, resourceful, possessed of 
administrative ability,. acknowledged by the majority of the people and 
admired for his leadership, and he will assume the responsibilities of this 
office in accordance with article 107.426 
The wiljyat al-faqih, as the supreme position, occupies a position at the peak of 
the pyramids of political and executive authorities in the IR according to article 
(57) that declares 
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under 
the supervision of the religious leader and the leadership of the Umma, in 
accordance with the forthcoming articles of this constitution. These 
powers are independent of each other. 427 
Accordingly, chapter 8 in the constitution is dedicated to demonstrate and 
explicate the theory of wiliyat-i faqih and elaborate the prerequisite conditions of 
the wafffaqih (the supreme leader) and his authorities as well as the role of the 
425 The Iranian constitution of 1979 was adopted on 24th October 1979, effective since 3rd December, 1979 and 
amended on 28 July, 1989. 
426 ibid, 78. 
427 The collective leadership was cancelled in the amendment of 1989; see Nifin A. Mus'ad, ibid, 78-9. 
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council of experts in nominating the waff faqft Clause 1 of article 107 
emphasises 
After the venerated source of imitation and the greatest leader of the 
"universal" Islamic Revolution and the founder of the Iranian Islamic 
Republic, His Eminence Ayatollah al-Uzmj Imam Khomeini, who the vast 
majority of people acknowledged for his leadership, the nomination of 
the [new] leader will be entrusted to the experts who were elected by 
the people. Those experts shall study the cases of all qualified faqahi 
according to articles 105 and 109 and elect for the leadership among 
them the most learned in jurisprudential doctrine or social and political 
issues or he who has obtained the endorsement or prominently enjoys 
one of the characteristics mentioned in article 109; otherwise, the 
experts shall appoint three or five fuqhj and introduce them to the 
populace as the members of the council of leadership. The elected 
leader or the council of leadership will fulfil the guardianship (wiliyat al- 
Amt) and carry all the related responsibilities. 428 
Additionally,, article 109 indicates the requirements the wafffagih must possess: 
The necessary scientific competence and piety for Aj (the ability to issue 
legal opinions) and MaYi`iyya (source of emulation), political and social 
efficiency, courage, and sufficient administrative ability for the 
leadersh ip. 429 
Article 110 emphasises the functions and authorities of the supreme leader as 
follows: 
I 428 bid, 80; also see $adr al-Din al-QaWinchi, al-Madhab as-5iyjsif1 al-Islim (Beirut: D5r al-'Aowa, 1985), 214. 
429 Nifin A. Mus'ad, Sun ' al-Qanir F/ Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya-a1-IranJyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir6sýt al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 304. 
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1. To draw up the general policies for the regime of the Iranian Islamic 
Republic after consultation with MajA5 Tashl(N5 Maslahat-l' Nizim (the 
Council for Defining the Interests of the Regime). 
2. To supervise the execution of the general policies of the regime. 
3. To issue the order for a general referendum. 
4. To hold the general leadership of the army. 
5. To declare war and peace. 
6. To appoint, dismiss and accept the resignation of: 
a). the fuqahj of the council for preserving the constitution 
b). the supreme executive of the judicial system 
c). chief of the general staff 
d). the elected President of the Republic 
From the aforementioned articles, the wiliyat al-faqih seems to be a smart 
resolution to escape the historical polemic of the contradiction between the 
concept of intizir (waiting for the return of the Mahdi to establish a ust and 
legitimate government) and the prerequisite of the establishment of the Islamic 
state that will prepare for the Mahdil's return. This practice of intizir has 
paralysed Shi'i political jurisprudence for centurieS430 in which the Shi'ite fuqahi 
have been isolating themselves and their community from any direct involvement 
in state polity no matter what the sectarian orientation of the de facto authority 
in awaiting the return of the hidden Imam. 
Furthermore, there are a number of concrete clues to strengthen the belief that 
Imam Khomeini's concept of wiliyat-i faqih is an authentic attempt to restore the 
political unity of the Islamic umma by the revival of the Sunni notion of the 
430 Colin Turner, St711 wai6ng for the Hidden Imam; ', 41-2. 
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caliphate in which there is a real possibility that the post of al-wa / 1-faq[h would /- a 
be assumed by a Sunni faqih, due to the fact that the Sunnis will compose the 
majority of the population of the Imam's intended Islamic federal state. For 
example, qualified Iranian Sunnis are eligible to run for the election of Majlis-l- 
Oubari (the Council of Experts) which is in charge of electing, observing the 
performance, and discharging the waff faqýh; according to Shaykh Mohammad 
Isýýq Madani, the Iranian President Advisor for Sunni Affairs, there are three 
Sunni members representing the Iranian Sunnis in the Council of Experts. 431 
Also, one of the grand Iranian Sunni ulami and the Imam of Jum "a of the city of 
Saqaz, Shaykh Abd al-Qýidir Z5hidf. had represented the people of the Kurdistan 
Governorate in the Council of Experts until his death at the age of 100 in 
2005.432 
The wiliyat-i faqih appears to be virtually identical to the traditional Sunni 
Caliphate in terms of the exigency, functions and qualifications of the caliph and 
in which the issue of leadership has become the key to unity rather than being a 
historical component of discord between Sunnism and Shiism. In other words, 
the concept of the wiliyat-i faqih seems to be an offspring of a dialectic marriage 
between the Shi'i Imamate and Sunni Caliphate that alternatively entailed by the 
ale facto absence of both original notions in modern Islamic polity. Indeed, the 
abovementioned required conditions of the wafffaqih had already received the 
consensus among the Sunni ulami as the prerequisites for the position of the 
Khalifa (caliph). For example, the Sunni faqih al-MawardT provides all those 
i a. 433 qualifications required for the caliph in his work al-Ahkim al-SultinyY, The 
link between Imam Khomeini's wiliyat-i /aq[h with the Twelver Shi'ism does not 
431 http: //www. fnoor. com/fnl739. htm. 
432 Al-Wi5q Newspaper, December 21,2005. 
433 Abi al-Hasan Ali ibn Hab"ib al-Basri al-Baghdýdii al-Mawýrcff, al-Ahkim al-Sult; ýniyya f, al-W11jyjt al-Dinlyya, eidiL 
Kh5lid al -'Alami (Beirut: D5r al-Kit5b al-'Arab-i, 1990), 31-32; see also, In Khald0n, the Muqaddlmah, trans. Franz 
Rosenthal, edit. N. 1. Dawood (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), 154-60. 
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exceed the name while its contents do totally reflect Sunni political 
jurisprudence. 
Additionally, there are obvious differences in the prerequisites between the office 
of the wafffaqih and the office of the President in which the qualifications of the 
former make it available to all eligible Muslim fuqahj regardless to their sects, as 
was illustrated above, while the conditions of the latter restricted it to Iranian 
nationality and Twelver Shi'ism. Significantly,, among the several conditions 
required for the Presidency of the Iranian Islamic Republic, clause I of article 
115 insists that he should be of Iranian origin and hold Iranian citizenship, and 
clause 5 asserts that he should be a believer and devoted to the principles of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the official sect (madhab) of the country (Twelver 
Shi'ite). 434 
Beside, it unchallengeable that the condition of the MJYi`iYYa is the only aspect 
that gives the office of the waff faqih its Shi'i characteristic; however, a 
discussion of the draft of 1979 revealed that Imam Khomeini strongly opposed 
adding the Marji "iyya to the conditions of the waff faqih, although he failed to 
435 
enforce his view. He prepared for this by issuing fatwas that emphasised the 
significance of the political qualification on the leader's character, which led to 
the resignation of the Imam's designated successor Ayatollah Munta? ir-1 who 
lacked to this qualification. 436 The Imam's wish was finally achieved in the 
amendment to the constitution in 1989 when he recommended the abolition of 
this condition in a letter he sent on 9th May, 1989 to the special commission 
entrusted with the amendment of the constitution. Additionally, the council of 
434 Nifin A. Mus'ad, ýun ' al-Qatir ff Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya-a1-Irafjyya (Beirut: Markaz Dirýýt al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 307. 
435 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, ', The Middle Eastem Joumal 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 206. 
436 Ayatollah Muntazin's dismissal and Imam Khomeini's fatwaswill be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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experts in charge of drafting the constitution of 1979 turned down on 7 
November, 1979 an article suggesting that "the leader and the members of the 
leadership council of the Islamic Republic must be Iranian citizens and [resident] 
in Iran. tA37 
It is true that article 12 affirms that Twelver Shi'ism is the official sect, and this 
article is unalterable forever any circumstances; however, this article has existed 
in the Iranian constitution since it was first introduced by Shaykh FaOlullah Nu-r-1 
in the constitution of 1905. Also,, it clearly states that this article is designated to 
be confined to Iran but not the Islamic Republic not to mention that this article 
emphasises total respect for the other Islamic sects which includes jyanafl, 
Shjfl "if Milikif t1anbaff, and Zqyalif and the rights of their followers to freely 
practice their rituals according ly. 438 
Finally, Imam Khomeini clearly declared in his political will that his intention was 
to create an Islamic federation to include all the independent Islamic Republics in 
the Islamic world. 439 Such an objective is firmly established in article 11 which 
clearly declares that "'Muslims are one nation according to the Holy Qur "an, and 
the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must establish all its general 
policies on the basis of the solidarity and unity of the Islamic peoples and 
continue efforts to achieve political, economical and cultural unity in the Islamic 
437 Quoted in Said Amir Adomand, 'Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ' in 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalism and ffie State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 150. 
438 Nifin A. Mus'ad, Sun ' al-Qafiýr fi Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya al-Iraniyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir5s6t al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 283. 
439 Imam Khomeini, Aaffb Wagyj. - wa. 5iyWt nimiy-e siyj5i 'ilihi, edit. ýujatol Isl5m Thabillý Aflah 'Ari-Z5cla (Tehran: 
Intish5rcit FardOsii, 2002), 22-3. 
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World. "'440 For that reason, the designation of articles 5 and 12 perhaps aims to 
preserve the Shi'i identity of Iran. 
Above and beyond, the appellative of Rahbar (Arabic Murshia) that Imam 
Khomeini opted for as the official title of the supreme leader perhaps created 
another link to modern Sunni political thought. The General-Guide (al-Murshid 
al-'Amm) is a title that was invented by Imam ýasan al-Banný the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. It was said that Imam Khomeini praised al- 
Bann5's role in reviving the call for Islamic unity, and he refused to be called the 
General-Guide for it should be preserved for the first inventor, al-Bann5 . 
44 1 After 
the success of the Islamic Revolution, the IR named a public square Maydin-i 
Imam-i Shahid Uasan al-Banný in commemoration of al-Banný. 
5.4.2. THE PROTECTION OF THE MUSTAI? 'AFiN 
To present the humanitarian dimension and to emphasise the universal message 
of Islam, Clause16 of article 3 affirms that one of the main aims of the IR is to 
organise its foreign policy according to Islamic criteria and fraternal 
commitments towards all Muslims and aimed at full protection of the oppressed 
people of the world (mustapl "afi-n). 442 Article 154 asserts that the IR of Iran 
supports the legitimate struggle of the mustao "afi-n (the oppressed) against the 
mustakbirin (the arrogant) at any place in the world while not interfering in the 
440 Nifin A. Mus'ad, 5un ' al-Qank /T Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arablyya al-Iraniyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir5sýit al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 283. 
441 This is asserted in an interview with al-Watan, the Kuwaiti newspaper, by the Consultant al-Dimirdýish al-'Uq6li, vihc-) 
was one of al-Bann6s disciples who was converted to Shiism and the leader of the Shi'i community in Egypt, the 
interview was published on 20th September, 2007; to review it check the URL 
http: //www. alwatan. com. kw/Default. aspx? Mg Did= 546730&pageId =3 5 (last visit on 8.12.2007 at 11-00 AM). 
442 Nifin A. Mus'ad, ýun ' al-Qanýr /T Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya al-lraniyya (Beirut: Markaz Diras<R al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 281-2. 
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443 internal affairs of other countries. However, who are these mu5taýf "afin? And 
why is such significance given to acknowledge their rights and protection in the 
constitution of IR? 
Noticeably, the term mustapf"afln (singular: mustaV`aý is derived from the 
Arabic root pfa "f, and the passive form of this term could be technically used as 
an equivalent to the other Arabic word mazldmin (singular: ma,, -10m); however, 
the former has replaced the latter, which Imam Khomeini had used in ! Yukt7mat-i 
Islami, in the his political discourse; that could be deemed additional evidence for 
Imam Khomeini"s efforts to escape the Shii template in which the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution was placed by its enemies, since the term ma., 710ml-n has been 
historically associated with the Shi'i characteristic of ma, 7-10miya tA hl al-Bayt -the 
unjust treatment of the Prophet's household after his death in which Imam Ali 
and his descendants were deprived of their right to the caliphate, Fatima, the 
Prophet's daughter and Ali's wife, not only miscarried her son, Mulýsin, due to 
mistreatment by the so-called enemies of AN al-Bayt but she was also robbed of 
her right to inherit from her father when the first caliph confiscated a fadak, a 
ranch that the Shi'ites claimed the Prophet had granted to his daughter during 
his lifetime. 
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, it has become one of 
the effective slogans,, and it has been widely used in Iranian political 
propaganda. Despite this fact,, some scholars still seem to be confused when 
they refer to the term mustapf"afln to denote an un-Islamic influence on the 
Islamic Revolution. Fuller and Franke argue: 
His [Imam Khomeini's] championship of the mustaýl "afi-n (the oppressed) 
against the mustakbirin (the arrogant) at a general level reflected the 
443 bid, 315. 
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radical ideology of Ali Shari'ati, who in turn was influenced by the 
concepts of other Third World ideologists such as Franz Fanon in a 
broader call for a struggle of the Third World to shake off the forces of 
imperialism and the exploiting West. 444 
The term mustagf "afln seems to be more significant in practice than maddlOmin In 
due to the Qur"inic application that grants legitimacy, according to God's 
commands,, to the Islamic state to intervene and protect Muslims whenever and 
wherever they suffer from injustice and oppression; for example, verse 4: 75 
asserts: 
And what reasons have you not to fight in the way of Allah, and of the 
weak among the men and women and the children, who say: Our Lord, 
take us out of this town, whose people are oppressors, and grant us from 
Thee a friend, and grant us from thee a helper. 44' 
The verse describes Muslim women, children and elderly people that had lived 
among the infidels in Mecca and emphasises the divine demands urging the 
newly established Muslim state in Medina to fight the infidels of Mecca to free 
their weak Muslim brothers and sisters and put and end to their suffering. 
Initially, Imam Khomeini deeply comprehended the influence of the West in the 
Islamic World in which the Western superpowers are indirectly ruling Islamic 
countries via their domestic lackeys. Under such circumstances, the Imam 
anticipated that any attempt to change the status quo would not be tolerated. 
Once an attempt succeeded in any country, that country would face dire 
consequences that would lead to the total isolation and freezing out of such a 
444 Graham E. Fuller and Rend R. Franke, The Arab Shia: the Forgotten Mu5llms (London: MacMillan, 1999), 75-77. 
445 The Holy Qur'jn, 4: 75. 
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turncoat country, and Iran would be no exception. Hence, he alerted the nation 
to this in his speech on the eve of the Iranian New Year of 1980 when he openly 
stated 
... all the superpowers and all powers have risen to destroy us. If we 
remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. We 
should clearly settle our accounts with the powers and superpowers and 
should demonstrate to them, despite all the grave difficulties that we 
have, that we shall confront the world with our ideol ogy. 446 
5.4.3. THE IMAMS OTHER ACTIVITIES IN PROMOTING ISLAMIC 
UNITY 
Imam Khomeini believed that the revival of Islamic unity is a duty of all Muslims, 
governments and individuals: "I hope to God that all Muslims will be awakened 
and united and become brothers and stop all clashes among themselves. 
Governments should stop raising disputes and people should be united. n447 
Nevertheless, he realised that al-wýala al-. Tslamiyya (Islamic unity) would not be 
achieved without active participation and continual discussion among Muslims. 
Therefore, he launched several additional initiatives to activate the involvement 
of all Muslims from all over the world in this process. First of all, he firmly 
instituted Islamic unity in the IR constitution as one of the major aims the 
country would strive to attain: Article 3. for instance, states several objectives 
that the IR is committed to achieving among which is clause 15, about the 
expansion and strengthening the Islamic brotherhood and collective cooperation 
amongst all people. Additionally, article 11 declares that according to the 
Qur "inic verse that clearly states " Your [Muslims] nation is one nation and I am 
your God, thereupon worship med', Muslims are considered one nation; hence, 
446 Merip Reports, June, 1980,22. 
447 Shaykh Na'im Qýisim, "al-$ahwa al-Isl5miyya fi al-'Alam al-Mu'5ýir wa dawr al-Taqnb ff Ta'miqih5, " edit. Sayyid 
Jal5l Mir 'Aq5y, in al-tiuk6ma min W#hat Nazr al-Madhihib al-Islamlyya (al-Majma' al-'Alami li al-Taqnb bayn al- 
Mathýihib al-Isl5miyyah: Tehran, 1411 H-Q), 438. 
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the Government of the Iranian Islamic Republic on the base of the Islamic 
solidarity and unity of the Muslim people and continue the efforts to achieve the 
political, economical and cultural unity of the Islamic world. 448 Furthermore, 
article 12, as stated earlier, clearly emphasises that "other Islamic doctrines that 
consist of tianafi-, Shifi"i, Miliki, tlanbak, and Zayydiare totally respectful, and 
their followers are free to practice their rituals according to their doctrines" 
although it declares that the official doctrine of the IR is the Ja "fan- 'Ithna 
rAshri449 
In addition, Imam Khomeini adopted several measures to highlight his call for 
Islamic unity, which not only heavily activated his religious authority but also by 
issuing religious fatwas (legal opinions) pushed forward Islamic unity and also 
encouraged his close disciples and assistants to initiate and conduct activities 
that might serve this purpose. 
5.4.3.1. RESTORATION OF THE JUM'A (FRIDAY PRAYER) 
The Jum "a prayer is one of the greatest Islamic rituals which Muslims perform at 
Friday noon every week and in which they gather to listen to a sermon given by 
a qualified cleric. The significance of the Jum 'a prayer is emphasised in the 
Qur"in in which a chapter is dedicated to elucidate the aims and objective of 
this prayer and to urge believers to maintain the performance of this great ritual. 
The topics of the Jum "a prayer are varied and cover all aspects of Muslim life: 
religiously, politically,, economically, culturally, and socially. For that reason, 
Jum "a prayer has traditionally been a suitable time to discuss any significant 
issues affecting the Islamic community. 
448 Nifin A. Mus'ad, . 5un 
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Yet, the Jum "a had been changed from an occasion of unity in which all 
Muslims, regardless to their sectarian differences, were gathering to pray for one 
God, in one place, at a given time, facing one direction and reciting the same 
Qur'jn, to a point of dispute, when the Twelver Shi'ite had suspended this 
prayer after the occultation under the pretext that performing it and appointing 
its leading clerics, were exclusive rights of the hidden Imam. Thus, it had 
become one of the major differences between Shiites and Sunnis for which the 
latter have accused the former of being mubtadi "in (sing. mubtadi ý, committing 
innovation. 
Imam Khomeini, however, in his work al-lýlukOma al-Islimiyya, blames the 
suspension of the -7um"a for bringing about an atmosphere of weakness, 
corruption and failure; therefore, he points to the necessity of Jum"a of its 
restoration: 
If we had continued to perform the Jumra till nowadays, with its lectures 
and zeal, with its spirit and its unlimited interests, we would not have 
come to this situation you see now. We should make every effort to 
resurrect such meetings and utilise them [the meetings] for guidance, 
education, enlightenment and leadership towards righteousness and 
success. 450 
Consequently, Imam Khomeini designated a study for the Jum "a prayer in his 
jurisprudential work Taýrlr al-wasfla (the Delineation of the Means), in which he 
elaborated the significance of the Jum ca prayer, its prerequisites, who should 
perform it, and when exactly it should be performed. 451 
450 Imam Khomeini, al-tiukima al-Islimiyya (Tehran: Kit5b Khýnah Buzurq, 1981), 126. 
451 Imam Khomeini, Taýrir al-Wasl7a, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Munta? ar li lttibý'a wa an-Nashr wa a[-Tawzi', 1985), 209- 
18. 
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The IR, for instance, hosted the conference of the -7uma prayer Imams in 
Tehran in April 1984 when Islamic unity was the key issue of the discussion. 
Remarkably, several Imams representing different Islamic sects from all Islamic 
countries attended the conference and alternately led the prayers during the 
conference. 452 
After that, four conferences were held in Tehran during Imam Khomeini's life in 
which different issues related to Islamic unity were discussed. For example, the 
first conference was dedicated to Islamic unity while Imam Khomeini and Islamic 
unity again were addressed in the second conference. The third conference 
shed light on the principles of Islamic unity, and the efforts of al-Taqrl-b among 
the Islamic sects was the focus of discussion in the fourth conference. 453 In 
addition, the Organization of Islamic Information, charged with propagating 
Islamic unity issued two magazines, al-Tawýid (Theism) and al-waýdahh al- 
Islamiyya (Islamic Unity) to serve its goals. 
454 
5.4.3.2. Legitimacy of Congregational Prayers led by Sunni Imams 
Imam Khomeini issued a fatwa, a religious opinion, in a letter to his 
representatives on the occasion of the hajj (annual pilgrimage) of 1979 in Mecca. 
He urged both the Iranian Shi'ites and all other Shi'ites around the world to 
participate in Falit al-Jami "a (congregational prayer) which were led by Sunni 
Imams and practice the Hajj rituals according to the Sunni jurists' instructions. 
Such a practice had been widely prohibited by Shi'i ulami in the past - among 
them the Imam himself. 455 For that reason, the Shi'ite had to either pray 
452 Fahmi Huw-id-i, Iran min al-DR&I (Cairo: Markaz al-AWrn lit-Tarjarnah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 337-8. 
453 Sayyid JaW Mir 'Aq5y, al-Mayma' al-'Alamf# al-Taqrlb bayn al-Mathihib al-Islimiyyah: Ahdjfih wa Manhaph wa 
Munjazitih (Tehran: Fajr al-Isl5m, 2004), 33-4. 
454 Fahmi Huwidi, Iran min al-DRNI (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahr5m lit-Tadamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 337. 
455 bid, 335-6. 
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individually, or they could participate in -7ami 
"a prayers according to taqiyya 
practice (the expedient concealment conventions). When he issued his fatwa, 
Imam Khomeini was asked if it was a sort of traditional taqiyya. He explained 
that he had not implemented the traditional concept of taqiyya, but his fatwa 
was a brief aphorism to propagate mutual accordance among all Muslims and 
abandon any sort of antagonistic attitude that had divided them and been the 
cause of disputes amongst them for ages, especially in such a sacred occasion, 
the Hajj. Imam Khomeini claimed that there are two types of taqiyya: the 
taqiyya "ýdpýNrjri, the exigency expedient concealment of the convention, and 
taqiyya mudJr5t[,, the considerate concealment of the conviction. He elucidated 
that the former, the traditional and popular one among Shiites, was used in a 
situation in which it could jeopardise the follower's life, property, or honour if he 
exposed his bona fide convictions, while the latter was used to show deference 
and respect to the other sects of Islam, particularly the Sunni, for the sake of 
Islamic brotherhood and un ity. 456 
The significance of this fatwa lies in the fact that it is considered as a shifting 
point in the Shiites' attitude towards Sunnis. Since it was the first time in the 
historical dispute between the Shi'i and Sunni sects of Islam that a high ranking 
Shi'i cleric, such as Ayatollah al- "Iýzmj Imam Khomeini, had called upon the 
Shi'i public to join their Sunni brothers in the Jami"a prayer, which had been 
one of the major sources of dispute. Thus, it appears to be a defection from the 
traditional fatwas that had the consensus of the Shi'ite ulam5, who had 
regarded the prayer of a Shi'i as invalid if conducted by a Sunni Imam unless 
he 
practised taqiyya; in this case the prayer should be repeated individually. Imam 
Khomeini's fatwa aimed to incorporate the Shi'i community with the rest of the 
456 Abdul-Karim Bi-Azarshirazi, Risil-i Nawin : Ibidat wa KhJds, ýzi- tijpvi Fatiýwf Hazrat Ayatollah al-'Uzfrlj 
Imam 
Xhome#71, vol. I (Tehran: Daftar Nashr Farhang Islami, 1376 H. S. ), 265-70. 
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Islamic body by removing one of the key issues that had isolated them from the 
other Muslims for centuries. 
This fatwa also conveyed a changing pattern in Imam Khomeini's views. In his 
early work, Kashf al-asrjr, he recognised just a single type of taqiyya as "when a 
man says something opposite to reality, or he does something against sharia 
(the Islamic Laws) to protect his life, honour, or properties. A57 This is the same 
compulsory one, "iddtiriri taqiyya that is understood from the Qur'jnic verse: 
"Let not the believers take disbelievers for their friends in preference to 
believers. Whosoever doeth that hath no connection with Allah unless (it be) 
that ye but guard yourselves against them, taking (as it were) secudtyý Allah 
biddeth you beware (only) of Himself Unto Allah Is the JoUrneylnVA58 and 
"Whosoever disbelieveth In Allah alter his belief - save him who is forced thereto 
and whose heal-t Is still content with the Faith - but whosoever fl'ndeth ease In 
disbelief: On them Is wrath from Allah. Theirs will be an awful doom, "" to 
prove the legitimacy of practicing such a Taqiyya. In addition, Imam Khomeini 
suggested a situation of a Shi'i person performing the wudL7 -', ablution, among 
Sunnis as an example of when the taqiyya should be put into practice 460 . 
However, his work did not mention the other type of considerate one, taqiyya 
mudiriti When comparing the two opinions, it seems obvious that there is only 
one type of taqiyya, which is the "Odtiriri one, but it was modified by Imam 
Khomeini for the sake of Islamic ecumenism. 
Nevertheless, Imam Khomeini's fatwa paved the way to the restoration of the 
Jum "a prayer officially in all Iran, in spite of the opposition of the other fuqahj in 
457 Ayatullah Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrjr, trans. Mohammad al-Binclan (Amman: D5r 'Ammýir, 1988), 147. 
458 The Holy Qur'jn 3: 28. 
459 The Holy Qur'jn 16: 106. 
460 Ayatullah Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrik, trans. Mohammad al-Binclýri, (Amman: D5r 'Amm5r, 1988), 147-8. 
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the holy city of Najaf, led by Ayatollah al-Khu-i who adhered to the traditional 
opinion, according to which the -7um 
"a prayer is prohibited in the absence of the 
hidden Imam . 
461 The Jum "a prayer having been abandoned for centuries had 
resulted in the Shiites being accused of heresy by other Islamic sects, especially 
the Sunnis. Again, Imam Khomeini succeeded in removing another hurdle that 
could have impeded the process of Islamic unity. 
5.4.3.3. The Image of the Rishidi (rightly-guided) Caliphs in the 
Iranian Schools'Texts 
On the pretext of usurping the right of Imam Ali,, the cousin's and the Prophet's 
son-in-law! in succession, the Shi'ites have cursed the prophet's companions, 
mainly the three Sunni Rishidi (rig htly-guided) caliphs: Abu Bakr al-$id-iq, Umar 
ibn al-Khatt5b and Uthm5n ibn 'Aff5n and consequently rejected the 
righteousness of their caliphate. That has been one of the major sources 
feeding the disputes between the Sunni and Shi'ite sects of Islam. Imam 
Khomeini had originally followed the same route and his early work Kashf al- 
a5rar, is full of accusations and criticisms regarding the Rashidi caliphs, 
particularly Abu Bakr al-$idiq and Umar ibn al-Khatt5b. For instance, Imam 
Khomeini selected some phrases from Imam Ali's work, Nahj al-balighah, to 
emphasise Imam's resentment of the Rashicli caliphs due to their usurping of 
power in relation to the succession. 462 Moreover, he pointed to Sunnism as a 
false doctrine established during the meeting of Saqifa-t ban! Salida, 463 when Abu 
Bakir al-$id-iq was elected by the majority of the Prophet's companions, in the 
absence of Ali ibn Ab_1 Talib, to be the prophet"s successor. In addition, Imam 
Khomeini claimed that Abu Bakr, the first caliph, violated the Qur"inic 
instructions on different occasions; as we have already mentioned, depriving 
461 Fahmi Huwid-i, Iran min al-CIRNI (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahr5m lit-Tarjamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 337. 
462 Imam Khomeini, Kashf al-Avir, trans. Mohammad al-Bind5ri, (Amman: D5r 'Ammýr, 1988), 186-7. 
463 ibid, 193. 
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Fatima,, the Prophet's daughter, of her rightful inheritance. 464 Furthermore, 
Imam Khomeini held that the second caliph, Umar ibn al-Khaqab, disobeyed the 
holy Qur 'in when he prevented temporary marriage, although God allowed it in 
the holy QUr -)jn. 465 
However, the attitudes towards the Sunni sect in general and the Rishidl-caliphs 
in particular positively changed after the Iranian revolution in accordance with 
Imam Khomeini's new tendency for rapprochement between the Sunni and Shi, i 
sects of Islam for the sake of Islamic unity. Such a change becomes clearly 
noticeable in the schools' textbooks in Iran dealing with Islamic history and 
culture. FahmT Huwayd-i reviewed eleven such textbooks that were assigned to 
different grades in the Iranian educational system after the revolution; he 
noticed that Sunni intellectuals had composed the textbooks of the Sunni 
dominating provinces, so they corresponded to the Sunni version of Islam. As a 
result, these texts honour the Rishiblicaliphs and lay stress on their efforts and 
achievements. In addition, the texts of the Shi'ite majority areas deal 
respectfully with Rishiblicaliphs although they deeply venerate the Imams and 
assert the Imams' right to succeed the Prophet. 466 Also, the school texts stress 
the significance of the unity of the Islamic nation in several lessons and the 
strong links that Iranian people have with the Islamic nation. According to 
Ghularn Hadad, the book of social instructions for the fourth grade, published in 
1374 A. H., had a lesson entitled al-umma al-Islimiyya (the Islamic Nation) which 
it stated that 
.. the Islamic nation is composed of all 
Muslims around the world who all 
believe in one God, the Prophet Mohammad, the holy Qur'ýin, and they 
all pray towards the same direction, the Ka'ba; ... Muslims in Iran are an 
464 ibid, 132. 
465 ibid, 13 6. 
466 For more details refer to Fahmi Huwidi's valuable field study in his work, Iran min al-Diftl 
(Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrým 
lit-Tarjamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 339-51. 
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indivisible part of the Islamic nation and we [Iranians] seek to strengthen 
our relations with all Muslims around the world. 6' 
The significance of such a step is not only to alleviate the frequent sectarian 
clashes in Iran but also to increase the solidity of the Iranian nation by extracting 
the seeds of hatred and dispute among the other Muslims, not to mention the 
ultimate goal of developing a new moderate generation in which the conception 
of Islamic unity is steady and deep-rooted. 
5.4.3.4. The Week of Islamic Unity 
For centuries, the date of the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad, mawlid al- 
Nabi, has been another example of the differences between Sunni and Shi, i 
Islam, since the former believe the Prophet was born in the 12th of Rabi' al- 
Awwa/according to the Islamic calendar while the latter suggest the 17 th of the 
month. Ayatollah Munta&i, the vice and nominated successor of Imam 
Khomeini, proposed in November 1981 to take advantage of such a sacred 
occasion for all Muslims to emphasise Islamic unity rather than it being a point of 
dispute. Therefore he called for an annual celebration during the period from 
the 12 th to the17 th of Rabi" al-Awwal, the week of Islamic un ity. 468 Accordingly, 
the IR held the first week of Islamic unity in January 1982, when speeches were 
delivered and seminars were held to remind all Muslims that "they have one 
religion, one Holy Book and one Prophet, and whosoever highlights the 
differences among Muslims is an enemy who is mitigating against their general 
-A69 interests of the Islamic umma., Still, this unifying initiative was regarded with 
467 Ghul5m A. ýad5d, The Image of Arabs in Me Iranian Schools' Texts, ( Beirut: the Centre for Arabian Unity Studies, 
1996), 288. 
468 Ayatollah Munta? iri's memoirs at http: //www. aImontazed. net. setar. html. 
469 From an interview of Ayatollah Munta4iCi with Fahmi Huwid-i, see Fahmi Huw-idi, Iran min al-Dikhd (Cairo: '. 1arkaz al- 
Ahr5m lit-Taoamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 338. 
208 
suspicion by some of their Sunni compatriots who accused the Iranian authorities 
of using this week to preach Shi'ism in the Sunni areas. 470 Other scholars 
placed this initiative in the context of a sectarian challenge and enmity between 
the Shi'ite fuqahj and the Saudi Wahhýibfl school, since it was introduced shortly 
after a fatwa issued by the Saudi Mufti, Shaykh Abd Al-'Az-iz ibn Baz, a well- 
known anti-Shi'ism WahhýbT cleric, "pronouncing the widespread custom of 
celebrating the Prophet's birthday a heretical innovation. 1,471 
5.4.3.5. Imam Khomeini and the Palestine Question 
In spite of the religious status of Jerusalem for all Muslims and the anger and 
bitterness that Muslims around the world expressed in response to the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948, the Iranian regime of Mohammad Reza Shah 
challenged the feeling of Muslims and officially established diplomatic ties with 
the State of Israel on 18th March, 1950 and Iran became the second Islamic 
country after Turkey to take such a step. However, the Shah soon after 
announced a cut in these diplomatic ties and closed the Israeli embassy because 
of the resistance of the members of parliament during the Mosadiq's cabinet and 
public rejection. 472 
Yet, the Shah announced in 1960 that Iran had acknowledged the State of Israel 
for eleven years, and the withdrawal of his representative from Israel did not 
mean any change in relations between the two countries. 473 The secret relations 
between the Shah's regime and Israel continued, and diplomatic cooperation was 
in progress on different levels. Politically, the Shah convened with several Israeli 
470 Fahmi Huwidi, Iran min al-Dýýkhil (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahr5m lit-Tadamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 355. 
471 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century- Me Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and 
RestraInt, trans. Joseph Greenman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 381-2. 
472 Amin Muýtafa-, Iran Wa falasp5n bayna "Ahdl-n (Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arabi 11 al-Abhýth wa at-Tawthiq, 1996), 30. 
473 Abdurahm5n Mad, at- Tasallul al-Isra 'ITI fikyiý (Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arabi ri al-Abhath wa at-Tawthiq, 1967), 40. 
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officials on different occasions. For example, he separately met Isaac Rabin and 
Moshe Dayan three times and once with Shimon Perez and Menachem Begin. 47-ý 
Economically, Iran and Israel reached a petroleum agreement which was signed 
by the Shah and David Ben-Gurion in December, 1961. The Shah not only 
provided Israel with its needs of Iranian petroleum but he also resisted and 
criticised Arab attempts to use petroleum as a political instrument to neutralise 
the West in the Arab-Israel dispute in the early seventies. Commercially, the 
exchange of trade between Iran and Israel grew twelve fold during the period 
from 1958 to 1963, and Iran became the third major Asian importer of Israeli 
goods in 1967 for which el-'Al, the Israeli national airlines, ran several weekly 
flights to Tehran. Militarily, Israel assisted in arming and training the Shah's 
army. For example, the squad of the Shah's special guards were provided with 
Uzi, the well-known Israeli machine guns, and the Iranian paratroops received 
their training in Israel, not to mention the anti-aircraft guns that Iran bought 
from Israel. 475 
However, the Jerusalem question and Palestinian misery had became central to 
Imam Khomeini's political discourse and attacks against the Shah's governments 
since the early years of his political career. In an interview with the magazine of 
the Fatý organization that was published in 1968, the Imam declared his full 
support for Palestinian resistance and issued a fatwa permitting his followers to 
pay alms (zakawjo, donations and dowries (. ýadaqjo to sustain the Palestinian 
fighters (r1dj, iyin)476 - and this despite the fact that Shiism has had no real 
existence in Palestine since the majority of the population are Sunni Arabs with a 
small Christian Arab minority. 
474 Samuel Sijef, al-Muthalath al-Irani, al- '11jqjtas-5Wyya baynkra'#, Iran, waa1-W11jWa1-Mutah1dJ, trans. Gh5zi as- 
_SMi (Amman: D5r al-Jalli, 
N. A), 76. 
475 For more details about Iranian-Israeli petroleum, commercial and militarily relations refer to Amin Mu5tafý§, Iran wa 
Falastin bayna 'Ahdl-n (Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arab-i R al-Abýah wa at-Tawthiq, 1996), 14-17. 
476 Fahmi Huwicri, Iran min al-DANI (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahr5m lit-Tadamah wi a]-Nashir, 1991), 374-5. 
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In a letter to the pilgrims dated 6tj' February 1971, the Imam urged pilgrim 
Muslim pilgrims to think about their brave Palestinian brothers and provide them 
with all the possible help they needed when he state: 
Consider the poor and needy in the Islamic lands. Turn your attention to 
the liberation of the Islamic land of Palestine from the grasp of Zionism, 
the enemy of Islam and humanity. Do not hesitate to assist and 
cooperate with those heroic men who are struggling to liberate 
Palestine.... It is those disputes between the heads of Muslim states that 
have allowed the problem of Palestine to arise and that do not permit it 
477 to be solved. 
Additionally, Imam Khomeini illustrated the role of imperial powers in the 
occupation of Palestine and Israel. s superiority over the Arabs and Muslims. He 
explicitly pointed to that in a message to Muslim students in North America dated 
10th July, 1972: 
Israel was born out of the collusion and agreement of the imperialist 
states of East and West. It was created in order to suppress and exploit 
the Muslim peoples, and it is being supported today by all the 
imperialists. Britain and the U. S., by strengthening Israel militarily and 
politically and supplying it with lethal weapons, are encouraging Israel to 
undertake repeated aggression against the Arabs and Muslims and to 
continue the occupation of Palestine and other Islamic lands. The Soviet 
Union, by preventing the Muslims from arming themselves adequately, 
477 Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writiogs and declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 1981), 195-6; also, Amin Muýtaf-a, zran wa Falaspn bayna Ahdl-n (Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arabi- lilWýth wa 
at-Tawthiq, 1996), 43. 
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by its deceit, treachery, and conciliatory policy, is guaranteeing the 
existence of Israel. 
478 
The Palestine issue continued to be one of the Imam's biggest concerns after the 
revolution. Therefore, he immediately reminded Muslims, in a letter to the 
pilgrims of Mecca in the first year after the revolution on 24th of September1979, 
of their religious duties towards Jerusalem and the role that they should prepare 
for in the battle against Israel. 
Today the flrst qibla of Muslims has fallen into the grasp of Israel, that 
cancerous growth in the Middle East. They are battering and 
slaughtering our dear Palestinian and Lebanese brothers with all their 
might. At the same time, Israel is casting dissention among the Muslims 
with all diabolical means at its disposal. Every Muslim has a duty to 
prepare himself for battle against Israel. "9 
Shortly afterwards, Imam Khomeini instigated several measures to affirm the 
solidarity of the Iranian revolution towards the Palestinians and their legitimate 
cause. First of all, he cut off all relations with the State of Israel. Then, Iranians 
welcomed the leaders of the Palestinian resistance and offered them the political 
and financial support which they needed. In addition, the IR granted Yasser 
'Arafat, the President of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), who was 
478 Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Wfitings and declarations of Imam 107omeinl, trans. Hamid Algar, (Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 1981), 210; See Amin Mustafa-, Iran wa Falastin bayna Ahdl-n, (Beirut: al-Markaz al-'Arabi lil . Abhath wa a'- 
Tawthiq, 1996), 44. 
479 Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Wfitings and declarations of Imam Khomelni, trans. Hamid AJgar, (Berkel, 
Mizan Press, 1981), 276. 
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the first and the only Arab leader to meet Imam Khomeini, the site of the Israeli 
embassy in Tehran, to become the Palestinian embassy. " 
One of the Imam's achievements to serve the Jerusalem cause was his 
announcement of the International Day of Jerusalem and the founding of the 
Jerusalem army. He called upon all Muslims around the world on 8th August 
1979, a few months after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, to gather 
and show their solidarity with Palestinian legal rights on the last Friday of 
Ramadan. According to the Imam it should be annually celebrated and he called 
it the International Day of Jerusalem (yawm al-Quds al- "Alaml). To emphasize 
the significance of this call, Imam Khomeini declared "'those who do not 
participate in yawm al-Quals are dissenting from Islam and agreeing with 
Israel . "481 The Imam aimed to emotionally and financially utilise the holy month, 
especially the last ten days in which Muslims intensify their worship and 
donations to charities, to keep the case alive, in order to continue the general 
mobilisation of all Muslims, and to divert some of the donations to support the 
Palestinians and their cause. In addition, he aimed to build an army of twenty 
million soldiers which he called Jaysh al-Quols, the Army of al-Quds, to prepare 
for the decisive battle against Zionism and its alliance with the Imperial powers 
(Mustakbirin). 
5.4.3.6. EXPORTING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Imam Khomeini's call to export the Islamic Revolution to the other Islamic 
countries received greater intentions and massive reactions than his other 
480 For more details about the post-revolution Iranian-Palestinian relations refer to David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of 
War and Revolutlon (New York: Holmes & Meier Publisher, 1990), 103-4; see also, Fahmi Huwidii, Iran min al-DMW 
(Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrým lit-Tarjamah wi al-Nashir, 1991), 386-7. 
481 Imam Khomeini's declaration of yawmul-Quds (a day that was designated by the Imam to emphasize the sanctity of 
Jerusalem in 1979 which corresponds annually with the last Friday of Ramdhan) quoted in ýusayn NOr al-Din al-Hamawi, 
Nahj al-1mam wa Taýfir al-Quds (Beirut: Oq3r al-H5&, 2002), 161. 
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political views, and this has become the favourite issue for anti-Khomeinism and 
the propaganda about the Islamic revolution which has restricted the Imam's 
dogma to this point. Indeed, it has been widely utilised to discredit Imam 
Khomeini"s call for Islamic unity and present it as an anti-Islamic attitude that 
reveals Khomeini's sectarian antagonism against the Sunni majority, and by 
which the Iranian Islamic Republic aims to use the Shi'i minorities in the Islamic 
countries in general and the Gulf states in particular to serve Iranian national 
interests. Fuller and Francke explicitly claim: 
.. Iran as a state tends to view Shite communities in the Gulf as objects 
to be manipulated for the Iranian state's interests. As the Soviet Union 
once felt free to sacrifice (or defend) the interest of communist parties 
around the world, depending on the immediate tactical needs of the 
Soviet state,, so too, Iran is ready to use or ignore, the interests of the 
Arab Shia depending on the immediate needs of Tehran's foreign 
policies. "' 
Indeed, the exporting of the Islamic Revolution, in the Imam's view, was merely 
a manoeuvre by which Muslim people would get rid off the regimes of Western 
lackeys and pave the way to establish an Islamic federation state; Menashri 
pointed to Khomeini's plan when he says 
Initially, Khomeini viewed all governments (particularly in Muslim 
countries) as illegitimate in principle, and declared his intention to 
conduct relations with people over the head of their leaders. "' 
In fact, exporting the revolution could have been a natural reaction of self- 
defence by which the IR attempted to confront the anti-Islamic Revolutionary 
482 Graham E. Fuller and Rend R. Franke, The Arab Shia: thefj2rgotten MuslIms, (London: MacMillan, 1999), 80. 
483 David Menashri, Revolution at the Crossroads: Iranýý DomesiYc and Regional AmblOons (Washington D. C.: The 
Washington Institution for Near East Policy, 1997), 70. 
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encleavours that had been activated by the superpowers and the governments of 
the Islamic countries, mainly the neighbouring Gulf States, since 1979. The 
superpowers looked on the Islamic Revolution as a serious threat to their 
economical and strategic interests in such a significant region that widely 
considered the major provider of energy to the Western countries, so they 
exerted all efforts to foiling it or at least containing its influence within Iranian 
borders. Imam Khomeini, aware of these intentions, delivered a public speech to 
the Iranian people on the Eve of the Iranian New Year of 1980, in which he 
warned Iranians about the West and their allies in the region trying to obliterate 
the Islamic revolution. He states: 
It is our duty to stand up to the Superpowers and we have the ability to 
stand up against them ... all the superpowers and all the powers [the 
regimes of the Islamic countries] have risen to destroy us. If we remain 
in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. We should 
clearly settle our accounts with the powers and superpowers and should 
demonstrate to them that, despite all the grave difficulties that we have, 
we shall confront the world with our ideology. 484 
5.5. THE IMAM'S POLITICAL WILL 485 
Since he introduced the theory of his political ideology in al-tlukOma al- 
Islimiyya, Imam Khomeini had affirmed his deep-rooted belief in his political 
visions and clung desperately to his call for Islamic unity till the last moment of 
his life. When he firmly established those visions in the Islamic Republic 
constitution of 1979, he elaborately granted them the necessary legitimacy for 
484 Imam Khomeini: "we shall confront the world with our ideology, " in Merip Report5 (June, 1980), 22. 
485 This will is published online in Arabic: http: //www. moqawama. org/imamI00/wi11/wiIItext. htm and for the English 
version refer to the URL http: //www. ima. com/occasion/ertehal/english/will/; also, it is published in textbook form 
designated for the students of the University of Islamic Freedom (Nnishgýh-e Az5d-e Isl5mýi check Vjb Wasjyj-, 
wa4vyyat-i nimly-i siyjsl, - 'ilihi Imam Khomeini, edit. ýujat al-Isl5m Thabib Allah Ali-ZMa, (Tehran: Intish6r6t Farclusi, 
2002). 
15 
practical application. Then, he made his political dogma the subjects of his 
political will that he designated in letter form, addressed not only to the Iranian 
people but to the Islamic nation as a whole. The will carried the Imam's 
recommendations in all fields of life in which it becomes the written document of 
what so called khaýT-i Imam (the political line of the Imam). 
Amazingly, this will had been written six years before the Imam's death in 1989 
since it was dated 1st Jumidial-Awwal, 1403 A. H. which corresponded to 14th 
February, 1983 according to the Gregorian calendar. One might inquire about 
the reasons that lay behind writing the will at this early time especially when the 
Imam was enjoying stable health and had no medical complaint at the time. 
This strengthens the belief that he could have anticipated his assassination, so 
he attempted to record his recommendations preceding a sudden disappearance, 
especially after the failure of the previous assassination attempt. Hamid Algar 
reveals: 
Indeed, in 1981, the Saudis gave $10 million to a colonel in the Iranian 
Air Force to stage a coup which was to include the bombing of the 
residence of Imam Khomeini in north Tehran; the coup was promptly 
discovered and foiled. 486 
Also, the Imam perhaps was inspired to make this move by several 
assassinations that targeted some of his close assistants. First, he lost his close 
friend and one of the leading figures of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah 
Mahmud T51iq5nT, who had been assassinated immediately after the success of 
the Islamic revolution in 1979. Then, a number of the Imam's associates along 
with other high-ranking cadres of the JimhOri. 151jmi (the Islamic Republican 
Party) were killed in a bomb which destroyed the party building while the party 
486 Hamid Algar, Wahhablsm. ' a a7&cal essay (New York: Islamic Publication International, 2002), 48, note, 40. 
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cadres were holding a regular meeting in which the president of the IR at the 
time and the Imam's successor, Ayatollah Kh5mina'-i,, was severely injured. 
As always, Islamic unity was the means and the end in Imam Khomeini Islamic 
programme. Hence, it was not surprising that al-waýda al-IslimiyYa became the 
essence and core of his political will; indeed, he repeatedly emphasised this issue 
in several places. First of all, he referred in the introduction of his will to one of 
the Prophet's ýjdiths (traditions) that is well-known among Muslims as ýadl-ffi al- 
Thuqalayn (the two burdens). In it the Prophet says: 
I left among you the Qur-'jn (Kiffb Allah) and my descendents ( "itraff 
AN Baytl) which will never be separated till they reach me at the pond 
(al-tlawd 
.) 
[in the Day of Judgement]. "' 
In his explanation to this sentence "they will never separate till they reach me at 
the pond" in the ýaalith, Imam Khomeini explains: 
[the Qur "in and AN al-Bayý are tied together and if anything happened 
to one of them it must happen to the other one, and neglecting one of 
them is neglecting the other one, until those two neglected reach the 
Prophet at the pond; but could the pond be a point where pluralism 
connects with unity and drops could disappear in the sea? Or the pond 
could be something unimaginable to the mind and human Gnosticism? 488 
Then, the Imam reminded his readers that this Ndl-th is authoritative for its 
matin (text) has received the census of both Sunni and Shi'i ulama despite the 
fact that the chains of relaters become a point of disagreement. Also, the 
Qur"in, which must be the point of unity for all Muslims, became either totally 
487 Imam Khomeini, KMýb Wa. ýjyj. * Wa. ýiyyat-j Njmiy-i Siyjsi 'llihi, edit. Hujat al-Isl5m Thabh Allah AJi-Z. 5da, 
(Tehran: Intish5r5t FardlOsii, 2002), 16. 
488 bid, 17. 
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neglected or used as a source of division and disagreement. Therefore, Imam 
Khomeini accused unjust governments and evil-minded clerics (mo'amamln), 
who were worse than the followers of idols (atbi " al-Tight7o, used the Qur "in 
to support oppression and corruption and to justify injustice of the tyranny that 
48 
resists Almighty God. 9 They neutralised the Qur an by using the Qur'in 
itse lf: 490 the oppressive rulers and the clerics of their courts are deactivating the 
Qur"jnicverses that call upon Muslims to resist all sorts of tyranny (Tighoo by 
emphasising the other Qur "inic verses that obliged Muslims to be obedient to ulf 
al-Amr(sing. waff Amr literally means the actual rulers). 
Seemingly, the Imam was pointing to the fatwas (legal opinions) that attempted 
to secure the status quo of the political order and prevent it changing in both 
Sunni and Shi'i Islam. On the one hand, there is a fatwa that prohibited 
revolution against a Muslim ruler no matter if he was just or a dictator, unless he 
prevented Muslims from performing their daily prayers. 491 On the other hand, 
another fatwa deprecated the clerics' direct involvement in politiCS. 492 
Imam Khomeini expressed his pride in the characters and emblems of Shi'ism 
such as the Imams and Nahj al-baligha (the Manner of Eloquence, a book 
alleged to be a collection of the Imam's speeches), du "i "Arafit (a supplication 
of God refers to al-Ousayn ibn Ali, the third Imam), al-. ýaý&a a1-SJjjjdiyya (the 
sheet of supplications attributed to the fourth Imam, Ali ibn al-Ousayn, well- 
known as al-Sajjjal, the frequently prostration which means spending most of his 
time at prayer), and the al-, 5aýifa al-Farimiyya (a book claimed to be written by 
489 ibid, 21. 
490 ibid, 17. 
491 This fatwa is widely recognised among Sunni scholars especially in modem history where Muslims have been 
suffering under tyrannical regimes. 
492 This had been the dominant view in traditional Shi'ism before Imam Khomeini introduced his theory of it ojyat al- 
Faqlb, and it still has its supporters among the Shiite clerics. 
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Fatima al-Zahra, the Prophet's daughter). 493 Clearly, Imam Khomeini attempted 
to refute any accusation of committing innovation or abandoning Shi'ism by his 
radical clerics, who have been opposing his political dogma and efforts of 
rapprochement with Sunni Islam. The Imam stated that "we are proud that our 
madhab [sect] is Ja "fari [called after la'far al-$ýcliq, the Sixth Imam], and of 
our jurisprudence (Aqhunaý, which is one of his legacies P494 for it was unpopular 
amongst the Shi'ites to call themselves Ja "fari, but they preferred to use either 
"Ithna "Ashn- (Twelvers) or Imami (Imamates). Yet the Imam could have 
targeted the Sunnis in this statement, since Imam Jafar is highly respected 
among the Sunni Muslims as one of the great Imams of Islam and widely 
accepted as a well-known jurist among other Islamic jurists, such as the 
founders of the schools of Sunni jurisprudence, Imam Abu ýanfifa al-lNl6mýn (the 
founder of the Mnafi-madhab), Imam MMk ibn Anas (the founder of the MilikI 
madhab), who was a contemporary of Imam Ja'far and had a close tie with 
him, Imam Mohammad ibn IdCis al-ShWil (the founder of the Shirl 7 madhab), 
and Imam Ahmad ibn ýanbal (the founder of the t1anbaffmadhab). Additionally, 
Imam Ja'far had descended on his mother's side from Abu Bakr al-5id-iq, the first 
Sunni caliph, so he historically became a collective character among all Islamic 
sects, 495 grounds on which Nýidir Shah called for Islamic unity in the eighteenth 
century (that has already been discussed in chapter 3). Indeed, the mention of 
this statement in the Imam's will is an affirmation of Khomeini's genuine belief 
announced in one of his public speeches soon after the success of the Islamic 
Revolution in which he deemed the -7a 
"fan- doctrine no more than one of the 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence. For example, Imam Khomeini in August 30, 
1979, called upon the Sunnis to consider Shi'ism as the fifth school of Islamic 
jurisprudence: 
493 Imam Khomeini, Kltjb Wagyg. ' Wa. ýiyyat-i Nimly-i Slyisi '. [Ijhi, edit. ýuýat al-Isl6m Thabih Allah Afi-Zcýda 
(Tehran: lntishýr5t Fard0si, 2002), 22-23. 
494 lbid, 23. 
495 Muýtafa- al-Shak'a, Islim Bili Madhihib (Cairo: al-D5r al-Maýriyya al-Libnýniyya, 1991), 192. 
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Our Sunni brothers must not suspect that in Islam a difference exists 
between you and us [Shi'ites], just as there are four religious sects 
among the Sunnis. How is it that these sects, although separate from 
one another, are brothers and not enemies? This is also the fifth sect 
where no enmity is involved, all are brothers, all are Muslims, all are the 
followers of the Quran and all are subordinate to the Holy Prophet, may 
the peace and mercy of Allah be upon him and his descendants. 496 
In another place, the Imam renewed his strong belief in the significance of the 
Jum "a (Friday) Prayer and the Jami "a (collective) prayers for Islam and all 
Muslim people, stressing 
My advice to the tyrannised peoples and the beloved Iranian 
people ... never be inattentive to Fridays and collective Prayers as they are 
a manifestation of the political dimension of prayer. "' 
Once more, Imam Khomeini affirmed his good intention towards al-Khulafj al- 
RishidIn (the rightly-guided Caliphs) and indirectly exculpated them from the 
aforementioned accusation of exploitation of the holy Qur an for political 
ambitions when he asserted that the divergence from the message of the holy 
book began after the assassination of Imam Ali ibn AbT T51ib. 498 Indeed, he 
praised them (the rightly-guided Caliphs) for imitating the Prophet"s example in 
trying to spread social justice, although the Islamic state during their time 
controlled a vast area. He declares: 
Although the Prophet established a government similar to the other 
government [of his time], it was essentially driven by the motive of 
496 Imam Khomeini, Excelpt: 5 of Imam KhomeiniST Speeches on the Unity of MuslIms (London: Embassy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, n. a), 15. 
497 Imam Khomeini, Viib Wagvj. ' Wasiyyat-i Njmlk-i 5iyJsi 'MN, edit. Huýat al-lslým Thab-ih Allah Ah-Z5da 
(Tehran: lntishýr5t Fard0si, 2002), 25. 
498 lbid, 17. 
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stretching social justice, and the earlier Muslim Caliphs who controlled 
vast governments did likewise; the government of Ali ibn AN T51ib, also 
was driven as well by that motive to a wider extent. 499 
Obviously, Imam Khomeini blamed the Umayyaolstate for deviating from the line 
and conduct of the Prophet and his rightly-guided caliphs. In this opinion, he 
concurred with the vast majority of Muslims, Sunnis, who acknowledged the first 
four caliphs for being committed to the Prophet's line corresponding to the 
Prophet's ýadith "'the caliphate will last for thirty years after my death, then it will 
turn into a dictator kingship; 1., 500 thirty years after the Prophet's death Muawl'ya 
ibn AN Suflin established the Umayyad dynasty and rule. Hence, those caliphs 
have been unanimously eulogised by the title of Rishidl-n (orthodox or rightly- 
guided). 
Imam Khomeini also emphasised the fact that the Islamic Republic was 
established by God's grant and support, that Islam comes at the top of the 
duties of the government, and he hoped that other Islamic countries would 
imitate the Iranian model, then peoples and countries would reach an accord 
that would allow them to cut themselves free of the hands of the superpowers. 
However,, if unjust governments do not comply with the people's will, they 
should be forced to submit since the essence of the Muslims' misery are those 
governments attached either to the West or the East (i. e. the communist USSR 
at the time). "' 
499 bid, 3 6. 
500 it is well-known as ýa&h Safina, one of the Prophet's companions, and it is cited in sunan al-Tarmadhi (2390). 
501 Imam Khomeini, Vib Wagyj., Wa. ýiyyat-i Nimiy-i Styiýsi '11W Imam, ed1t. Hujjat al-Islim Thablb Allah A, -_'3L; ý? 
(Tehran: Intish5r5t Fard0si, 2002), 44. 
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Imam Khomeini called upon the oppressed people (mustao'afi-n) of the world, 
Islamic states and the Muslims of the world to stand up and restore their rights 
by their own efforts and not to fear the uproarious propaganda of the 
superpowers and their associates. He states "'You should repulse those unjust 
rulers who handed over your income to the enemies of beloved Islam. " 
Furthermore, he urged them to step further to establish a federal Islamic state to 
include numerous free and independent Islamic Republics in which 
... you will halt the oppressors (mustakbirfn) and achieve the Imamate of 
the oppressed (mustapfrafl-n) who will inherit the earth according to 
divinep ro mise[A nd We desired to besto wa fa vour upon those who were 
deemed weak in the land, and to make them the leaders, and to make 
them the heir. And to grant them power in the land, and to make 
Pharaoh and Haman and their hosts see from them what they feared 
(Qur .1 jn 20o., 5- q. 502 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
In short, Islamic unity was the cornerstone of the Imam's political dogma. At the 
outset,, he was provoked to become heavily involving in politics by his enmity to 
Western attitudes towards his country and intrusion in Iran and other Islamic 
countries, against which he stood in 1963 and was later exiled. Observing in 
pain how weak and scattered was the Islamic world; he believed that Islamic 
unity was the only remedy for the prevailing status quo that allowed the enemies 
of Islam to strengthen their influence and interference in Islamic countries. In 
researching how to achieve Islamic unity, Imam Khomeini developed his theory 
of wiliyat al-faq#7 and al-tiuki7ma al-151imiyya which are the appropriate 
methods to achieve the ultimate goal, Islamic unity. In other words, the 
leadership of the jurist and the existence of the Islamic state are the legs on 
which the rest of the body, Islamic unity, stands. 
502 An English version of Imam Khomeini's political will at the URL http: //moqawama. org/imamlOO/will/willtext. htm. 
Consequently, he introduced and demonstrated his political dogma in his work 
al-tlukdma a1-. 1s1jmiyya, published in the late 1970s. After he had succeeded in 
establishing the Islamic Republic in 1979, Imam Khomeini firmly elaborated and 
legitimised his political views in the newly written constitution. Accordingly, the 
IR under the leadership of the Imam exerted all feasible efforts to achieve 
Islamic unity. 
As we have seen, Islamic unity was the core of his political will in which he 
demonstrated his political line, urging Muslims of the world to follow in order to 
achieve the much sought goal of Islamic unity. 
Undoubtedly,, the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989 was a serious challenge to 
the future of possible Islamic unity. The Imam had exceptional characteristics 
and qualifications such as political charisma,, religious authority as al-Ma)ji' al- 
A "/j of the Twelver Shi'ism, and a long revolutionary history, which together 
made him the central character and allowed him to promote these efforts in spite 
of the sectarian -oriented war with Iraq. 
However, such conditions that the Imam had enjoyed were unavailable to the 
elected successor, Sayyid Ali Khýmina'i, who not only lacks political charisma but 
also the religious legitimacy for which his leadership has become a subject of 
debate. Accordingly, the activities which might have led to Islamic unity were 
influenced by this change, and the revolutionary call for this to happen was 
evaluated and replaced with a pragmatic rapprochement policy after the demise 
of Imam Khomeini. Hence, the efforts of al-Taqrib under the leadership of the 




THE EFFORTS FOR ISLAMIC UNITY IN POST- 
KHOMEINI IRAN: KHAMINAI'S PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH OF AL-TAQRIB 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, the call for Islamic unity was the cornerstone 
of Imam Khomeini's political scheme and through it the Imam attempted to 
export the revolutionary model of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the other 
Islamic countries in order to achieve his ultimate target of creating a strong 
Islamic federation, able to revive revolutionary Islam, liberating the Islamic 
nation, putting an end to Western hegemony, and implementing the universal 
message of Islam. Additionally, the Imam enforced this unifying tendency in the 
constitution of the IR of 1979 in order to guarantee that the call and efforts for 
Islamic unity would continue henceforth. 
Evidently, the Imam's call for Islamic unity had three major aspects. Firstly, it 
was mainly oriented to the Muslim peoples rather the governments that were 
accused of furthering the interests of the West. Secondly, revolutionary Islam 
was seen as the only alternative to get rid of the status quo and restore Islamic 
unity. Thirdly, the call for Islamic unity that was adopted in the IR during the 
Imam's time was based on three precepts: the entrenchment of the principle of 
Islamic Unity in the constitution as one of the major targets the IR has to make 
every effort to achieve; the employment of religious fatwas (legal opinions) 
issued by Imam Khomeini himself, his religious authority, and the proposals for 
Islamic unity put forward by the Imam's disciples. Khomeini approved of 
Ayatollah Munta? ir-i's Isbu- " al-waýa al-Islimiyya (the week of Islamic unity) and 
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Sayyid Al i Kh5 mi na 'I's mu "tamar A "immat 5alit al--7um "a (the conference of the 
leaders of the Friday prayer). 
After Imam Khomeini's death in 1989, however, the concept of Islamic unity 
(waýda) and the revolutionary approach needed to accomplish it have been 
remarkably modified in the "second Islamic Republic", as some scholars like to 
call it/ 503 under the leadership of his successor and the recent waff al-faqlf-h 
(Su preme- leader) Sayyid Ali KMmina`i. Although he frequently emphasises in 
his public speecheS504 that this loyalty and enthusiasm for the Imam's political 
line (Khatt-i Imam) is assured and promises to be committed to the Imam's 
political scheme in which Islamic unity undoubtedly represents the backbone, 
tjUjjjtU1 al_151j&05 Ali KMmina'i nevertheless seems to be prevented from 
following in the footsteps of Imam Khomeini in this matter due to his personal 
qualifications and the outcomes of the revision of the 1979 constitution. This 
saw a separation between the Rahbafiyya (political leadership) and the 
Ma)WciYYa (spiritual leadership) adopted, not to mention the negative and 
fruitless outcomes of the Imam's revolutionary approach that not only revealed 
the unwillingness of Muslims around the world to accept and support such a call 
but also caused catastrophic consequences to the Islamic Revolution and Iranian 
people that resulted in waging an unjust war against Iran and consumed all its 
energies for eight years. Accordingly, tiujjat al-Islim Sayyiol Ali Khýmina' i, who 
was elected by MajAs Oubari (the Assembly of Experts) to the position of the 
Supreme-leadership on 3 rd June, 1989 and novelty enjoyed an absolute political 
503 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Alter Oomeini. - the Iranian 5econd Repubfic (London : Routledge, 1995); also Henner 
Furtig, "Iran: The Second Islamic Republic? ". Joumal of 5outh Asian and Middle Eastern 5tudles 20: 3 (spring 1997). 
504 Ali Kh5minaTs belief in Imam Khomeini's political views was reflected in a speech he delivered in one of the 
meetings of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). This speech was published in a pamphlet entitled Khaq-i Imam in which 
it is presented as a manifesto to the members of the IRP; see Sayyid Ali Khamina'i, KhaýT-i Imam (Tehran: ýizb-e 
JumhOri Islými, 1980). 
505 A science degree that is granted to the students in the hawza, the religious Shi'i seminary, when they successfully 
become acquainted with a certain number of books in Islamic theology. This Arabic term literally means authoritative 
source and might be an equivalent to a Master's degree in the modern Western educational system. 
authority, lacked the significant characteristics that his predecessor had 
possessed mainly the religious legitimacy as al-Ma)ji " al-A "/j (the highest source 
of imitation of his time for the Shi'ites), the political charisma, and the 
revolutionary reputation that he had acquired from his long struggle against the 
Pahlawi regime by which his political discourses were authoritative and his 
sectarian reforms to propagate the Islamic unity were widely indisputable. 
Hence, tiujjat al-Islim Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'i faced a serious dilemma since he is 
constitutionally, as the Supreme-leader, obligated to make every effort to 
propagate and achieve the aims of Islamic unity. However, he lacked both 
religious legitimacy and popular recognition that are a must to deal with such a 
sensitive jurisprudential and sectarian issue being deemed unqualified. To 
escape this problematic situation, Khamina'11 has been heavily relying on his 
constitutional powers from which he obtains an absolute political authority, and 
subtly established two institutions, al-Majma ' al- 'Alaml- # al-Taqrib Bayn al- 
Madhihib a1-. Ts1amiyyah (the International Council for Proximity among the 
Islamic Schools of Thought) and al-Majma " al- "Alami # AN al-Bayt (the House of 
the Prophet World Assembly), through which he might achieve several significant 
targets. Constitutionally, the new supreme-leader would overcome one of the 
responsibilities under which he is obligated to activate all possible means to 
propagate and achieve Islamic unity. Domestically, al-Majma " al-Alami # al- 
Taqrfb Bayn al-Madhihib al-Islamiyya would be an effective means to increase 
the Supreme-leaders popularity among the Sunni Iranians and protect the 
solidarity of the Iranian people. Also, the supreme-leader would prevent his 
religious rivals challenging his political authority by taking advantage of this 
significant theme by centralising the Islamic unity issue in his own hands. On 
the other hand, the Supreme-leader might have aimed at employing al-Majma " 
al- "Alami # A171 al-Bayt to put forward his Ma)ji "iyya among the Shi'i minorities 
by popularising his role as the waff Amr al-Muslimin (Guardian of Muslims) in 
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which he presents himself as the eligible protector and defender of their rights in 
their communities, not to mention the financial and political benefits that the 
Supreme-leader would gain from these minorities. 
This chapter is dedicated to surveying the encleavours at Islamic unity post- 
Khomeini when the revolutionary strategy of the concept of Islamic unity was 
modified to the pragmatic tactic of the notion of al-Taqrib under the leadership 
of Khomeini's successor, Sayyid Ali Khýmina'-I, due to his personal and spiritual 
qualifications and the ineffectiveness of the previous approach. Hence, 
inescapable issues such as a brief biography of Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'-i, the 
constitutional alterations of the office of wali faqih and the power transition, and 
its impact on the implementation of the new notion of al-Taqrib will be 
investigated in depth. 
6.2. THE NEW RAHBAR 506 
Sayyid Ali al-Ousayn-1 al-Khýimina'i was born in 1939 in Mashhad, where the 
shrine of the eighth Imam Ali al-RiO5 is located, to the late Ayatollah Sayyid 
Jaw5d Ousayn-i Khýimina'T. His early life was humble due to the poor 
circumstances of his family: 
My father was a well-known man of religion who was very pious and a bit 
of a recluse. We had a difficult life. I remember that sometimes at night 
we didn't have anything in the house for dinner. Nevertheless my 
506 This biography is mainly obtained, unless otherwise mentioned, from the official websites of the Office of the 
Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamina'!, http: //www. al-imam. org/pages/nobtha/nobtha. html and 
httD: //www. leader. ir/lanqs/EN/index. i)hi)? i)=bio; also, refer to David Menashri, Iran a Decade of War and Revolutbn 
(Holmes & Meier: New York, 1990), 350-351, and Nifin A. Mus'ad, Sun' al-Qank F/ Iran wa al-'Iiljqjt al-'Arabiyya al- 
I4nýW (Beirut: Markaz Dir5s5t al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 2001), 86-7. 
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mother would scrape up something and that dinner would be bread and 
raisins. 
507 
6.2.1. HIS EDUCATION 
Sayyid Ali started his education at the age of four when his father sent him to 
study at a makktab, a traditional old-style primary school, in which the alphabet 
and the Holy Qur'jn are studied. Then, he enrolled along with his elder brother 
in the Dir Ta "lim al-Diyjnat, a newly opened Islamic school where he finished 
his primary education. He began studying Arabic Grammar when he was at high 
school, which he continued after transferring to a seminary education under the 
supervision of his father and other scholars. 
During this intermediate stage in additional to his father who taught him 
Jurisprudence and its principles (flqh and u, 50ý, Sayyid Ali was taught by several 
scholars such as the late Aghý Mirz5 Mudarriss Yazd! who taught him part of the 
book of Sharh al-lamea, 508 and the late hj, Shaykh 1-15shim Qazw-in-I with whom 
509 he studied the Rasi"iland Makisib. 
At the age of eighteenth, he started his higher Islamic education (dars-ikhiro) in 
Jurisprudence and its principles under the late grand ma)ji ". Ayatollah al- "Uzmj 
M-I&-i, in Mashhad. Then he went to the seminary in the holy city of Najaf in 
507 http: //www. al-imam. org/pages/nobtha/nobtha. html. 
508 Al-Raw0a al-Bahiyya ft Sharh al-Lam'a al-Dimashqiyya is one of the commonly required sources at the Suti]h level 
(the second phase in the seminary educational system ). The original source of al -Lam'a al-Dimashqiyya was written by 
Mohammad ibn Jam5l al -Din Makki al -Amiri (d. 1384 C. E. /786 H. ) who is known as al -Shahid al -. Awwal (the first martyr), 
and the Sharh (demonstration) was composed by Zin al -Din al-Jab'i al-'Amiri (d. 965 H. ) who is known as al-Shahid al- 
Thýini (the second martyr). 
509 AI-Rasý'il and al-Mak5sib are required sources for the SutOb level; the former is also known as the Far5'iO al-'U501 
while the latter consists of three sections ; al-Mak5sib al -Mubarrama (prohibited benefits ), al-Bay' (selling), and al - 
Khay5r5t (alternatives). The author of both sources is the well -known Shaykh MurtaO5 ibn MohammadAmin al -Tastari 
al-An-gri (d. 1882 C. E. /1281 H. ). 
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1957and continued lessons in Dars-i Khjrý under such well-known teachers as 
Sayyid Mul)sin OakTrn, Sayyid Mahmud Shahru-dii, Miirzý B6qir Zanj6ni, Sayyid a Ja i 
Yal)y5 Yazd!, and Miirzý ýusayn BajnGrd-i. In 1958, Sayyid Ali moved to the holy 
city of Qum to further his studies in Dars-i Kharij in jurisprudence and 
philosophy, attending lectures by some of the grand teachers in of the time in 
that seminary such as the late Ayatollah al- "Uzmj Buru-jard-1, Imam Khomeini, 
Shaykh Murtadý ýý'irli YazdT, and AMma Tabatabý'i. However, he was obliged 
to suspend his studies at the seminary of Qum in 1964 and return to Mashhad 
due to his father's illness. In Mashhad, he maintained his studies of r1qh and 
u., r, 01 under the supervision of Ayatollah Mlilýn-i and taught religious subjects to 
young seminary and university students. 
6.2.2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Although Sayyid Khýrnina'-i acknowledges that he was a student of Imam 
Khomeini in jurisprudence and its principles and in revolutionary and political 
ideas, his first political ideal was the well-known revolutionist and founder of the 
organisation of Fidi -'iyin Islim, Sayyid Mujtab5 Nawwýb Safawi 510 who deeply 
influenced him in his revolutionary and political inclinations. This started in 1952 
when Naww5b Safaw-i along with some of his supporters visited the Sulayman 
Khan Madrasa in Mashhad and delivered a lecture on embracing Islam and its 
rules. He also awakened the Iranian people to the machinations of the Shah's 
regime and the British government. Sayyid Khýmina'-I, who was one of the 
young students of the maclrasa, substantiates this in his own words: 
It was at that very moment, because of Nawwab Safawi that the 
consciousness of Islamic Revolutionary activism sparked inside me. I 
510 Naww6b Safawi was one of the Islamic activists who opposed the Shah's regime and supported '-Iuýadaq's 
movement. When the movement was failed in 1953, Nawwab Safaw-i was arrested and executed. 
-)-)g 
have no doubt that it was Nawwab Safawi who first kindled the sparks 
511 (of revolutionary Islam) in my heart. 
When the Shah introduced his pro-American plan, **the White Revolution' in 1963, 
Sayyid Khýimina'fi was in Qum and joined the opposition led by Ayatollah 
Khomeini against the Shah's policies. Then he was sent by Imam Khomeini in 
May 1963 on a mission to the province of Khurýsýn carrying the Imam's 
message to Ayatollah Mlilýini and other clergymen to join the opposition against 
the Shah and proclaim against his policies in the month of Muýarraar, he 
continued to Bidand where he delivered the sermon of the ninth of MuNrram 
(2nd June, 1963) himself after which he was arrested for one night and 
conditionally released that he would never preach again. However, he was 
rearrested following the event of the fifteenth of Ourclid 12 in Bidand and 
transported to Mashhad where he remained in police custody for ten days under 
brutal torture. In 3anuary 1964 (Ramapfin 1383), he had delivered speeches in 
Kerm5n and Z5hid5n against Mohammad Rioý Shah's policies and American 
interference in Iran before being arrested by SAVAI<513 and sent to Tehran, 
where he faced all sorts of torture for two months. From then onwards, Sayyid 
Kh5mina'! came under close surveillance of SAVAK, and was arrested several 
times. Recalling his experiences with SAVAK, he describes how 
511 http: //www. al-imam. org/pages/nobtha/nobtha. html. 
512 On 3rd June, 1963 Imam Khomeini gave a speech in Faydiyya seminary school in Qumm that was attended by 
thousands of his students and supporters in which he criticised the Pahawi regime accusing it of merely being an 
American puppet and Israeli servant. This speech had ignited the light of demonstrations in several Iranian cities. The 
demonstrations were severely subdued by the Shah's forces, and thousands of people were killed and injured on 5th 
June, 1963 that corresponded with the 15th of KhurdM 1342 H. Shamsi; see Kayhjn Intemational, February 10,1985, 
11. 
513 SAVAK was short for &izim5n Ittil5'5t va Amniyyat-i Kishvar (the Shah's domestic security and intelligence 
organisation); since its establishment in 1957 till the success of the Islamic Revolubon in 1979, S4 VAK had been known 
for its ruthless reputation and brutality by which thousands of Iranians were tortured and executed accused of 
participating in anti-regime activities. 
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The situation had ripened to an armed revolution in Iran since 1348 
[1970]. The sensitivity and severity of the former regime against me had 
increased. Because of the circumstances they were no longer able to 
ignore people such as me. In 1350 [1972], 1 was again taken to prison, 
for the fifth time. The harsh attitude of SAVAK indicated that the system 
(regime) was very afraid of an armed revolution being accompanied with 
a sound Islamic ideology. They could no longer believe that my 
intellectual activism and propagation in Mashhad and Tehran had nothing 
to do with the developing situation. After being released, the attendance 
at my classes on the exegesis of the Qur'an and private classes on 
ideology and other subjects increased. "' 
Between 1972 and 1975, Sayyid Khamina'-1 delivered lessons and lectures in the 
exegesis of the Qur"in and Islamic ideology in three mosques in Mashhad: 
Karimat, Imam ýIasan, and Mirzj Ja "far. These lectures and lessons were 
attended by thousands of politically active students. He also taught the well- 
known work of Imam Ali, Nahj al-baligha, in which he shed light on the Imam's 
political views and wisdom. His teaching sessions became popular among the 
revolutionary minded students to the extent that his reputation spread to the 
surrounding cities. Accordingly, Sayyid Ali Khýmina'i was arrested by 5AVAKin 
winter 1975 and imprisoned in the central prison of Iran before being released in 
the fall of 1976. Then he returned to Mashhad and continued anti-government 
political activities although he had to keep a low profile due to observation by 
SAVAK Eventually, Sayyid Ali was rearrested and sentenced to exile in Iran- 
shahr for three years before his return to Mashhad in the mid-1978, during the 
public unrest against the Pahlavi's regime. 
514 http: //www. al-imam. org/pages/nobtha/nobtha. html. 
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6.2.3. OFFICIAL POSITIONS 
From his headquarter in Paris, Imam Khomeini formed a revolutionary council 
consisting of the key figures of the Islamic Revolution among whom was Sayyid 
Ali Khamina'!. From then onwards, Sayyid Ali was in charge of several positions. 
For example, he was one of the founders of fflzb-i Jimhtki Islimi (the Islamic 
Republican Party) formed in February 1979, which had become the ruling party 
before its dissolution after the Iraqi-Iranian war in 1988. He was also appointed 
Secretary of Defence in 1980 in which he supervised the Revolutionary Guards. 
In addition, he had been entrusted by Imam Khomeini to lead the Friday Prayer 
from 1980, and he was elected as Tehran representative in the Majlis-I 5hiki 
(the Consultative Assembly) in 1980. Sayyid Ali also became Imam Khomeini's 
representative in the High Security Council in 1981. He had survived an 
assassination attempt in AbutharMosque in June 1981 before being elected to 
the presidency of the Islamic Republic -a position he held for two terms till 
1989. In addition, he was appointed chairman to the Constitution Revising 
Committee in 1989, charged with reviewing the constitution and proposing the 
necessary revisions. After the death of Khomeini, Sayyid Ali was elected by the 
majority of the MajAs-i Oubarg (the Council of Experts) to the position of Wa#y 
al-faqih (Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution). 
6.3. THE POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE WALi FAQiH IN THE 
POST KHOMEINI ERA: AN INEVITABLE SECULARISATION 515 OR A REVIVAL 
OF IMAM KHMEINI'S ORIGINAL CONCEPT? 
Sayyid Kh5mina'! "s relationships played a major role in his ascending to the 
position of the wa#y al-faqffi after the death of Imam Khomeini on June 3,1989. 
In the 1950s, Kh5mina'-1 had met 1-15shim-1 Rafsinjan-i when they had paid a visit 
to the holy Shi'ite Shrines in Iraq together, and their friendship had 
515 Olivier Roy, The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, The middle Ea5t Joumal 53: 2 (Spring 1999), 201. 
3' -1 
strengthened when Khýimina`i moved from Mashhad to live in Qum; Khýimina )i 
and Rafsinjýinfl both joined a secret organisation opposed to the Shah's regime in 
Qum in the 1960s called Jam'lyyat Islih al -Hawwza (the Organisation of the 
Seminary Reforms), meeting other members such as Qadus-1, Rabýini Shlirýizii, Ali 
Mashk7ini, and Azar-i Qumi. When the organization was discovered by the Shah's 
police, Sayyid Ali along with his close friend Rafsanjani fled from Qum to Tehran 
where they had lived in the same house for a whole year. 516 
After the Success of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Ali and his close friends, 
Rafsanjani and Ali Mashkiini, established an influential political alliance, which 
David Monashri called the 'religio-politicians. r517 This alliance occupied the key 
executive and legislative offices of the Islamic Republic during the Imam's life. 
Sayyid Ali Khýmina'i was elected to the Presidency of the Islamic Republic in 
1981, a position he held until the death of the Imam in 1989; Hýshimli 
Rafsanjani became the Speaker of the MajAs-iSht7rj151jmi(the Parliament), and 
Shaykh Ali Mashkiini was entrusted to the position of the speaker of the Experts 
Council. 
It had been widely anticipated that the absence of Imam Khomeini would create 
a huge emptiness in the Iranian political arena that could ignite a challenge over 
his position among the different fragments of the Iranian clerical institution. 518 
The possibility of such an expectation had increased since March 28,1989 when 
the Imam officially discharged his close friend, that he had once called 'the 
flower of his life', Ayatollah ýusayn Ali Munta? iCi from his position as Qj`im- 
516 Nifin A. Mus'ad, ýun ' al-Qargr 5 Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- `Arabivya-a1-1nJnwa (Beirut: Markaz Dir5s5t al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 86-87. 
517 David Monashri made a distinction between the theologians and the religio-politicians as "... persons who gained 
prominence on the basis of their religious scholarship and authority are deemed theologian, whereas those who exercise 
authority as a result of their political power are referred to as religio-politicians; " David Menashri, Revoluton at 
Cfassmaos. - lranýý Domestic and Regional Ambitions, Washington D. C.: The Washington Institution for Near East Policy 
(1997), 7, note. 2. 
518 Shireen T. Hunter, "Post-Khomeini Iran, " Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 133. 
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maqam Rahbari(the vice of the supreme-leader and the designated successor of 
the Imam) to which he was officially appointed by the Majlis-i Oubari (the 
Council of Experts) on November 22,1985, leaving this post vacant and 
entrusting nobody despite his unstable medical condition. 5'9 
Neil Shevlin claimed that the KMmina'T-Rafsanjani axis, which would be 
endangered if Ayatollah Munta? iCi occupied the position of supreme-leadership, 
set the scenario for Ayatollah Munta4ir-i's dismissal. 520 Indeed, Ayatollah 
Munta? 16 asserted this claim in his memoirs and blamed the coalition of "religio- 
politicians' for the loss of his position. He revealed that they nominated him to 
this post in the first place in spite of his disinclinations, and they zealously strived 
to guarantee his election by the council of experts. He clearly states 
I severely opposed this idea [a designated successor to the Imam] since 
I deemed it a humiliation to the Imam who is still alive, so there is no 
need to appoint a successor to him; therefore, I wrote a letter to the 
head of the council of experts, Shaykh al-Mashk-ini, requesting him not to 
continue with the process of my election. However, he responded that 
Shaykh Rafsinjan-1 and Mr. Kh5mina-i have great determination to 
proceed on the pretext that my election would secure the future of the 
Islamic revolution and the regime, and Shaykh al-Mashk7in-i added that 
they expressed a high commendation to you.... Later, I knew that they 
were determinant to knock me down at a suitable moment. 521 
Indeed, the dismissing of Ayatollah Munta4ir-i was due to Imam Khomeini's initial 
vision of the position of the waliy al-faqfh (Supreme-leadership) in terms of the 
requirements and qualifications. The Imam, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, during the drafting of the constitution of 1979 had opposed confining 
519 Said Amir Adomand, "the State and Khomeini's Islamic order, " Iranian Studies 13: 1 (January 1980), 158. 
520 Neil Shevlin, "Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: the implementation of Theocracy, " Journal of Cons6tution 
Law 1: 2 (Fall 1998), 375-6; also, Shireen T. Hunter, "Post-Khomeini Iran, " Forel4n Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 133. 
521 See Muntaz[2-Vs Memoirs at the URL http: //alfajer. org/vb/showthread. php.? t=8911; also, the URL 
http: //www. ansar. org/arabic/montaziri02/htm. 
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this position with any sectarian and national condition such as the Ma)ji VYYa that 
clearly represented the Shii characteristic of Supreme-leadership, but he rather 
put the emphasis on political competency. As Roy witnesses Vk... a mada' could 
be a Guide only if he is first a 'political man", as Khomeini explicitly stated in a 
speech in March 1989.1/522 For that reason, the election of Ayatollah Munta? iri as 
Qj`im-maqjm Rahbaricould have been an inevitable and temporary measure to 
suit the crucial circumstances that the Islamic Revolution was passing through at 
the time when- Khomeini had lost most of his sincere and revolutionary 
adherents in the explosion that struck the headquarters of the ýiizb-iJimhurl-yl 
Islimi(Islarnic Republican Party IRP) apart from the fact that Khomeini himself, 
as also mentioned in the previous chapter, had been the target of a failed 
assassination attempt. However, Ayatollah Munta&T, although he had already 
acquired the MJ)ji`iyya, lacked the necessary political competency -a matter 
that finally led to his dismissal. 
Consequently,, Imam Khomeini had started issuing a number of fatwas during the 
last months of the Iraqi-Iranian war to prepare the Iranian public for the 
dismissal of Ayatollah Munta&ii and the amendment of the 1979 constitution in 
which the major alterations were directed to strengthening the power of the 
waliy al-faqih and his own absolute authority. Hence, he issued a fatwa on 7 th 
December, 1987 and clarified it, a month later 8 th January, 1988, in which he 
affirmed that the government of the wali al-faq#7has absolute authority over the 
people to the extent that allows it to impede the divine ordinances. Forthrightly 
he states: 
The government [of the faqih] can unilaterally abrogate legal [shar "JI 
agreements that it has made with the people ... The government can 
when it sees fit to contravene the good of the Islamic country --- prevent 
522 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran, " The Middle East Jbtlmal 53: 2 (Spring 1999), 206. 
" ", 
the pilgrimage, "' which is one of the important divine duties... If the 
government can exercise its authority only within the bounds of the 
peripheral divine laws, then the bestowal of the divine ordinances 
through the absolute deputyship upon the Prophet ... would be hollow and 
meaningless. "' 
Khomeini issued another fatwa on 6 th February, 1988 in which he established a 
new institution by the name of Majma "-i Tashkhl-S-i Maslahat-i Nizim (the 
Council for the Identification of the Interests of the System); while the 
announced aim for this council has been to resolve clashes between the 
Parliament and the Council of Guardians composed of the qualified fuqaha and 
aims to observe the compatibility of Parliament's enactments of Islamic Laws, the 
ultimate objective seems to be the undermining of the latter since it has only six 
representatives among fourteen members of the Council for the Identification. 525 
Akhavi believed that Imam Khomeini's fatwas resulted in placing the imamate in 
a higher position among other principles of Shi'ism and legitimizing the 
encroachment on the constitutional powers of other authorities. 526 However, 
Akhavi seems to have misread the Imam's intention. Apparently, Imam 
Khomeini had earlier decided on a constitutional revision in which his ultimate 
aim was to reactivate his genuine vision of the concept of wali faqih in terms of 
qualifications and authority that he had failed to emphasize in the 1979 
constitution, so the fatwas were mainly oriented to justifying the dismissal of 
523 Imam Khomeini activated this fatwa when he suspended the annual ritual of Oajj and prevented the Iranian pilgrims 
from performing this divine ordinance in 1988, objecting to the Saudis' decision to reduce the quota of Iranian pilgrims 
from 150,000 to 40,000; see Nifin A. Mus'ad, 5un 'al-Qank ffIran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya-al-kýnyya (Beirut: Markaz 
Dir5sýt al-Wabda al-'Arabiyya, 2001), 58. 
524 Quoted in Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shici Law on the Tradition of Wilayat al-Faqih, ff Iranlan 
Stzldies29: 3 (June 1996), 264. 
525 61d, 265. 
526 ibid, 265. 
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Ayatollah Munta? iCi and paving the way for radical constitutional amendments i in 
the position of the wali faqjh. 
Khomeini had dismissed Ayatollah Munta? ir! from his position as the Qj ) /M- 
maqjm Rahbarion 27tt' March, 1989 before he announced the intention to revise 
the constitution. As a result, a special commission of twenty members 527 was set 
up according to the Imam's order on April 25,, 1989 to reconsider the revision of 
the constitution of 1979; amongst its members were Sayyid Ali Kh5minai (the 
President), Ayatollah Ali Mashk-in-I (the Speaker of the Council of Experts) and 
H5shimT Rafsanjani (the Speaker of the Parliament). 528 
Although the aforementioned council proposed several revisions to the 
constitution of 1979, the amendments that had been made for the qualifications 
necessary for the office of the wali al-faqih were undoubtedly considered the 
most significant. A noticeable separation between the political and religious 
authorities was adopted when the major two conditions of the Ma)ji VYYa (source 
of emulation) and the recognition of the majority of the populace were dropped 
according to Imam Khomeini's demand expressed in a letter addressed to the 
commission dated 9th May, 1989 . 
529 Thus the Islamic Republic becomes a 
"constitutional theocracy" where the leadership bestows on a merely 
"constitutional faqih. 11530 Also,, the collective leadership which article 107 had 
stipulated in the constitution of 1979 in case no single faqih achieved the 
required conditions of the leadership was dropped. Additionally, the council 
strengthened the position of the wa#y al-faqih according to article 57 which 
527 Fifteen of those twenty members were nominated by Imam Khomeini while the Majlis (Parliament) appointed the 
other five members; see Neil Sheviin, "Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: the Implementation of Theocracy, " 
-70umal of ConsUtut7on Law 1: 2 
(Fall 1998), 376, note 198. 
528 ibid, 376. 
529 Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shid Law on the Tradition of Wilayat al-Faqih, " Iranian Studles 29: 3 
(June 1996), 267, note. 117. 
530 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious legitimacy in Iran, " The Middle East -)6umal 
53: 2 (Spring 1999), 214. 
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emphasizes the absolute political authority of the wa#y al-faq#7.531 The new 
amendments received the consent of the Iranian populace in a national 
referendum on July 28,1989, together with the presidential elections which were 
brought forward from August to jUly. 532 
Stillf it has been admitted that the alterations in the qualifications for the office 
of waliy al-faqih were a necessity for the post-Khomeini era. According to Nifin 
Mus'ad, the high qualifications of the wa#y al-faqlh in the 1979 constitution were 
intentionally designated to match Imam Khomeini's status, but after the Imam's 
demise the lowering of the ceiling of the prerequisites for this post became 
inevitable. 533 
The constitutional amendments paved the way to Sayyid Ali Khýmina )IrS 
nomination for the post of Supreme-leader; however, the support that he 
received from his A religio-politician' allies in the council of experts resolved the 
competition over this post in his favor when he was elected on June 3,1989 
(only one day after the demise of Imam Khomeini) in which he gained the vote 
of a two-thirds majority of the Majlis-i Oubari (Council of Experts). 534 Patrick 
Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji reveal the role of Rafsanjani, despite what were 
perceived as the somewhat weak qualifications of the new leader, when they 
affirm: 
When revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, a 
backroom deal brokered by Rafsanjani put then-president Khamina'-I in 
531 Nifin A. Mus'ad, ýun ' al-Qank ff Iran wa al- lliljqjt al- `Arabiyya-a1-IrJnyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir5s6t al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 77-85; also, Neil Shevlin, "Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: the Implementation of 
Theocracy, " Jourrial of Constitution Law 1: 2 (Fall 1998), 376-79. 
532 Shireen T. Hunter, "Post-Khomeini Iran, " Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 135; also, Neil Sheviin, "Velayat-e Faqih in 
the Constitution of Iran: the Implementation of Theocracy, " Jourrial of Constitution Law 1: 2 (Fall 1998), 378. 
533 Nifin A. Mus'ad, ýun ' al-Qargr /T Iran wa al- 'Illjqjt al- `Arab1yya-a1-IrJnyya (Beirut: Markaz Dirýýt al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 80. 
534 Shireen T. Hunter, "Post-Khomeini Iran, " Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 134. 
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his place. Khaminal's religious credentials were widely ridiculed at the 
535 time. 
In fact the election of Ayatollah Khýmina`i's leadership raised legitimate and 
legal inquiries. Hypothetically, the leader in a theocratic regime, who is 
supposed to be the shadow of God on earth, should be at least one of most 
learned clerics if not the superior among them. This did not apply to the case of 
&#jat al-. Isljm Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'T, the new wali al-faqfh who was soon 
granted the degree of Ayatollah after his election, although most of the senior 
Shi'ite ulami still deemed him scientifically unqualified for the position of 
Ayatollah al- `Lý=J536 that allowed him to hold the ma6fi'Yya; for that reason. 
For that reason, David Monashri mistakenly concluded that Khýmina`i had 
certainly to imitate one of the living Ayatollahs as a Shi'ite muqaffid (follower) 
for which he subtly followed the 100 year old Ayatollah Arýkli who was too old to 
be a serious threat to Khýminai`s political authority. 537 
Even though Sayyid Ali Kh5mina)i had been considered qualified according to 
the new amendments when he was elected to the post of the Supreme- 
leadership on 3 rd June, these amendments were not officially in effect until 28 th 
July, when the results of the general referendum were announced. Hence, the 
legality of his election did become questionable and raised noticeable opposition 
among the clergy outside the Council of Experts. Among this opposition was the 
well-known Ayatollah Azari Qum! who strongly protested and denied Sayyid Ali 
Kh5mina'-I"s leadership, nominating Ayatollah al- `Lýzmj Bahjat instead, justifying 
535 Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaj, "How Supreme is Iran's Supreme Leader?, " Policy Watch # 1262, The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, (23 July, 2007), 1. 
536 Literally means the great verse of God, and it is the highest theological degree in the Shiite seminary system that is 
roughly equivalent to a Professorship in the Western educational system. 
537 David Monashri, Revolution at the Crossroads. - Iraný; Domis6cs and Regionals Ambitions (Washington D. C.: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), 40. 
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his objection on God and the Prophet's denial of such a leadership . 
538 In 1990, 
also, Ayatollah Munta? iCi who was the former-designated successor attacked the 
ruling clerics and indicted them of betraying Islam, so he was put in home- 
imprisonment. 539 
In such circumstances, the supporters of the new supreme-leader repeatedly 
used every possible means to assert the legitimacy of his leadership, and the 
Council of Experts re-emphasized the legitimacy of Kh5mina'Vs election on 
several occasions and proclaimed this election 'a good decision . 
640 Furthermore, 
his supporters recalled the words of praise and commendation of Sayyid Ali 
KMmina'i by the late Imam Khomeini; on one occasion, the adherents of the 
new Rahbar publicly broadcast an old letter from Khomeini addressed to Sayyid 
Ali Kh5mina'i in which the Imam deemed the election of Khýimina`i for 
Presidential Office a blessing from God, being as he was a mujýhid committed to 
the straight line of Islam and very knowledgeable in both religion and politics. 
The Imam also considered Khamina'-i one of the pillars of the IR when he 
stated: "I consider you one of the strong cornerstones of the Islamic Republic, 
acquainted and committed brother in doctrinal issues, and protector of the 
fi 1154 1 Additionally, doctrinal principles of the absolute authority of the aq)77 
Ayatollah KMmina'fl not only received the vow of loyalty from the constitutional 
authorities (executive, judicial, and legislative), but also the two branches of the 
military, namely the army and the Revolutionary Guards, declared their 
allegiance as did the state's elite well-known clergy among whom was Ahmad, 
the son of Imam Khomeini, who congratulated Ayatollah Ali Khýmina`i and 
538 Nifi n A. M usad, $un ' al-Qark fl- Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- , Arabiyya-a1-Irjnyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir5sýt al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 85. 
539 Ferecloun Hoveyda, "the Second Death of Ayatollah Khomeini, " Brown Journal of World Affairs IX: 2, (Mriter/Spring 
2003), 207. 
540 Nifin A. Musad, $un ' al-Qafik ff Iran wa al- 'Iiljqjt al- 'Arabiyya-al-Inýnyya (Beirut: Markaz Dir5s. 6t al-Wahda al- 
'Arabiyya, 2001), 85-6. 
541 http: //www. moqawama. org/-Ieragibkhitab. php? filename=2005060. 
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proudly expressed his happiness for the unity of the leadership that "blinded the 
enemies of the Islamic regime. Ff542 
Noticeably, there were two significant factors present in the revision of the 1979 
constitution and the succession of Imam Khomeini. On the one hand, the 
abolition of the two prerequisites of Ma)ji`iyya and the recognition of the 
majority of the people, the characteristics that attached the concept waffal-faqfh 
to Shi'ism, could provide another evidence and place this concept in a broader 
non-sectarian Islamic context by which it could have equally opened the office of 
the wali faqih for the other qualified Sunni fuqahj regardless of the sectarian 
belief, and sustain the claim that this concept could have been designated for a 
role that expanded beyond Iranian borders, as has been discussed in depth in 
the previous chapter. 
On the other hand, the revision of the 1979 constitution in general and 
particularly the reformulation of the office of the wali faqih after ten years of 
actual implementation of the concept, carries another significance which could 
have been considered an evaluating attempt at the outcome of such an 
implementation. Hence, the strengthening of the political authority of the wali 
faqih while degrading his religious qualifications seems to be a conclusion of this 
evaluation. For that reason, this attempt could have provided the legitimacy for 
the new wa#y al-faqih to reasonably review all the correlated policies in which 
the revolutionary policy of Islamic unity (al-waýda al-Islamiyya) perhaps 
becomes a priority. 
542 Shireen T. Hunter, "Post-Khomeini Iran, " Fbreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90), 134,136. 
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6.4. THE NEW PHASE OF AL-TAQRiB: A GENUINE DEPARTURE FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY WAODA OF THE KHATT-I IMAM OR A PRAGMATIC 
OVERHAUL? 
Constitutionally, the new waliy al-faqfh Sayyid Ali Khýimina`i was expected to 
activate and promote both domestically and internationally the principle of 
Islamic unity. He publicly announced his full commitment in the KhaýT-i Imam 
(Imam Khomeini's political line); however, the lack of the jurisprudential 
legitimacy and political popularity, 543 as a result of the separation between the 
MJ)ji'iyya and Rahbariyya in the amendments of the 1989 constitution, became 
the stumbling block that seemed to impede the new Supreme-leader from 
identically tracking the revolutionary approach of Imam Khomeini in this respect. 
Actually, the energetic nature of the Imam's previous approach turned out to be 
fruitless and created severe reactions that resulted in the Isolation of the Islamic 
Republic from its Islamic milieu. Therefore, Sayyid Ali Khýmina-i was realistic in 
developing his own tactics to accomplish the strategic objective of Imam 
Khomeini within his own potentials. Accordingly, he initially used the call for 
Islamic unity to guarantee the solidarity of the Iranian people and present the 
Iranian nation as an example model for this intended Islamic unity, where he 
had to rely on his political constitutional authority. He had exclaimed such an 
intention four months after his election in a speech delivered to the first 
conference on Islamic unity and the third conference in a row that was held in 
Tehran in the period from 12 th to 17 th October, 1989. In it he stated: 
Indeed, when we emphasize our wish for achieving a unity between our 
Sunni and Shii brothers and between all different madhihib (sects), so 
543 Hoveyda asserts "the official pollsters also discovered that Ayatollah Khamina'i, the powerful "Supreme Leader", was 
the most unpopular figure in the country"; see Feredoun Haveyda, the Second Death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Brown 
Joumal of World Affairs IX: 2, (Winter/Spring 2003), 207. 
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we call primary for a unity between the different groups (firaq) within the 
Iranian people. '44 
Furthermore,, Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'! clearly expressed the desire to revise the 
current revolutionary policy to promote Islamic unity to a new modus vivendi 
approach 
545 in the same speech when he explained his understanding of this 
much wished-for Islamic unity; 
The second meaning of unity is that the different Islamic groups (firaq) 
should try to come closer to one another. They have to understand each 
other better and must try hard to discern by a mutual comparison of 
their madhift how large the measure of their agreement is. There are 
many fatwa of fuqahj (religious jurisprudents) and ulami that can 
promote the taqr1fb between the madhihib, when they are analyzed as 
the basis of the scientific criteria of the flqh Ourisprudence). That is the 
reason why we have a sincere wish to found Dir al-taqrlb bayn al- 
madhJhib al-. 151imiyya (House of Reconciliation between the Islamic 
Sects) and want to realize this wish. 546 
One might inquire if this could be a significant retreat from Imam Khomeini's 
political line in which Sayyid Ali Khýimina'fi replaced the Imam"s concept of 
w^la (unity) with a new concept of al-Taqrib (rapprochement)? Indeed, the 
Arabic term al-Taqrib appears to be different from the other Arabic term of 
waýda not only in terms of the literal meaning but also in its perception of reality 
and effective mechanism that was imposed due to two essential motives. Firstly, 
544 Quoted in Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqnj-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a 
Trojan Horse of Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem Times: Religious Culture 
and Political History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 337. 
545 Ibid, 337. 
546 Quoted in Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqnb): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a 
Trojan Horse of Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., [-he Twelver 5hia in Modem Time5: Rellglous Culture 
and Political History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
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the new approach seemed to be more suitable for the new su preme- leader's de 
facto authority which lacked the required religious legitimacy (Ma6V Vyya). Unlike 
Kh5mina'T, the religiously qualified Imam Khomeini, in his great effort to restore 
Islamic unity (waýda Islimiyya), heavily depended on his religious legitimacy as 
the maiji "A "5 (the highest source of emulation of Shi'ism of the time) when he 
employed the religious fatwas to eradicate some of the long sectarian conflict 
that had formed the major obstacle to preventing or maybe delaying such a 
unity. According to Abd al-Kar-im b-i Azar Shabb, Sayyid Kh5mina'-i was aware of 
the difference between the two terms of waýda and taqrlf-b and he chose the 
latter. 547 
Secondly, the disappointing outcome of Imam Khomeini's confrontational 
approach imposed such a modification. The Imam's clarion call for Islamic unity 
provoked the hostility of governments in the Islamic world- particularly the 
surrounding countries - against the Islamic Republic. These governments viewed 
such a policy as a serious threat to their existence. Also at the same time, it 
turned out to be ineffective in achieving its genuine target in transferring the 
Islamic revolution beyond the Iranian borders. Brunner notices: 
One reason for this shift in the concept of the country's foreign policy 
may be seen in the apparent failure to spread the revolutionary spirit 
anywhere abroad. 
548 
547 Dr. Abd al-Ka6m bi Azar Shabb, who is an active member of al-Majma' al-'Alami li al-Taqn-b bayn al-%iadhýihib al- 
Isl5miyya, asserts this in an interview with RisNat al-Taqnl-b, see the URL 
http: //www. taghrib. org/arabic/nashat/elmia/markaz/nashatat/elmia/matboat/resalataItaghdb/15/12. htm AJsol Ayatollah 
Taskhirii, the present Secretary-General of Majma' al-Taqn-b, distinguishes between the two concepts of al -Wahda and al- 
Taqn-b in his work m6a al-Mu'tamar5t al-Dawliyya hawla al-Wahda wa a1-Taqnb; check Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Taskhiri, 
m6a al-Mu'tamar5t al-Dawliyya hawla al-Wahda wa al-Taqr-ib (Tehran: l(it5bkh5nah Milff Ir5n, 2003). 
548 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumeni5m in Me 20th Century. - the Azhar and Shiism between Rapprochement and restrain 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 384. 
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Surprisingly, one of the proposed institutions was initially granted the no less 
meaningful title Dir al-Taqrib that was established by Mohammad Taq-i al-Qumi 
in Cairo in the 1940s although the name of its founder was being evaded as 
much as possible 549 thanks to the IR's undervaluing attitude towards Shaykh 
Mohammad al-Qum! during the time of Imam Khomeini, (as already discussed 
above) when it appeared to be another deflection from Imam Khomeini's political 
line. 
6.4.1. MU'TAMAR ATBA' AHL AL-BAYT 
Within a year of his election, Sayyide Ali Khýmina )i put his ideas into practice, 
and Tehran hosted mu "tamar Atbj " AN al-Bayt (the conference of the Followers 
of the House of the Prophet) on Monday 21st May, 1990 (or 25 th of ShawwN 
1410 in the H! jCi calendar) ; 550 more than three hundred Shi'i clerics and 
intellectuals participated from all over the Islamic world. 
Significantly, there were two possible reasons behind the hosting of this 
conference. On the one hand,, it could be utilised as an opportunity to evaluate 
Tehran's previous plan to promote Islamic unity ten years after its 
implementation. On the other hand, Sayyid Ali Khýimina )i , who lacked the 
necessary religious credentials to deal with such a jurisprudential issue as we 
have seen, could have been trying to obtain religious backing from the Shi'i 
clerics and intellectuals attending the conference for his proposed taqr1F-, b policy 
rather than seeking such religious support from the traditionalist Shi'i maiji's 
living In Iran, a matter that might shake his already questionable authority in the 
549 ibid, 382-3. 
550 This date was stated on the Official website of al-Majma' al-'Alami li ahlul-Bayt at URL http: //www. Ahl al-Bayt. org 
while Wilfried Buchta cited different date in which he asserted that the conference was held a month eadier in the period 
between 20-24 April, 1990; see Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' AJ-Taqni-b): a Veritable Ecumenical 
Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., The Twelver ShIj in Modem TImes., 
Religious Culture and Political History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
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eyes of the populace and jeopardise his future plan to claim al-Ma)ji (1YYa al- 
"týzmj. Sayyid Kh5mina' T's plan succeeded when the final declaration of the 
conference adopted his rapprochement policy: paragraph 2 of the declaration 
presented the delegates' request for the Supreme-leader, Sayyid Ali Kh5mina ) I/ 
to e sta bIish al-Majma " al- "Alami # al- Taqrib bayn al-Madhihib al-Islimiyya (t he 
International Council for Proximity among the Islamic Schools of Thought); also, 
they appealed for the founding of another institution by the name of al-Majma " 
al- "Alami # AN al-Bayt (the World Assembly for the People of the Prophet's 
House) that was documented in paragraph 9 of the same declaration. 551 
6.4.2. AL-MAIMA' AL-'ALAMi AL-TAQRIB BAYN AL-MADHAHIB 
AL-ISLAMIYYA (THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR PROXIMITY 
AMONG THE ISLAMIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT) 
At the instigation of Ayatollah Ali Khamina'-i who pretended to be complying with 
the request of the aforementioned conference, al-Majma " al- "Alami # al-Taqrib 
bayn al-Madhihib al-Islimiyya, the International Society for Proximity 552 among 
the Islamic Schools of Thought, 553 was established on 4 th October, 1990. As 
Farid Mirbaghari notices "On many occasions, what is thought to be a foreign 
policy is actually conducted for domestic consumption ...... 
554 Significantly, this 
date means that the Majma " was established two months after Iraq had invaded 
Kuwait and the US forces and its Western allies had a physical presence on the 
opposite shore of the Persian Gulf, which raises the question of whether the 
551 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqni-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem TI-mes: Religious Culture and Polltical 
History(Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
552 The official employment of the translated literal meaning of the Arabic term taqn-b (proximity) in the tide of this 
institute is inaccurate and does not reflect the intended conceptual meaning of the term; therefore, I rather prefer the 
use of some other English equivalents that give better clarification for the concept of al-Taqrlb such as rapprochement, 
reconciliation, and the Christian term ecumenism; another lingual mistake occurs in the official website address of the 
Maima' when they use the wrong transliterated word taghrib, which literally means westernising, instead of the correct 
form of the word taqr-ib. See the URL http: //www. taghrib. org. 
553 The name of the society has been changed recently to The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought 
554 Farid Mirbaghari, "Shi'ism and Iran's Foreign Policy, " The Muslim World 94 (October 2004), 555. 
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founding of this institution was an Iranian reaction to the development of the 
political events of the time - not to mention another remarkable event at the 
domestic level corresponding with the election of the members of the Assembly 
of experts. So the waffAmr al-Muslimbn Sayyid Ali Khýimina )i could have been 
aiming to influence the Sunni votes and direct them to preferable candidates of 
this election. In the following section, unless otherwise stated, the analysis will 
heavily rely on a pamphlet that has been published by Majma " al-Taqrib in 
Tehran in 2004 to present the story of Majma 'al-TaqrlFb, how it worked, and the 
significant role that it meant to play. 555 
To begin with., Majma " al-Taqrib identifies Maohihib islimiyYa (Islamic sects) 
according to its strategy, 556 as the well-known jurisprudential schools that 
employ a harmonious judgemental system based on the holy Qur'jn and the 
Prophet's Traditions (Sunna). For that reason, Majma " al-Taqrib recognises only 
eight jurisprudential schools among the Islamic sects eligible to be involved in al- 
Taqrib activities of the Majma ": the ýianafi-, Shifl"'i, Maliki, and tianbafffrorn the 
Sunni side, and the ". 1thng "Ashri, Zqyali, and Buhar, 3557 from the Shi, i side in 
558 addition to the Ibidi 
According to its statute, the constitution of Majma " al-Taqrl-b contains twenty 
nine articles to organise and control its work at domestic and international levels. 
555 For more details refer to Sayyid JaIN Mir Aq5y , al-majma 
' al -. 41ami # al- Taqrlb bayn al-Madhihib al-Islimlyyx 
Ahdgfih wa manhajih wa Munjazitih (Tehran: Fajr al-Isl5m, 2004); also, this pamphlet is published online on the official 
website of Majma' al-Taqn-b at the URL 
httD: //www. taqhrib. orq/arabic/nashat/esdarat/kotob/arabic/books/lamha/index. htm (last visit 12 of December 2007). 
556 This strategy was edited and approved by the Supreme Council of the Majma' in its meeting on 23rd and 24th 
December, 2002. 
557 it is a group derived from the Shi'ite Ism5'liiyya; the followers of this sect are mostly located in the indian Peninsula, 
and its name Bahara means merchants in the Hindu language. 
558 Sayyid JaW Mir Aqýy, al-Afajma ' al- 'Alami # al-Taqnb bayn al-Madhjhlb al-Islimiyya: Ahdjlrlh wa Manhajlh wa 
Muniazitih (Tehran: Fajr al-Isl5m, 2004), 25. 
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Among these there are a number of significant articles worth reviewing. For 
instance, article 1 identifies Majma " al-Taqrýb as an international, academic, and 
cultural Islamic institution founded by Ayatollah al-'U? m5 Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'-i in 
1411, which has its own legal and independent identity and it is managed 
according to this constitution. Article 2 nominates Tehran as the main site of 
Majma " al-Taqrib with the possibility to establish other branches and offices in 
different cities andcountries as needed . Article 3 emphasises that the supreme 
supervision and observation over Majma " al-Taqrib is granted to the waffAmr al- 
Muslimin, the Superior Guardian of Muslims, Ayatollah al-'U? m5 Ali Kh5mina'-I. 
One might inquire about the legitimacy and aims of this article if Majma " al- 
Taqrib supposedly represents all Islamic sects and each sect has its own 
definition and representation for the term, waffAmr al-Muslimin. 
Also, article 5 numbers the objectives of Majma " al-Taqrib according to which it 
has six main goals: 
1) Helping in reviving and spreading Islamic culture and teaching and 
defending attacks on the holy Qur'jn and the Prophet. 
2) Seeking all available paths to achieve the acquaintance and 
understanding among the ulami, Intellectuals, and leaders in the Islamic 
world and in different fields such as ideologies, jurisprudence, society, 
and politics. 
3) Preaching the idea of al-Taqrl-b among Muslim intellectuals and the elites 
to pass it on to the masses in the Islamic world and alert them to the 
antagonistic conspiracy to rupture the unity of the Islamic nation. 
4) Aiming to arbitrate and propagate the principle of interpretative 
judgement and inference among the Islamic sects. 
5) Making every effort to create coordination and establish a united Islamic 
front against the informational conspiracy and cultural attack of the 
enemies of Islam according to the uncontested Islamic principles. 
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6) Denying the sources of mistrust and suspicious among the followers of 
the Islamic sects. 
Additionally, article 6 reveals the methods that Majma " al-Taqrl-b would rely on 
to achieve it goals and objectives: 
1) To recognise and communicate with different Islamic organisations, 
centres, and individuals in terms of creating the basis for mutual activities. 
2) To compose and publish academic and social books, journals and research 
studies that focus on the mutual subjects among Islamic sects. 
3) To find and expand the activities of the theological schools and 
universities in the field of Islamic sciences. 
4) To hold conferences and participate in all relevant activities. 
5) To join the membership of the international organisations that might serve 
the objectives of Majma " al-Taqrib, such as the Islamic League and 
United Nations. 
6) To institute at-Tqrib groups all over the world. 
7) To support the centres, institutions and individuals who favour and adhere 
to the notion of at-Taqrib. 
8) To establish centres and branches in important areas as needed. 
Article 7 of the constitution explains that Majma " al-Taqrib consists of three 
boards: the General Assembly, the Supreme Council, and the Secretary-General, 
and the articles 8- 25 explain the mechanism of Majma " al-Taqrlr-b through 
which the three boards function. Accordingly, the role of the General Assembly 
is consultative, and its members are elected by the Supreme Council for six years 
from among the jurisprudents, intellectuals and leaders of Islamic sects from all 
over the world who adhere to the ideology of al-Taqrfb among the Islamic sects: 
article 8. Although the General Assembly is supposed to gather annually 
according to the Majma ( constitution, it was not until 1996 when the Majma' 
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was able to hold the first meeting for its General Assembly due to undefined 
difficulties. "' 
Articles 13 - 
20560 are dedicated to defining the role and functions of the 
Supreme Council. For example, article 13 states that the Supreme Council plays 
the legislative role and all of its members are elected by waff al-Amr (the 
Supreme Guardian of Muslims) for six years from among Jurisprudents, 
intellectual, and Islamic characters from all Islamic sects. This article has three 
paragraphs: 
(1) The Secretary-General is a member of the Supreme Council 
(2) The members of this council are members of the General Assembly as well 
(3) The membership in the Supreme Council is renewable 
Article 14 emphasises that the Supreme Council of Majma ' al-Taqrib is in charge 
before waffal-Amr according to its authority and responsibilities, while article 15 
asserts that the Supreme Council is composed of a minimum of fifteen members 
and maximum of twenty-one. According to article 16 the president and vice- 
president are elected by the majority of its members every two years. 
Signiflcantly, the meeting of the council is officially considered by the attendance 
of the majority of members in Iran, and its decisions will be recognised by the 
acceptance of the majority of the delegates according to article 17. The present 
Supreme Council has twenty-one members: 561 
559 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqn-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende edits., The Twelver Shia in Modern Times. - Religious Culture and Political 
History(Boston: Brill, 2001), 340. 
560 Sayyid JaW Mir Aqýy, al-Mayrua' al-'Alami # al-Taqrib bayn al-Madhih1b al-Islimiyya: Ahdjfih wa Manhailh wa 
Munjazj&h (Tehran: Fajr al-lslýim, 2004), 18-20. 
561 Ibid, 12-13. 
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1. The President of the council Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad B5qir al- 
ýaklim (Iraq )562 
2. The Vice-president Shaykh al-MOlawl Mohammad Isýýq Madan-i 
(Iran) 
3. The Secretary-General Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Taskh-ir-I (Iran) 
4. Ayatollah Mohammad W5'i? -Zýcla Khurýs5n-i (Iran) 
5. Shaykh Abd al-Hýcl-i Awang (Malaysia) 
6. Shaykh Ahmad Mohammad al-Shýrnfi (Republic of Yemen) 
7. Ayatollah Mohammad ýusayn FaOI Allah (Lebanon) 
8. ýujjat al-Isl5m Dr. Abd al-Karim b-i Azar Shir5z-1 (Iran) 
9. ýujjat al-Islým ýasan Rab5n-i (Iran) 
10. Shaykh Ahmad ibn ýarnad al-Khal-il-i (Oman) 
11. Dr. Abd al-Ralý-irn Ali (Sudan) 
12. Dr. Mohammad Sal-im al-'Awwý (Egypt) 
13. Ayatollah Mohammad Aýif M^inll (Afghanistan) 
14. Dr. Sayyid Ja'far ShahTd-l (Iran) 
15. Hujjat al-Islým Mohammad Hasan Akhtar-i (Iran) 
16. ýujjat al-Islým Mahmud Ahmad-i Ir5q-i (Iran) 
17. Shaykh Mohammad Shaykh al-Isl5m (Iran) 
18. Oujjat al-Isl5m Sayyid S5jid Naqaw-i (Pakistan) 
19. Dr. Mohammad al-'A$-i (Syria) 
20. ýujjat al-Islam 'Abbýs Ali SulaymýnT (Iran) 
562 He was assassinated on his way out after one of the Jum'a prayers in Najaf and the council has not elected a 
replacement for him yet. 
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21. Oujjat al-Islým Musa al-MOsaw-i (Iran) 
According to article 21, the Secretary-General represents the highest executive 
position in Majma " a1-Taqri&, the Supreme Council of the Majma " is responsible 
for nominating candidates to the position of Secretary-General to the waff al- 
Amr, who is authorised to entrust one among them to the position for four years. 
Ayatollah Khýimina'! chose tiqjjat al-Islim W5'i? -Zýida Khurýs5n-i, a Shi'i scholar 
from Mashhad, for the position of Secretary-General of the Majma ". W5'i? -Z5da 
Khur5s5n-i was born in Mashhad in 1925. During the 1940s and 1950s, he 
studied flqh and ur>01 al-fiqh in Qum under some of the well-known ulami of the 
time, such as Ayatollah al- `týzma BurOjerd-i, Ayatollah Ar5k-i and Ayatollah 
Golp5yg5n-l. After his return to Mashhad, W5'i? -Z5da Khurasan-i resumed the 
management of Mishkit, the theological Journal of the rich and powerful Imam 
Rida Foundation in Mashhad, becoming the Editor- in - Chief. 563 The recent 
Secretary-General of the Majma" is Shaykh Mohammad Ali Taskh-ir-i who has 
been in the post since 2004; Shaykh TaskhiCi, also served as Secretary -Genera I 
of the Majma " AN al-Baytfrom its founding till 1999.564 
Majma al-Taqrib acknowledges five legitimate sources of its financial income for 
Majma " al-Taqrlb, as article 26 explains: a) endowments; b) the numerous 
activities of Majma " al-Taqribr, c) financial aids from legal and intrinsic sources; 
d) loans and e) all the other sources that the Supreme Council approves. 
However, the financial sources for the large budget of Majma al-Ta rb appear 7 L 
to be questionable since none of the aforementioned sources is clearly defined, 
which suggests that the Supreme-leader may be the sole sponsor for this 
563 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqr-ib): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem Times: Religious Culture and Pollttiý31 
History(Boston: Brill, 2001), 338 note (20). 
564 A brief biography of Ayatollah Mohammad Ni TaskhiCi will be provided below. 
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institution. Buchta asserts "'the Society [Majma " al-Taqrib] acknowledged that it 
is sponsored by the 
organisations. ir565 
waff-ye faqlf7,7 and some undefined charitable 
From the fore-mentioned articles, it appears that the representation of the Shi 
and Iranian delegates have been dominant in the Supreme Council of Majma 
at-Taqrib responsible for its legislative and executive functions for out of twenty- 
one members in the Supreme Council eleven are Iranians, and twelve of the 
Council members are Shi'ites, not to mention the chief of this Council and the 
Secretary-General both are Shi'ites. For that reason, it has been widely 
considered that Majma " al-Taqrib has been essentially oriented to serve Iranian 
national interests and it also means that Iran stands to gain a stronger influence 
not only among the Shiite communities abroad but also the Muslims of the 
world. Hence, it has been said that the Majma " is merely a useful and effective 
instrument for Iranian foreign policy through which the Islamic Republic would 
politically use Shi'i minorities to serve that national interest, spread Shi'ism in 
the Sunni Islamic countries, and prepare the way for the Iranian intelligence 
services to recruit secret agents in different countries including the West, 
566 
and 
so strengthen the political role of the Iranian Republic in both regional and 
international affairs. The fact that Majma " al-Taqrib is under the direct 
supervision and observation of the warl Amr al-Muslimin, the Superior Guardian 
of all Muslims, who is constitutionally in charge to formulate Iranian foreign 
policy, has made such a claim even more compelling. 
565 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' A]-Taqni-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende edits., The Twelver 5hia in Modem TIMes: Religlous Culture and P016-ý-31 
H/story(Boston: Brill, 2001), 341. 
566 Shmuel Bar, "Sunnis and Shiite: Between Rapprochement and Conflict, " Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 2 (2005), 
90. 
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However, this claim seems to be either superficial or perhaps politicized to a 
certain extent to maintain the present political siege that has been imposed on 
the Islamic Revolution since its success in 1979 through the intimidation of the 
neighboring Sunni community and their governments, alarmed at the so-called 
Shi'i expansion at their expense. On the contrary, it would indeed be more 
appropriate to look at the founding of Majma " al-Taqrib as an outcome of 
evaluating the IR's policies for its previous revolutionary approach regarding the 
issue of Islamic unity that implemented the export of the Islamic Revolution as 
the appropriate means to achieve their ultimate objective of establishing the 
Islamic federal state; such an evaluation became inevitable after the demise of 
Imam Khomeini and the election of a new leadership perceived to be lacking the 
religious and political authority of Imam Khomeini. The new Supreme-leader, 
Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'-i had to develop new policies appropriate to his capacity and 
at the same time bypass the mistakes of previous policies. For example, Imam 
Khomeini's charismatic leadership made his policies unchallengeable and his 
decisions authoritative so they received the support of the vast majority of 
Iranians and the Shiites of the world - even though they led to some 
catastrophic outcomes such as the war with Iraq, something Ayatollah Ali 
Khýmina'i is pleading for. Additionally, it could have been that the new 
Supreme-leader had evaluated the reason for the failure of the previous 
revolutionary approach as the propagation of Islamic unity, and reached the 
conclusion that the Islamic world was still suffering from symptoms of long 
sectarian conflict. The bloodshed which had marked Islamic history had 
generated a situation of mistrust between the various Islamic sects on the one 
hand, and a sort of sectarian reclusiveness that closed the channels of 
intellectual dialogue among Muslim scholars on the other hand - not to mention 
the role of Western colonialism in promoting this status quo through 
consolidating the concept of "the national state" - so the restoration of Islamic 
unity merely becomes a sort of unrealistic idealism of the imagination. 
2-54 
Accordingly, Ayatollah Khýimina'-[ had to develop a progressive tactic based on 
founding a transitional preceding stage that will pave the road for the ultimate 
restoration of Islamic unity. Efforts would be focused on the re-establishment of 
confidence among the different Islamic sects with priority given to highlighting 
the aspects of agreement and disregarding the marginal controversial issues; this 
hopefully would normalize relations among all Muslims and revive the culture of 
Islamic unity by creating the necessary popular grass roots for it to come about. 
So with this in mind, Ayatollah Kh5minal, in one of his public speeches, revealed 
the intention of founding Majma " al-Taqrib, identifying the concept of the unity 
that the new institution has been designated to accomplish: 
The second meaning of unity is that the different Islamic groups (fl'raq) 
should try to move closer to one another. They have to understand each 
other better and must try hard to discern by a mutual comparison of 
their madhihib how large the measure of their agreement is. There are 
many fatwa of fuqah, 5 (religious jurisprudents) and ulami that can 
promote taqrib between the madhihib, when they are analyzed as the 
basis of the scientific criteria of fl"qh Ourisprudence). That is the reason 
why we have a sincere wish to found Dir al-taqrib bayn al-madhihib al- 
. 
fsljmiyya (the House of Reconciliation between the Islamic Sects) and 
want to realize this wish. 567 
Significantly Ayatollah Taskhirli, the Secretary-General of the Majma ", explicitly 
pointed to the transitional nature of Majma " al-Taqrib when considered the 
strategy of al-Taqrib is only a manoeuvre to achieve Islamic unity. 
568 Indeed, 
Taskh-iCi's testimony is compatible with the content of article 28 which implies an 
567 Quoted in Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' A]-Taqr-ib): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a 
Trojan Horse of Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Encle edits., The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious 
Culture 
and Pbli6calHlstory (Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
568 Ayatollah Taskhiri asserted this view in a speech delivered before the Wultaqý al -Taqn-bfial-Fikrwaal-Wahd5fial- 
Arnal (Forum of Rapprochement in Thought and Unity in Action) that was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 4th 
September, 
2007; see the URL http: //news. taghrib. org/news. php? action=fuIInews&jd=318 (last visit 12th January, 
2008). 
extraordinary possibility for the termination of this institution and gives the 
impression of its impermanence: 
At the dissolution of Majma " al-Taqrýb, all its movable funds and 
immovable are placed at the disposal of waff Amr al-Muslimin (the 
Guardian of Muslims) for utilizing them in the interests of the Islamic 
umma. 569 
In addition, the large representation of Iranian and Shi'i figures in the Supreme 
Council of the Majma " al-Taqrib has been presented as evidence for utilising this 
institution to promote Shi'i propaganda while serving Iranian national interests. 
However, it seems that this Iranian and Shi'i dominance in this council is 
inevitable due to a number of practical reasons. First of all, the Supreme Council 
represents the executive administration of Majma " al-Taqrfb and is mainly in 
charge of managing daily activities, so the members of this council have to be 
residents of Tehran to carry out their duties, as was the case with Ayatollah 
Mohammad Býiqir al-ýakim, the Iraqi high ranking cleric who chose Tehran as his 
optional exile. Also, the membership in the Supreme Council would appear to be 
undesirable by most of the Muslim ulami and intellectuals who are activists in al- 
Taqrfb encleavours, since this membership is voluntary for which the member will 
not receive any income. More significantly, the members of this council have to 
maintain direct and frequent contact with wali Amr al-Muslimin, Ayatollah Ali 
Khýmina'!, which could be politically sensitive for them and for security reasons 
put them under suspicion by their government, especially the non- Iranian Sunni 
countries. 
To do its mandated role, Majma " al-Taqrib institutionalised a number of schemes 
through which it launches numerous periodic activities. 
569 Sayyid JaW Mir Aq5y, al-Majma' al-'Alami # al-Taqnb bayn al-Madhift al-Islimiyyx Ahdjfih wa Manhaph wa 
Munjazit7h (Tehran: Fajr al-Isl5m, 2004), 22. 
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6.4.2.1. The Annual Conference on Islamic Unity 
Majma " al-Taqr6 holds an international conference to discuss Islamic unity and 
the paths to strengthen it from 12 th to 17 th of Rabi " al-Awwal every year. The 
significance of this date is due to the fact that the twelfth of Rabi" al-Awwal 
represents the Prophet's birthday according to the Sunni sources, while Shi'ite 
sources affirm that the Prophet was born on the seventeenth of the same 
month; therefore, the week from 12 th to 1 7th of Rabi" al-Awwal is seen as the 
perfect time of year for this conference to emphasis the status of the Prophet 
Mohammad among all Muslims as a symbol of Islamic unity. It also sends a 
clear message that some differences among Islamic sects are manageable when 
good deeds prevail. Another significance of this date lies in the fact that the 
seventeenth of Rabi" al-Awwal is the birthday of Imam la'far al-5ýdiq who was 
the seventh Imam for the Twelver Shi'ites and widely respected among Sunnis, 
as he was the Master of the Imams of the Sunni schools of thought. 
Furthermore, the conference is politically employed as a replacement for the 
annual week of Islamic unity that was instigated by Ayatollah Munta4ir-1 during 
the time of Imam Khomeini. 
Majma " al-Taqrib has already held twelve conferences, in addition to the four 
conferences, the week of Islamic unity, held prior to its foundation. 570 Several 
prominent ulami members and intellectuals have attended these conferences 
from Iran and other Islamic countries representing all various Islamic sects. 
6.4.2.2. Periodicals and Journals 
Majma " al-Taqrib issues several publications in Arabic and Farsi in which they 
discuss all relevant subjects to al-Taqrlb and Islamic unity. For instance, Risilat 
al-Taqrl-b is a quarterly periodical that is published in Arabic, called after the 
570 The 17th, 18th and 19th conferences were resper-tvely held in 2005,2006 and 2007. 
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Journal once published by Dir al-Taqrib in Cairo till early the 1970s; the first 
volume of this periodical was issued in Ramadan, 1413, and forty volumes of this 
specialised periodical have been published so far. 
Additionally, Akhbjr al-Taqrib is a monthly Journal published in Farsi for updated 
news and information of Maima " al-Taqrlb(s efforts and activities; however, it 
was replaced with another monthly Farsi publication called P[k TaqrlFb after forty 
issues, and ten issues of the new Journal have been presently printed. 
As well, al-Majma " publishes an annual periodical in Arabic and Persian entitled 
Viza Nima Taqrib, designed to publish the papers of participants at the annual 
conference on Islamic unity; eleven issues of this Journal have appeared so far, 
but three of them had been printed before the establishment of Majma " al- 
Taqrfb. 
6.4.2.3. The University of the Islamic Schools of Thought (Jamiat al- 
Madh4hib al-Islimiyya) 
The plan to found an inter-sectarian Islamic university (-7ami "at al-madhihib al- 
islimiyya) could be traced back to November 1992 when the former president 
05shim-1 Rafsanjani expressed the intention of the Iranian government to 
establish such a university. This intention was activated by the Supreme-leader 
Sayyid Ali Kh5mina'fi who issued his commands to found the University of the 
Islamic Schools of Thought in 1413/1992 which were to contribute to improving 
al-TaqrlFbýýendeavours by raising new generations of preachers, researchers and 
teachers who are well-acquainted with all Islamic doctrines and sincere to al- 
TaqribSý concept, so it was attached to Majma " al-Taqrib. Although the 
pamphlets of Majma " al-Taqrfb and its official website confirm this as the official 
date of its establishment, the plan was postponed several times, however, and it 
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was not until the late 1990s when this university first opened to students: 
indeed, the university was founded after 12t" September, 1994 when Buchta 
interviewed Dr. Oasan TabaWiyýin, the designated head of the university in 
Tehran, who put the blame on financial difficulties for the postponing of its 
opening. 571 Moreover,, the University of the Islamic Schools of Thought consists 
of three colleges: the College of Islamic Doctrines, the College of the Sciences of 
Qur'jn and t1adith, and the College of Theology, Philosophy and Religion. The 
university has a Board of Trustees which is composed of eight members: the 
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary-General of Majma " al- 
Taqrib (who is the head of the Board of Trustees), the Minister of Research and 
Technology, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance, two faculty members nominated by the Secretary-General of Majma 
al-Taqrib, and the university Chancellor. 
6.4.3. AL-MAJMA' AL-'ALAMi Li AHL AL-BAYT (THE HOUSE OF 
THE PROPHET WORLD ASSEMBLY) 
Although the founding of this institute, al-Majma " al- 'Alaml- ff A171 al-Bayt (the 
House of the Prophet World Assembly) has received no attention from the 
Western scholars in the field, Wilfried Buchta's study Tehran Ecumenical Society 
f '352 (Majma " al-Taqrib): a veritable ecumenical revival or a Trojan horse o Iran 7' 
and Rainer Brunner's Islamic Ecumenism in the 206ý century: the Azhar and 
Shiism between rapprochement and restra#7573 appear to be the only exceptions; 
however, the researchers could have been confused with some inaccurate 
information which might have affected their interpretations and misled their 
analysis regarding the date of the establishment, the aims and objectives of this 
571 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' A]-Taqr-ib): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem Times: Religious Culture and Political 
History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 342. 
572 Wilfried Buchta, bid. 
573 Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Centzlry. - the Azhar and 5hlism between Rapprochement and restraln 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004). 
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institution, and its relationship with the aforementioned Ecumenical Society 
(Majma " al-Taqrib) in terms of disputes and cooperation. Given the paucity of 
studies, the official website of al-Majma " al- "Alami ff AN al-Bayt574 will be 
consulted as the major source for the present approach with some reference to 
the invaluable and exclusive information that Buchta and Brunner's studies 
provided. 
According to AN al-Bayt Assembly's website, the Supreme-leader of the IR 
agreed to institute al-Majma " al- "Alami IiAhl al-Bayt (the House of the Prophet 
World Assembly) at the request of the delegates who attended the conference of 
akAbi " AN al-Bayt that was held in Tehran on Monday, 21st May, 1990. 
Accordingly,, the first meeting for the General Assembly of al-Majma " al- "Alamfli 
AN al-Bayt was held in Tehran between 15th and 18 th of Shibin 1414 A. H. 
(which is 28th to 31st March, 1994). This date reflects the official establishment 
of this institution, a point that Buchta and Brunner appeared to miss and perhaps 
mistakenly confused it with the date of the conference of atbi " AN al-Bayt of 
1990 - notwithstanding that Buchta cited the request to establish both Majma ' 
al-Taqrlf-b and Majma " AN al-Bayt in paragraphs 2 and 9 of the final declaration 
of the aforesaid conference, as previously explained. 575 However, the founding 
of Majma ' AN al-Bayt was significantly delayed for more than four years since 
the first appeal to establish it,, made at the conference of AN al-Bayt in 1990 - 
unlike Majma " al-Taqrib that was established less than six months after the 
conference. Such a delay could raise several inquiries, such as had it been 
purposely scheduled? What were the reasons behind this delay? And what was 
the necessity for establishing a separate institute for the madhab of AN al-Bayt 
574 See the official Website at the URL http: //www. ahl-ul-bai. org. 
575 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' Al-Taqn-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Wemer Ende edits., The Twelver Shia in Modem Times: Rellgious Cu&we and Polltical 
H115tory (Boston: Brill, 2001), 338. 
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(mainly the Ja "fari and Zaydl) if they were already included with the other 
Islamic sects under the umbrella of Majma " al-Taqrib? 
Buchta claimed that the conservative Shi'i clerics who participated in the 
conference might have been vigilant to Kh5mina'-I's need for their support, so 
they imposed their will to create another institution for ahl al-Baytsý followers to 
act as the conservatives' retaliation to Khýmina'-I's proposed inter-sectarian 
institution (Majma " al-Taqrib), which they could use to hinder the activities of 
the latter or at least have an influential role in directing its policies. He leaned 
on the fact that two well-known members of the AN al-Bqýt Assembly, Ayatollah 
Mohammad Taskhiri (the Secretary-General of this institute) and Ayatollah 
Mohammad B5qir al-Ualdim, served on the Board of Directors of Majma " al- 
Taqrib to support his view. 576 
Yet, Buchta's claim does not seem to be unquestionable for a number of reasons. 
First of all, the conference of the followers of the Prophet's House was held at 
the instigation of the new supreme-leader Sayyid Ali Khamina'l, who initially 
aimed to escape the criticisms of the traditionalists and was looking for 
jurisprudential cover for his modified policy of a call for Islamic unity, not to 
mention the fact that the traditional clerics, who deemed the ruling according to 
the concept of wiliyat-i faqih as no less than an assault on the right of the 
hidden Zmam and distortion of the fundamental principles of Shi'ism, had 
distanced themselves from dealing with state affairs. Additionally, the 
participation of Ayatollahs Mohammad Taskhfirli and Mohammad 13ýqir al-Oak-im in 
the executive administration of Majma " al-Taqr6 was due to their well-known 
activities in the field of Islamic unity that preceded the establish of the Majma ". 
Last but not least, knowing that Majma' al-Taqrib had been established four 
576 bid, 351. 
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years before the founding of AN al-Bayt Assembly, so the nomination of a 
member of the Board of Directors of the former as the Secretary-General of the 
latter perhaps turns Buchta's evidence upside-down: Majma " al-Taqrl-b not only 
could have benefited from Ahlal-BaytAssembly but also had a greater impact on 
directing its activities, as will be evident when the aims and activities of this 
institution will be surveyed later in this chapter. 
Even though the founding AN al-Bayt Assembly has been officially directed 
towards the followers of the Prophet's house in general, it does reflect an inner 
challenge in Twelver Shi'ism between the traditionalists and the religio- 
politicians or what might be called the "Khomeinists", the followers of the KhaýN 
Imam in which the latter may have aimed to ultimately achieve three 
respectively correlating objectives. First of all, AN al-Bayt Assembly has been 
designated to preach for Imam Khomeini's political dogma among the Shi, ites of 
the world and mainly the followers of the traditional Twelver Shi'ism, since this 
dogma was not only revolutionary in its political aspects but also revisionist in 
terms of introducing new jurisprudential views. Such an intention could be 
inferred from the officially broadcast aims of this institution. According to the 
official website of AN al-Bayt world assembly, the institution is founded to 
achieve several purposes: 
1) To establish a connection with the followers and defenders of AN al-Bayt 
in all countries, regardless of their origins and groups. 
2) To propagate for the great individuals of Ahlal-Bayt 
3) To disseminate the ideologies and knowledge of Ahlal-Bayt 
4) To aid the followers of AN al-Bayt with financial support and improve their 
living conditions 




6) To print and disseminate the publications and precious cultural heritage 
about AN al-Bayt 
7) To establish economical co-operation among the followers of Ahlal-Bayt 
Having succeeded in this, the second target was to be automatically 
accomplished when the assembly met to choose the leader and the Ma)ji C lyya of 
Imam Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Ali Khýimina'-I, who claimed the title of 
Ayatollah immediately after his election. 577 Buchta, in a clear contradiction with 
his aforementioned claim, noticed such a goal when he stresses 
The ahl al-Bayt assembly pursues one main objective, namely to gain 
control over the political, social and religious affairs of the Shii 
communities throughout the world in order to centralize them under the 
leadership of the Iranian waff-ye faqfh Ali Kh5mene-i. "' 
The third purpose,, although it might be considered subsidiary, seems to be 
significant: the recognition of Kh5mina'-I's Ma)ji "iyya (source of imitation) would 
bring additional funds to his annual revenues from khums and zakit of the new 
followers, and such a considerable revenue would enrich the separate and 
independent budget of Ayatollah Kh5minal and help him to fulfil his political, 
constitutional and religious commitments. In other words Ayatollah Khýmina'! 
could have used this amount to financially support numerous activities among 
them the activities of Majma" al-Taqrlfb. It became known that the Majma C 
depends on the economic aid received from Ayatollah Khamina"i. as waffAmr al- 
Muslimin, to cover the expenses of its activities. For instance, the establishment 
of -7ami 
"at al-Madhihib al-Islimiyya had been postponed several times in spite 
of the fact that such a project was first announced in November 1992, but the 
577 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious legitimacy in Iran, " The Middle Ea5tJournal 53: 2, (Spring 1999), 207. 
578 Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran Ecumenical Society (Majma' AJ-Taqni-b): a Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of 
Iran? " in Rainer Brunner and Wemer Ende edits., The Twelver 5hia in Modern TI-mes: Religious Culture and Political 
History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 351. 
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financial shortages caused frequent delays, as already mentioned; however, it 
appears remarkable that the university project was finally accomplished after AN 
al-BaytAssembly had been founded. 
Also, the activities of this institution perhaps provide further indication for the 
economic motivations for this institute. According to its official website, AN al- 
BaytAssembly conducts various activities in different areas such as productivity, 
service and commerce and takes advantage of the donations of benevolent 
people to support its aims and objectives. As a result, AN al-Bayt Assembly 
utilises its website to market its economical activities and application forms for 
different activities are provided, such as religious tourism to Mecca, Medina, and 
the Shi'ite sacred shrines, membership of the Shi'i Muslim Merchants' 
Association, booking qualified guides to escort during the ziyjrat (visit to the 
sacred shrines of AN al-Bayt inside Iran and abroad). Additionally, its website 
supplies donation forms for different kinds of charities, such as mawqOfat (sing. 
waqf means endowment) and naafhL7r (sing. naafhr means vow or votive 
donation). 
Ultimately one might wonder about the reasons for delaying the establishment of 
the AN al-Bayt Assembly for a period of four years, after Majma ' al-Taqrl-b was 
founded in 1990. Placing AN al-Bayt Assembly in its historical context would 
merely propose two reasonable possibilities for this delay. Since AN al-Bayt 
Assembly has been essentially oriented towards non-Iranian Shi, ite, this puts 
forward the proposal that the could have been due to the unsatisfactory 
relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Iraqi Shi'ites, the largest Shi'i 
community outside Iran, because of the Islamic Republic's disappointing 
response to the Iraqi Shi'ites' request for support during their uprising against 
the Ba "thFs regime of Saddam Ousayn in March, 1991; then the Iranian 
" 64 
government ignored their request for intervention or at least provide the needed 
aid. Roy notices 
... the lack of support for the Iraqi Shiis during the 1991 Gulf War 
crisis ... shows that the clerical links which were instrumental in mobilizing 
the Shi'i communities in favour of the Islamic Revolution, have either 
been destroyed or have become alienated from the Iranian 
government. "' 
Such a claim is supported by the appointment of Ayatollah Mohammad Ali 
Taskhi r, 580 to the position of Secretary-General of this institution. Ayatollah 
Taskh-irTi. who is of Iranian origin, was born in the holy city of Najaf in 1944. He 
was among thousands of the Iraqi Shi'ites expelled from Iraq by $add5m 
ýusayn's Arabisation campaign in the early 1970s; he has held a number of key 
positions since the success of the Islamic Revolution, among which is the senior 
adviser to Ayatollah Kh5mina )i and the cloyen of the influential ýaqqanl 
seminary. 581 Ayatollah Taskh-ir-i had served as the reporter for Mu "tamar AN al- 
Bayt held in 1990, before he was nominated to the position of the Secretary- 
General of AN al-Bayt Assembly in 1994. Vali Nasr shed light on the efforts of 
Ayatollah Taskh-ir-i and his AN al-Bayt institution to promote Iranian influence 
among the Iraqi Shiites when he asserts 
Taskhir-i briefly returned to an-Najaf in 2004 to oversee the work of his 
ahl al-Bayt foundation which has invested tens of millions of dollars in the 
construction of projects and medical facilities in southern Iraq and 
promotes cultural and business ties between Iran and Iraq. He is now 
back in Tehran where he wields considerable power over the 
government's policy toward Iraq. 582 
579 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious legitimacy in Iran, " 7he Middle EastJournal 53: 2, (Spring 1999), 211. 
580 Ayatollah Taskhiri is serving now as the Secretary-General of Majm' al-Taqn-b; for more information refer to the URL 
httl2: //www. taqhrib. orq/arabir-/aminalaam/index. htm (last visit 3anuary 5th, 2008). 
581 Vali Nasr, "When the Shiite Rise, " Foreign Affairs 85: 4, (3uly/August 2006), 62. 
582 Ibd, 62. 
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Perhaps the issue of Ma)ji Vyya is another reason for the delay in establishing the 
AN al-Bayt Assembly because the efforts of the new Supreme-leader had 
repeatedly failed even among the Iranian populace to secure support for him 
amongst adherents as Ayatollah al- 'týzmj (the highest source of imitation) after 
his election in 1989. Therefore, Ayatollah Kh5mina'i might have purposely 
waited for the demise of the two Grand Ayatollahs Gholpygýnli (d. 1993) and 
Arýikfi (d. 1994) who were enjoying dominant and unchallengeable MJ1ji'iyya5.583 
6.5. SELF-COMMITMENT IN AL-TAQRIB AND PROMOTING THE FATWAS 
The Iranian government has been repeatedly accused of using at-Taqrfb policy 
as a Trojan hor. 5e to preach for and expand Shi'ism in the surrounding Sunni 
countries; however, Ayatollah Ali Khýimina'fi, who represents the acme of 
authority in the IR, has shown serious commitment to the issue of al-Taqrib on 
several occasions. For instance, Shaykh Abd al-Raz5q Rahbar Bukh5r-i 
Turkumýinl, the leader of the Iranian Sunnis and a member of Majma " al-Taqrib, 
in an interview with al-R5yy, the Kuwaiti newspaper, praised Ayatollah 
Khýimina'Vs efforts in promoting al-Taqrib policy - Khýimina'-i himself had 
translated some of the publications of the Muslim Brotherhood - and has always 
shown respect for the Rashidi Caliphs, especially Abu Bakr and Umar. 584 
On another occasion, Hamid Algar, the well-known scholar, was an eyewitness at 
a meeting in which Ayatollah Kh5mina'i expressed his disapproval of the 
583 Olivier Roy, "The Crisis of Religious legitimacy in Iran, " The Middle East Joumal 53: 2, (Spring 1999), 207; see also, 
Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. - Me Azhar and Shii5m between Rapprochement and restraln 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 384. 
584 For the interview refer to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-R5yy at the URL http: //www. alraialaam. com/Archive/03-05- 
2007/ie5/local. htm#01 (last visit on 12th December, 2007). 
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aggressive reaction of some Afghani Shii organisation to the Taliban's 
antagonistic attitude. This is how he put it 
The following should in fairness be mentioned. In an audience with 
Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Khamina'i in June 1997 at which the present writer 
was present, two representatives of an Afghan Shi'a organization 
complained of the allegedly inadequate assistance Iran was providing 
them in their struggle for survival. In his response Ayatullah Khamina )I 
reproached the organization in question for employing in its conflict with 
the Taliban the same brutality of which they justifiably stood accused. 
He had in mind presumably the massacre of the Taliban garrison in 
Mazar-I Sharif that had occurred the previous month; this could be 
classified as either a sensible precaution or an act of revenge, given the 
mass killings of Shi'is in which the Taliban had already engaged 
585 elsewhere in Afghanistan. 
After he had firmly established his Ma)ji "iyya (religious authority), Ayatollah 
Kh5mina'i has directly participated in promoting the efforts of al-Taqrlib by 
issuing various fatwas (legal opinions) whereby he is not only responding to the 
accusations of politicizing this issue but also attempting to follow in the footsteps 
of his predecessor, Imam Khomeini, who had resorted to the fatwas in an effort 
to promote Islamic unity. For example, he emphasizes Imam Khomeini's fatwas 
regarding the Jamj "a (congregational) prayers behind a Sunni Imam and Friday 
Prayer on different occasions. In a response to questions asking for the legality 
of participating in the congregational prayers in Mecca and Medina during the 
ýIaj (pilgrimage) and `umra (frequent religious visits to the holy city of Mecca) 
and if it is acceptable to separately perform the prayers in hotels' rooms, 
585 Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: a criticwl essay (New York: Islamic Publication International, 2002), 57-8, note. 49. 
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Ayatollah Khýmina )i replied that the congregational prayers are enough and 
praying individually in hotels is unacceptable. 586 
On another occasion, he was asked by one of his followers studying in a Western 
country if it is permissible for a Shi'i to attend the Jum "a Prayer led by a Sunni 
Imam and among Sunni people. Ayatollah Ali Khamina'i replied "'There is no 
objection in participation to preserve Islamic unity and the union Of MUSliMS. ir587 
However, his fatwa regarding the cursing of the companions of the Prophet 
including the Caliphs that he issued on 23rd November, 2006 is undoubtedly 
deemed the most significant. Giving a response to a question asking about the 
religious legality for the sabb (cursing) of the ýJýjba (Prophet's Companions) 
and al-Oulafj al-RasNalin (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs), Ayatollah Kh5mina'-I 
replied, "Any word, deed, or behavior that provides a pretext for our enemies or 
leads to division between Muslims is legally prohibited of course. ff588 The 
importance of this legal opinion lies in the two points; on the one hand, it has 
been an unprecedented step since the establishment of the IR in 1979, that 
explicitly forbids the sabb against the caliphs and the companions - despite the 
efforts that have been discussed in the previous chapter to emphasis the highly 
respectful status of the caliphs and the companions in Iranian school texts. On 
586 Kit5b Man5sik al-ýaj (the book of Pilgrimage Rituals), under the subtide Miscellaneous questions 3 and 9; an e-copy 
form of this book is published on the official website of the Supreme-leader at the URL 
http: //www. leader. ir/lanqslAR/index. php? i)=si)eech&jd=3126# (last visit 28th January, 2008). 
587 http: //www. alwihdah. com/view. php? cat=4&id=7. 
588 This fatwa was published on the 23rd of November, 2006 in the wide spread Egyptian newspaper, al-Ahr6m, which 
pointed to the Iranian authority's demands for this fatwa to be circulated and sent to several media. Also, the fatwa was 
re-published on the official website of the International Union for Muslim Scholar IUMS (al-Itih5d al -'Alami ff-Ulamj al- 
Muslimin) on the 2nd of December, 2006 along with the IUMS's welcome and praise to such a long waited step; refer the 
IUMS's site at the URL http: //anonymouse. org/cgi-bin/anon- 
www. cgi/http: //www. iumsonline. net/english/articles/2006/12/04. shtml (last visit January 15th, 2008). 
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the other hand, it is not restricted to the sabb but inclusive of all other sayings, 
intentions and actions that might irritate sectarian hatred among Muslims. 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
In short, Ayatollah Ali Khamina'! was forced to modify the revolutionary 
approach to restore Islamic unity that had been implemented by his predecessor 
Imam Khomeini because of his questionable religious authority and the failure of 
the previous policy, so he heavily relied on his constitutional authority to develop 
an indirect but affective programme to achieve the ultimate goal of the 
restoration of Islamic unity. In this pragmatic programme, Ayatollah Khamina'i 
acknowledged the impossibility of immediately restoring the unity of the Islamic 
umma due to the long history of hostility among the Islamic sects that creates a 
culture based on mistrust and enmity, so it was planned to utilise this 
programme to pave the way for the culture of unity by relieving the restraints 
and restoring trust among the Islamic sects as well as presenting the numerous 
points of agreement that all Muslims share, regardless of sectarian orientation, 
and thus create a suitable basis for mutual cooperation. Accordingly, this 
pragmatic programme was firmly articulated in the statute of al-Majma" al- 
"Alami # al-Taqrib bayn al-Madhihib al-Islimiyya that was founded in October 




The unity of the Islamic umma has been one of the greatest principles of Islam 
that has been repeatedly emphasized with all of its political dimensions in the 
holy Qur"in and the Prophet's haaliths. Albeit their assurance of being one of 
the Islamic sects, the Twelver Shiites had surrendered themselves to the 
political quarantine of intizirsince the occultation of their twelfth Imam in 329 H. 
when they had likely committed themselves to live in small scattered cantons 
within the larger community of the Sunni majority. During this era, the Twelver 
Shi'ites abandoned or modified most of the Islamic rituals that called attention 
to the unity of Muslims such as the congregational daily prayers, Friday prayer, 
and the celebrating of the Muslim festivals. Furthermore the ghulit (extremists) 
among the Twelver Shi'ites began to accuse the majority of Muslims, the Sunnis, 
of being kuffir (disbelievers) and introduced the sabb (cursing) of the first two 
caliphs for usurping Imam Ali's right to the caliphate. 
However, the Iranian ulami of us&ll- Shi'ism have repeatedly taken part in the 
endeavours calling for a revival of Islamic solidarity throughout the umma since 
the fall of the Safavid state. Significantly, such a phenomenal involvement of the 
Iranian u. 50ff ulami in this process failed to grab the attention of scholars, 
though a few shy glances were directed at a few approaches, which were 
ostensibly considered merely a practice of taqiyya, without consulting the legal 
view of the subject matter according to the jurisprudence of Twelver Shi, ism. 
Such a claim was no more than a generalization despite the fact that only two 
out of four official attempts have been briefly highlighted by a small number of 
studies, namely that of Nadir Shah and Khomeini; accordingly, an individual 
270 
approach for each case and placing it in its historical context seems to be 
inevitable to avoid such a generalization. 
Although Twelver Shi'ism shared with other Muslims groups the two sources of 
legislation, namely the holy Qur"in, and the Prophet's hadiths, the ulamý of 
Twelver Shi'ism, indeed, are distinguished from other Islamic sects in solely 
relying on the traditions of the Imams as the only authentic channel through 
which they receive the right interpretation of the holy Qur "in and the accuracy 
of the Prophet's ýadiths. For that reason, a sufficient knowledge of the legal 
position of the theme of Islamic unity is initially required in order to judge the 
genuineness of the frequent appearance of the Iranian u.. -r, 
011 ulami in the state 
approaches to Islamic ecumenism. 
Hence,, an attempt was made in chapter I to extrapolate the legitimate opinion 
regarding the unity of the Muslim umma from the Imams' attitude towards the 
de facto authority of their time as it was documented in the primary and 
secondary sources of Twelver Shi'ism. In view of that, it becomes noticeable 
that the Imams considered the unity of the umma their sacred duty and for 
which they were willing to sacrifice their legitimate right to the caliphate as long 
as the essential principles of Islam were preserved. The Imams" attitude was 
represented in the positive intizir of the first two Imams, in which they 
preserved their active and interactive role with the authority as well as their 
fellow Muslims and waited to restore peacefully their right to the caliphate. 
However, the third Imam had acted differently and rebelled against the 
incompetent authority when the principle of the caliphate was drastically 
replaced with the kingship of Umayyad dynasty, and the qualifications needed for 
the caliph were ignored and this led to the division of the umma. Nevertheless, 
the gloomy end of the third Imam imposed the kingship as an indisputable 
reality; accordingly,, since then the Imams practically adopted what could be 
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considered the rational state of intizir in which they appeared to dismiss the 
claim of their right to the caliphate because of the undue exploitations of such a 
legitimate cause by members of ahl al-Bayt and others to serve their political 
ambitions, despite the devastating consequences that led to the loss of 
thousands of Muslims' lives and cracked the solidarity of the Muslim umma. Yet 
the chaos that followed the death of the eleventh Imam, al-ýasan al-'Asskar-i, in 
260/873 without a known successor, imposed a diversion in the doctrine of 
inti, 7-jr from its ultimate objective. It was negatively utilized by the imimfulama 
as a segregating instrument to prevent any political activities and isolate Twelver 
Shi'ism from the main Muslim body in their efforts to rescue the theory of the 
imamate that was supposed to be transmitted through Imam ýusayn's line 
without interruption until the day of resurrection; accordingly, the imaml- ulami 
claimed the existence of a twelfth Imam who went into occultation and will 
return at some point in the future to fight unfairness in a corrupt world and 
restore justice. At that crucial moment, the JmJm1- ulami had no choice but to 
adopt such modifications in an attempt to preserve the imiml-community from 
being fragmented. 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, the negative inti, -7jr, indeed, 
has placed the ulami 
of Twelver Shi'ism in a dilemma when it clashes with other apocalyptic hadiths 
of the Prophet and Imams' traditions that had received the consensus of all the 
Muslim ulami including that of Twelver Shi'ism. According to those ýadiths and 
traditions, the rising of a precursor Islamic state from Khurýsýn or the East will 
be a prerequisite for the Mahdi's return. Such a dilemma had lasted until the 
establishment of the Safavid state by Shah Ismý'-H, who claimed descent from 
the seventh Imam, Musa al-Ký? im, at the beginning of the 16 
th century and 
proclaimed Twelver Shi'ism as the official religion of the newly established state, 
when a group of the ulami within this sect, mainly the Shii ulama of Jabal 
'Amil (in modern Lebanon), found in this temporal state the resolution to escape 
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the historical cul-de-sac of the doctrine of inti, 7jrand granted them hope for the 
Mahd-i's return, they served it enthusiastically. Among those ulama was al- 
muýaqiq al-Karak7i who introduced the #tOid based on "aql (reasoning) in order 
to legitimize his association with the Safavid state and justify his disregard for 
the doctrine of intizjr Al-KarakT"s teachings of reasoning led to the introduction 
of his theory of al-Waliya al- 'Ama and became the manifesto according to which 
the u. ýOff ulami of Twelver Shi'ism have been firmly established as the 
representatives of the Hidden Imam and had enjoyed unprecedented influence in 
state polity under Safavid rule that was invested to transform Iran into the 
stronghold of u. ýOffShi'ism. 
The failure of scholars to notice the two different phases that Islamic ecumenism 
had passed through has been a natural outcome for their disregard of the 
relationship between the fall of the Safavid state and the role of the u., r, &ffu1Jmj 
in instigating frequent calls for Islamic ecumenism and the long-term impact of 
this movement on the development of political thought of Twelver Shi'ism. 
Indeed, the Iranian u. _? rOff ulami 
had utilized the legitimacy of the principle of 
Islamic unity to surpass the consequences of the fall of the sponsor state of the 
Safavids, which had seriously threatened the existence of Twelver Shi'ism in 
Iran, and maintained their influential status in state affairs by containing the 
newly established temporal regimes that were in need of such legitimacy. 
The Safavid state had practically fallen since the invasion of the extremist Sunni 
Afghans in 1722 which corresponded with the overwhelming domination of the 
Akhbiri School of Twelver Shi'ism, the historical rival of u. ýOlism, in the Shi, i 
shrines of Iraq and parts of Iran. Meanwhile, Nadir Qul-i became the de facto 
ruler of Iran in 1731; however, he was unable to establish his own rule due to 
the lack of legitimacy, so he used the infant Safavid Shah 'Abb5s III to exercise 
authority. As a result, the initiative of Islamic ecumenism was merely a 
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pragmatic means that granted Nadir the necessary legitimate cause to overthrow 
the heretic dynasty of Shah IsmWil. Meanwhile the u. 501 ulami, as the sole 
interpreters of the faith, enjoyed influential status in Nadir's realm, using it to 
restore the domination of u. ýOff Shi'ism in the holy shrines of Iraq - not to 
mention that such a policy somehow absorbed the radicalism of the Afghans. 
As surveyed in chapter 3, the u. ýJlf ulami likely encountered the same situation 
with the founding of the Qýjýr state when the new Shah, Fatý Ali, revealed his 
clear determination to revive and promote the akhbiriteaching in Iran in spite of 
the numerous attempts made by the u.? rdff ulama, mainly Shaykh Ja' far Kashif al- 
Ghat5, to contain the Shah and relieve him of the growing influence of the 
akhbiris. Consequently, the u.? rt7ff ulami had to direct their efforts towards the 
crown prince, 'Abbýs Krzý, who was striving to affirm the legitimacy of his 
nomination for the post of crown prince. 'Abbas Miirzý not only welcomed the 
ulamjýý approach but also granted them a distinguished position in his court, 
maintaining a weekly meeting with them to solve unsettled problems to 
implement the sharl-'a. He also ultimately aimed to utilize the ulamjýý influence 
among the Iranian populace to increase the popularity of his policies in the war 
with Russia, and in the Nizim-iJacf1bland rapprochement with the Ottomans and 
surpass the difficulties raised by his half-brothers who were questioning his 
competency for the post. The religious contents of 'Abb5s M-irzYs letters to the 
Ottoman officials undoubtedly revealed the key role the u. ýJll- ulami had played 
in the ecumenical discourse. After he had overcome the challenges he had 
faced, the crown prince's hitherto friendly and respectful attitude towards the 
ulama soon changed and he went on to use them as a scapegoat for his 
humiliating defeat in the war with Russia. 
Remarkably, the calls for unity of the Islamic umma under the temporal states 
were dominated by a political motif that aimed to ensure the survival of Iran as a 
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stronghold for u.? r&ff Shi'ism. But in fact there was a lack of jurisprudential 
development that could promote such calls as well as a realistic mechanism to 
achieve their ultimate goal. Yet fresh ecumenical efforts under the Islamic 
Republic of Iran seem to be a dialectical outcome of correspondence between 
the political motif and a natural development in political jurisprudence of u., 50rl 
Twelver Shi'ism, which happened to be stimulated by direct contact and 
interaction between the u.? rOff ulami and the political elites - not to mention the 
unofficial efforts of al-Taqr-ib conducted by middle ranking clerics, namely al- 
Afghani and al-Qum-i, who opened a contact channel to approach the 'other, 'the 
Sunnis, and create an impartial atmosphere for substantive dialogue. As was 
emphasized in chapter 4. Imam Khomeini keenly adhered to Shaykh W-in-l's 
concept of mashrOýUyya and criticized Shaykh Naraq-i's theory of wiliyat al-Faqih 
under the pretext of its needing further instigation - as he had asserted in his 
first work, Kashf al-srjr which also carried unfriendly critiques of the first three 
rightly-guided caliphs. Khomeini gradually approached the political arena 
through his friend Nawwjb Safa ý, the founder of the Mujjhidi Islim, who W/1 
enthusiastically discussed with Khomeini the ideology of the Sunni Muslim 
Brotherhood, founded by Imam Oasan al-Bann5 in Egypt in 1928. However, the 
political jurisprudence of the founder of the Islamic Republic had already been 
formulated when he engaged in the political struggle against the Shah's regime 
from 1963 which led to his exile to Turkey in 1964 before he eventually settled in 
al-Najaf. At that point the Imam was only too aware of Western hegemony on 
the Islamic World that was responsible for the same troubles Muslims 
encountered in all Islamic countries, so in his opinion any local remedies would 
be worthless. Unsurprisingly that was a dialect which became the core of Imam 
Khomeini's political dogma. Accordingly, he composed his work, afflukOma al- 
Islimiyya, in which he emphasized the legitimacy of the fuqahaýý government or 
what became known by wiliyat al-faqih as the guarantee for unity of the Islamic 
Umma. Significantly, the Shi'i orientation was hardly noticed in this work 
although it was addressing the Iranian case. Imam Khomeini's endeavors really 
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began with the success of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 when his work, al- 
tluki7ma al-Islimiyya, was utilized as a program for the newly established Islamic 
Republic. In spite of the numerous references to Islamic unity that were 
promoted by the Imam's speeches and fatwas, his major accomplishment was 
the founding of the jurisprudential and constitutional basis that asserted the 
significance of the unity of the Muslim umma. In the second period of striving 
for Islamic unity, since his election in 1990 Imam Khomeini's successor, Sayyid 
Ali Kh5mina'f, has contributed to the creation of institutional mechanisms that 
will assure the continuous promotion of Imam Khomeini's dogma for Islamic 
unity which was thoroughly surveyed in chapter 5. 
In reflecting on the distinguishing nature of both the endeavors calling for 
Islamic unity and their political discourses, it became obvious that the rise of the 
Safavid state corresponded with several calls to release Shi'i thought and 
jurisprudence from the clinical death sentence that had been imposed upon them 
by the tradition of ghayba and the doctrine of inti, 7_jr (passive waiting for the 
return of the Mahdi) - not to mention the contradictions in these traditions with 
others that portray the conditions suitable for the Mahdi's return. Such 
wranglings had placed the ulamjof Twelver Shi'ism as well as the believers in a 
serious dilemma. Consequently, it seems to be about this time when a number 
of the ulami increasingly gave voice to the need to activate all the necessary 
means to develop Shi'i jurisprudence so that it would pave the road to them 
having direct involvement in political issues and state affairs and eventually lead 
to the creation of a just Islamic government -a pre-requisite for the return of 
the Mahdi according to the traditions of al-rjyjt al-St7d of Khurýsýn. Hence, it 
was the first adoption of "aql by al-Karak-i that became a genuine departure from 
traditional akhbjr&m that had been dominating Twelver jurisprudence since the 
Greater Occultation. Eventually, al-Karak-i utilized "aql, to grant the u, 51N ulami 
the upper hand in the leadership of the Shi'i community, which according to his 
276 
theory of al-Wiliya al- "Ama (the general deputyship), duly appointed them as 
the legitimate representatives of the Hidden Imam. However, the fall of the 
Safavid state had a catastrophic consequence on the Usd/iSchool as the ulami 
then faced a serious challenge to preserve their hitherto influential role in the 
state's affairs and safeguard the new sectarian identity of Iran as the stronghold 
of u.? rOiTwelver Shi'ism. 
For that reason, it is strongly believed that the Islamic unity movement in post- 
Safavid Iran has passed through two different stages. The movement in the first 
stage had been utilised by the Iranian u. ýOff ulami as a pragmatic policy to 
absorb the catastrophic outcomes of the fall of the Safavid state which had 
sponsored it, and was merely activated as a political slogan that suited the quest 
of the new regime for legitimacy. Meanwhile its ultimate aim was to preserve its 
accomplishments achieved during the Safavid era, when the ulami had indeed 
attained an unprecedented influential role in state affairs as the single means to 
secure the newly established u., r>01 identity of Twelver Shi'ism of Iran. However, 
the movement in the second stage, namely the Khomeini era, turned out to be a 
natural development and logical outcome for the earlier calls for Islamic unity 
when the u. 50ff ulama might have been influenced by Sunni political thought via 
direct interaction with their Sunni counterparts. This impact also corresponded 
with the efforts that had initially aimed at escaping from the passiveness of 
intizir and the politicization of Twelver Shi'ism that had taken place since the 
rise of the UsOff School during the Safavid era and which eventually led to 
genuine conceptual reforms to the long-lasting traditional doctrines. This indeed, 
establishes the differences and also commonalities between the two efforts, one 
being historical the other being a contemporary call for Islamic unity. 
In concluding, in the light of the discussion presented in this research, it is the 
hope that this study will attract the interest of scholars of the field and stimulate 
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further researches to cover untouched dimensions of the subject matter, such as 
a serious attempt to find a framework to the response of the Sunni counterparts 
to the Shi'i calls for Islamic unity that should be placed in the context of the 
political development of the national and ethnical awareness that has been 
contemporary with the growing hegemony of the West over the political centres 
of decision making in the Islamic world. 
In line with the search for unity between Shi'i and Sunni traditions,, it is 
important to state that the belief in the apocalyptic ýaaliths and traditions of the 
Mahdi's appearance is shared by all Islamic sects; this belief also set the 
motivation for several rebellions and opposition to the cle facto authority 
throughout Islamic history. However, the impact of this belief on the 
development of Islamic political thought in its wider dimension has been totally 
neglected 589 as well as the probability for such a belief to surpass the sectarian 
differences and establish a mutual ground for future co-operation. 
589 A new publication discussing the apocalyptical dimension of Iranian Shi'ism was released, on 
28th February 2009, at 
the time when this thesis to obtain a Ph. D. from Durham University was being submitted; see Abbas 
Amanat, . 4; '(V. 3'yPt, c 
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